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Abstract
The construction of national values has been the highest priority for the Russian Federation (RF) into 
and during the post-communist era. In tliis transition period tlie democratic process shifted focus from 
central government to regional authorities, and the centrally planned economic system simultaneously 
transferred to a largely market economy. A struggle for authority arose between the centre and the 
periphery, regional leaders endeavouring to gain more political autonomy and economic power within 
the federation. Those witli strong economic ties attempted to expand their spheres of influence through 
a political and legal agenda, believing that the regions should be the main implementers of their own 
social and economic development.
In this context, my research specifically focuses on analysing issues of the political agenda in 
the Russian Far East (RFE) in the post-Soviet era (1991-1997), drawing upon, but also extending, the 
methodology developed by Tarschys (1979) and other scholars. I do this in the light of present market 
development, treating both domestic and international agendas. I utilise content analysis, exploring 
these agendas and discussing possible fiiture trends. Of primary significance are questions raised by 
regional leaders and their public on both domestic and international political issues in the RFE. It can 
be clearly seen from the results of content analysis tlrat the following issues are accorded most weight 
in their press coverage.
In the domestic sphere, my thesis explicates the changing forms of regional autonomy in the 
RFE and the relationship between the centre and tire periphery in tire process of economic 
transformation. I also explore the level of regional environmental problems affecting public health, 
and the related issues of ethnic identity and mortality. I draw attention to the differing socio-economic 
situations within the RFE and also compare the region as a whole with other regions of the federation. 
On the international front, improvement of political conditions in Nortlieast Asia coupled with 
decentralisation and growing regional autonomy in the RFE have developed a favourable environment 
for international economic relations with the closest countries, China, Japan and the two Koreas. I 
examine ways in which the RFE has reformulated its political and economic interest in the context of a 
changing international enviromnent. In each cases, the construction of tire political agenda is fotmd to 
result from a complex interaction of local, fed.^ml/a)rd-tih some cases) international interests.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Studying the Political Agenda
Where do issues come from? Why, when most do not matter, are some the leading 
themes to the story o f a polity? Some issues, like lines drawn in the dust, define what it 
means to be a party to political conflict. Why one question rather than another comes to 
seem important, why it happens at a particular time, rather than another, why some last, 
why most do not?^
What is politics? Spiro writes, ‘politics is the process by which a community 
deals with its problems.’^  Every social system must have an agenda if it is to prioritise the 
problems facing it, so that it can decide where to start work. Such prioritisation is 
necessary for a community and for a society.^ What are any given society’s main political 
issues? How are they selected? Why do some controversies issues come to command the 
attention and concern of decision makers, while others fail to do so? In other words, what 
determines the agenda for political controversy within a community? How is an agenda 
built, and who participates in the process of building it?
In this context, the primary purpose of this subsection is to explore the issue of 
agenda setting in general, and more specifically, to explicate the forms of the agenda 
setting process in democratic societies.
 ^ Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, “On the Evolution o f Political Issues,” in William H. Riker 
(ed.), Agenda Formation (Michigan: The University o f  Michgan Press, 1993), p. 151.
 ^ Spiro also notes, ‘A community exists among people who are aware o f pursuing common goals. Problems 
are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. Problems must therefore be recognised in order to 
become politically relevant or alive.' See Herbert J. Spiro, “Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive 
Approach,” American Political Science Review. Vol. LVI, No. 3,1962, p. 577.
 ^ Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, “The Politics o f Agenda-Building: An Alternative Perspective for 
Modern Democratic Theory,” Journal o f  Politics, Vol. 33, 1971, p. 905.
The Concept of Political Agenda
What is an agenda? Bearing and Roger define it as follows: ‘An agenda is a set of issues 
that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time.’"^ What is agenda- 
setting? It relates to the process by which public opinion is shaped, and why certain 
issues are addressed through policy actions while others are not. Agenda-setting offers a 
framework within which to examine why information about certain issues, and not other 
issues, is available to the public in a political system.^ Zhu remarks that agenda-setting 
can be a ‘zero-sum game’ in that space on the agenda is a scarce resource, so a new issue 
must push another issue down the agenda to come to attention,^ We can see an agenda as 
fluid, with different issues rising and falling in importance over time in different 
societies.^ Agenda-setting is also a process in which the mass media play a crucial role 
enabling social problems to become acknowledged as public issues.^ What is the 
definition of political agenda? Cobb and Elder define an agenda in political terms as ‘a 
general set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling 
within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity’.^  Tarschys 
writes that the concept of political agenda ‘deals primarily with the transformation of 
social conditions into political questions and with the selection of political issues’.
'* James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, Agenda-Setting (London: Sage, 1996), p. 2.
 ^ Maxwell E. McComb, “The Evolution o f Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the 
Marketplace o f Ideas,” Journal o f Communication. Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 60-1.
® Further discussion of the zero-sum game see J. Zhu, “Issue Competition and Attention Distribution in 
Agenda-Setting: A Zero-Sum Perspective,” Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 69, No. 4, 1992, pp. 825-36.
 ^Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 2.
 ^For a foil discussion on this issue see E. M. Rogers and J. W. Dearing, “Agenda-setting Research: Where 
has it been, Where is it going? in J. A. Anderson (ed.). Communication Yearbook 11 (Newbury Park: Sage, 
1988), pp. 555-94.
 ^Cobb and Elder, “The Politics o f Agenda-Building,” p. 905.
Daniel Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda: Problems and Priorities 1950-1970 (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1979), p. 6.
Lôwenhardt also writes, ‘A political agenda is a set of issues demanding binding decision 
making.’
What role do issues play in the process of agenda setting? Issues or their 
proponents must compete for a place on the decision-making agenda. The process by 
which the demands of various groups in the population are translated into items 
competing for the serious attention of public officials can appropriately be called agenda 
building.Cobb and Elder define an issue as ‘a conflict between two or more identifiable 
groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or 
resources’.M o r e  broadly, an issue is whatever is in contention.W e can regard issues 
as competing with one another for attention. All communities must decide which issues 
will be the concern of decision makers. At the same time, there is great variety in the way 
this is accomplished, and in the proportion of potential issues that are eventually seriously 
considered by community leaders. An issue also is defined as a social problem, often 
conflictual, that has received mass media coverage. The characteristics of an issue are 
important in understanding why and how an issue achieves prominence on the agenda. 
The potentially conflictual nature of an issue helps make it newsworthy as proponents 
and opponents of the issue battle it out in the public area.^^
John Lôwenhardt, Decision Making in Soviet Politics (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 17.
Oscar Gandy, “Beyond Agenda-Setting,” in David L. Protess and Maxwell McCombs (eds.). Agenda 
Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking (Hillsdale, NJ; Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), 
pp. 264-65.
R. W., Cobb and C. D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics o f Agenda-Building. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Second Edition, 1983), p. 32.
For a full discussion see G. E. Lang and K. Lang, “Watergate: An Exploration o f  the Agenda-Building 
Process,” in G. C. Wilhot and H. DeBock (eds.). Mass Communication Review Yearbook 2 (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage, 1981), pp. 447-68.
Fay Lomax Cook and Wesley G. Skogan, “Covergent and Divergent Vocie Models o f the Rise and Fall o f 
Policy Issues,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and 
Policymaking, p. 189.
Roger W. Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross and Marc Howard Ross, “Agenda Building as a Comparative 
Political Process,” American Political Science Review. Vol. 70, 1976, p. 126.
For a full discussion see S. Ansolabehere and S. Iyengar, “Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership
How was the paradigm for agenda-setting research formed and what was 
chronological sequence in which the main components of this paradigm were introduced 
as ‘conceptual innovations’?^  ^ To consider the scholarly development of the concept of 
the agenda-setting, I will mainly adopt Dearing and Roger’s approach.
Dearing and Roger see Robert Park ‘as being the first scholar of mass 
communication, he conceived of media gatekeeping and implied what was later to be 
called the agenda-setting process’ in his book The Immigrant Press and Its Control 
(1922). Lippmatm investigated the relationship between the mass media agenda and the 
public agenda. In his book Public Opinion (1922) he argued that the mass media were the 
principal connection between (a) events that occurred in the world and (b) the images of 
these events in our minds.^^
Cohen further advanced the conceptualisation of agenda-setting. He observed 
that the media
may not be successful much o f  the time in telling people “what to think” but it is 
successful in telling its readers ‘what to think about.’ The world will look different to 
different people, depending on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and 
publishers o f the newspaper they read.
Cohen expressed the concept that led to agenda-setting research and its focus on the mass 
media. He gave further status to what was already an important issue among political 
scientists and international relations scholars.^^
Cohen’s work was developed by McComb and Shaw in terms of the agenda-
Over Issue: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns,” Public Opinion Quarterly. 
Vol. 58, 1994, pp. 335-57.
Everett M. Rogers, James W. Dearing and Donne Bregman, “The Anatomy o f Agenda-Setting 
Research,” Journal o f Communication. Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 69-70.
For full details o f the historical development o f the paradigm for research on the agenda-setting process 
see Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, pp. 8-17.
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922); Roger, Dearing and Bregman, 
“The Anatomy o f  Agenda-Setting Research,” pp. 70-1.
setting function of the mass media. In 1972 McComb and Shaw coined the term ‘agenda- 
setting process’ and established a research paradigm. This paradigm was adopted mainly 
by mass communication scholars, and to a lesser extent by political scientists, 
sociologists, and others. The paradigm offered a new way of thinking about the power of 
the mass media. McComb and Shaw examined the public agenda-setting process for a 
hierarchy of issues.T hey  justified agenda-setting research as an improved approach to 
understanding media effects.^ "^  As Reese remarks, ‘This media agenda simultaneously 
projects forward a powerful structuring effect on audience perceptions, while itself 
indicating the powerful influences behind its creation’. I n  1973 Funkhouser initiated the 
over-time study of public agenda-setting at a macro level of analysis, and investigated the 
relationship of real-world indicators (to be discussed later in this subsection) to the media 
agenda. In 1987 Shanto Iyengar and Donlad R. Kinder experimentally began to 
investigate the micro-level agenda setting of individual respondents.^^
Agenda-Setting Process
As can be seen in table 1-1, a widely accepted model of the agenda-setting process
B. C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13.
Roger, Dearing and Bregman, “The Anatomy o f  Agenda-setting research,” p. 72.
Agenda setting was a theoretical idea. It did not even have a name until McComb and Shaw’s classic 
study o f  the media’s role in the 1968 presidential election campaign in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They 
calculated the media agenda in Chapel Hill from a content analysis o f  the main mass media that were 
reporting the presidential campaign, and measured the public agenda by surveying 100 undecided voters. 
The 1972 study set off a research tradition that at first closely followed McCombs and Shaw’s approach of  
combing a media content analysis with an audience survey o f  the ranking o f agendas. See, ibid., p. 72; for 
further details o f their methodology see Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting 
Function o f Mass Media,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public 
Opinion, and Policymaking, pp. 17-26.
Alex S. Edelstein, “Thinking About the Criterion Variable in Agenda-Setting Research,” Journal of 
Communication. Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 86.
S. D. Reese, “Setting the Media’s Agenda: A Power Balance Perspective,” in J. A. Anderson (ed.). 
Communication Yearbook 14 (Newbury Park, CA; Sage, 1991), p. 309.
For a full discussion see G. R. Funkhouser, “The Issues o f  the Sixties: An Exploratory Study in the 
Dynamics o f Public Opinion,” Public Opinion Ouarterlv. Vol. 37, No. 1, 1973, pp. 62-75.
would comprise three main components: (a) the media agenda, which influences (b) the 
public agenda, which in turn may influence (c) the policy agenda; this in turn facilitates a 
study of the interrelationships among these three e lements .A research tradition exists 
for each of these three types of agendas. The agenda-setting process is an ongoing 
competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of media professionals, the 
public, and policy elites, although agenda-setting was not originally conceptualised in 
this way.^  ^ Also a real-world indicator has often been studied in agenda-setting 
investigations as a further variable.^^
Table 1-1: A General Model of the Agenda-Setting Process
Policy
agenda
Media
agenda
Public
agenda
Gatekeepers, 
influential media 
and spectacular 
events
Personal experience and interpersonal 
communication among elites and other individuals
Real-world indicators o f the importance of the 
agenda issue or event
Source: Adapted from Maxwell E. McCombs, “Explorers and Surveyors: Expanding 
Strategies for Agenda-Setting Research,” Journalism Ouarterlv. Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter, 
1992; James W Dearing and Everett M. Rogers, Agenda-Setting (London: Sage, 1996), 
p. 5.
As McCombs notes, ‘the agenda-setting process has been on public issues, the
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 13.
Rogers, Dearing and Bregman, “The Anatomy o f Agenda-Setting Research,” p. 69.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 6.
agenda of issues presented daily by the news media, the agenda of issues on which public 
concern is focused and the sociological and psychological environment encompassing 
these issue agendas’. A  study by Dearing and Rogers suggests that certain agenda- 
setting studies seek to understand the temporal dynamics of the agenda-setting process by 
analysing the relationships between the media agenda, the public agenda, the policy 
agenda, and real-world indicators over time rather than cross-sectionally (at one point in 
time).^^ In such longitudinal studies, a qualitative over-time method such as participant 
observation or a quantitative over-time method such as time-series analysis may be 
used.^ ^
The public agenda. Public agenda-setting deals with the link between issues as 
mentioned in the mass media (valued by content) and the issue priorities of the public. 
The issue hierarchy in the media agenda sets the issue hierarchy of the public agenda. "^^  
Two types of agenda-setting research on the public agenda have been conducted: (a) 
hierarchy studies, in which all of the main issues on the public agenda at a certain point in 
time are investigated, and (b) longitudinal studies, in which an agenda-setting scholar 
investigates the rise and fall of one or a few issues over time or through experimental 
research with individuals.^^
In hierarchy studies the agenda is usually measured by means of a special kind 
of question in a public opinion poll. The usual public opinion poll asks for a respondent’s
Ibid., p. 18.
Maxwell E. McCombs, “Explorers and Surveyors: Expanding Strategies for Agenda-Setting Research,” 
Journalism Ouarterlv. Vol. 69, No. 4, Winter, 1992, p. 814.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 18.
Judy VanSlyke Turk, “Public Relations’ Influence on the News,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.), 
Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking, p. 214,
Kosicki, “Problems and Opportunities,” p. 101; G. Ray Funkhouser, “The Issues o f  the Sixties: A  
Exploratory Study in the Dynamics o f Public Opinion,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: 
Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking, p. 36.
Further discussion on the longitudinal studies see Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, pp. 54-71.
attitude toward a particular issue.^  ^This type of question usually takes the form: What do 
you think is the most important problem facing your country today? The aggregated 
responses to such a MIP (most important problem) question indicate the relative position 
of an issue on the public agenda. Dearing and Rogers give an example: ‘in 1989, 54 per 
cent of a national sample of Americans said that drugs were the most important issue 
facing America; 2 years later, this number dropped to only 4 per cent, as the “War on 
Drugs” was pushed down the agenda by other issues’ (I utilise these kinds of study in 
chapters 4 and 5).
The media agenda. The media agenda is usually indexed by a content analysis 
of the news media determining the number of news stories about a given issue or issues 
of study. This number demonstrates the relative salience of an issue on the media agenda. 
Individuals in the audience are presumed to judge the relative importance of an issue on 
the basis of the number of media messages about the issue to which they are exposed. 
As mentioned above, the content analysis measure of the media agenda was derived by 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) and Funkhouser (1973) as a parallel to the MIP measure of 
the public agenda, focusing similarly on issues.
The agenda-setting process begins with an issue climbing the media agenda. In 
agenda-setting studies, media content is usually operationalised as the number of some 
countable unit, such as the number of story column inches in a set of newspapers, the 
number of front-page stories an issue receives, or the number of seconds of airtime given
As mentioned previously, in the study by McCombs and Shaw (Chapel Hill in 1972) the agenda-setting
effect was measured by asking voters what they personally thought were the key issues o f the presidential
campaign. The answers to that survey question defined the public agenda. See Protess and McCombs 
(eds.), Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking, p. 43.
Dearing and Rogers, Aeenda-Settina. pp. 17-18.
Kim A. Smith, “Newspaper Coverage and Public Concern About Community Issues,” in Protess and 
McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking, p. 76.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 18.
to an issue during a year of TV newscasts."^  ^Often, the number of news stories about an 
issue of study is counted for a particular period of time, usually the several months prior 
to the measurement of the public agenda, by means of a poll or survey/^ I have adapted 
this method in conducting my research.
The policy agenda. The policy agenda leads to government policies designed to 
address or solve a social problem. The policy agenda is of key importance because it 
represents an outcome of the influence and activity of both the media agenda and the 
public agenda."^  ^ The policy agenda is measured by such actions as the introduction of 
new laws pertaining to an issue, by budget appropriations, by other legislative decisions 
and by the amount of time given to debate of an issue in the Parliament."^  ^ Measures of 
the policy agenda vary from study to study much more than do measures of the media 
agenda or of the public agenda, which are fairly standard' '^  ^(Throughout my thesis we can 
see examples of policy agenda at work in the RFE).
Real-world indicators. These are defined as a variable that measures more or 
less objectively the degree of severity or risk of a social problem. Such objective 
indicators include, for instance, the number of drugs-related deaths per year, the 
unemployment rate, or the measured state of the environment e.g. levels of air pollution'^  ^
(These indicators provide valuable insight and information, particularly in chapters 3 and
4).
Funkhouser, “The Issues o f the Sixties,” pp. 36-7.
James P. Wnter and Chaim H. Eyal, “Agenda-Setting for the Civil Right Issue,” in Protess and 
McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policvmaking. p. 103.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 18.
Koiscki, “Problems and Opportunities,” p. 101.
David L. Protesss, Fay L. Cook, Thomas R. Curtin, Marget T. Gordon, Donna R. Leif, Maxwell E. 
McCombs and Peter Miller, “The Impact o f Investigative Reporing on Public Opinion and Policymaking: 
targeting Toxic Waste,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public 
Opinion, and Policvmaking. pp. 180-81.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 23 and p. 28.
What is primarily important in agenda-setting research? Salience is the degree 
to which an issue on the agenda is perceived as important. The key question for agenda- 
setting scholars is why the salience of an issue on the media agenda, public agenda, and 
policy agenda increases or decreases/^ The task of agenda-setting scholars is to measure 
how the salience of an issue changes, and why this change occurs. Agenda-setting links 
specific content characteristics, usually the amount of coverage on a specific topic, with 
the salience of the topic to members of the audience."^  ^As Dearing and Rogers argue;
rather than focusing on positive or negative attitudes towards an issue, as most public 
opinion research does, agenda-setting scholars focus on the salience o f an issue. This 
salience on the media agenda tells viewers, readers, and listeners, “what issues to think 
about.” They also argue, research on the agenda-setting process suggests that the 
relative salience o f  an issue on the media agenda determines how the public agenda is 
formed, which in turn influences which issues policymakers consider. Control o f  the 
choices available for action is a manifestation o f power. Policy makers only act on 
those issues that reach the top o f the policy agenda.^
The time element has also been brought into agenda-setting research. As 
McCombs and Shaw’s study clearly demonstrated, agenda-setting is a process over 
time."^  ^ Methods of investigating aspects of agenda-setting include moving from issue- 
hierarchy studies to investigations of a single issue. Hence, when real-world indicators, 
the media agenda, and other agenda variables are measured over time (such as on a 
month-by-month basis), time-series data and analysis methods can be used to understand 
the time sequence of these variables. The length of period depends upon such factors as 
the nature of the issue and its amount of media coverage. For instance, MacKuen found 
that for six of the eight issues he studied, the media agenda led the public agenda. The
Gernal M. Koiscki, “Problems and Opportunities in Agenda-Setting Research,” Journal of  
Communication. Vol. 43, No. 2, 1993, pp. 104-5.
McCobms, “Explorers and Surveyors,” p. 814.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 8.
For a lull discussion see M. E. McCombs and D. Shaw, “The Agenda-setting Function o f  Mass Media,” 
Public Opinion Ouarterlv. Vol. 36, 1972, pp. 176-85.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 67.
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average time lag was several months.^ ^
Kosicki suggests that the agenda-setting process falls into five main categories 
as follows;
a. it deals with the importance or salience of public issues;
b. it has followed the intellectual legacy of public opinion polling;
c. it has a twin focus on media content and audience perception;
d. it is characterised by some desire to deal with a range of issues rank- 
ordered into an agenda, although sometimes only the rise and fall of a single 
issue is considered;
e. it is proposed as an effect of specific media content or trends in that 
content, not a general effect of watching television or reading newspapers or 
newsmagazines.
Understanding the agenda-setting process is to understand the interrelationships 
among media organisation, public opinion and policy-making. It is useful for studying 
media effects on public opinion in the context of public issues.
Methodologically the hierarchy approach to studying public agenda-setting has 
been dominated by one-point-in time correlational comparisons of media content, with 
the aggregated responses by the public to survey questions about issue salience. 
According to Dearing and Roger, however, longitudinal studies have begun to replace the 
dominance of the multiple-issue hierarchy approach. The study of media agenda has 
expanded to include over-time participant observation in media organisations as well as
^^Further discussion see M. B. MacKuen, “Social Communication and the Mass Policy Agenda,” in M. B. 
MacKuen and S. L. Coombs (eds.), More than News: Media Power in Public Affairs (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage), pp. 19-144.
Koiscki, “Problems and Opportunities,” pp. 104-5.
Protess and McCombs, Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policvmaking. p. 149.
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the analysis of quantitative variables (such as real-world indicators).^^ Studies of policy 
agenda-setting have also developed, now displaying more variation in method, from in- 
depth interviews with elite figures to surveys of public leaders, to time-series analyses of 
congressional voting behaviors/^
What are the major roles of the mass media and their coverage of political and 
social issues in democratic society? Gurevitch and Blumler have indicated several 
expectations of media research, including ‘meaningful agenda-setting’, or ‘identifying the 
key issues of the day, including the forces that have formed and may resolve them’/^ By 
stressing meaningful agenda setting, they have tried to distinguish careful, thoughtful 
coverage from that driven by entertainment news values such as sensationalism and 
personalisation, which tend to distract attention from the big issues of the day/^ In a 
democracy, what influences the selection of issues for public consideration (and how 
those issues are subsequently discussed) is an important matter.^^
The Strengths and Limitations of Agenda-Setting Research
Finally, what are the major limitations of agenda-setting studies and what is the primary 
contribution of agenda-setting research? Protess and McCombs argue that there are
Ibid., p. 2.
Dearing and Roger, Agenda-Setting, p. 88.
Marc Benton and R Jean Frazier, “The Agenda-Setting Function o f the Mass Media at Three Levels of  
Information Holding,” in Protess and McCombs (eds.), Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public 
Opinion, and Policvmaking. pp. 69-70.
M. Gurevitch and J. G. Blumler, “Political Communications Systems and Democratic Values,” in J. 
Lichtenberg (ed.). Democracy and the Mass Media (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 
270.
For a full discussion see ibid., pp. 271-89; regarding this point, Jamieson notes that the coverage of  
recent American elections gives us much to ponder in terms of this standard. For instance, the multibillion- 
dollar savings and loan scandal was not a prominent part of the 1988 American presidential election 
campaign, but federal prison furloughs and the pledge o f allegiance were. Further discussion on this case 
see K. H. Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Deception. Distraction, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp. 17-42.
Kosicki, “Problems and Opportunities,” p. 118.
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several challenges to the conventional definitions and approaches of agenda-setting 
studies, as follows:
First of all, the definition of agenda-setting is occasionally said to suffer from 
conceptual ambiguity. For instance, does agenda-setting refer to changes in people’s 
priorities but not their opinions, as though the two are always separate? Does issue 
salience include changes in personal priorities as well as social or policy priorities?
Secondly, there are questions about the unit of analysis that is being selected. By 
agenda-setting, do we mean media effects on individuals, groups or larger societal units? 
Can the term agenda be used in the same way to describe media, public, and policy 
priorities? Do public agendas matter in the making of media and policy agendas?
Thirdly, other questions are raised about the direction of agenda-setting effects. 
Does media affect public and policymaker priorities, or do they themselves reflect the 
concerns of their audiences? To what extent do interpersonal relations outside of mass 
communication (e.g., between journalists and policymakers or interest groups) influence 
media content and citizen priorities?
Finally, is it meaningful to suggest that media effects can occur in a linear 
direction in a society that is complex and rapidly changing?^^
These questions suggest to us that more research is required before we 
complete the agenda-setting quest. Using different methods of data gathering requires 
more preparation and planning in the design of the research project. More resources 
(time, money, and collaborators or assistants) are also required.^^
Despite these difficulties, Carragee et al. assess the contribution of agenda- 
setting research to understanding effects in this way:
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Despite important shortcomings, the agenda-setting approach has contributed to a more 
advanced understanding o f the media’s role in society. It has helped to change the 
emphasis o f  mass communication research away from the study o f  short-term 
attitudinal effects to a more longitudinal analysis o f social impact. This is no small 
contribution.^^
Reese also stresses that it ‘implicitly adopts the pluralistic values of democratic 
theory, bringing public opinion to centre stage’ We can see that this emphasis on public 
opinion is particularly characteristic of conceptualisations of the agenda-setting process 
in which public opinion plays a determining role.
Dearing and Roger raise a further question, ‘What assumptions about the media, 
public opinion, and democracy do agenda-setting scholars make?’ According to their 
answer, ‘One crucial assumption about the agenda-setting process is that the media 
agenda often launches the process, putting an issue on the public agenda, which then may 
lead to policy change. This instigating role for the mass media highlights a crucial role 
they play in a democratic s o c i e t y T h e  media of mass communication tell us how to 
think about issues, and therefore, what to think.^  ^ Agenda-setting studies are obviously 
concerned with the relative importance of public issues and less obviously so with the 
general functioning of public opinion in a democracy. Research on the agenda-setting 
process, in this connection, offers at least a potential explanation of the complex process 
by which social change occurs in modem society.
1.2: The Political Agenda in the USSR
The main purpose of this subsection is to examine the secondary literature on the political
Protess and McCombs, Agenda Setting, p. 262.
Further discussion on this question see Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, p. 99.
K. Carragee, M. Rosenblatt, and G. Michaud, “Agenda-Setting Research; A Critique and Theoretical 
Alternative,” in S. Thomas (ed.), Studies in Communication Vol. 3 (Norwood, NJ; Albex, 1987), p. 42. 
Reese, “Setting the Media’s Agenda,” p. 310.
Dearing and Rogers, Agenda-Setting, pp. 99-100.
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agenda and its formation in the USSR. In doing so, I will give particular attention to two 
works: Daniel Tarschys’s The Soviet Political Agenda (1979), and Barbara Ann 
Chotiner’s The 1982 Reorganisation o f Agricultural Administration in the Soviet Union 
(1992), both of which deal directly with the political agenda and its formation. What 
methods and used by their authors, which periods do they treat and in which issues have 
they been primarily interested?
Daniel Tarschys’s book The Soviet Political Agenda analyses the political 
priorities of the Soviet leadership in three different years: Stalin’s 1950, Khrushchev’s 
1960 and Brezhnev’s 1970. Tarschys studies the problems which these Soviet leaders 
encountered, and which they attempted to induce their society to resolve during these 
three different periods. In order to study the Soviet political agenda, Tarschys collected 
data from editorials in the daily newspaper Prayda, the official organ of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He identified the political 
agenda set by the party leadership by examining its editorials from 1950 to 1970, which 
throughout the history of Soviet studies have been used as a source of information on the 
political orientations of the party leadership. Editorials instructions, which were in effect 
divided into two parts: the first was primarily diagnostic, pointing out shortcomings, and 
the second was mainly prescriptive, urging the necessary measures to be taken in 
remedying those shortcomings. The instructions contained an implicit causal analysis of 
the faults noted; the factors considered to be responsible for such deficiencies usually 
become apparent in the way blame was dealt out or in the formulation of the strategy 
recommended to attain the desired results.^^
McCombs and Shaw, “The Evolution o f Agenda-Setting Research,” p. 62.
^  Rogers, Dearing and Bregman, “The Anatomy o f Agenda-Setting Research,” p. 69, 
Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda, p. 40.
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As the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Party, Pravda first established 
by Lenin in 1912,®^  and is still published - despite occasional difficulties - in post-Soviet 
society. Tarschys gives several reasons for his study of its instructions as a source;
(a) Pravda’s editorials were considered the most reliable indicator of Soviet leaders’ 
perception of political problems, their interpretation of the causes of those problems, their 
allocation of political energy and their choice of instruments of control.^^
(b) Pravda was known to have been the unchallenged leader among Soviet papers and 
magazines. Its viewpoints and judgements functioned as guideposts for the rest of the 
press, and its verdict in any debate was always conclusive.
(c) The instructions in Pravda displayed the most important problems on the political 
agenda during this period. They did not summarise all the problems considered by the 
Soviet leadership at any time but they did indicate those which leaders intended to 
resolve via the mobilisation of political and administrative organs. The Pravda editorial, 
for these reasons, was generally agreed to be a reliable indicator of the total political 
agenda in Soviet society.
What are the major motives behind Tarschys’s selection of the three years 
chosen for analysis (1950, 1960, and 1970)? The first was an interest in changes in the 
political agenda over a long period of time. Specifically, he was concerned with the 
development of the country’s problems during a period when the Stalinist regime was 
replaced by a relatively more liberal order, when an economy plagued by shortages 
developed into relative prosperity and the legitimacy of the political system was by all
In 1912 Pravda was produced by revolutionaries in a tiny, cramped office, with someone on guard to 
warn o f police raids”. Further fiill description o f  Pravda in the Soviet period see Angus Roxburgh, Pravda: 
Inside the Soviet News Machine (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1987).
Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda, p. 58.
Ibid., p. 59.
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indications secured. Secondly, he was concerned with how social problems changed as a 
political order matured and how this maturing affected the diagnoses, analyses, and 
strategies of its leaders. This developmental perspective made a longitudinal study 
natural, although limited resources prevented an examination of all Pravda editorials even 
a ten or twenty-year period. His method was based upon the retrieval of short passages 
containing indicated words or word groups from a large textual mass. This made it 
possible to retrieve all sentences in Pravda that dealt with a particular subject in a 
keyword in context form, which facilitated a comparative analysis of the paper’s 
treatment of a given problem over a long period of time.^^
Tarschys related his findings to three models representing three alternative 
views of the Soviet political system (the Totalitarian, Pluralistic and Bureaucratic 
models).^^ These, in turn, illustrated three different hypotheses on the emergence of 
political problems. Tarschys noted that if the totalitarian interpretation was accurate, the 
leaders had a great deal of autonomy in their choice of issues and priorities. Advocates of 
the pluralist model argued, by contrast, that interest groups played a considerable part in 
the articulation and aggregation of political demands. Yet there were also good reasons to 
emphasise the element of inter-organisational competition in Soviet government. 
According to the bureaucratic model, the Soviet government’s instructions originated in 
the vast network of economic and administrative organs.
By noting the frequency with which different political problems were 
mentioned in Pravda between the 1950s and the 1970s, Tarschys identified the priorities
Ibid., p. 63.
Further discussion o f his qualitative and quantitative method for structuring through information retrieval 
see ibid., pp. 65-71.
For a full discussion o f his interpretation o f these models see ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., pp. 38-9.
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of the leadership during this time. In turn, he explicated Soviet political problems within 
three main categories: the sectorial, the geographical and the institutional. I will briefly 
examine these divisions in the following subsection.
The sectorial dimensiofu Economic problems strongly dominated the Soviet 
political agenda. As Tarschys noted, ‘Raw materials shipped behind schedule, inoperative 
plants, undelivered consignments of goods, abortive planning, inefficient management, 
such deficiencies were constantly criticised in Pravda’s ed ito ria ls .H e  argued that the 
Soviet leadership’s principal remedy for disturbances in the economy was to influence 
attitudes at the source of the problem. The changes registered within the eleven sectors 
selected (the metal industry, the energy sector, the chemical industry, light industry, the 
transport sector, agriculture, the service sector, education and research, the mass media, 
and cultural life) reflected several facets of the country’s economic and social 
development.^^
According to Tarschy’s evidence, it was possible to draw the following 
conclusions: interest in industrial problems rose sharply between 1950 and 1960, after 
which it declined somewhat towards 1970. Agriculture was mentioned with greater 
frequency in 1950 than in either of the following two dates, while the total value for 
questions of public opinion in the broad sense -  the mass media, culture, education and 
research -  was high during the first two years and lower during the third. Between 1950 
and 1960 was registered: a failing trend for the mass media, agriculture, services, energy, 
and transport; a stable trend for culture; and a rising trend for the building industry, 
consumer industries, iron, steel and engineering, the chemical industry, and education 
and research. Interest in the mass media continued to decline between 1960 and 1970,
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and the same tendency was registered for culture, the building industry and the consumer 
industries. Agriculture, services, iron, steel and engineering, the chemical industry, 
education and research remained at about the same level, whereas energy and transport 
received more attention.^^
The geographical dimension. To study the geographical dimension (the 
republics, the economic areas and the regions), Tarschys sorted the material according to 
mentions of various administrative areas. A first search produced all items containing a 
reference to republics, a second extracted those mentioning regions, territories and 
provinces. In latter searches cities, districts and enterprises were traced to their respective 
regions. The Soviet Union was divided into fifteen republics, of which the Russian Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), with its capital in Moscow, was by far the largest. 
The RSFSR was understandably the republic mentioned most often in Pravda’s editorials, 
while the small republics, the least of which were more or less equivalent to regions 
within the RSFSR, were mentioned fairly seldom. According to Tarschys’s calculations, 
most prominent among the non-Russian groups were the Central Asian and Caucasian 
republics. Turkmenistan topped the list in all three years, and Kazakhstan also had a high 
ranking. The Caucasian republics showed a gradual rise. Attention to the Ukraine was 
low both under Khrushchev and under Brezhnev, but these figures corresponded closely 
well to the pattern for the western part of the Soviet Union, which received little 
attention. The Ukraine and Belorusssia together accounted for almost a quarter of the 
Soviet population, but the frequency with which they were mentioned continued to
Ibid., p. 81. 
Ibid., p. 82.
77 I will not deal with each sector’s content but for full discussion see ibid., pp. 81-124.
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decline in the following years/^
In terms of the major economic areas, Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia, 
the Caucasus and the central region around Moscow, the southern part of Russia and 
western Siberia all received a high level of attention in Pravda editorials. The Volga-Ural 
areas and the western parts of the Soviet Union attracted scant attention. The Ukraine, 
Belorussia and the Baltic States were also noted for low values. Other peripheral areas 
which registered weakly in Pravda’s editorials included the extreme eastern part of 
Siberia and the northwestern comer of European Russia. However, the industrial regions 
south of Moscow, the Volga-Ural areas and the Kuznetsk Basin aroused more interest, as 
did the Central Asian republics in while interest rose increasingly during the period. 
According to Tarschys’s data, Moscow tended to look to the south and east rather than to 
the north and west. The Soviet Party leadership evidently regarded the western parts of 
the country as less troublesome than the eastern areas, and Central Asia and the industrial 
areas in southern Russia and western Siberia attracted particular attention.^^
The institutional dimension. Regarding political institutions, Pravda indicated 
both how the problems of society were diagnosed at various times and how the agents of 
change capable of contributing to their solution were evaluated. In this way, it provided a 
picture of normative role distribution in the Soviet political system. They also revealed 
leaders’ understanding of the function of various institutions. During the twenty years 
between 1950 and 1970, many different kinds of ministries and civil service departments 
had continuously been formed, abolished or had changed name and functions. 
Jurisdictions had been combined or divided, the structure of individual enterprises had 
been altered, and the boundaries between governmental and public organisations had
78 Ibid., pp, 125-26.
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been adjusted. Tarschys subdivides political institutions into the party, the governmental 
apparatus, and public organisations.^^
The Pravda editorials of the late Stalin period presented the regional and local 
Party organs as the key levers of social and economic development. Both internal and 
external Party activities attracted a great deal of interest, but the Party apparatus had to be 
consolidated and an effective organisation was needed at base level. The Party was urged 
to utilise all available resources to spur the people on to increased efforts.^  ^ However, 
during the last two years the Party as organiser and supervisor of the economy was a less 
prominent theme in Prayda’s editorials. Attention in 1960 tended instead to be directed 
towards lower governmental organs, particularly those of the republics. Although it was 
not clearly reflected in the frequencies, specialised governmental authorities were in 1970 
a more important category of address than Party organisations. Particular agencies 
appeared to be the prime movers in many areas, and the leaders attempted to direct the 
activities of these organisations by means of specific instructions. Khrushchev sought to 
broaden the functions of the public organisations. The trade unions and the Komsomol 
were given a new boost, and certain state agencies were transformed into independent 
public organisations.^^
The leadership under Stalin still regarded the Party as the dominant instrument 
of change. Political strategy prescribed a mobilisation of human resources that was 
primitive in the sense that the goals and means of activities were not subjected to any
Ibid., pp. 130-50. 
Ibid., pp. 151-52.
For a full discussion o f  the Communist Party (CPSU) see Leon P. Baradat, Soviet Political Society (New  
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1986), pp. 102-35.
Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda, p. 162.
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close analysis. Twenty years later instructions were directed towards more realistic 
goals. They went out to a large number of specialised elites, seeking to use them as 
instruments to influence society. In 1970 the leaders no longer relied on the generalists in 
the Party, but turned instead to trained specialists.^"^
Through systematic comparison of the instructions contained in the editorials of 
Pravda, Tarschys formed a picture of the changing political agenda in Soviet society from 
Stalin to Brezhnev. He noted that there appeared to be a fairly uniform Soviet approach to 
political problems. This was reinforced by the many points of similarity between the 
agendas of the Stalin era and the Brezhnev era, while the Khruschev era represented a 
deviation. The social order that had emerged in the Soviet Union was certainly a 
command economy in the sense that central government was very important in economic 
and social development. As Soviet society proceeded from relative poverty to relative 
prosperity, new issues arose, new geographical areas attracted attention and new patterns 
emerged in the institutional structure of the political system. Consumer issues persistently 
loomed large in Soviet politics. This illustrated the complementary relationship between 
the economic and the political systems. The consumer was weak in the planned economy, 
and needed to be protected by the exercise of political power.
The other study we have selected for particular attention, Barbara Arm 
Chotiner’s The 1982 Reorganisation o f Agricultural Administration in the Soviet Union, 
is based upon an analysis of the political agenda of the Brezhnev administration as 
carried out on the Food Programme. This programme was adopted at the May 1982 
Plenum of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
D. Richard Little, Governing the Soviet Union (New York: Longman, 1989), pp. 61-88. 
Tarschys, The Soviet Political Agenda, p. 166.
For a further discussion see ibid., pp. 188-89.
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(CPSU). It consisted of territorially-based agencies at the krai, oblast, union-republican, 
and all-union levels which were intended to administer the agro-industrial complex. 
Chotiner emphasised that historically and in contemporary times, agricultural policy and 
the modes of directing farming operations have been viewed as helping to define the 
nature of the former Soviet regime. Grass-roots involvement in rural production 
processes had not only served as a generator of political resources for the Communist 
Party, but also provided a framework within which power was exercised. Therefore, 
altering agricultural organisation in 1982 had real salience in terms of regime values, 
popular satisfaction, and the role of the Communist Party in society.
Examining the process of political agenda-setting regarding agricultural 
administration, Chotiner attempted to discover the attitudes of the Communist Party and 
its leaders towards governmental institutions, the openness of the leadership structure 
towards policy initiation, and political differentiation along institutional and regional 
lines. In her study, she dealt firstly with the initiation of the policy for the food 
programme (from the October 1980 Central Committee through to the 26* Party 
Congress). Secondly, with the emergence of territorially-based agro-industrial 
associations (from the 26* Party Congress to the November 1981 Central Committee), 
and finally she drew conclusions from the period 1980-1981 regarding political agenda- 
setting in agricultural administration.
In October 1980 Brezhnev announced to the CPSU Central Committee that the
For further analyses o f the 1982 reform see Valentin Litvin, “Agro-Industrial Complexes; Recent 
Strucutral Reform in the Rural Economy o f the USSR,” and Everett M. Jacobs, “Soviet Agricultural 
Management and Planning and the 1982 Administrative Reforms,” both in Robert C. Stuart (ed.), The 
Soviet Rural Economy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 258-72 and pp. 273-95, 
respectively.
Barbara Ann Chotiner, The 1982 Reorganisation o f Agricultural Administration in the Soviet Union: The 
Role of the Communist Partv in Agenda Setting ^Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck Papers, No. 907, April 1992),
p. 2.
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Politburo had concluded the drawing up a food programme and was including it in the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Support for the food programme and its utilisation varied 
significantly among members of the leadership.^® At the late February and early March 
1981 Party Congress, six Politburo members and candidates made reference to the Food 
Programme, but not to agro-industrial integration.®  ^ The press served to provide 
information and a channel for debate over subsidiary as well as basic issues. The 
structuring of the process for developing the Food Programme may have strengthened the 
advancement of regionally-oriented concerns. It is not known exactly how many sub­
national CPSU committees and their leaders were among the major players in elaborating 
the Programme.^^
The importance of the press (as a channel of communication and persuasion 
towards policy development and adoption) was underlined by a change in sponsorship of 
the journal Kadry seVskogo khozyaistva. It had begun publication as an organ of the 
USSR Ministry of Agricuture (along with Gosplan, which had been charged since 1978 
by the CC CPSU with harmonising agro-industrial integration activities). The first 1981 
issue of the journal announced that it had become a publication of the CPSU Central 
Committee, In November 1980 a series of sessions was held, the subject of which was the 
further development of the specialisation and concentration of agricultural production on 
the basis of inter-farm cooperation and agro-industrial integration. At a December all- 
union agronomic conference, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about the Food Programme, the 
conference was attended by republican, oblast and krai CPSU secretaries. Although these 
meetings were primarily used to discuss the Food Programme, several other issues were
“Brezhnev Assigns ‘Improvement o f Food Supply’ Top Priority in Russia Standards,” Los Angeles 
Times. 22 October 1980.
Chotiner, The 1982 Reorganisation o f Agricultural, p. 6.
24
raised that either supported or directly advanced the possibility of introducing raion agro­
industrial associations {Raionnye agro-promyshemye organizatii - RAPOs). Several 
Communist Party journals discussed governmental administrative arrangements for 
economic operations as a source of the deficiency in providing the populace with an 
adequate diet, Kommmist Sovetskoi Latvii, for instance, argued that any reform of 
economic structures and management practices should have several objectives that would 
be likely to have expanded the role of territorial authorities below the all-union level. 
Subsequently, many proposals and diagnoses were made in different circumstances.^^
An initiative to get the diffusion of RAFOs^^ onto the national political agenda 
came next. In 1981, Party Congresses were to provide opportunities for agitating for 
broader utilisation of the RAPO form and for a reinforcement of district administration. 
Further support for upgrading authority at the bottom of the governmental and CPSU 
hierarchies was in evidence at the 26* Party Congress. In conclusion of the 26* Congress 
seemed to signal a new phase in the discussion of possible alterations in the system for 
managing agriculture and economically-related activities. The new approach could 
determine what progress the respective advocates had made in inserting their proposals 
into the declared national policy agenda.
In the months between the Congress and the November 1981 CC Plenum, 
several Politburo members and republican CPSU secretaries had occasion to discuss 
aspects of organisational reform.^ "^  Along with general discussion of proposed agro-
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
Ibid., pp. 8-10.
For a fttU discussion about the origin, development and assessment o f the RAPOs see Chotiner’s another 
work, “Soviet Local Party Organs and the RAPOs” in Peter } .  Potichnyj (ed.), The Soviet Union Party and 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 48-64.
Chotiner, The 1982 Reorganisation o f Agricultural pp. 11-2.
^  Joan DeBardeleben, Soviet Politics in Transition (Lexington, MA: D C. Health and Company, 1992), p. 
47.
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industrial reform, several issues received more intensive examination. These included the 
importance of the structural alterations already made in several republics, along with 
appropriate ways of extending innovation up the administrative chain.^^ Coverage of 
agro-industrial experimentation in the smaller republics gave their leaders and scholars 
opportunities to extoll successes achieved, which could gratify local opinion and reflect 
well upon the territorial political establishment. As Chotiner noted, a series of articles of 
regarding the creation and adoption of RAPOs were published.^^ CPSU journals explored 
the problems of insufficient coordination between vertical productive-administrative 
hierarchies with operative agencies in the districts and head offices in Moscow.
In his address to the November 1981 Central Committee Plenum, Brezhnev 
implied his assent to the creation of RAPOs or similar organisations, as well as to 
changes in other aspects of the directive structure for farming and linked branches of the 
economy.^® By the time of the 26* Party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev was not in good 
health and might not have been expected to control every aspect of policy-making. 
However, his vague statements about the unitary administration of the agro-industrial 
complex provided the basis from which to suggest regional coordinative organs.^^ After 
March 1985, successive restructurings of the state farming and agriculturally-related 
bureaucracies could be seen to have had conceptual affinities to the RAPOs and superior 
agencies created by the May 1982 CC Plenum: the establishment of the USSR State 
Agro-Industrial Committee (Gosagroprom), for instance, was one of the first 
organisational conversions carried out under the Gorbachev regime. RAPOs remained the
Chotiner, The 1982 Reorganisation o f  Agricultural, p. 20.
96 Ibid., pp. 21-3.
Ibid., pp. 25-6.
^*Ibid. p. 32.
Gordon B. Smith, Soviet Politics: Strugpltng With Change (London: Macmiîîan, Second Edition, 1992),
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lowest units of Gosagroprom’s organisational pyramid until the agency’s abolition in
i q g q i o o
Examining the process of political agenda-setting in regard to agricultural 
administration and based on the territorial agro-industrial associations, Chotiner drew 
several conclusions. Firstly, social learning by elites was proceeding by trial and error; 
branch harmonisation was no longer effected by a single all-union organisation, nor 
brought down to the level of producers. Secondly, the integration of operations related to 
farming and food processing had been mainly devolved to the republics. At the beginning 
of the last decade of the Soviet Union republican officials had been active in efforts to 
place territorial agricultural agencies into all-union political activities. Finally, she 
suggested that an understanding of the food programme enabled scholars to gain a better 
understanding of the dramatic changes that subsequently took place under Gorbachev and 
his reform policies.
Of the literature on political agenda, Tarschys’s work has been widely reviewed 
whereas reviews of Chotiner’s work are hardly to be found. Among Tarschys’s reviewers, 
several common observations are made concerning his line of argument. According to 
these, Tarschys was concerned with the shift from totalitarian to bureaucratic pluralist 
images of Soviet politics. Reviewers drew attention to his vision of the limited nature of 
Soviet market capacity and free agreement among autonomous groups, relative to the 
West. They also first noted his view of the Soviet Union as a society of weak consumers, 
both individual and institutional, who could not compel their suppliers to perform and so
p. 57.
Chotiner, The 1982 Reorganisation o f  Agricultural pp. 36-7.
Ibid., p. 38.
Book Review Digest 1980. (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1981), p. 1196; Problems o f  
Communism. Vol. 29, March/April 1980, pp. 52-7; Annals o f  the American Academy o f  Political and Social
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required the continuous intervention of the central authorities.
Another point reviewers identified in Tarschys is that of the Soviet Union as 
both a semi-strong and semi-weak society, with persons and groups not being strong 
enough to fend for themselves in the struggle for a share of the material and cultural 
values which Soviet society seemed to offer. Members of the party elite had access to the 
necessary means for realising their own aspirations. Regarding the economic reform 
process (Tarschys cites the 1965 economic reform and the 1971 campaign for consumer 
goods production) reviewers noted his conclusions that every attempt at reform or 
redistribution in the Soviet Union called forth opposition from forces that feared a loss of 
privilege or status from the proposed changes. There was general agreement among these 
forces, as they all included ideologically or politically conservative elements in the 
central and regional elite who were represented at leading levels in the CPSU.
In order to collect materials to expand his study from Pravda, Tarschys used a 
number of key words to pick out certain issues found in the editorials by computer. As 
Miller indicates, he did not allow the labour invested to blind him to the limited and 
ambiguous value of his results, unlike other researchers in quantitative politics, In 
further discussion of Tarschys’s work, McAuley^ ®"^  points out that Tarschys covers only a 
part of the political agenda by limiting himself to Pravda. Tarschys’s methodology has 
influenced my research methodology, in particular the use of content analysis of the 
press. In my research, however, to avoid the limitations identified by McAuley I use a 
wide range of published sources, based on the CDPSP and RA Reports, which 
themselves are based upon a wide variety of sources. Another point made by McAuley is
Sciences. Vol. 445, 1979, pp. 173-4.
J. Miller, International Affairs. Vol. 55, No. 3, 1979, pp. 477- 
Mary McAuley, Slavic Review. Vol. 39,1980, p. 691.
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that Tarschys does not include a wider geographical dimension (i.e., his source is a 
central, Moscow-based one). In my work, I have also been concerned to provide a 
regional perspective of a kind he does not provide, and the RA Report has been 
particularly valuable in this respect by providing a full overview of the press of the Far 
East, most of which is not readily available outside the former USSR.
1.3: Setting the Political Agenda in the Post-Soviet Period
From the mid 1980s, the Soviet Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika 
and glasnost were designed to tackle Soviet internal economic problems at the same time 
as they initiated ‘new thinking’ in Soviet foreign policy. With Gorbachev’s reconstructing 
of national values, the Soviet Union’s relations with the outside world shifted from 
military and ideological confrontation to a desire for increased political and economic co­
operation. This ultimately led to the ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union itself. Since the early 1990s political and economic reform continued in the 
transition period to establish Russia as a post-communist federation.
Gorbachev’s successor, Boris Yeltsin, made further efforts to radically transform 
totalitarian Russia into a formally democratic society. Through development of his own 
reforai processes he established the main elements of a decentralised and open market 
economy, and drove his country’s integration into the global, political and economic 
systems. The vast dimensions of Russia and its striking diversity have meant that the 
regional aspect of this process of decentralisation has been particularly important. Under 
the present federal system, political reform in Russia has transferred substantial power to 
regional and local authorities. Regional leaders have managed to extract significant 
concessions from Moscow, for example, they have gained greater freedom to engage
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directly in foreign trade. Overall, however, relations with the centre remain uncertain and 
the distribution of powers is unclear - up to and indeed beyond President Putin’s attempts 
to restore federal authority in 2000.
In this context, my study specifically focuses on the gradual emergence of 
political reform and the generation of a reform agenda in the Russian Far East in the post- 
Soviet period. My intended contribution to the wider field of regional development 
studies is specifically the setting of political agenda in the RFE in the post-Soviet period. 
During the Soviet era, the Far East was primarily seen as a frontier of military protection 
against a hostile international environment. Economically, it was one of the largest raw 
material suppliers to Soviet m ark e ts .U n d e r the Russian Constitution of 1993, it 
contains 10 of the 89 so-called subjects of the federation; the republic of Sakha 
(Yakutiya), Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, the Amur, Magadan, Kamchatka and 
Sakhalin oblasts, the Jewish Autonomous oblast, and the Chukot and Koryak okrugs.
This huge, sparsely populated region is still at an early stage of development, 
and the volume of production and manufacturing facilities is relatively modest - certainly 
in relation to the area’s enormous size - a third of the entire federation- and economic 
potential which have been only partially explored up to the present. The Far East 
contains a large proportion of Russia’s coal, oil and natural gas deposits, rich mineral 
reserves, and possesses substantial potential in forestry and fishing. A new regional 
development policy has been discussed, which envisages the priority development of 
processing capacity in forestry and minerals, fishing and fish-farming, transport facilities, 
conversion of the arms industry, tourism, food-processing, and the social and industrial
For further discussion o f the historical development o f  the Far East see chapter 2.
For an extensive survey o f  the Far East's natural resources see Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory L. Freeze 
(eds.), The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey (Khabarovsk: RIOTIP, Second Edition, 1996).
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infrastructure. Both regional authorities and businessmen have set up a string of agencies 
to promote trade and investment. As in the rest of Russia, however, the Far East has faced 
new economic, political and social difficulties. Problems include unemployment, crime, 
pollution, privatisation, high living costs, the decline of the birth rate, falling life 
expectancy, a lack of infrastructure for economic development, and the instability of the 
political environment.
As Manezhev notes, ‘The break-up of the USSR and the consequent 
geopolitical shifts have turned Russia into a predominantly northern countiy, with limited 
access to the Black, Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.’^^  ^ This has resulted in greater 
national importance for the Northern and Pacific regions. Due to the Far East’s proximity 
to the prosperous and rapidly developing countries of North and Southeast Asia, it is one 
of the regions of Russia where foreign economic exchange can have a substantial impact 
on development. Indeed it is farther from Russia’s main industrial regions than it is from 
a number of rapidly developing Asian Pacific countries. From the early 1990s, the Soviet 
Union has attempted a reorientation of Far Eastern trade laying greater emphasis on 
relations with the Asia Pacific countries. The RF has continued to reduce its military 
presence in the RFE, to improve its bilateral relations with neighbouring countries such 
as China, Japan and South Korea, and to integrate the RFE more fully into the Asia- 
Pacific region.^ ®® As a result, foreign trade transactions in the Far East can appear far 
more attractive than economic exchanges with other parts of Russia. Trade and 
investment activity has been growing rapidly and spreading into new areas.
For the purpose of my thesis, which concerns the setting of the political agenda.
Sergei Manezhev, The Russian Far East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), p. 1.
L.A. Anosova, DaFniv Vbstok i stranv Azti: perspektivv sotmdnichestva (Moscow: RAN, 1993), p. 4; 
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I wiîî explore the major issues of regional development in the light of market 
transformations, and in a domestic and international context. To do this, as discussed 
above, I will deal specifically with the RFE, which is one of Russia’s remotest, yet most 
resource-rich regions. In setting the agenda in the RFE (1991-1997) my methodology 
relies mainly upon of content analysis. This methodology may be set out as follows.
As discussed in the first subsection, agenda-setting studies claim that that media 
agenda is manifested in the ratings of importance or salience of issues among audience 
members. As Dearing and Roger note, the media agenda examined in these studies is 
the editorial content of selected newspapers. Content analysis is the quantification of 
meaning in documents. Meaning may be both manifest (that is, obvious) or latent 
(implied or inferred). For agenda-setting studies, media content is usually operationalised 
as the number of some countable unit, such as the number of story column inches in a set 
of newspapers, the number of front-page stories an issue receives, or the number of 
seconds of airplay an issue receives during a year of TV newscasts. The number of news 
stories about an issue of study is often counted for a particular period of time, usually the 
several months prior to the measurement of the public agenda, by means of a poll or 
survey. These several months are needed because a lag usually occurs between media 
coverage and its impact on public op in ion .^ In  typical agenda-setting research, the 
number of news reports about an issue is counted, and the exact content is not examined 
or measured. Thus, the media agenda is a rather gross indicator of the coverage accorded 
an issue. Repetition sets the public agenda through the continual hammering away of the 
media on the same issue. Each news story about the issue of study is a variation on a
Dearing and Roger, Aaenda-Setting. p. 47. 
p. 214.
in Ibid., p. 35.
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theme, as each story describes some particular facet of the broad issue.
In the Soviet Union, as in Western society, young and old alike were strongly 
influenced by the media, and the Soviet press was among the most extensive in the world. 
For instance, Mickewicz states that, ‘Soviet newspaper circulation was around 400 per 
1,000 people, while the US’s figure was only 282 per 1,000.’^^® The Soviet Union, more 
than 8,000 newspapers (640 of them published daily) along with some 6,000 journals and 
other periodicals, had a combined circulation of more than 200 million.^ "^^  There were 
three types of newspapers: firstly, all-union papers like Pravda. which as noted in the 
previous subsection was the official newspaper of the CPSU with a daily circulation of 
over 11 million; Izvestiva (News), the organ of the Supreme Soviet which claimed a 
circulation of between 8 and 9 million; and Komsomolskava pravda (Komsomol Truth), 
the newspapers of the Young Communist League, with a circulation of more than 10 
million. Secondly, newspapers servicing specialised audiences, such as Krasnaya 
Zvezda (Red Star), published by the military establishment; Trud (Labour), representing 
the national trade union movement, mimeographed leaflets of tiny splinter parties and 
movements, such as Doverie (Trust) and Svobodnoe slovo (The Free Word).^^  ^Thirdly, 
regional or municipal newspapers of general circulation representing altogether more 
than 7000 publications, most of which were organs of party, state, or trade union 
organisations in their respective areas,
On the whole before Gorbachev the Soviet mass media had been under
Ibid., p. 36.
Ellen Mickiewicz, “Policy Issues in the Soviet Media,” in Erik P. Hoffmann (ed.). The Soviet Union in 
the 1980s (New York: The Academy o f Political Science, 1984), p, 113.
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pervasive political control. The supply of newsprint was controlled by a state monopoly. 
All printing equipment had to licensed by the government. The Communist Party selected 
all senior editors. Censorship took various forms in the Soviet press. In dealing with 
ordinary news and events, newspaper editors consulted a multi-volume index. The 
Soviet press depended neither on consumer demand nor on a commitment to the people’s 
right to know. The press was simply another instrument for shaping public attitudes and 
motivating the masses to accomplish the goals set by the nation’s leaders.^Before the 
glasnost campaign got underway crime news in the Soviet media was restricted to 
coverage of the evils of corruption, pilfering and other anti-social behaviour. Coverage of 
such crimes as domestic violence, mugging and rape, was non-existent.
In spite of limitations, under the influence of glasnost, the Soviet press changed 
dramatically. For instance, Komsomolskava pravda took an aggressively pro-reform 
stance in an attempt to win back its following. Argumentv i faktv (Arguments and Facts) 
and Moscow News have turned into reformist newspapers. Glasnost led to a major 
change in the forms of content and effects of mass communication. Television and radio 
broadcasts and news programme became more open.^^  ^After the reformation of Article 6 
of the Constitution in March 1990 and the passage of new law on the control of the press, 
the ability of party and governmental bodies to directly control newspapers and 
magazines was severely reduced. Today the biggest challenges to the Russian press
Cambridge Encyclopedia, p. 407.
Thomas F. Remington. PoKtics in Russia (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 78.
For a âitî discussion o f  the Soviet press see Baradat, Soviet Political Society, pp. 196-206.
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and journals are not threats of political intrusion, but the pressures of self-financing, 
competition, falling profits, uncertain circulation, inadequate facilities and equipment, 
and understaffing.
Officially the broadcast and print media serve political and social functions in 
addition to their normal communications role as conduits of needed information, 
exhorters to work hard and well, critics of social problems, and providers of feedback 
from the public. Information is generally recognised as a major source of power in any 
society. The Russian press also performs an important communications function 
between the political leadership and the various layers of bureaucracy that manage the 
country. Press coverage of internal political debates broadened to include the discussion 
of deficiencies of goods and services, the market, incentives, economic practice in the 
West, poverty, income differentials, the Chechen War, comparative election procedures, 
and interviews with Western political leaders.
The press undoubtedly has a substantial effect on the knowledge the Russian 
public have of both domestic and international affairs. The press, under the constitution 
and Russian laws, is also more independent of the political authorities than in the Soviet 
period. Under the 1993 constitution (article 29), freedom of the mass media ‘is 
guaranteed’ and censorship ‘is prohibited’. However, several developments have served 
to undermine this new-found independence, including a concentration of ownership 
nationally in the hands of a small number of magnates (the ‘oligarchs’), and locally, in
Jennifer Turpin, Reinventing the Soviet Self: Media and Social Change in the Former Soviet Union 
(London: Praeger, 1995), pp. Î01-2.
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the hands of regional administrations. Additionally, because of economic circumstances 
and other factors, circulations have fallen dramatically. In 1980 the annual print of all 
Russian newspaper was 29 billion, and in 1990 38 billion, by 1998 this figures had 
slumped to just 8 billion.^^  ^Conversely, the reach and importance of television has grown 
enormously. By the year 2000, according to VTsIOM survey evidence, 70 per cent of the 
population watched television ‘practically every day’, but just 11 per cent read a national 
and 8 per cent a local newspaper. But broadly, compared with other institutions, the 
media were trusted: 67 per cent, in the same survey, trusted the ‘completely’ or 
‘somewhat’, and only 1 per cent distrusted them.*^  ^ The media, taken as a whole, 
remained the principal vehicle for advancing the political agenda both nationally and in 
the individual regions.
The main source for my content analysis in classifying the political agenda in 
the RFE is the RA Reports from 1991 to 1994.^^  ^These were published by the Centre for 
Russian, Asian Sc Pacific Studies at the University of Hawaii, and they particularly focus 
on regional issues in the Far East by analysing regional reports and newspapers. These 
reports are digests of news items culled from the local press (e.g. Vladivostok Mews. Utro 
Rossii. Svobodnvi Sakhalin. Sibirskava gazeta. etc.), also from local radio and TV 
broadcasts. Many of these sources are not normally available outside the Russian 
Federation, or indeed the region. I have also used the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press (CDPSPI from 1991-1997. Although this is a journal with a primarily national 
focus, it still contains wide coverage of regional issues based on reports by local
Karodnoe khozvatstvo RSFSR v 1990 g. Statistichesku sbomik (Moscow: RespubUkanskü 
informatsionno-izdateTskii tsenir, 1991), pp. 258 and 55Î (for 1980 and 1990); Rossiva tsiffakh. Kratkii 
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correspondents.
The results of my content analysis are displayed in table 1-2 and 1-3. Each 
subject in these tables was analysed by counting the frequency with which the subject 
appeared as a headline in both the RA Reports and the CDPSP. From these two sources it 
can be clearly seen which issues are accorded most weight in their volume of newspaper 
coverage. The following chapters will examine how the Russian Far East has dealt with 
these issues after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. I will divide my discussion of 
these issues according to their respective positions on the domestic and intemationai 
political agendas. The former will be dealt with in chapters 3 and 4, and the latter in 
chapters 5 and 6.
In the following chapters, I will be investigating the emerging political agenda in 
the RFE in the post-Soviet era. My research will centre upon the following questions;
(1) What specific domestic and intemationai political agendas are being dealt with in the 
transitional period in the RFE, and what are perceived by leaders and the local people as 
being the most important domestic and intemationai issues? Answering this question (via 
content analysis) necessarily gives rise to further questions, namely:
(2) What degree of local autonomy has the RFE attained within the RF?
(3) To what extent have regional environmental factors affected public health, especially 
regarding ethnic identity and mortality?
(4) What differences can be seen in socio-economic circumstances between the RFE and 
the nation as a whole?
(5) How has China been regarded in its relations with the Far Eastern region, and what 
prevents the closing of a deal with Japan on the Kuril islands?
130 From July 1994 the RA Reports ceased to be published.
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(6) How has Korea developed its relations with the RFE in the changing international 
environment?
(7) What conclusions can be drawn in answering these questions and what are the 
subsequent implications for the future of the RFE?
In all these issues it is the process by which the political agenda is constructed 
that is my primary concern,
1.4: The Structure of the Agenda-Setting Study
Chapters 2 and 3 are mainly based on an extensive reading of Western and Russian 
academic literature, with some tables derived from the statistical yearbooks. Chapter 2 
contains an introduction to the RFE in the post-Soviet period, looking at it through its 
historical development, natural resources, transportation and relations with neighbouring 
countries. Table 1-2 indicates the relative importance of some major domestic political 
issues in the RFE. This thesis will not, of course, be able to cover the entire contents of 
the table but in chapter 3 I will explore the most important issues (as highlighted by the 
table) of local autonomy and environmental problems, including those facing indigenous 
peoples. In this chapter I will deal mainly with the development of centre-periphery 
relations in the Russian Federation, following this with an exploration of the level of 
regionalism in the RFE. Alongside this the vital issue of environmental pollution and 
public health in the RFE will be investigated. We will see that ethnic identity and 
mortality are closely linked with ecological and environmental problems, and I will also 
discuss international involvement in the development of the environment in the RFE.
In chapter 4 shows that social and economic conditions in the RFE as revealed 
by content analysis occupy a substantial proportion of news coverage and therefore
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generate a similar proportion of concern amidst the public of the RFE. I will look first at 
the changing population, birth and death rates and national composition; secondly I will 
be examining related social issues, primarily crime and alcoholism in the RFE, finally 
turning to employment, industrial production, retail trade, income and living standards. 
This chapter is based chiefly on quantitative data from three major sources of official 
statistics: the census of 1989, the ‘micro-census’ of 1994 (another national census will 
not be held before 2002), and the statistical yearbooks. The majority of my tables, figures 
and scattergrams are based on data as reported in these sources, with due 
acknowledgement of their limitations.*^*
Table 1-2; The Domestic Political Agenda: Items Ranked According to Frequency 
(mentions in numbers)
Subject No
Local autonomy 132
Environment 128
Crime (& alcoholism) 112
Population (mortality, fertility, migration) 109
Elections 98
Native peoples 91
Privatisation (general) 82
Unemployment 76
Income (living cost) 70
Fishing 67
Timber industry 66
Oil and gas 58
Source: Compiled from the RA Reports fi'om 1993-1994 and the Current Digest of the 
Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP) from 1991-1997.
Table 1-3 displays levels of concern within the RFE over international political
131 The limitations o f these sources is discussed in chapter 4.
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issues. As formerly, I will not be dealing extensively with every item mentioned, but will 
focus on the most important issues (as identified by the table). Chapter 5 is based mainly 
on data taken from RA Reports, CDPSP. FBIS. Russian national newspapers (e.g. 
Izvestiva and Rossiiskava gazetal and some local newspapers (e.g. Vladivostok News 
and Utro Rossii). I have also adapted the results of public opinion polls conducted by the 
All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) and by the Moscow-based 
survey organisation ‘Vox Populi’. In this chapter I will explore the RFE’s relationship 
with China regarding the primary issue of the border demarcation. Also I will discuss 
Chinese expansion into the RFE, which compounded anti-Chinese sentiment within the 
region. In this chapter I will also deal with relations with Japan, especially regarding the 
territorial dispute over the Kuril islands. While the ownership of these islands is 
obviously of economic and military importance, in my discussion of this issue I am 
primarily concerned with its political significance at grassroots, based on examination of 
the results of national and regional opinion polls.
Table 1-3; The International Political Agenda: Items Ranked According to 
Frequency (mentions in numbers)
Subject No
China, border disputes and Chinese expansion 296
Japan and the Kuril islands 198
South Korea 165
North Korea 98
Foreign trade 93
The US 67
Joint venture 55
Free Economic Zone (FEZ) 43
Tumen river proiect 40
Mongolia 34
Taiwan 32
Source: As Table 1-2.
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Chapter 6 is based upon primarily qualitative data: chiefly, the interviews I 
conducted and the published materials and data that I collected during my research visits 
to Vladivostok (in September 1996), to Seoul, Korea (in September 1996 and July 1998), 
and finally Moscow (in March 2000). This chapter will mainly focus on the relationship 
between the RFE and Korea since the early 1990s in the changing international economic 
environment, with particular emphasis on the Russian and South Korean industrial park 
project in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone. Finally, I draw attention to some problems 
involved in South Korea’s economic activities in the RFE. Other international issues the 
agenda, such as relations with North Korea, foreign trade, the free economic zone, the 
joint venture and Tumen river projects will also be included in this chapter.
In my concluding chapter I summarise the major findings of previous chapters 
and discuss implications for possible future trends, based on the evidence as shown in my 
research to date.
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Chapter 2: The Russian Far East: An Overview 
2,1: Introduction
As shown in map 2-1, the Russian Far East {DaVniy Vostok) contains ten administrative 
units: the Republic of Sakha, Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais (territories), Amur, 
Magadan, Kamchatka and Sakhalin oblasts (regions), the Jewish Autonomous region, 
the Chukotka and the Koryak Autonomous okrugs. According to the Federation treaty 
in 1992 and the 1993 Constitution, these territories are subordinate to the Russian 
Federation.^ The RFE’s most northerly point is the Arctic and it borders China and 
North Korea in the south.^ The average temperature in January is -25 and in July +17 
degrees centigrade.^ Although the region covers an area of 6.2 million square kilometers 
(more than one-third of the territory of the RF), its population as of January 1996 was 
only 7.5 million. This was 5 per cent of the total population of the RF (147 million).'^ 
The population is largely concentrated in the south and the east. Since 1990 the RFE’s 
population has decreased: for instance, the population fell by 110,000 between 1992 and 
1996.  ^The region is multinational with a significant number of indigenous nationalities. 
I will deal with the demographic dimension of the RFE further in Chapter 4. The RFE, 
in addition, has a growing community of foreign workers (mainly Chinese and North 
Korean).^ Since 1960 a large number of North Korean guest workers have lived in the
 ^ In the Soviet Union these units made up the planning region o f the same name and in post-Soviet Russia 
these administrative territories are collectively know as the Russian Fai* East (RFE). See Irina Busygina, 
“Rossiiskii Dal’niy Vostok,” Mirovava ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniva. July 1995, p. 106.
 ^ Gilbert Rozman, ‘The Crisis o f  the Russian Far East: Who is to Blame? Problems o f Post-Communism. 
Vol. 44, No. 5, September/October 1997, p. 4.
 ^“RAU Business Book; Russia Today,” Obozrevatef. 1993, p. 21.
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996 (Moscow; Logos, 1996), pp. 16-20.
 ^ Ibid., p. 713.
 ^ Michael J. Bradshaw and Nicholas J. Lynn, Resource-Based Development: What Chance for the RFE? 
(Birmingham University: School o f Geography Working Paper No. 3, 1996), p. 3.
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timber camps in the Khabarovsk krai and Amur oblast. The opening of the Russian 
border to China in early 1990 was the critical factor permitting the inflow of Chinese 
workers into the RFE. In 1993 approximately 30,000 foreign workers lived in the RFE/
Map 2-1: The Russian Far East
Anadyr
Palana
Magadan
Yakutsk
barovsk*
Yuzhno
Sakhalinsk
Blagoveshchensk
[Jewish'i
Petropavlovsk-
Kamchalskiy
L e g en d
Vladivostok
(Prim orski/I
  Main Roads
•  Administrative C entres
Main Railways 
Main Rivers
Kilom etres
Source: Based upon Nicholas J. Lynn, The Far East of Russia: Regional and National 
Perspectives on Economic Development (Birmingham University: School of Geography 
Working Paper No. 4,1996), p. 2.
Jeff Lilly, “Greater Leader’s Gulag,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 September 1993, pp. 21-2; Won 
Bak Kim, “Sino-Soviet Relations and Chinese Workers in the RFE,” Asian Survey. Vol. x io f lV , No. 12, 
December 1994, p. 1065.
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Moscow is over 6,000 kilometers away from Vladivostok (the capital of 
Primorskii krai). Its main transport connections to the Far East are by air and the Trans- 
Siberian railway. The Far East is one of the largest raw material suppliers to the Russian 
markets. Therefore the economy of the region is dependent upon natural resource 
extraction, producing significant quantities of oil, coal, natural gas, timber, gold, 
diamonds and other precious stones.^ During the Soviet era, the Far East emphasised 
resource extraction rather than processing, and industrial production concentrated on 
defence-related projects.^ From the early 1990s there has been a reorientation of Far 
Eastern trade and a greater emphasis on trade relations with other countries. Associated 
with this there has also been an attempt at restructuring resource production in the Far 
East.^  ^Gorbachev emphasised the need to integrate Russia into the Asia-Pacific region 
and to minimise tensions and possible conflicts with neighbouring countries. The Soviet 
successor state, the RF, has continued to reduce its military presence in the region and to 
improve its bilateral relations with neighbouring countries such as China, Japan and 
South Korea. I will deal with further trade and investment relations between the RFE 
and Northeast Asian countries in chapter 6.
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Russian Far East (RFE) in 
the post-Soviet period: looking at its historical development, natural resources, 
transportation and international relations with neighbouring countries.
 ^Violet Conolly, “Siberia: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” in Rodger Swearingen (ed.), Siberia and the 
Soviet Far East: Strategic Dimensions in Multinational Perspective (Stanford University; Hoover, 1987), 
pp. 13-5.
Busygina, “Rossiiskii Dal’niy Vostok,” p. 109.
Tsuneo Akaha, Pavel A. Minakir and Kuno Okada, “Economic Challenge in the Russian Far East,” in 
Tsuneo Akaha (ed.). Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 53-4. 
L.A. Anosova, D afniy Vostok istrany Azii: perspektivy sotrudnichestva (Moscow: RAN, 1993), p. 4;
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2.2: The Historical Development of the Far East
The historical expansion of Russian power in the Far East from the 15* century to 1985 
can be seen through its economic interests in relation to its territories. For centuries the 
Russian Empire and the tonner Soviet Union expanded into the Far East to gain rich 
natural resources. The Far East began by providing furs and later followed with precious 
metals, ores, timber and fish. In the Soviet period, the region’s economic development 
was oriented towards supporting the vital needs of the army and navy. During the 1930s 
and 1940s the modem economic complex of the Far Bast was guided by military- 
strategic objectives, and by the expansion of the prison camp system. In the 1960’s and 
1970’s there was a greater emphasis on natural resource development, but this did not 
affect previous strategies. This resulted in economic stagnation in the 1980s. During 
Gorbachev’s administration a new reform process was implemented which diminished 
the military importance of the Far East. He introduced new attitudes and methods in 
dealing with Far Eastern regional problems. Under the present government the Far 
Eastern region has gained greater freedom in the export of local products. Political 
reform in Russia has also attempted to empower regional authorities in the Far East. 
However, relations with the centre have remained tense and the extent of local 
autonomy is unclear. The RFE has also enhanced external links by international trade 
and investment. Moscow has made attempts at greater integration of the RFE with the 
Asia-Pacific economy.
“Notes Need for Trust,” Tass. 22 July 1992 as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-141. 22 July 1992, p. 14.
Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory L. Freeze, The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey (Khabarovsk: 
RIOTIP, Second Edition, 1996), p. 13.
Sergei Manezhev, The Russian Far East (London: Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1993), pp. 1-
2 .
“Our First Step towards ASEAN,” Pravda. 22 July 1991, p. 6, as cited in the Current Digest o f  the Post- 
Soviet Press (CDPSPL Vol. XLm, No. 29, 1991, p. 16.
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The Far East’s historical development can be divided into three main periods: 
its origin and access to Pacific Asia (15* century-1945), the economic and strategic 
dimensions (1945-1985) and the emerging regionalism from Gorbachev to the present 
Russian Federation (RF)
Origin and Access to Pacific Asia o f  the Far East century-1945), 
Russia’s historical territorial acquisitions in the Far East can be traced as follows. It 
advanced into the Pacific and established sea power (15*-17* century). In the 18* 
century it absorbed a large area of Old Chinese empires. After clashes with Japan in 
1904-1905 and again in 1945, the Russians gained control of South Sakhalin and the 
Kuril islands.
In the late 15*-mid-17* century Russians made their way to Primorskii krai 
from the Trans-Baikal region and southwards from Yakutia. Cossacks and Russian 
peasants penetrated into Siberia and in 1632 Russians established Yakutsk. Russia’s 
first Pacific port, Okhotsk, was established in 1647 after Ivan Moskvitin took Tsarist 
rule to the Pacific and the sea of Okhotsk in early 1639.^  ^ In 1648 a Cossack explorer 
Yermak, reached northeast Siberia. Later in the 17* century Russian explorers 
survived the forbidding waters of Kamchatka and moved towards Japan from the Kuril 
islands. During the reign of Peter the Great Russia became occupied with sea power and 
the need to establish a naval presence in the Pacific. Russian’s expansion was swift.
Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments o f Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983),
p. 8.
® Vladimir Ronin, Reeionv Rossii (Antwerp: Benems, 1996), p. 218.
V. Chemavskaia and O. Sergeev, “The First Expedition o f the Russian Cossack Pioneer Explorers to the 
Amur Region (in Russian), Rossiva i ATR (Vladivostok), 1994, p. 40.
B.N. Slavinskii, “Russia and the Pacific to 1917,” in Stephen and Chichkanov (eds.), Soviet-American 
Horizons on the Pacific (Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 32.
46
taking advantage of rivers and open country to reach the Pacific. This all happened 250
years before Russia explored Central Asia.^^
By the end of the 17* century Russia reached the Pacific and challenged
Chinese dominance. Russia and China first came into contact when Erofei Khabarov in
the 1640s explored the Amur River. In 1651 Khabarov established his first fort on the
Amur and a year later he reached the banks of the Ussuri River.Throughout the 1650s
and 1660s Russians gradually moved to Primorskii krai where they settled in vacant
lands, built small forts and engaged in grain growing, animal husbandry, fishing and
hunting. By 1680 approximately 300 peasants had settled there. The Manchu (Ch’ing)
dynasty had established itself in China, therefore pressure was placed on the Russians to
withdraw gradually. Thus, as the Russians reached the area around the Amur River they
came into conflict with China. This resulted in the Nerchinsk peace treaty between
Russia and China in August 1689.^  ^ Through this treaty no precise demarcation of
jfrontiers was established. But the Russians had to pull out of the Primorskii region.
After this treaty the Russians were excluded from the Amur area. As a result, Russia
failed to establish a grain base in the area.^^
In the 18* century Peter the Great had maintained a naval presence in the
Pacific. In 1714, for instance, he planned to gain control over the sea of Okhotsk and the
search began for a northern sea route to the RFE.^  ^Bobrick and Black’s description of
the Vitus Bering exploration is as follows:
After Peter Great died, in February 1725, his widow and successor, the empress 
Catherine I confirmed Bering’s exploration. The Bering mission was navigated
Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (London: Chatham House, 1990), p. 17.
G. Patrick March, “Amuria/Ussuria: the Russian Prize,” Sibirica. Vol. 1, N o .l, 1993/1994, p. 37. 
Ronin, Reaionv Rossii. p. 219.
Slavinskii, “Russia and the Pacific to 1917,” p. 33.
Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, p. 19.
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through the Arctic ice regions. When Bering arrived in Okhotsk in July 1726, barely 
three dozen Russians lived th ere .T h ey  fed more on fish and roots than on bread. In 
1741 Okhotsk had 73 houses, 33 o f which were occupied by shipbuilders. In 1774 
the centre o f  the harbor was dominated by a fortress and surrounded by a palisade 
with towers. Okhotsk was earmarked as the base o f  the Second Kamchatka 
expedition under Bering.
After Bering’s efforts, G.I. Shelikhov in 1784 established the first permanent 
Russian settlement in Alaska. His exploration of the Northeast Pacific coastline resulted 
in the first development of cross-Pacific links.^^
The late 1840s and early 1860s were a period of change in Russia’s Far Eastern 
policy. The long-standing problem of recovering the territories lost under the Nerchinsk 
Treaty (1689) was raised by various sections of Russian society. The main aim of 
Russia was to expand its power into East Siberia, the Trans-Baikal region and the Sea of 
Okhotsk in order to take over the food and raw material supply and organise 
transportation.^^ After Russia and China signed the Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860) 
treaties, Russia gained territory from China in the Amur basin which provided easy 
access to the Vladivostok region. This issue will be dealt with under the new 
demarcation and border treaty along the Amur River in chapter 5. Through the 1860 
treaty, Vladivostok became the main port of Russian power in the Pacific. The Russians 
also made efforts to reinforce their power influence in Northeast Asia, The Far Eastern
Bering and his staff managed across to Bolsheretsk, the capital o f Kamchatka. Located on the north 
side o f the Bolshaya river, Bolsheretsk was still scarcely more than a stockade, garrisoned with about 45 
troops. Outside the fort there was a chapel dedicated to St. Nicholas with lodging belonging to the church 
and about thirty houses on the various islands o f  the delta (among them a saloon and a distillery). See 
Benson Bobrick, East o f the Sun: the Conquest and Settlement o f Siberia (London: Mandarin, 1993), pp. 
151-53.
J. L. Black, “Opening up Siberia: Russia’s ‘Window on the East,” in Alan Wood (ed.). The History o f  
Siberia: from Russian Conquest to Revolution (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 61-2.
Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific, p. 19.
Alexander Preobrazhensky, “Our Far East: Origins,” International Affairs. Special Issue 1993, pp. 82-3.
Sung Hack Kang, “Korea-USSR Relations in the 20* Century: With Some Remembrance o f  the Last 
Century,” Korea and World Affairs. Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 1991, pp. 682-83.
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administrations were also established: Yakutsk oblast, Primorskii oblast and 
Kamchatka/^
When Russia strengthened its base in Sakhalin, Japan remained the main threat 
to Russian interests in the Far East^ :^
Japan in 1894 seized Korea and attacked Chinese forces at sea and in Manchuria.
China was defeated by Japan and Russia shared a common interest with China in
containing Japan. In a secret treaty in 1896, Russia and China agreed to help each
other against what was by then an increasingly confident Japan.^^
Russia sought to increase the strategic importance of North China, in particular 
the Harbin and Manchuria regions. Russia built the Trans-Siberian railways to the 
Pacific through Manchuria. This railway connected European Russia with East Asia and 
promoted Russian settlement in the Pacific Far East.^^ The railway reached Vladivostok 
in 1904 and provided a way for Russian peasants to migrate.^^ Because of Russia’s 
expansion, there were tensions with Japan which resulted in the Russo-Japanese war of 
1904. After this conflict the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed in 1905. Through this 
treaty Russia lost Liaodong, Port Arthur and the southern railways in China and south 
Sakhalin. "^^
In 1917 there were two revolutions (one in February and the other in October) 
which led to Soviet rule being established. During this time civil war broke out
Ronin, Reeionv Rossii. pp. 222-23.
V. Kozhevnikov, “Japanese Perception o f  Russia: Love and Contempt (in Russian),” Rossiva i ATR 
(Vladivostok), 1994, pp. 107-8.
Steven G. Marks, “The Burden o f the Far East: The Amur Railroad Question in Russia, 1906-1916, 
Sibirica. Vol. 1, No. 1, 1993/4, p. 11.
Extending eventually 5,500 miles through seven time zones from Chelyabinsk in the Ural to 
Vladivostok, the Tran-Siberian railway (1891-1095) was destined to be far the longest railway in the 
world. See Bobrick, East of the Sun, pp. 353-55.
James Forsyth, A History o f the Peoples o f  Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony. 1582-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 219.
Steven G. Mark, Road to Power: the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Colonisation o f Asian Russia. 
1850-1917 (London: Tauris, 1991), pp. 205-6.
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throughout the country/^ Japan attacked Russia in 1918 following the Bolshevik 
uprising. In March 1920 the Soviet Union established a separate state (the Far Eastern 
Republic, FBR) to banish the Japanese army from the Far East,^  ^and then in April 1922 
they established the Yakutia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In the summer of 
1922 the Japanese army began to withdraw from Vladivostok.^^ In November 1922 the 
FBR was absorbed by the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and 
thereby became an integral part of the USSR. Thereby Soviet power was established 
from the Urals to the Pacific.^^ In 1926 the Far East was reclassified as the Far Eastern 
region {Dal 'nevostochny krai) after the incorporation of Chukotka in 1924.^^
Lenin partially agreed to the demands of the pro-autonomy movement in the 
Far East due to the chaotic conditions of the Civil War. However, Stalin removed all 
traces of regionalism in the Far East as elsewhere."^  ^He systematically purged the local 
leadership in the 1930s and also deported or relocated the region’s Korean (see chapter 
6) and Chinese minorities. Labour camps filled with prisoners rapidly took over the 
region. A large number of people perished working in mines, logging camps and 
construction projects across the north of the region."^  ^ In the early 1990s, a FER 
movement was revived in the RFE. This will be dealt with in chapter 3 as an example of 
post-Soviet Far Eastern regionalism.
John Channon, “Siberia in Revolution and Civil War, 1917-1921,’ in Wood (ed,). The History o f  
Siberia: from Russian Conquest to Revolution, pp. 163-64.
Ibid., p. 176; Ronin, Reeionv Rossii. p. 224.
John J. Stephan. The Russian Far East (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 141-55.
G. Otaina, “Aborigenii Dal’nego Vostoka,” Rossiva i ATR (Vladivostok), 1994, pp. 49-50.
Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 160 and p. 173.
Ibid., pp. 174-75.
An example was that more work, less food, less heat, worse clothes, ferocious discipline and more 
severe punishment was in effect. See Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 2 (Glasgow: 
Collins, 1975), pp. 107-11 and p. 119.
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Economic and Strategic Dimensions (1945-1985). In August 1945, Soviet 
troops crossed the Amur and captured Manchuria, by defeating the Japanese/^ Soviet 
troops also occupied North Korea and supported the North Korean communist 
revolution. After the Korean War (1950-53), relations with the USA deteriorated further 
and the Far East came to occupy a strategic position in the Cold War. In this period, Far 
East administrative regions were sub-divided; Sakhalin oblast was formed in 1947 (it 
was detached from the Khabarovsk krai), Amur oblast in 1948 (from the Chita district 
and Khabarovsk krai), Magadan oblast in 1953 and Kamchatka oblast in 1956 (both 
from Khabarovsk krai).'^^
After the Stalin era the Far East’s economy was developed under Khrushchev. 
In 1958 the Far East became involved in international trading and agreed to supply 
Japan with coal and timber in exchange for manufactured goods. Nikita Khrushchev 
also launched resource development projects in industrialisation, oil, natural gas, 
electricity, forestry, mineral resources, fishing and the development of seaports at 
Vladivostok, Nakhodka and Vanino.' '^  ^In February 1966, at the 23^ *^  CPSU (Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union) congress, a five-year plan was approved which emphasised 
the importance of the Soviet Far East in the exploitation of economic and strategic 
resources. The Soviet Union initiated significant joint economic projects with Japan 
during 1967 and 1969 to develop this concept.'^  ^ A complementary relationship arose 
between the Far East and Japan; Japan was rich in technology but poor in resources
Forsyth, A History o f  the Peoples o f  Siberia, p. 354, 
Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 243.
44 After the Soviet-Japanese Peace Declaration o f 1956 and the commercial treaty o f 1958, Japan joined 
the Far East’s international economic activity. See. Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 262.
Rodger Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, pp. 230-31; Thomas W. Robinson, “Soviet Policy 
in Asia: the Military Dimension,” in Robbin F. Laird (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy (New York; the 
Academy o f Political Science, 1987), p. 152.
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whereas the Far East was rich in resources but poor in technology. This example shows 
the potential that exists for interaction between the Soviet Far East and other 
northeastern countries,"^  ^ In addition, financial incentives (for instance, wage bonuses) 
working in the difficult conditions of the north encouraged the migration of workers to 
the Far East. This was one of the main reasons for population growth in the region 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.'^^
Khrushchev’s successor Leonid Brezhnev, at the 24* CPSU congress in 
February 1971, announced a new plan for the development of the national economy 
(1971-1975). He devoted a substantial and specific section to the Soviet Far East.'^ ® A 
greater emphasis was placed on the development of energy resources (oil and some 
gases) with Japan. Construction of the Baikal-Amur mainline railway (BAM) started in 
1974. This aimed at opening up Far East resource industries to further export-oriented 
development."^  ^However, regional industrial production was dominated by the mining, 
fishing and forestry sectors and was characterised by a very low level of raw-material 
processing.
During Brezhnev’s visit to the Far East in 1978 he underlined the importance 
of Soviet strategic developments in the region. In the same year the Soviet military 
presence was increased in the Kuril islands,^^ along the Sino-Soviet border, the Sino- 
Mongolian border, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka peninsula. Over a quarter of
Gary Hausladen, “Perestroika and Siberia: Frontier Resources Development,” in Michael J. Bradshaw 
(ed.), The Soviet Union: A New Regional Geography? (London: Belhaven Press, 1991), p. 109.
Nicholas J. Lynn, The Far East o f Russia: Regional and National Perspectives on Economic 
Development (Birmingham University: School o f Geography Working Paper No. 4, 1996), p. 9.
Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, Third edition, 1988), pp. 165-66.
Stephan, The Russian Far East, p. 266.
Michael J. Bradshaw, “Economic Relations o f  the Russian Far East with the Asian-Pacific States,” 
Post-Soviet Geography. Vol. 35, No. 4, 1994, pp. 234-35.
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Soviet armed forces were deployed to the Far East/^ This continuous military 
expansion into the Far East resulted in the 1969 Ussuri River conflict with China, the 
1979 Soviet support for Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, the decline of US-Soviet 
détente in the early 1980s and the Korean Air Lines (KAL 007) incident in 1983/^
This expansion created an imbalance of military, political and economic 
relations between the Soviet Union and neighbouring countries. For progress in 
economic relations the Soviet Union would be required to reduce its military presence 
in the Far East and a new political concept of co-operation with the neighbouring 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) would need to be established. '^^
Emerging Regionalism: From Gorbachev to the Present Russian Federation 
(RF). Despite all the reforms proposed during the last decades, the economic stagnation 
of the early 1980s seemed entrenched. To reverse this trend new ideas for restructuring 
emerged under Gorbachev. It was noted that the eastern regions were of particular 
importance during Gorbachev’s keynote speech at the 27* CPSU congress in February 
1986. He announced a set of ‘Basic Guidelines of the Social and Economic 
Development of the Soviet Union (1986-1990)’ and for the period up to the year 2000,^  ^
This emphasised the short-term and long-term future which was connected with the 
development of the Soviet Far East on the basis of the exploitation of its natural
Swearingen, “The Soviet Far East, East Asia,” p. 232.
Herbert J. Ellison, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective (Seattle: University o f Washington, 
1982), pp. 200-2.
Peter Zwick, Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 312.
A. Bogaturov, V. Lukin and M. Nossov, ‘International Security in tlie Asia-Pacific Region,” in Richard 
Smoke and Andrei Kortunov (eds.). Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 208.
 ^ Ni Xiaoquan, “Gorbachev’s Policy towards the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Pushpa Thambipillai and 
Daniel C. Matuszewski (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region: Views from the Region 
(New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 13-4.
Jolin J. Stephan, “The Russian Far East,” Current History: A Journal o f Contemporary World Affairs.
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resources and the provision of transportation links/^ Two other major speeches, at 
Vladivostok in July 1986 and at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988, stressed the critical 
and growing significance of the Soviet Far East. Gorbachev particularly emphasised the 
importance of building up bilateral relations with all countries in Northeast Asia.^  ^This, 
he suggested, could be achieved using two major objectives: by minimising Soviet 
military power in the region through the withdrawal of a considerable number of troops 
from Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border, and by attracting more active neighbouring 
and western involvement in the economic development of the Soviet Far East. These 
major decisions adopted by the Soviet leadership focused its attention eastward.
We can see that the course of reform throughout the Gorbachev years (1985- 
1991) represented a new pattern of economic, political and international relations in the 
Far East, breaking with the traditional pattern of reforms in the Soviet Union. Since the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the decentralising of the economic 
system encouraged the RFE to seek a new pattern of co-operation with the outside 
w o r l d .T h e  regional policy of the central government has subsequently been 
characterised by a tension between the need for intensified economic and political 
independence in the region and the contradictory forms that local sovereignty has 
taken.^^
October 1993, p. 332.
Yufan Hao, “The Development o f  the Soviet Far East: A Chinese Perspective,” Korea and World 
Affairs. Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 231.
For the text o f  these speeches see M. S. Gorbachev, Izbrannve rechi i stat’i. Vol. 4 (Moscow; Politizdat, 
1987), pp. 9-34, and ibid.. Vol. 6 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), pp. 540-64.
Stephen M. Young, “Gorbachev’s Asian Policy: Balancing the New and Old,” Asian Survey. Vol. 28, 
No. 3, March 1988, p. 318; Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in 
the Gorbachev Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 27-8.
“Prising Open Vladivostok,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 15 August 1991, p. 44.
Tamara Troyakova, “Regional Policy in the RFE and the Rise o f Localism,” The Journal o f  East Asian 
Affairs. No. 2, Vol. IX, Summer/Fall 1995, pp. 428-29.
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The rise of regionalism in the Far East has been encouraged by the steady 
economic decline of the region and also lack of support from the central government. 
To overcome this situation the RFE leaders tried to gain special privileges from the 
central government in return for gradually transfonning itself into a market-oriented 
economy. They demanded more freedom in business activities and privatisation, which 
has sometimes caused central-peripheral conflict.^^ In the early 1990s Far East 
regionalism grew and this supported the idea of the rebirth of the Far Eastern Republic 
(FER).^^ In September 1990 the Far Eastern Republic Freedom Party (FERF) was 
established to support the FER. The leaders of the FERF party declared their opposition 
to central governmental rule.^ '* In early 1991 the regional organisation - the Far East 
Association - was also created to represent the interests of the Far Eastern region. In 
1992 it was renamed the Far East Economic Co-operation (FEEC) and included all the 
local administrators of the individual Far Eastern regions. The FEEC preserved political 
and economic interests in the Far East. After the signing of the 1992 Federal Treaty and 
during the process of drafting the new 1993 constitution local politicians frequently 
talked about re-establishing the FER.^^
However, the FER and the FEEC could not present a united regional front. 
These two movements were limited by a lack of support from regional political leaders 
in the Far East. It seemed that the FER awakened historical interest among the people.^^ 
The regions of the RFE, however, were divided and failed to work together to create an
Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita, Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion: The Provinces 
Versus the Centre in Russia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), p. 181.
“Moscow is Provoking Separatism in Russia,” Izvestiva. 29 November 1995, pp. 1-2, as cited in 
CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 48, 1995, p. 18.
Stephan, “The Russian Far East,” p, 334.
Busygina, “Rossiiskii Dal’niy Vostok,” pp. 116-17.
Irina Busygina, “Primor’e,” Svobodnaya M v sf. September 1995, p. 90.
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effective autonomous movement/^ In chapter 3 I will deal with the centre-periphery 
relations specifically focusing on regionalism in the RFE and will elaborate on the FER 
and the FEEC.
2.3: Natural Resources and Transportation in the RFE
As illustrated earlier in this chapter, the Far East has been regarded as a major resource 
potential. The region has expanded its export of natural resources due to its geographic 
proximity to the Asian Pacific region. A new resource development project would 
improve the economic situation in the Far East region and consolidate Russia’s political 
and economic positions in Northeast Asia.^ ® The most developed sector of the Far 
Eastern economy consists of the extraction and exploitation of natural resources. The 
region has a very diverse natural resource base including mining, fishing and logging, 
with some processing in these sectors. Transportation has played an exceptionally vital 
role in the social and economic development of the Far East. Difficulties are apparent 
due to the RFE’s remote location; severe weather and mountain terrain lead to high 
transportation costs. Despite this problem, Russian goods from Siberia, the Urals, 
central Russia and the CIS still make their way through freight transport to RFE ports 
and then abroad.
In the following section, I will begin by focusing on the Far East’s main natural 
resources and levels of production during the past decade. Attention will then be turned 
to the Far East’s main sources of transportation.
Natural Resources. The Far Bast contains large proportions of coal, oil, natural
“T’ma ovladela Vostokom (Vladivostok in Darkness),” Argumenty i Faktv. No. 21, 1997, p. 7. 
Busygina “Rossiiskii D afniy Vostok,” pp. 110-11.
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gas deposits, rich minerals and possesses large forestry and fishing industries. The 
following excerpt illustrates which natural resources contribute most to the region’s 
economic development:
The area is rich in many resources; it has 35 per cent o f the RF’s forest coverage, 26 
per cent o f its wood reserve, 27 per cent o f its potential water-power reserve and 17 
per cent o f its maritime biological resources on continental shelves. One o f  the most 
valuable components o f the Far East’s resource potential is its forests. It has the 
largest land area o f forests in the RF and ranks only second to eastern Siberia in the 
volume o f its timber reserves.™ The Far East contains over 30 per cent o f  explored 
coal reserves on the territory o f the former Soviet Union and its offshore oil and 
natural gas deposits represent approximately 30 per cent o f the Russian total. Some 
70 kinds of mineral resources have been found in the region, including iron ore, non- 
ferrous and precious metals (such as gold, silver, zinc, lead, tin, copper, etc.), 
diamonds, chemical raw materials, building materials, fish and other sea products, 
exports o f wood and beans.
The marine life in the RFE’s 200-mile offshore zone is estimated at about 30 
million tons, or approximately 17 per cent of total resources in the Pacific. The RFE is a 
major Russian supplier of non-ferrous and precious metals, timber, minerals and fish. 
The mining industry, fishing and forest industries are markedly export-oriented.^^ The 
region also has an extensive tourism industry, including beach and coastal water 
recreational zones, opportunities for fishing, hunting and winter sports, curative mineral 
and thermal springs.^  ^ It is expected that these activities will be extended to a network 
of hotels, motels, and huntsmen’s preserves in Kamchatka oblast, the South of 
Primorskii krai and on Amur oblast for use by the tourism industry.
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey, p. 152.
™ Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory L. Freeze, The Russian Far East: An Economic Handbook (Armonk, 
New York: M E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 62.
Leslie Dienes, Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices (London: Westview, 
1987), pp. 32-3.
The region provides over 40 per cent o f Russia timber exports, 7 per cent o f wood-pulp, 5 per cent o f  
wood-working products, 23 per cent o f fish, 30 per cent o f tinned fish and 20 per cent o f coal. See 
Manezhev, The Russian Far East, pp. 17-8.
™ “RAU Business Book: Russia Today,” Obozrevatel’. Agency 1993, p. 62.
™ Busygina, “Primor’e,” p. 90; Manezhev, The Russian Far East, p. 21.
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In the RFE, each region has supplied large quantities of natural resources for 
the national economy as follows:
(A) The republic of Sakha (including the region around Yakutsk and southern Yakutiya, 
around Neryungri) supplies coal, diamonds (99 per cent of all Russia’s diamonds) and 
iron ore. It also produces agricultural products for local consumption.^^
(B) In the Pacific Far East there are three relatively isolated sub-regions: Magadan 
oblast, Kamchatka oblast and Sakhalin oblast. Each is located near an important port 
facility: Magadan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk respectively. 
Magadan is a major source of gold, Kamchatka supplies coal and Sakhalin is beginning 
to extract its deposits of oil and gas. Each also provides access to the Pacific.^^
(C) The third region includes Khabarovsk krai, Primorskii krai and Amur oblast. The 
major cities of the region are Khabarovsk, Vladivostok and Nakhodka as well as the 
region’s major industrial centre, Komsomolsk-na-Amure.^^ Khabarovsk and 
KomsomoIsk-na-Amure are major suppliers of timber products, coal and non-ferrous 
metals. They also produced machinery, especially machinery associated with 
shipbuilding and repair. Vladivostok, in addition, is the terminus of the Trans-Siberian 
railway and a major naval port. Since the 1970s Nakhodka and Vostochny have both 
developed into major ports with special facilities for loading coal, timber and 
containers. In addition to the natural resources these ports provide greater access to the 
Pacific for both economic and military purposes.
Rodger Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, p. 31.
™ David Wilson, “The Siberian Oil and Gas Industry, in Alan Wood (ed.), Siberia: Problems and 
Prospects for Regional Development (London: Groom Helm, 1987), pp. 124-25.
Conolly, “Siberia: Yesterday, Today and Tomon-ow,” p. 33.
Viktor Savalei, “Maritime Territory: in Search o f an Economic Niche,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), 
No. 6, 1991, p. 21.
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Now we shall attend to the RFE’s regional economy which is mainly based on 
mining, fishing and logging. Since the beginning of the 1990s these industries have 
experienced an overall gradual decline in production. Mining was a fairly stable 
industry in the RFE with only the smallest fluctuations occurring despite the turbulence 
of the first half of the 1990s. However, unlike the general mining industry, the gold- 
mining industry has been in crisis for several years and annual production has been 
steadily decreasing. In the Soviet period, Magadan oblast was the highest gold producer 
because Chukotka was included in the Magadan statistics. However, the Sakha republic 
superseded Magadan oblast in later years.^^
Most of these regions are seeking foreign investment and foreign technology 
for hard rock gold mining. Governor Mikhailov of Magadan oblast, for instance, has 
stated that the future of the oblast’s gold mining industry depends on strong partnerships 
with foreign mining companies.In Magadan oblast and Khabarovsk krai, several joint 
ventures have included raising capital to commence a modernisation programme for its 
gold mining operations and development of gold sites.^^
Russia is the world’s second-largest diamond producer (behind South Africa 
and Botswana combined). As can be seen in table 2-1, all of Russia’s diamonds come 
from the republic of Sakha. Diamond-mining is monopolised by the joint stock 
company, Almazy Rossii-Sakha (ARS), located in Sakha and controlled by the Russian 
and Sakha governments. Sakha is trying to implement a programme to develop its own 
diamond-processing industry. Sales in 1994 were limited almost exclusively to domestic
™ Finansowe Izvestiva. p. 12, November 1996, as cited in Russian Far East Update IRFEUl. Vol. VII, 
No. 1, January 1997, p. 6.
“Foreign Investment in the RFE’s gold Mining Industry: Cyprus Amax Leads the Way,” Russian Far 
East Update IRFEU). Vol. VI, No. 5, May 1996, p. 6.
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Russian markets and were therefore small 82
Table 2-1: Mining Industry in the RFE in 1994: Share of Russia’s Total Output
Item % Item %
Diamond 99.8 Tin 95
Gold 69.0 Lead 50
Silver N/a Zinc 50
Platinum N/a Tungsten 40
Source: The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide (Seattle: Russian Far East 
Update, Third Edition, 1997-1998), p. 127.
The second most important natural resource in the RFE is fishing. The RFE is 
Russia’s most important fishing region. A successful fishing season kept the economies 
of Kamchatka, Primorskii and Sakhalin from registering overall industrial declines. In 
fact, Kamchatka, which relies almost entirely on the fishing industry, was the only RFE 
region that showed growth in 1995 (an estimated 7 per cent).^^
Table 2-2: Production and Exports of Fresh/Frozen Fish in Primorskii krai (in 
1,000s of metric tons)
Tear Production Export
1991 1,106 174
1992 485 58
1993 387 108
1994 370 229
1995 542 417
Source: “Primorskii krai Fish Exports,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 11, December 1996, p. 4.
“Mining Update: Khabarovsk krai and Magadan oblast,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 10, May 1997, p. 10. 
“Sakha Republic Diamond Company Profiled,” Delovoy Mir. 24 August 1995, p. 5, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-95-171, 5 September 1995, pp. 30-31.
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Like other industries the fishing industry has re-oriented towards foreign 
consumers. In 1995, for example, Primorskii fishing enterprises continued to export 
most of their fish despite a more favourable domestic market for fi’esh and frozen fish, 
as can be seen in table 2-2. Moscow is the biggest domestic buyer at 9.1 per cent. In 
comparison with fresh/frozen fish, almost all canned fish produced in Primorskii krai 
was sold on the domestic market in 1995.^ '^  To develop the fishing and timber industry 
further it will be necessary to modernise and buy new fishing vessels, mostly with the 
help of foreign partners as the mining industry has been forced to do.
In examining the timber industry, it is evident that it is also in decline. 
Logging, not wood processing, is the major activity in this sector for many RFE 
territories. In this industry production decreased from some 35 million cubic meters in 
the late 1980s to only 10 million cubic meters in 1994 but saw some improvement in 
1995 where production was up 4 per cent from the previous year.^^
There are three main reasons why the timber industry has experienced one of 
the largest declines amongst all the RFE major industrial sectors. Primarily, high rail 
tariffs have left all inland producers isolated and rendered them economically unviable. 
This has led to the high construction costs of road transport and other necessary 
infrastructure. Western firms that have declined to participate in logging ‘say capital 
costs are too high and that the remote locations and the general working environment 
prevent the projects from being commercially viable.’®*^ Secondly, there is the decline is 
the absence of clear property rights over timber resources. In contrast to mining and
^  Elisa Miller and Soula Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide (Seattle: 
Russian Far East Update, Third Edition, 1997-1998), p. 121.
“Primorskii krai Fish Exports,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 11, December 1996, p. 4.
Miller and Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East, p. 121.
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fishing, distribution of ownership rights on forested land has proved to be more difficult 
to clarify, and as such it is prone to confusion and to favoritism. Finally, the depression 
in the timber industry has roots in one specific pattern of development. The RFE timber 
industry relied on both Japanese capital (for financing equipment purchases) and on 
Japanese markets (for selling produce). For example, for the past 20 years, via a number 
of compensation agreements, major Japanese trading companies (backed by government 
guarantees) were financing the development of logging in the region. Millions of dollars 
in loans to Russia were used to buy logging equipment as well as trucks and earth 
moving equipment to build roads in the taiga. Although Japan remains the single largest 
market for RFE timber exports (80 to 85 per cent), the 1990s have seen the former 
system break down resulting in a decline in the timber industry.
The timber industry is concentrated in Khabarovsk krai, which in 1995 
accounted for 58 per cent of the RFE’s industrial wood production. Amur and Sakhalin 
oblasts accounted for about 16 per cent each and Primorskii krai 11 per cent. Although 
the industry is in decline, foreigners have continued to find the RFE’s timber resources 
attractive.In September 1995, for instance, there were 108 registered foreign joint 
ventures in the RFE. About 71 of them were in the timber industry, mostly with 
Japanese companies.^^ About 5.75 million cubic meters of Far Eastern logs were
“What’s wrong with the RFE logging industry?,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 12, December 1997, p. 6.
Miller and Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East, pp. 139-41; Vysiigiha, “Rossiiskii Dal’niy Vostok,” p. 
109.
Ibid., p. 142.
Yuzhno-Sakhalinskii Experimentalnyi Remmekhzavod (ERMZ) formed a new wood processing joint 
venture with Japanese Michinoku Lis. Co. Ltd., wliich began operations in May in Yuzlino-Saklialinsk. 
Technical equipment has been supplied by a Japanese company, a subsidiary o f  the Michinoku Bank. The 
bank planned its initial investment to be US$ 700,000. The designed capacity o f the plant was 12,000 
cubic metres o f wood produced a year. See “Sakhalin Wood Processor Joins With Japanese Partners,” 
RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 5, May 1997, p. 4.
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exported to Japan in 1997, almost 14 per cent higher than in 1996.^° In early 1990 the 
South Korean company Hyundai also established a Svetiaya joint venture in 
Khabarovsk krai. But Hyundai’s project is currently facing some developmental 
difficulties. I will deal with this project further in chapter 6.
Transportation, Previously, waterways had provided the chief transportation 
routes in the RFE. Today, however, they no longer play such a vital role with the 
exception of the Amui-Ussuri River. This river shows much potential in terms of trade 
and as a source of hydroelectricity.^^ The three main transportation systems in the RFE 
consist of the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railways, the airplane 
services (which are now updating and expanding) and shipping, which is promoting its 
exports and imports from other parts of Russia to the Far East and abroad.
Considering the railway systems in the RFE, the two most reliable are clearly 
the Trans-Siberian (double track) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railroads as 
illustrated in map 2-2. Both rail connections are concentrated in the central and southern 
part of the Far East. The southern line extends westwards out of the region, widening as 
it crosses the Urals. In the east, the main termini of these railway lines are the ports of 
Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Vostochnyi, Poset, Zarubino, Sovetskaya Gavan and Vanino.^^ 
As well as the BAM railway system there exists the 830 kilometer line (515 mile)^  ^
called the ‘Little BAM’ which runs along the Tynda-Tommot-Yakutsk railroad. Its 
construction began in 1985 and was completed to Aldan (in Sakha). The line was
“Why Russian Timber Flood the Japanese Market During 1997,” RFEU. Vol. VIII, No. 2, February 
1998, p. 5.
Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East, pp. 59-60; Robert North, “The Far Eastern Transport 
System,” in Allan Rodgers (ed.), The Soviet Far East: Geographical Perspectives on Development 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p. 213.
Robert North, “Transport and Communications,” in Wood (ed.), Siberia: Problems and Prospect, pp. 
136-37.
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extended another 520 kilometers in order to reach Sakha’s capital, Yakutsk. Thus, 
Yakutsk is linked by rail with Trans-Siberian and European Russia via the BAM. Some 
Russians anticipate that this Yakut line may eventually be extended beyond the borders 
of Yakutia to the port of Magadan in the far north. '^^
Map 2-2: The Baikal-Amur Mainline Railway (BAM)
The Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) in 1986
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Source: Victor Mote, “The Communications Infrastructure,” in Rodger Swearingen 
(ed.), Siberia and the Soviet Far East: Strategic Dimensions in Multinational Perspective 
(Stanford: Hoover, 1987), p. 48.
Mote, “The Communications Infrastructure,” p. 49.
Violet ConoUy, “The Baikal-Amur Railway (the BAM),” in Wood (ed.), Siberia: Problems and 
Prospects, p. 167; Theodore Shabad, “News Notes,” Soviet Geography. Vol. 27, No. 1, January 1986, p.
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The RFE has a rail-ferry connection that is used to ship supplies from the 
mainland to Sakhalin island. The port of Vanino (in Khabarovsk krai) is linked by 
railway ferry with the port of Kholmsk on Sakhalin island. Three segments of the Trans- 
Siberian railway also pass through a border crossing in the northeastern provinces of 
China and North Korea. A section of line is still under construction between Kraskino, 
Primorskii krai and the Chinese city of Hunchung (in the province of Jilin). Under the 
Tumen river project further lines are being planned and constructed to link Primorskii 
krai with China and North Korea. This will be dealt with further in chapter 6.
Despite its high costs, air transportation is the most popular and important 
mode of transportation in the RFE today. Business has exploded within the last decade 
and connections have been extended to most of its neighbouring countries. South Korea, 
China, Japan and other western countries have opened direct services between the Far 
East and their countries. A regular international air service is available at five RFE 
cities: Khabarovsk (Khabarovsk krai), Vladivostok (Primorskii krai), Magadan 
(Magadan oblast), Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii (Kamchatka oblast) and Yuzhno- 
Sakhalinsk (Sakhalin oblast).^^ With Moscow’s backing SAT Airlines (Sakhalinskie 
Aviatrassy), based in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, has been created. It is a government owned 
service and now competes with the former Aeroflot divisions. The airline’s fleet ranges 
from helicopters to a leased Boeing 737 which flies regularly scheduled domestic and 
international charter flights.
13.
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East: An Economic Survey, p. 154.
V. Ishaev, “We have our own laws (O nas svoe pole zakonov),” Argumentv i Faktv. No. 24, 1997, p. 9. 
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East, pp. 159-60.
SAT has a tomlst agency ‘Satellit” on Saklialin. Satellit initiated a meeting o f Sakhalin and South 
Korean tour agencies in mid-October 1997 on Sakhalin. SA Es passengers were tourists most o f them 
travel to South Korea and Japan. See “SAT Promotes South Korean Tourism,” RFELT. Vol. VIT, No. 12,
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Foreign expertise and capital at most of the RFE’s international airports have 
been sought to help with new construction and upgrades. For instances, Vladivostok 
international airport was reconstructed by the South Korean company Hyundai in the 
mid 1990s.^  ^Khabarovsk’s modem intemational-passenger terminal was completed in 
1993 by a Japanese company. Sakha’s international air-passenger terminal also was 
built by a Canadian construction firm in 1996.^°  ^The Russian Far East Update mentions 
a few ongoing projects involving foreign technology and capital:
(1) Sakhalin Airport authorities are seeking foreign investment to reconstruct the 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk airport for international flights and are actively negotiating with 
several Japanese firms. The estimated cost o f the airport project is US$ 55 million.
Sakhalin Administration provided US$ 3 million for airport construction in 1996.
The federal government has designated funds for the airport but has yet to provide 
these funds. IDI
(2) The new Federal Aviation Authority o f Russia submitted the financing 
programme for the upgrade o f the RFE air traffic control to the Russian Ministry o f  
Finance and Ministry o f Economy. Monies for the project are expected to come 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The project 
has been downsized from an original estimated cost o f US$ 150 million, and is now 
being looked at in phases.
The US Trade and Development Agency also provided a US$ 750,000 grant 
towards a study to establish an aircraft leasing company that would supply the new 
Antonov-38 aircraft to airlines in Khabarovsk krai, Kamchatka oblast, Chukotka and the 
Sakha republic. A US$ 70 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan will be 
used to lengthen Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk’s airport runway, construct a new navigation and 
flight control tower and upgrade the international passenger terminal .Another
1997, p. 2.
When I arrived to conduct my field research at Vladivostok airport in September 1996, I noticed that 
the passenger arrival and departure points were reconstructed by a Korean company.
Miller and Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East, p. 109,
“Sakhalin International Airport Development,” RFEU. Vol. VII, N o.l, January 1997, p. 2.
“Cuirent Status of RFE Air Traffic Control Plan,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1997, p. 2.
103 “Aircraft Leasing Company Study Approved for RFE,” RFEU. Vol. VTB, No. 3, March 1998. p. 2. 
“Vuzhno-Sakhalinsk Airport Gets Loan to Modernise,” RFEU. Vol. VH, No. 9, September 1997, p. 2.
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airport-deveiopment project which is under study involves the upgrading of a former 
military air base near Nakhodka for use as a commercial airport These examples 
illustrate the wide scope of foreign input in the RFE’s air services.
Finally, we shall look at the shipping transportation service in the RFE. These 
services contribute to both foreign and coastal trade between the southern and northern 
regions of the RFE. The RFE ports continue to gain in national importance, especially 
the container ports of Vostochny and Nakhodka in Primorski krai. Other ports of 
national interest include Vanino in Khabarovsk krai and a new complex at Zarubino in 
the Tumen river delta in southern Primorskii krai, near Russia’s border with China and 
North Korea. Zarubino port handled 611,000 metric tons of freight in 1996, 20 per 
cent more than the previous year. Coastal trade operates from ports in southern 
Primorskii krai (in particular, Vladivostok and Nakhodka) to ports in the far north such 
as Magadan, Chukotka, and Kamchatka. A distinct feature of the coastal trade is its 
seasonality. Maximum turnover is registered from May to October when navigation in 
the Arctic regions is possible.
In the past several years, domestic cargo for coastal trade has dropped 
gradually while foreign cargo has increased. However, the net result still shows marked 
overall declines. Primorskii krai ports demonstrated this trend between 1991 and 
1995 (see table 2-3). During this period exports increased steadily, primarily due to the 
increase in ferrous metal products exported although the domestic demand for these 
products has dropped off sharply. But the imports decreased. Although there was an
Miller and Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East, p. 110.
Ibid., p. 101.
“Changes at the Port o f Zarubino,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 9, September 1997, p. 2. 
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East, p. 153.
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increase in imported foodstuffs in 1995, sharp decreases in imported grain and Japanese 
steel products reflect the overall decline/
Table 2-3: Primorskii krai Ports Cargo Turnover from 1991 to 1995 (in millions of 
tons, includes commercial and fishing ports)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total 30.0 26.6 25.8 24.2 23.8
Exports 12.5 12.6 13.9 15.5 17.5
Imports 4.4 4.0 2.2 1.5 0.7
Coastal trade 13.1 10.0 9.7 7.2 5.6
Source: Pacific Economic Development and Co-operation Centre, Economic Research 
Institute (Vladivostok) as cited in RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1996, p. 12.
A few other ports in the RFE have faced similar situations. Vanino trade port in 
Khabarovsk krai processed 5.5 million metric tons of cargo in 1995. This was about the 
same amount as in 1994 but was approximately half the amount processed in 1990. 
Magadan trade port also experienced decline as it processed only 669,000 metric tons of 
cargo in 1995, a drop of 30 per cent from 1994.^^  ^In addition, Kholmsk and Korsakov 
trade ports in Sakhalin have been faced with sharp cargo turnover decline and heavy 
financial losses over the last few years. Kholmsk trade port, which has traditionally 
been primarily used for domestic cargo, has suffered a sharp decline in cargo turnover 
in the early 1990s mainly due to the drop in domestic cargo transported by the Vanino 
(mainland)-Kholmsk ferry.^^^
“Primorskii Krai Ports Cargo Turnover; Some Statistics,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1996, p. 12. 
“News on RFE Ports According to the Press,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 7, July 1996, p. 2.
In the early 1990s, Kholmsk handled approximately 7 million metric tons (MT) o f ferry cargo from the 
mainland. Korskov trade port processes most o f Sakhalin’s import and export cargo, was handling only
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As can be seen from all these examples, domestic coastal trade and foreign 
imports have experienced decline over the years between 1991 and 1995. Conversely, 
foreign exports have increased. This trend is expected to continue into the future.
Despite this setback a new service has entered the shipping arena bringing new 
hope for transport development. This has come in the form of passenger transportation, 
which has become popular along the shipping routes between the RPE and Asia Pacific 
countries. For example, a new RFE-South Korea passenger line was opened in the early 
1990s. Korus Shipping Co. Ltd (Seoul) has leased the ‘Olga Sadovskaya’ from FESCO 
(Far Eastern Shipping Company, headquartered in Vladivostok) and has begun a 
passenger service between Vladivostok and Pusan which has the capacity for 200 
passengers.
2.4: The Russian Far East and Its Neighbouring Countries
As previously noted, Gorbachev emphasised the need to integrate Russia into the Asia- 
Pacific region by minimising possible military conflict with its neighbouring countries. 
The RF has continued this policy by reducing its military presence in the Far East, 
improving Moscow’s bilateral relations with China, Japan and South Korea in 
particular^ (see map 2-3). These positive relationships have attracted economic 
development to the RFE and in turn direct contact with the Asia-Pacific region has been 
achieved. Russia’s economic decentralisation and regional autonomy have also
one fifth o f the cargo it processed in 1990 (2.5 million MT). See “Sakhalin’s Ports Turnover,” RFEU, Vol. 
VII, No. 2, February 1997, p. 3.
“New RFE-South Korea Passenger Line,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 9, September 1996, p. 2.
Stephen Blank, “The New Russia in the New Asia,” International Journal. Vol. XLIX, Autumn 1994, 
pp. 876-77.
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enhanced this development/^"^ This can be seen in Russia’s involvement with ASEAN 
(the Association of South East Asian Nations), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co­
operation) and other regional organizations/^^ Since 1992 the RF has become a member 
of the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference and an observer at the ASEAN 
ministerial conference. With strong support from China and South Korea (amongst 
other member countries), Russia finally joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC) in 1998.“ ^
When the Soviet Union considered further diplomatic and economic advance in 
the Northeast Asian region, it was apparent that Japan would be its greatest single 
challenge. The disputed islands have remained a major obstacle to a deeper Russian- 
Japanese relationship. Moscow also recognised the importance of China and South 
Korea’s political normalisation. China is a geopolitical and economic priority for Russia 
and stable relations with Beijing are necessary for Russian security. Concerning the 
Korean peninsula, Russia has developed a closer relationship vwth the South while 
maintaining balanced relations with the North. The following section will illustrate 
the development of the relationships between the RFE and these neighbouring 
countries.
The RF opened the strategically positioned Far Eastern port o f Vladivostok to foreign ships for the 
first time in more than 30 years. See Busygina, “RossiiskÜ D d ’niy Vostok,” pp. 111-12.
“Russian Desire To Join APEC Viewed,” Delovov Mir. 14 July 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-154. 10 
August 1995, p. 6.
Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 51,31 March 1998, p. 9.
117 Kozyrev Wants to Boosts Relations with East,” Xinhua, 4 August 1992, as cited in FBlS-China-92- 
151,5 August, 1992, p. 8.
“Russia’s New Policy for Asia, Pacific,” Rossiiskiye Vesti. 5 December 1997, as cited in RIA-Novosti
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Map 2-3: The Russian Far East and Its Neighbours
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Source: W. Mendl, Japan’s Asia Policy (London: Routledge, 1995), p. xvi.
China, After decades of military tension and economic underdevelopment on 
either side of the border, the RF has developed a new path in its bilateral and border 
relations with China/Gorbachev took steps in the late 1980s to address the most
Daily Review. 5 December 1997, p. 6.
Neil Melvin, Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation (London; The Royal Institute of  
International Affairs, 1995), p. 22.
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serious issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict. His efforts resulted in his May 1989 trip to 
Beijing. In this summit, the two countries initially agreed to negotiate further arms 
reductions along their common border and to continue to seek agreement on the 
disputed boundary i s su e .T a b le  2-4 shows which bilateral relations between the two 
countries improved. Progress, in particular, was made in demarcating the border in the 
1994 summit. During Jiang Zemin’s June 1997 visit to Moscow, both presidents agreed 
that a final resolution of the demarcation process would be completed in December of 
1997. This occurred under very strong opposition from Far Eastern local authorities, 
particularly from the Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko in Primorskii krai.
The rapid expansion of Russian-Chinese relations during the 1990s led to a 
dramatic increase in bilateral contacts between governmental entities, as well as newly 
private companies and individual citizens. In September 1992 the first Chinese 
consulate in the RFE opened in Khabarovsk krai and was followed by another in 
Vladivostok and then by several other trading offices. As Russian-Chinese relations 
improved, similar openings occurred at border crossings, which led to a rapid 
development of trade. Communities in the RFE (in particular, in Primorskii krai and 
Amur oblast) welcomed the opportunity to trade with their Chinese neighbour. China’s 
northern provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin supported the rapid expansion of cross- 
border trade.
Beijing insisted that Moscow should accept three obstacles before normalisation. These were; the 
presence o f the Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border; the Soviet military occupation o f Afghanistan; 
and Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation o f Cambodia. In his Vladivostok speech in July 1996, 
Gorbachev indicated a willingness to move on all three issues.
Wenguang Shao, “China’s Relations with the Superpowers; Strategic Shifts and Implication,” 
Survival. Vol. 42, No. 2, March/April 1990, pp. 160-61.
RA Report, no. 14 January 1993, p. 35.
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Table 2-4; Development of Russian-Chinese Relations from 1991 to 1997
Year Summit
Dec.
199Ï
After the USSR was breaking up in December 1991, Boris Yeltsin sent an emissary to 
Beijing to reassure China that Russia would abide by the border accord.
Mar,
1992
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was in the Chinese capital for the formal exchange o f  
ratified documents. Progress was also made in the realms o f  economic and military 
co-operation; Russia and China signed a new trade agreement and the chief o f staff o f  the CIS 
armed forces concluded an agreement to sell fighter planes to China.
D ec,
1992
Boris Yeltsin made a visit to Beijing and the Russian delegation signed over twenty 
documents. In one o f  these documents was made by Russia and China a mutual 
promise not to enter into any military-political alliance directed against each other.
S e p t
1994
When the Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow, he declared a “qualitatively new level 
o f relations” o f “constructive partnership,” although this was not an alliance and not aimed 
against any other country in particular.
Apr.
1996
During his visit to China, Yeltsin described their countries’ relationship to be a “partnership 
directed towards the twenty-first century” and this was between nations o f  which there was “no 
other such pair in the world.”
Apr.
1997
During Jiang’s visit to Russia, the Russian president reached new rhetorical heights, describing 
the visit as one o f “enormous, and perhaps even historic, significance, inasmuch as we are 
determining the fate o f the twenty-first century.” Of the joint declaration signed by the two 
presidents, Yeltsin declared, ‘never before has Russia signed such a document with any other 
country.’
J im e
1997
Jiang’s visit to Moscow provided the occasion for a significant agreement concerning reductions 
in military presence along the borders, with Yeltsin and the presidents o f  the three Central Asian 
border states.
N ov.
1997
During Yeltsin’s visit to China (Yeltsin’s fifth summit with Jiang Zemin), the 4,200 kilometer 
border had been demarcated for the first time in the two nations’ histories.
Source: “Russian-Chinese Declaration is Essentially Tantamount to a Non-aggression Pact,” 
Izvestiva. 21 December 1992, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 44, No. 51, 1992, pp. 13-14; “Partners, 
but not Allies,” Segodnia. 2 September 1994, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 46, No. 36, 1994, p. 13; “ 
Boris Yeltsin Sees No One Who Could Stand Against Such a Pair as ‘Great Russia’ and ‘Great 
China’,” Segodnia. 27 April 1996, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 48, No. 17, 1996, pp. 7-8; “A 
Breakthrough for Russian Policy on the Asian Front,” Rossiiskie vesti. 24 April 1997, as cited 
in CDPSP. Vol. 49, No. 17, 1997, pp. 1-2; “Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin Find Harmony,” 
Segodnia. 12 November 1997, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 49, No. 45, 1997, p. 6. Vladimir Ronin, 
Regionv Rossii (Antwerp: Benerus, 1996), p. 229.
123 ‘Russia and China Agree Capitalist Trading Style,” The Financial Times. 14 June 1995, p. 3.
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In many respects the Russian and Chinese economies are highly 
complementary. The Soviet Far East and present RFE have been rich sources of land 
and natural resources such as oil, natural gas, minerals, coal, timber and river water for 
hydropower. However, harsh living conditions and the lack of consumer goods in the 
Far Eastern territories have resulted in severe and continuous labour shortages. 
Manpower for Soviet/Russian industry has been frequently supplemented by North 
Korean and Vietnamese seasonal workers in forests and factories on construction sites 
and f a r m s . A s  Russian-Chinese ties improved, many surplus rural labourers from 
China have sought employment across the border. One of the mutual benefits of these 
closer ties has been that the number of Chinese workers in Russian agriculture, timber 
and construction industries has gradually increased, and cheap Chinese goods have been 
(and still are today) exported through border trade.
From the early 1990s as border tensions eased and border trade developed, the 
scale of illegal Chinese immigration increased. A demographic imbalance was 
created along the border with 150 million Chinese crowded into northern China, and 
only 7 million Russians existing in the vast bordering territories of the Far East. The 
governors of the Russian Far Eastern provinces claimed that huge numbers of Chinese 
businessmen, workers and peasants settled in the RFE. Some even suspected the
Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 64-5.
Stephan, “the Russian Far East,” p. 335.
“Parts o f  Maritime Territory Have One Chinese Foreign Resident for Every Inhabitant,” Izvestiva. 27 
April 1994, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 16, 1994, p. 26.
Busygina, “Rossiiskii DaTniy Vostok,” p. 112.
“Khabarovsk Seeks to Stem Influx o f Foreigners,” Seeodnva. 26 October 1995, p. 3, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-95-209, 30 October 1995, p. 53.
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Chinese of harbouring territorial ambitions. This issue has been a source of concern 
for local politicians and citizens. In response to high levels of illegal Chinese 
immigration, Russia concluded an agreement with Beijing in 1994 to establish formal 
border crossing posts and to tighten visa restrictions. The border issues of the 
demarcation process and illegal Chinese immigration will be specifically dealt with in 
chapter 5.
Japan. With the Soviet economy in increasing decline, Soviet leaders would 
have liked (as do Russia’s today) to enlist Japan’s financial and technical help in 
modernising their country. The Soviet Union hoped to expand its trade with Japan and 
to secure Japan’s active participation in the development of the Far East.*^  ^ This 
expectation was first highlighted when Gorbachev visited Tokyo in April 1991. He went 
to Tokyo with a view to encouraging Japanese economic support for Soviet perestroika 
on the basis that economic relations could be separated from the territorial issue. 
However, the issue of the Southern Kuril islands (Japanese refer to these as the Northern 
Territories) has become one of the most important current political questions for the 
RFE in relation to Japan.^^  ^From the end of World War II to the present post-Soviet era, 
the territorial dispute over the islands has been an obstacle to both the conclusion of a 
peace treaty and to a wide range of other economic relations. Recently the leaders of 
the two countries have reached a written agreement to sign a peace treaty in the year 
2000 .
“In Every Propeller Breathes a Scandal,” Kommersant-Dailv. 18 July 1996, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 
48, No. 30, 1996, pp. 20-21.
“Far East Governors Said Adamant on PRC Border Demarcation,” Segodnva. 11 March 1995, p. 3, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-95-049, 14 March 1995, p. 18.
Donald S. Zagoria, “Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning,” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 68, No. 1, 
1989, pp. 125-26; RA Report. No. 16 January 1994, p. 39.
Yu. V  Georgiev, comp., Kurilv-ostrova v okeane problem (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998), pp. 305-7.
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The Yeltsin administration have tried to maintain a flexible and careful attitude 
towards Japan over the Kuril dispute. The plans for restructuring the Russian domestic 
economy and the increased openness of the Russian system did lead to an improvement 
in relations with Japan/^'^ Although neither side took any new initiatives on the 
territorial dispute, Moscow showed that it was willing to change its approach in order to 
deal with the issue/^^ In fact, by recognising the existence of the problem the Russian 
government gave the Japanese hope that the issue could soon be resolved. In this 
context, it is apparent that economic reasons have been a major factor in driving Yeltsin 
and other leaders to establish closer links with Japan. They aimed to gain access to 
major Japanese investment, trade and technology through the domestic economy of the 
Far East.^^  ^The peaceful negotiations over the Kuril islands have made progress but no 
concrete agreements have been reached as of yet.
Perhaps the drawn-out nature of these negotiations is influenced by the various 
pressures faced by the decision-makers. We now turn to address some of these 
pressures. Pressures on the Russian government from the military, local and other 
nationalist groups and from public opinion prevent the kind of policy movement 
required to consider returning the territory to Japan/^* Many answers have been 
developed concerning this issue but I will focus on three particular possibilities given by 
Far Eastern Russians.
Japan Times. 31 October 1992, as cited in RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 26.
134 Y Zilanov, A. A. Koshkin, I. A. Latyshev, A.Y. Plotnikov, I. A. Senchenko, Russkive Kurilv: Istoriya
i sovremennost’ (Moscow: Sampo, 1995), pp. 152-53.
Georgiev, Kurilv-ostrova. pp. 317-18.
Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policv after the Cold War (London: Praeger, 1996), p. 173.
Paul Marantz, “Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin’s Second Tenn,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1997, p. 342.
Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policv. p. 175,
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First of all, these islands are very economically important for the fishing 
industry. Relations have been troubled by the problem of Japanese fishing in disputed 
waters. For instance, Russian patrol boats fired on Japanese fishing vessels resulting in 
several casualties, and in an incident in October 1994 a Japanese fishing vessel was 
actually sunk. Russia proposed that the Japanese pay a fishing fee for the right to fish 
around the disputed islands. Details of the actual agreement will be discussed in 
chapter 5.
Secondly, the islands are still of military significance despite the withdrawal of 
some Russian troops. The question of military presence in the disputed islands led to 
different opinions between Yeltsin and the Russian Defence Ministry. In October 1993 
Yeltsin announced that about 50 per cent of the forces would be withdrawn from the 
disputed islands. The rest would follow shortly, leaving the islands fully demilitarised. 
Despite this announcement, one year later (in October 1994) the Russian Defence 
Ministry declared that there was no intention to remove the forces deployed there and 
emphasised the importance of the Far Eastern Military District for Russian security.
The final and most important factor with regard to the Kuril islands is Russian 
political thinking. As a post-Communist state, the RF moved to prepare the public for 
negotiations over the issue with Japan, Public opinion within Russia was fast becoming 
an important factor in foreign policy. According to national and local public opinion 
polls within the last ten years the majority of Russians and residents of the islands are 
strongly opposed to returning the islands to Japan. The results of these opinion polls 
will be examined in chapter 5 along with other issues regarding the disputed islands.
“Japanese Prime Minister Announces New Policy Toward Russia,” Izvestiva. 26 July 1997, p. 3, as 
cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLIX, No. 30,1997, p. 23.
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The Korean Peninsula, Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union’s 
influence over North Korea was primarily based on military and economic support. This 
resulted in limited relations with South K o re a /A s  mentioned already, the Far East has 
maintained relations for many years with other neighbouring states, exchanging its 
resources for hard currency, especially with Japan. Even North Korea has maintained 
economic contacts with the Far East since the late 1960s, mainly through the timber 
industry. China’s economy has also increased since the late 1980s through border trade 
with the Far East. However, the development of major economic relations with South 
Korea was hindered by the state of political relations. Since the late 1980s and early 
1990s, a political normalisation between the Soviet Union (later Russia) and Korea has 
taken place. Essentially, the renewal of diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union has 
permitted a Korean rediscovery of the RFE. Since then Korea and the RFE’s economic 
co-operation has shown a steady increase.
One result of the political normalisation in diplomatic and economic relations 
between Russia and South Korea was that relations cooled between Russia and North 
Korea. Russia even terminated military and economic support to North Korea. Russia 
also condemned North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and urged the opening of its nuclear facilities to International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspection. In addition, in June 1994
Izvestiva. 26 October 1994.
L.A. Zabrovskaya, Rosslya i Respubtika Koreya: ot koofrontatsii k sotrudnichestvu ('197Q-1990-e gg.I 
(Vladivostok: DO RAN, 1996), pp. 10-11,
Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy o f Russia: Changing Systems. 
Enduring Interests (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 251-22,
L.A. Anosova, "KNR, Respublika Koreya i NKDR: geopoliticheskie otnosheniya: novyi etap,” 
Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka. No. 4, 1995, pp. 25-6; for more discussion on these see Hakjoon Kim, 
“North Korea’s Nuclear Development Programme and Future,” Korea and World Affairs. Vol. XVEE, No. 
2, Summer 1994, pp. 273-300,
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Yeltsin stated that the 1961 treaty of ffiendship/'^'^ cooperation and mutual assistance 
with North Korea would expire in 1996 unless it was revised. All these factors placed 
limits on any improvement in Russian-North Korean relations. From the mid 1990s, 
however, the Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula has been re-evaluated. 
Russia has made an effort to strengthen its ties with the South while simultaneously 
attempting to revive its relations with the North. After an interval of several months 
Moscow resumed talks with the North at the deputy-minister level, opening a channel 
for discussion between the two sides. In the RFE the number of North Korean 
workers has steadily increased in the timber industry (in Amur oblast and Khabarovsk 
krai) and even in the construction sector (in particular, in Primorskii krai). The RFE and 
North Korea have also worked together for the development of the Tumen river project. 
I will examine this issue along with the issue of North Korean workers in more depth in 
chapter 6.
If we return to the issue of South Korea it can be seen that its political contacts 
with the RF have been highly developed. These positive relations have also promoted 
contact between local RFE leaders and South Koreans. A combination of market, ethnic 
Korean and geopolitical factors created a powerful motivating force for Russia and 
South Korea’s long-term thinking about both countries. As Stephan comments, some
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Union o f  Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea signed by Nikita Khrushchev and Kim II Sung 
in Moscow on 6 July 1961. After the collapse o f  the USSR, Russia, as its successor, denounced Article 1 
o f the treaty which provided for each side’s obligation to render immediate ‘military and other aid by all 
available means’ in case o f ‘armed attack’ by a third party. See Dae-Ho Byun, North Korea’s Foreign 
Policy (Seoul: Research Centre for Peace, 1991), pp. 249-51.
KBS-1 TV (Seoul), 20 November 1992.
Tsuneo Akaha, “Russia in Asia in 1994: An Emerging East Asian Power,” Asian Survev. Vol. 35, No. 
1, January 1995, p. 107.
Ho-Won, Jeong, “Impact o f Gorbachev’s New Thinking on Soviet Policy towards South Korea,” in 
Kanet, Roger E, Miner, Deborah N  and Resler, Tamara J. (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policv in Transition
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Russians hope that South Korean investment will reduce the Far East’s reliance on 
Japanese capital and free regional development from being an obstacle to the perennial 
territorial disputes/'^^ Korea hopes that this economic co-operation with the RFE will, in 
turn, provide a stable political environment and reduce tensions between North and 
South Korea. The RFE has attracted South Korea’s business interests because of its 
geographical proximity and its supply of raw materials. South Korea has meanwhile 
gained significance as a foreign-trade partner for the Far East. The RFE exports steel 
and metal products, coal, petroleum and fishery products, while importing machinery, 
textiles and food.^^  ^It has become one of the most important markets for South Korean 
home electronic manufacturers. Russian shuttle traders (chelnoki) in particular have 
been major contributors, making profits and maintaining small scale trade relations with 
South Korea.
South Korea, as Russia expected, has shown an interest in developing resource 
exploitation and although its investment is on a smaller scale than China and Japan’s, it 
is becoming involved in the joint venture projects with the RFE.^^  ^ The following 
examples indicate the level of the South Koreans’ activities. One of its largest projects 
is the Svetiaya timber joint venture in Primorskii krai by Hyundai. The construction
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 283-84.
Stephan, “The Russian Far East,” p. 336.
“Russia’s Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Interfax. I December 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92- 
232, 2 December 1992, pp. 3-5; L.A. Anosova ànd G. S. Matveeva, Yuzhnava Koreva: vzelvad iz Rossii 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1994), p. 237.
Hakjoon Kim, “The Emergence o f  Siberia and the Russian Far East as a “New Frontier for Koreans,” 
in Stephen Kotin and David Wolff (eds.), Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russia Far East 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 307-8.
The Director o f the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) in Vladivostok, Lee 
Kwang Hee, kindly provided this information during an interview in September 1996.
Hongchan Chun and Charles E Ziegler, “On Russo-South Korean Relations,” in Blank, Stephen J. and 
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. (eds ), Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Role in Asia (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1997), p. 191.
Zabzovskaya, Rossiva i Respublika Koreva. p. 160.
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of Hotel Hyundai Vladivostok, which was opened in 1997, is another large project/^'^ 
Hankook Mill and Steel company invested in Amurstal, a steel plant in Komsomol’sk- 
na-Amure, Khabarovsk krai. South Koreans’ involvement in the Sakha natural gas 
projects was discussed. In addition, some Korean companies made efforts to join the 
Sakhalin Oil and Gas projects. Some of these, however, were postponed or cancelled 
due mainly to the effect of the Asian economic crisis. Despite this, the Nakhodka 
Korea-Russia industrial park project (which is supported by the government-owned 
Korean Land Corporation and RFE local leaders) is making modest progress. And when 
the South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung visited Moscow in May 1999, the two 
governments agreed to develop this project further.
In fact South Korean investment in the RFE is not only economic but also 
includes an interest in the presence of a Korean ethnic minority. For instance, the Kohap 
Group invested in an agricultural joint venture in Amur oblast and Primorskii krai. Its 
donation of a Korean College building at the Far Eastern University in Vladivostok and 
its contribution to the construction of the Far Eastern villages for the Far Eastern 
Koreans in Primorskii krai also highlight Korean cultural interest in the RFE.^^  ^ In 
chapter 6 I will specifically discuss South Korean economic activities in the RFE and 
compare them with other Northeast Asian activities, including amongst others, the 
Nakhodka Korea-Russia industrial park project.
When I visited Vladivostok in September 1996, it was under construction.
“South Korea and the Russian Fai' East: A Review,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1996, p. 9. 
“Korea-Russia Summit,” Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 29 May 1999, p. 1.
I conducted an interview with the vice Chairman o f the Kohap Group in July 1998.
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Chapter 3: The Domestic Political Agenda: Autonomy and the 
Environment
3.1: Introduction
Since the early 1990s political and economic reform has continued to establish Russia as 
a federal state. The democratic process has shifted from central government to regional 
and local authorities and this has been one of the primary aims achieved in the 
transitional period. The centrally planned economic system simultaneously transferred 
to a largely market economy as a direct result of this democratic process. This led to a 
struggle for authority between the central government and the peripheral (regional) 
governments, the latter endeavouring to gain more political autonomy and economic 
power.’ To this end, regional leaders with strong economic ties have attempted to 
expand their spheres of influence via a political and legal agenda. This type of 
‘regionalism’ is defined as the belief that provinces ought to be the main implementers 
of their own social and economic development. The Far Eastern local government, in 
this view, is more capable than central government of addressing a region’s particular 
problems.^ In short, ‘regionalism is the belief that regions should have more control 
over their own destinies,’^  and ‘can be understood as an effort to create a stronger basis 
of authority at the territorial level.’ This includes economic independence and political 
power within the federation,'’
In the post-Soviet period, according to the results of my content analysis (see
 ^ Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Russian Federalism and Regionalism,” in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman and 
AlexPravda (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 4 (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 229.
 ^ Shugo Minigawa, Regionalism’ in a Transitional Period: the Case o f Primorskii krai (Sapporo; 
Hokkaido University, 1996), p. 1.
 ^ Josephine Andrew and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia,” Post- 
Soviet Affairs. Vol. 11, No. 4, 1995, pp. 384-85.
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table 1-2), local autonomy was revealed as clearly the most important issue on the 
political agenda in the RFE. The main purpose of this first subsection is to deal with this 
issue, firstly focusing on the development of centre-periphery relations in the Russian 
Federation (from 1991 to 1997); and secondly via a substantial exploration of the local 
autonomy movement in the RFE itself.
The ecological factor was largely ignored during the Soviet period of social 
and economic development. The competing factors of the rise in crime, economic 
stagnation and the decline in living standards pushed ecological problems to the back of 
the public’s mind. Priority was given to production, particularly to the development of 
defence, energy and the agrarian complex.^ Ecological factors such as environmental 
pollution, however, have had a significant effect on public health.^ It was reported that 
Siberia and the RFE particularly had reached crisis point due to the unsafe operation of 
facilities using radioactive materials. Disastrous accidents with long-term effects 
occurred as a result of mismanagement, the use of old generators and a lack of proper 
security. Major accidents such as Chernobyl in April 1986, Tomsk-7 in April 1993, 
Chelyabinsk-65 in July 1993 and Kamchatka in June 1994 were the results of these 
problems. These areas have been declared ecological disaster zones.^ As Stewart notes, 
‘after the Chernobyl incident as many as 20 percent of the population lived in 
enviromnental danger areas and another 35 to 40 percent in unsatisfactory conditions.’*
In this context, this subsection will conclude with a discussion of
Tamara Troyakova, “Regional Policy in the Russian Far East and the Rise o f Localism in Primorskii 
krai,” The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs. Vol. IX, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1995, pp. 430-31.
 ^ Sergei Bobylev, “An Environmental Friendly Economy and Commercial Profits,” Environmental Policy 
Review. Vol. 10, No. 1, Summer 1996, p. 13.
Nezavisimava gazeta. 14 April 1994, p. 6, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 15,1994, p. 23.
' For fiill details o f accidents and their effects, see Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the 
Hidden Legacy o f  the Soviet Regime (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), p. 20.
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environmental issues in the Russian Far East, which as we noted in table 1-2 have 
figured prominently on the domestic political agenda. Issues of ethnic identity and 
mortality are closely linked with ecological and environmental problems, and 
themselves prominently on the political agenda according to my content analysis. The 
development of the environment in the RFE is also affected by the region’s involvement 
with outside powers, and this too must be taken into consideration in a discussion of the 
forces that shape this part of the political agenda.
3,2: Development of Centre-Periphery Relations in post-Soviet Russia
The Russian Federation was composed of 89 units under the 1993 Russian constitution. 
This included 21 republics (formerly ASSRs), 49 oblasts, 6 krais, the 2 federal cities of 
Moscow and St. Petersburg (formerly Leningrad) with the status of an oblast, 1 
autonomous oblast and 10 autonomous okrugs (see appendices 1 and 2 for a list of these 
units and map). The promotion of 4 autonomous oblasts to ASSR status (ASSRs were 
renamed simply ‘republics’), and the splitting of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR into two 
republics took place. All the units vary in geographic size and population. For example, 
the Evenk autonomous okrug has about 25,000 citizens and the city of Moscow has 
close to 9 million.
In exploring the development of centre-periphery relations I will mainly be 
following Tolz and Busygina’s four stages.^
First, from  late 1990 to February 1992. During this period there were 
significant legislative changes in the relations between the centre and the Russian
* John Massey Stewart (ed.), The Soviet Environment: Problems. Policies and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 1.
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regions. As Tolz and Busygina have pointed out, in early 1990, regional and republican 
leaders used the power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin to obtain privileges in 
exchange for a pledge of their loyalty. In the central government Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
were rivals and Yeltsin’s decision to decentralise political and economic decision­
making led to an unprecedented increase in the autonomous power of regional and 
republican leaders in the Russian Federation.’®
In March 1990 regional soviets were popularly elected across Russia. As Stoner- 
Weiss notes;
These elections were to create regional legislatures that were more accountable to 
constituents rather than to Moscow. The elections succeeded not only in 
introducing a certain degree o f  democracy into the local political process but also 
changed the point o f political reference o f local leaders from Moscow to 
provincial interests.’*
By October 1990 eleven of the sixteen autonomous republics declared 
themselves sovereign over their own territories, but not fully independent from Russia. 
They were initially more aggressive in pursuing increased political and economic 
authority. Even some oblast leaders also became very active in declaring themselves 
masters of their own domains.’^
In May 1991 the Fourth RSFSR Congress adopted a new law on the RSFSR 
presidency, and in June Yeltsin was elected President of Russia with 57 per cent of the 
vote. In the Presidential election campaign Yeltsin proposed the new position of heads
 ^ Vera Tolz and Irina Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin: the Ongoing Battle for Power,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, pp. 402-5.
Ibid., pp. 402-3.
”  Stoner-Weiss, “Russian Federalism and Regionalism,” in White, Gitelman and Pravda (eds.), 
Developments in Russian Politics 4. p. 233.
Josephine Andrew and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “Regionalism and Reform in Provincial Russia,” Post- 
Soviet Affairs. Vol. 11, No. 4, 1995, p, 386.
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of regional administrations. His proposal was that executive power in the regions be 
transferred from the executive committees of regional soviets’'’ to the offices of 
governors. After the 1991 August coup against Soviet President Gorbachev, Yeltsin 
created regional governmental institutions which would to some extent maintain a 
unitary system of central control. This included the office of the presidential 
representative (PR) and the head of oblast and krai administrations (governor). These 
two were to be filled, at least initially, by Yeltsin appointees; later, governors were 
elected.’^
After the appointment of these posts, the central government actively proposed a 
change in market relations and began pressing more responsibility for its 
implementation at regional level. According to Stoner-Weiss, in this period the local 
governments faced three major difficulties. Firstly, they had little funds with which to 
pay for these new responsibilities. Secondly, they struggled to gain ownership of 
property as privatisation intensified. Thirdly, there was a division of powers between 
Moscow and the constituent units of the federation.’^
The second period o f centre-periphery relations: from  March 1992 to
G.D.G. Murrell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy: An Internal Political History. 1989-1996 (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 1997), p. 70.
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The governor has considerable power to change regional governmental structures. The first appointed 
governor had loyalties firmly based in M oscow rather than the regions over which they governed. Later 
regions gained increased autonomy from Moscow. Many o f  Yeltsin’s own appointees later led their 
regions’ efforts to gain increased autonomy from Moscow. The governor can appoint the entire local 
cabinet. Governors had many powers, but were still accountable to local soviets. According to the March 
1992 ‘Law on Oblast and Krai Soviets and Oblast and Krai Administration’, local soviets could remove 
governors from their positions. See Darrell Slider, “Federalism, Discord and Accommodation: 
Intergovernmental Relations in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Theodore H. Friedgut and Jeffrey W. Hahn (eds.). 
Local Power and Post-Soviet Politics (Armonk and New York: M.E, Sharpe, 1994), pp. 251-58.
Stephen White, Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, The Politics o f Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet 
Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 113.
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December 1993, On 13 March 1992, a Federal Treaty was signed between all 
constituent units of the RF (with the exception of Chechnya’* and Tatarstan’^ ). The 
Federal Treaty defined the division of powers between the federal government and the 
republics, and the treaty was formally made part of the constitution of the federation/® 
This Treaty formally established which areas were to have central jurisdiction, and 
which were to share responsibilities. It assigned each area to one of the categories of the 
constituent units (republics, oblasts and krais and the autonomous oblast and okrugs).^’ 
It also divided authority between the centre and the periphery, with republics receiving 
greater rights in controlling their natural resources and in managing their economic 
matters than the oblasts and krais. This led to growing tensions between the oblasts and 
republics due to the inequalities being reinforced between them.^^ There were 
additional results of the federative agreements:
The twenty-one republics were declared ‘subjects o f the federation’, whereas
The Chechen republic was created in 1991 when the Chenchen-Ingush autonomous republic was 
divided into two. In November o f that year the Chechen Republic declared itself fully independent from 
not only the RSFSR but also from the Soviet Union. See Murrell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy, p. 
183. In December 1994 Yeltsin issued a decree ordering federal armed forces into the Chechen republic to 
put a temporary hold on regionalist activism. The ongoing war between separatist forces and federal 
troops served to prevent the potential danger o f heightened separatist activism moving into other regions. 
Yeltsin’s decision to use force to quell Chechen independence was driven mainly by political and 
economic pragmatism. Reasons being, firstly, several crucial oil pipelines run tlirough Chechnya. Moscow  
did not want to risk losing control over these pipelines. Secondly, President Yeltsin’s popularity hit record 
lows in late 1994, due to difficult economic reforms. Finally, a strong show o f force in Chechnya would, 
by Moscow’s calculations, also provide an example to other republics pushing for increased sovereignty 
(like Tatarstan and Sakha). During the 1996 presidential campaign Yeltsin promised to end the war and a 
cease-fire was implemented in late May. He then sent his newly appointed security advisor, Alexander 
Lebed, to Chechnya to negotiate a more comprehensive settlement. See Stoner-Weiss, “Russian 
Federalism and Regionalism,” pp. 242-44.
After long negotiations, the other republic refusing to sign the Federal Treaty, Tatarstan, signed a 
separate bilateral treaty with Moscow in February 1994. This treaty granted the republic wide authority 
over its political life and most importantly over its economic resources. See Steve D. Boilard, Russia at 
the Twentv-First Century. Politics and Social Change in the Post-Soviet Era (Orlando, London; Harcourt 
Brace & Company, 1998), p 142.
See Article 84 o f  the amended constitution, Vedemosti s”ezda narodnvkh deputatov Rossiiskoi 
Federatisii i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. no. 20, 21 May 1992, pp. 1417-40.
For more discussion on the federal treaty see Elizabeth Teague, “Centre-Peripheiy Relations in the 
Russian Federation,” in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia 
and the New States o f  Eurasia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 33-8.
Rossivskaya gazeta. 18 April 1995, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 47, No. 16, 1995, pp. 8-9.
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oblasts and krais remained ‘territorial administrative units.’ Republics were given 
more rights to control property and trade than the oblasts and krais. Republics 
appointed presidents whereas the oblasts and krais appointed governors (at 
present governors are elected).^^
Despite trying to solve the most pressing problems of centre-periphery relations, 
some of the agreements reached in the treaty increased tensions that already existed. 
Busygina describes the resulting political situation as follows:
The power struggle between Yeltsin and the Congress o f  People’s Deputies 
heavily influenced central-peripheral relations. Yeltsin tried to obtain the support 
o f the republican elites and largely ignored regional governors. As the majority 
o f governors were the President’s appointees, he thought their loyalty to him was 
assured. But the parliament speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov, supported the oblasts 
and krais.^ '^
It was reported that throughout 1992 the oblasts and krais leaders declared their 
sovereignty from the centre.^^ They went further: twenty regions stopped remitting taxes 
to the central government by late 1992. In February 1993, an open parliamentary 
hearing was held on the integrity of the Russian Federation and regional policies. 
During this meeting, the following opposing views were highlighted. The regional 
leaders wanted more authority but the central authorities wanted the regions to have less 
(under the current Federation Treaty, only republics can pass laws).^  ^ The krais and 
oblasts demanded equal rights with the republics. Some of them were planning to 
declare themselves equal: ‘sovereignisation’ is one manifestation of ‘privatisation’ or 
the struggle for ownership. Being a sovereign republic means owning diamonds, oil, 
real estate, and being involved in foreign trade activities.^^
Cameron Ross, “Federalism and Regional Politics,” in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds.), Russia 
After the Cold War {London: Longman, 2000), pp. 87-8.
Toiz and Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin,” p. 403.
Pravda. February 19 1992, p. 1; Izvestiva. March 30 1992, p. 2; Rossivskava gazeta. 2 April 1992, p. 2. 
“Regions Vie for More Powers from Unwilling Government,” Kommersant-Daily. 23 February 1993, p. 
9, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-036. 25 February 1993, p. 46.
“Oblasts, Krays Vie for Status with Republics,” Komsomolskava pravda. 26 June 1993, p. 3, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-93-124. 30 June 1993, p. 29.
This type o f special treatment was initiated in some oblasts in early 1992, President Yeltsin issued 
special decrees allowing some regions (e.g. Tyumen) special privileges. These centred around economic
After the referendum of April 1993, a conference of 20 republican leaders was 
convened in May. At this meeting Yeltsin attempted to gain general support for his 
constitutional reform but did not succeed with his draft constitution.^^ In late September 
1993, 70 per cent of regional leaders set up the Council of Members of the Federation. 
These came from 15 republican, 43 oblasts, two krais and two autonomous okrugs (most 
but not all of whom represented their respective legislatures). The Council stated that 
the central government in Moscow had discredited itself and therefore should step 
down. Until new elections were held, the Council would govern Russia. The federal 
government failed to recognise the Council as Yeltsin ignored the wish of the majority 
of provincial leaders who were calling for simultaneous presidential and parliament 
elections. The divisions between the President and the parliament, and also the poor 
results of the second constitutional convention in August 1993 resulted in the storming 
of parliament by federal troops in October. This event marked a major barrier to 
regional activism.
Following this there were new parliamentary elections at national level (in 
December 1993) and Yeltsin also asked the Russian electorate to approve a new 
constitution for the Federation. (The State Duma elections of both December 1993 and 
1995 will be dealt with in chapter 5.) This constitution, which is currently in force, 
declares all subjects of the federation equal, thereby ostensibly redressing the concern
control over resources. Many regional leaders opted to invest in some collective endeavours, including the 
establishment o f interregional trading blocks, a national governors’ association and agreements among a 
few contiguous regions to co-operate in the areas o f ecology and trade. In addition, some regions insisted 
on holding elections for regional governors (these were held in eight regions in 1993). Yeltsin suspended 
further elections, but he permitted gubernatorial elections in thirteen oblasts in 1995. See Andrews and 
Stoner-Weiss, “Regionalism and Reform,” pp. 384-85.
Murrell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy, p. 159.
Tolz and Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin,” p. 404.
Kamchatskaya pravda. 21 August 1993, p. 1, as cited in RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 105.
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oblast leaders had felt regarding the special privileges given to republics.^^ This did not 
dissolve the 1992 federative agreements which upheld the inequality of oblasts and 
republics/^ The constitution also created a Council of the Federation (or upper house of 
parliament). '^^
The relations of the centre-periphery between 1990 to 1993 illustrate conflicting 
views about the type of federation Russia should become. It became increasingly clear 
that the provinces were pushing for a much more decentralised form of federalism while 
the centre was pressing for a more national federal (unitary) system.Surveying this 
period, it is clear that regional leaders (including Yeltsin’s own appointed regional 
governors) insisted on more autonomy over policy and more control over economic 
matters. The partial resolutions (the Federal Treaty and the new constitution) 
implemented during this period consolidated the basis of central-peripheral relations in 
the RF.
Thirdly, the 1994 period. Following the December 1993 election, Yeltsin’s main 
aims were to achieve stability and reduce the level of confrontation. In order to improve 
relations with regional leaders, the federal government finally responded to their
Joan DeBardeleben, “The Development o f Federalism in Russia,” Peter J. Stavrakis, Joan Debardeleben 
and Larry Black (eds.), Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence o f  Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Baltimore & London; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 38-9.
MuiTell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy, p. 159.
Candidates who were members o f the executive and legislative branches o f government were eligible to 
run for this Council. Elections were held in 1993 and in most cases the regional governors and the head o f  
the regional legislature each won a seat. From the 1995 State Duma election the governor and head o f the 
regional duma would fill the Federation Council seat. This would not be an elected post. This further 
consolidated Yeltsin’s hold on the levels o f  power by guaranteeing regional governors a voice in the 
legislative side of national politics. It was supported that they would use their voices to vote in the 
President’s favour, but this was not always the case. This practice guarantees two seats to all 89 o f the 
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demands to introduce fairer budget and tax policies, and governors obtained the right to 
make the final decision on the regional budget. According to a Yeltsin decree of 
November 1994, veto laws passed by the regional legislatures, enabling the appointment 
of executives at municipal level.^  ^ Above all members of regional and local 
administrations were given the right to be elected to regional and local legislatures, 
thereby influencing the activities of the legislative branch from within. While the 
regions gained autonomy in some economic matters, this was tempered with caution 
from the centre in the creation of regional legislatures. But, in fact, some governors 
managed to co-operate rather than oppose regional deputies, and were more successful 
in establishing control over regional legislatures.^^
From 1995 to 1996. In the spring and summer of 1995, Yeltsin continued to sign 
further bilateral agreements with some republics. For example, in June 1995 Moscow 
and Yakutia signed a bilateral treaty raising the level of political and economic 
ffeedoms.^^ By the early summer of 1995, several oblast governors insisted that Yeltsin 
allow them to hold regional elections, and pressed for more regional control over local 
concerns. By August he accepted this proposal and in December 1995 consented to 
thirteen gubernatorial elections. In the autumn of 1996 and winter of 1997 another 52 
regions held elections. Gubernatorial elections were allowed to proceed, as there was no
Examples are the inability to compensate workers for unpaid wages, the closing o f many factories that 
had gone into liquidation and the great divide between policy responsibilities and allotted tax revenues. 
See Stoner-Weiss, “Russian Federalism and Regionalism,” p. 247.
Peter Kirkow, “Local Self-government in Russia; Awakening from Slumber?,” Europe-Asia Studies. 
Vol. 49, No. 1, 1997, pp. 44-5.
For example, in Saratov oblast the relationship between the governor Dmitrii Ayazkov and the regional 
Duma was very relaxed. Twelve deputies were invited by the governors to combine their work in the 
legislature but maintain positions in the regional administration. In Primorskii krai also, the process o f co­
option went even further. The regional legislature was attended by the same people who participate in the 
krai administration. Sevodnya. 3 September 1996, p. 2.
Moskovskive novosti. No. 44, June 25-July 2, p. 10, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XL VU, No. 26, 1995, p. 
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question of ultimate central control over regional politics being relinquished."^^
Yeltsin now signed more bilateral agreements with various oblasts, republics and 
even autonomies. Many of these agreements were signed in the spring of 1996 before 
the presidential elections in June (these elections will be dealt with in chapter 5). It was 
reported that a total of 26 agreements were signed between Moscow and various 
subnational units by the end of November 1996 and more were awaiting signature."^  ^
Although it was unclear exactly what these agreements would mean in practice, on 
paper they appeared to guarantee regional leaders relatively wide authority over areas of 
interest specific to a region. These included the use of natural resources, direct 
engagement in foreign trade and in the obtaining of wider budgetary and tax powers."^ ^
3.3: Autonomy Movement in the Russian Far East
In the context of new movements towards local autonomy in early post-communist 
years, regional political autonomy was being established in the RFE. The leaders of 
each region tried to gain more political autonomy within the RF, and to develop a 
common aim, in their own political, social and economic affairs."^  ^ They particularly 
sought to have greater control over their own resources, a larger share of locally- 
generated taxes and more freedom in creating regional political structures. Increasing 
power struggles between the regions and the centre have dramatically altered the 
relationship between them."^ "^  At present there are a group of ten regions in the RFE
Stoner-Weiss, “Russian Federalism and Regionalism,” p. 245; DeBardeleben, “The Development o f  
Federalism in Russia,” in Stavrakis, Debardeleben and Black (eds.), Bevond the Monolith, pp. 50-1.
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which have equal political status. Some leaders of the Far East have willingly seized this 
opportunity and pressed for even greater autonomy, notably the republic of Sakha, 
Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai and Sakhalin oblast.
In the early 1990s the powers and responsibilities of regional authorities and 
their capacity to influence local social and economic affairs were substantially upgraded 
as part of the general decentralisation of administration in Russia. Firstly, the economic 
base of local authorities was expanded through the establishing of municipal and 
regional property-land holdings, enterprises, financial assets, and so on. Secondly, local 
authorities became legally responsible for ensuring comprehensive economic 
stabilisation in their area. They obtained the power to approve (or forbid) the setting up 
or substantial alteration of any economic or social entity, with regard to possible 
demographic, ecological or other local consequences.^^ Thirdly, in addition to managing 
their own property, local authorities were given certain responsibilities in regard to 
locally-situated federal enterprises (concerning environmental protection, the social 
security of local residents, etc)."^ ^
3.3.1: The Regionalist Movement for Autonomy and Resources: The Far Eastern 
Republic (FER) and the Far East Association for Economic Co-operation (FEAEC)
In early 1990 Far East regionalism grew and spread, with some local leaders beginning 
to support the idea of the rebirth of the Far Eastern Republic. As a result of this rise in 
regionalism there were created new, collective political and economic institutions with 
independent decision-making powers. Economic decline in this region and the inability
V. Leksin and E. Andreeva, Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhumal. 1992, no. 8, p. 40.
Vedomosti S”ezda Naro^vkh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsli i Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii. no. 13, 1992, p. 869.
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of the centre to support the RFE economy encouraged the rise of regionalism in the Far 
East. While the RFE had attempted to obtain special privileges from the central 
government in return for gradually transforming itself into a market-oriented economy, 
regional leaders demanded more freedom in business activities and privatisation. This 
became a major cause of conflict between the centre and the Far Eastern region."^  ^The 
revival of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) and the formation of the Far Eastern 
Association for Economic Co-operation (FEAEC) illustrated the growing movement for 
both political and economic autonomy within the RFE.
Rebirth o f the Far Eastern Republic. Separatism was not an influential force in 
the RFE, but in the early 1990s the idea of a separate FER was popular/^ It re-emerged 
between 1989 and 1990 as a result of the pre-election campaigns, in which groups trying 
to get elected as deputies tended to oppose the existing bureaucratic-party system that 
had been imposed by the centre. The goal became the creation of a republic in the RF."^  ^
The slogan for this campaign was ‘Vozrozhdenie’, or ‘rebirth of the FER’ that had 
existed from 1920 to 1922.^° It acted as a rallying point for those who opposed the 
administrative-command system and wanted economic independence for the Far East.^^
Troyakova, “Regional Policy in the Russian Far East,” p. 429.
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Vostok Rossii. No. 7, February 1992, as cited in SUPAR Report No. 13, July 1992, p. 31; The FER 
appeal derived partly from history, partly from myth. Created on 6 April 1920, the FER was a nominally 
independent state encompassing most o f the Russian Far East between the Soviet Union and the Japanese- 
occupied Primorskii krai. Lenin intended the FER to serve as a tactical plan to cause Japan’s withdrawal. 
Although tlie FER was communist in content, some FER officials (including non-communist socialists 
and Siberian regionalists) hoped that the republic would become genuinely democratic and independent. 
FER delegations went to New York and Los Angeles to solicit U.S. investment. Such unrehearsed and 
unplanned initiatives worried Moscow and as a result the FER President Aleksandr BCrasnoshchekov was 
removed in 1921. Tn October 1992 the last Japanese troops left Golden Horn bay and finally the FER was
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The Far Eastern Republic Freedom Party (FERFP) was created in September 
1990 and supported the idea of the FER. Its leaders declared that the party would oppose 
any rule from the centre. Their activity was limited and had no real support, but two 
years later they reemefged as a response to the economic crisis in the region and the 
debate on the Federal Treaty. Igor Cherevkov, the leader of FERFP, sent an ultimatum 
to President Yeltsin that called for a referendum on the re-establishment of the FER.^  ^In 
response, the Primorskii krai branch of the Social Democratic Party of Russia took the 
idea of an FER one step further. Its leader Ilya Grinchenko declared Primorskii krai a 
republic that would be a free economic zone with free politics. He was confident that the 
status of republic would give Primorskii krai the necessary guarantees of equality with 
the other subjects of the Federation.^"^
After the signing of the Federal Treaty in 1992 and during the process of drafting 
a new constitution for the RF in 1993, the possibility of re-establishing a Far Eastern 
Republic was frequently discussed. In August 1993, this possibility caused debate 
within the Khabarovsk krai small soviet. A proposal was put forward by a group of 
deputies of the krai soviet stating that the FER should consist of Primorskii krai, 
Khabarovsk krai, Amur oblast, Kamchatka oblast, Sakhalin oblast and the Jewish 
Autonomous oblast. The krai small soviet also dealt with raising the status of the krai to 
that of a republic and called for this to be added to the Constitution.^^ The idea of 
creating a FER was even brought to the public’s attention in Japan. Journalists from 
Tokyo Television made a programme in Khabarovsk about the movement for the
disbanded. See John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994), p. 141.
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creation of a FER.^^ Despite all these activities for the revival of the FER, there was no 
real support from the region or the centre except from a few ambitious local 
politicians/^
Far East Association fo r Economic Co-operation (FEAEC). The local 
authorities in the RFE made energetic use of their new rights. In early 1991 the legal 
regional organisation, named the ‘Far East Association’, was created in order to 
represent economic policy in different regions and influence relations with Moscow. In 
1992 it was renamed the Far East Association for Economic Co-operation and included 
all the local administrators of the individual Far Eastern regions. The main purpose of 
the FEAEC was to help the local soviets to achieve results in their activities. Like the 
other eight Russian inter-regional associations, the main interest of the FEAEC was 
economic.^^ Meetings were held in Khabarovsk, at least once every three months. The 
intention of the FEAEC was to secure food and consumer goods, set up social and 
economic programmes in different regions and to maintain relations with the centre. In 
1992 a number of bilateral economic agreements were signed (e.g. between Khabarovsk 
and Primorskii krai, and between Yakutia and the Sakhalin oblast). Direct inter-regional 
supplies (under contracts signed by the Khabarovsk krai administration) accounted for 
80 per cent of local sales of Russian products. These inter-regional contracts were 
normally arranged on a counter-trade basis, making active use of local commodity
Priamurskie vedomosti. 21 August 1993, p. 1, as cited in RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 103.
RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 141.
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stocks/^ All this reinforced the position of the local authorities and increased their role 
in regional economic stabilisation.
Due to the RKE’s serious economic and social problems, this association could 
not be seen simply in a regional context. The inevitable continuation of the Far East’s 
protracted dependence on federal financial support meant that it was particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of national economic policies. Disregarding the effect of 
irrational relative prices, the sectoral structure of the local economy resulted in low 
productivity and high production costs. The price liberalisation policy and the associated 
fall in living standards, together with the increase of social tensions in the RFE, had 
introduced new elements into the social and economic activity of the local authorities, as 
well as with their relationship with Moscow. Attempting to control its own budget, the 
federal government had tried to transfer the bulk of welfare and other social 
expenditures to regional level. In 1992, for instance, price subsidies and welfare 
expenditures amounted to 71 per cent of the local budget in Primorskii krai, as against 
22 per cent of projected federal expenditures.*^  ^In the RFE the pressure on local budgets 
continued to grow. Hence the FEAEC had little impact in promoting regional co­
operation or in defending the Far East’s interest with regard to Moscow. With the 
restoration of presidential power after the December 1993 election, inter-regional 
associations’ activities declined.*^ ^
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3.3.2: Direct Regional Political Pressure on the Centre
As the economic and legal functions of regional government expanded, contacts with 
central administrative bodies became more frequent, and the regions become stronger 
vis-a-vis the centre. As a result there grew a relatively comprehensive system for 
exerting pressure on federal policy-makers. Various instruments of direct political 
pressure were employed by the Far Eastern region in enhancing their relations with the 
centre. The most obvious were appeals, petitions and open letters directed to the 
President, the Supreme Soviet or the federal government by regional authorities or 
public organisations (e.g. by the region’s trade union council). Most of these documents 
referred to the serious rise in social tension which had occurred in the region and 
demanded an immediate allocation of additional funds and subsidies from the federal 
budget.
In the early 1990s there was a revival of the nationalist movement in the Sakha 
republic (as Yakutia had now styled itse lf.M ik h ail Nikolaev, an ethnic Yakut (and the 
former chairperson of the Yakutia Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviet), was elected 
the first president of Sakha-Yakutia in 1991. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Nikolaev has played a key role in steering the developing movement towards greater 
autonomy, including the right to control its own economic resources.This encouraged 
independence moves by other regions in the RFE. In July 1991 Nikolaev declared the 
sovereignty of the republic and its control of natural resources, in particular, diamond
Izvestiva. 12 March 1994, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 10, 1994, p. 15.
“Yakutia President on Progress Since Declaration,” Pravda. 3 October 1995, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-Sov- 
95-192, 4 October 1995, pp. 35-6.
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wealth.^ "^  In early 1992 he also introduced the republic’s post-Soviet constitution and 
signed the Federation Treaty under the name of the Sakha Republic/^
In March 1992 the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha concluded an 
agreement ‘On Mutual Relations between the Government of the RF and the republic of 
Sakha’ which provided the republic with the right to develop, extract and sell natural 
resources in its territory/^ Following this, President Nikolaev signed a further agreement 
with the Russian government, which meant that the land, mineral wealth, water and 
natural resources of the republic of Sakha were declared the property of its people/^ 
Acting on these agreements, the republic actively worked on developing its huge energy 
resources, especially gas, and attracting foreign investment.^^ Motivated by the need for 
hard currency, the republic has been particularly keen to attract foreign investment into 
its diamond, oil and gas industries instead of acting as a supplier of energy to the rest of 
Russia/^ In the 1995 bilateral treaty between Moscow and Yakutia the division of the 
profits from the mining of precious metals in Yakutia was decided. As a result, Moscow 
secured 26 per cent of Yakutia’s diamond production, 30 per cent of its gold output and 
a slightly smaller percentage of its oil and gas, with Yakutia retaining greater control of
“Yakutia President Update on Economy, Term Extension,” Kommersant-Dailv. 30 September 1995, p. 
3, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-191. 3 October 1995, p. 38.
Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer and Uliana Alekseeva Vinokurova, “Nationalism, Interethnic Relations 
and Federalism: The case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia),” Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 48, No. 1, January 
1996, p. 103.
Its constitutional status was defined in the Federation Treaty o f 31 March 1992, along with that o f  
nearly all o f  the other republics. See Federativnvi Dogovor. Dokumentv. Kommentarii (Moscow: 
Respublika, 1992).
Nezavisimava eazeta, 14 April 1992, pp. 1-3, as cited in FBIS. 15 April 1992, pp. 39-40; The republic 
Constitution classified land, subsoil resources, and local natural resources as the property “o f  the peoples 
inhabitating the republic o f Saklia-Yakutia.” See Sevodnya. 18 April 1995, p. 2, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 
XLVII, No. 16, 1995, p. 18.
For further details o f  the gas and oil development project in Northeast Asia see Keun Wook Paik, Gas 
and Oil in Northeast Asia: Policies. Projects and Prospects (London: Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs, 1995), p. 222.
“Sakha Republic Diamond Company Profiled,” Delovov Mir. 24 August 1995, p. 5, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-95-191, 5 September 1995, pp. 30-31.
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its resources/^
All these above achievements were based on a strong personal relationship 
between Nikolaev and the Russian president, with the support of the majority of Sakha- 
Yakutia’s electorate. In 1993 he was elected as a representative to the Federal Assembly 
in Moscow with 67 per cent of the vote. In 1996 he was re-elected as president with 
strong support from the electorate. Running against four other candidates, he achieved 
59 per cent of the vote.^  ^ In order to pursue Sakha’s national development, Nikolaev has 
promoted foreign economic co-operation more actively than other regional leaders in 
the Far East. As president of the Sakha republic in 1996, he visited South Korea and met 
President Kim Young Sam to deal with Korean’s involvement in the Sakha gas pipeline 
project and to promote further economic relations with the Koreans. Of the regions in 
the RFE, the Sakha republic has been most successful in establishing local autonomy; in 
comparison many other regions are still struggling to gain this autonomy.
The success of the Sakha republic in establishing economic autonomy may well 
have been the provocation for moves to emulate it in other Far Eastern regions. On 8 
July 1993 Primorskii krai Congress of People’s Deputies adopted a declaration 
demanding that Primorskii krai be granted the status of a republic within the federation. 
A local referendum on tins issue was to be called, to Moscow’s evident annoyance. The 
purpose in pursuing this cause was dictated by economic rather than political 
necessity. The draft declaration stated that:
Moskovskive novosti. no, 44, 1995, p. 14. For the text o f the Sakha treaty see Respublika Sakha. 5 July 
1995, reprinted in B. A. Strashun, (ed.), Federal’noe konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossii (Moscow: Norma, 
1996), pp. 248-55.
Vyborv glav ispolnitel’noi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-1997. Elektoral’nava statistika 
(Moscow: Ves’ mir, 1997), pp. 86-7; Valentin Fedorov, former governor o f Sakhalin (leaving the post o f  
governor of Sakhalin in 1993), was elected Prime Minister o f  Sakha by the local Duma in January 1997. 
See Russian Far East Update Advisorv. 23 January 1997.
Japan Times. 9 July 1993, p. 7.
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the republic was an integral part o f  the RF governed by local laws, except those issues 
which were under the jurisdiction o f federal authorities. The natural wealth o f the 
republic would belong to its people, and it would retain the right to foreign economic 
relations and fully-fledged representation in the federal bodies o f  authority.^^
Ultimately, it was not accepted by Moscow In July 1993, the Governor of 
Primorskii krai, Yevgenii Nazdratenko, applied pressure to federal government to force 
recognition of his attempted extension of power.^ "^  Nazdratenko passed a draft decree to 
the Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, on the ‘Extension of Powers of the Primorskii 
Administration in Solving Outstanding Social and Economic Problems/ This was 
prepared by the Primorskii administration in the hope that the Prime Minister would 
convince Yeltsin to sign it.^  ^ The main purposes of the decree were to provide ‘the 
Primorskii krai administration with exclusive rights for three years not to pay federal 
taxes, to detennine regional quotas on natural resources and products and to unilaterally 
distribute licenses for export of products produced in the krai/^^
In order to raise the pressure on the President, in early August 1993, the regional 
legislature adopted a declaration on the status of Primorskii krai, which among other 
things demanded the extension of powers of the regional administration. When this did 
not happen, Nazdratenko apparently tried to make the legislature support a referendum 
on the status of Primorskii krai, in which the people could decide whether they were in
“Maritime Region Wants Status as Republic,” Tass. 6 July 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-128. 7 July 
1993, pp. 37-8; In January 1994, V. Dubinin, acting head o f administration o f Primorskii krai, signed a 
resolution affirming the regulation about the representative body, the local self-administration and the 
elections. The head o f administration gained more power. He could not only appoint heads o f  
administrations o f subordinate units, but also call elections to these posts. This was the only amendment 
to the draft regulation which was presented to the commission on reform o f  representative bodies and 
local self-administration. See Utro Rossii. 22 January 1994, p. 1.
Peter Kirkow and Philip Hanson, “The Potential for Autonomous Regional Development in Russia: The 
Case o f Primorskii krai,” Post-Soviet Geography. Vol. 35, No. 2, 1994, p. 83.
Tolz and Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin,” p. 408.
Moscow Times. 9 July 1993, p. 5.
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favour of the creation of a Far Eastern republic/^ In March 1996, in an interview with 
Nezavisimava gazeta. he again spoke about support in his region for the creation of such 
a republic, implying that it could eventually demand full autonomy from Moscow/* 
However, as McFaul notes, ‘the political struggle between Primorskii krai and central 
government has had everything to do with elite politics and very little to do with popular 
attitude/^^
Nazdratenko was appointed as governor of Primorskii krai after Vladimir 
Kuznetsov**  ^was removed from his post in May 1993. In December of the same year 
Nazdratenko was elected to the Federal Assembly with 62 per cent of the vote. He ran 
as an independent candidate and his victory came on a tide of increasing dissatisfaction 
with the reforms of the central government. He was backed by the local industrial lobby 
and attempted to pursue a more clearly isolationist policy than his predecessor. Through 
most of 1993 and 1994 the local situation was marked by turmoil between the krai and 
city administrations and between Nazdratenko and the local press. The press questioned 
the legitimacy of the removal (in February 1994) of Vladivostok’s Mayor Mktor
Tamara Troyakova, “A Primorsky Republic: Myth or Reality?,” Communist Economies & Economic 
Transformation. Vol. 10, No. 3, September 1998, pp. 392-93.
Tolz and Busygina, “Regional Governors and the Kremlin,” p. 408.
Michael McFaul, “The Far Eastern Challenge to Russian Federalism,” in Sheman W. Garnett (ed.). 
Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Rlations in a Changing Asia (Washington, D C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p. 331.
Vladimir Kuznetsov was elected deputy o f the Primorskii krai soviet and then appointed the head of  
administration. The Kuznetsov’s administration wanted a policy o f  self-government through the 
development o f foreign relations to promote market structures in Primorskii krai. There were plans to 
create a Nakhodka FEZ, a Greater Vladivostok project and a Tumen River project, all o f  which were to be 
supported by foreign investment. But the first generation o f idealistic reformers had been deposed amidst 
economic turmoil and replaced by older industrial managers with deep roots in the old Soviet power 
structure. Yevgenii Nazdratenko was appointed the head o f  administration by President Yeltsin in May 
1993. This was a time when Yeltsin was attempting to gain support from the local politicians in his 
struggle with the Supreme Soviet. The opposition o f the Primorskii soviet to the Kuznetsov cabinet was 
the result o f confrontation between the old Communist party leaders (nomenklatre) and the group of  
politicians with strong ties to the new state industrial entrepreneurs. As the former director of the Vostok 
mining enterprise, Nazdratenko had strong ties with industry. See Tamara Troyakova, “Regional Policy in
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Cherepkov on corruption charges (which were later dismissed by the federal 
prosecutor).*^
Incumbent Nazdratenko was re-elected governor in December 1995 (Primorskii 
krai was the only RFE region that held gubernatorial elections on 17 December).*^ The 
popular Nazdratenko was supported by a 69 per cent majority of the residents of 
Primorskii krai,** with the second runner being Viktor Cherepkov*"  ^who achieved only 
17 per cent of the vote.** After Nazdratenko was re-elected to his governorship in 1996, 
he himself faced corruption allegations in Primorskii krai. This became a focus for 
national attention and Yeltsin attempted unsuccessfully to remove him from his post.*^
the Russian Far East and the Rise o f  Localism in Primorskii krai,” The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs. 
Summer/Fall 1995, Vol. IX, No. 2, p. .451.
For a further discussion o f recent political developments in Primorskii krai see paper given by Jeffrey 
W. Hahn entitled “The Development o f  Political Institutions in Three Regions o f the Russian Far East,” 
conference on “Regional Politics in Russia” in Dundee, 13-14 May 2000.
Nazdratenko was elected in May 1993 as the new governor through the regional council o f  people’s 
deputies. His candidacy was put forward by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and he received 147 votes in 
the election. There were 11 votes against him and 7 abstentions. He was the chairman of the “Vostok” 
mining company and a people’s deputy o f Russia. “Yeltsin-Nominated Candidate Elected Head o f  
Primorye,” Itar-Tass. 19 May 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-095,19 May 1993, p. 56.
Izvestiva. October 8, 1996, pp. 1-4, as cited in CDPSP, Vol. XLVIII, No. 40, October 30, 1996, p. 18.
Former Vladivostok Mayor Cherepkov, who was accused o f bribery and forcibly removed from his 
post in December 1994. He was forced to leave office by Yeltsin, under pressure from Nazdratenko, and 
was succeeded by Konstantin Tolstoshein. See “Vladivostok Former Mayor on Dismissal by Yeltsin,” 
Novava vezhednevnava gazeta. 28 December 1994, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-014. 23 January 1995, 
pp. 48-9; following the additional election in January 1995 the first territorial Duma was elected in 
Primorskii krai. Cherepkov was not elected at this time. See “Territorial Duma Elected in Maritime 
Region,” Itar-Tass. 17 January 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-012. 19 January 1995, pp. 26-7; however, 
he resumed his municipal duties on 30 September 1996 after both a Moscow court and a presidential 
decree restored his right to serve as the city’s mayor. Tolstoshein, who held the post o f  Mayor o f  
Vladivostok until Cherepkov’s return, accepted the post o f First Deputy Governor o f Primorskii krai. See 
“Cherepkov is Mayor Again,” RFEU. November 1996, p. 6; On 22 December 1996 Tolstoshein scheduled 
mayoral elections, having the support o f Governor Nazdratenko, and supporters dominating the city 
Duma. Cherepkov sought to cancel the elections on the grounds that Tolstoshein had no authority to set 
elections. After a local court backed his opponents, Cherepkov went to Moscow and returned on 18 
December with the news that representatives o f  the Procurator-General’s Office, the Central Electoral 
Commission, and the presidential administration all supported him. This planned controversial election to 
the Vladivostok Duma was declared invalid. Only 9 per cent o f eligible voters had turned out. More 
voters cast more ballots “against all candidates” than for any o f  the contenders, indicating that the teething 
problems and personality clashes o f the new democratic process left the electorate confused and hostile. 
See “Low Turnout Wrecks City Election in Vladivostok,” QMRI Dailv Digest. 8 January 1997.
Vvborv glav ispolnitel’noi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1995-1997. pp. 117-18.
“Viktor Cherepkov Reinstated as Major,” Vladivostok News. No. 124, 19 August 1996, p. 1.
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He appeared to lose the support of central government and Izvestiva published a series 
of articles at the end of July 1996 aimed, in part, at discrediting Nazdratenko. The 
newspaper directly linked the governor to criminal groups in Primorskii krai:
These articles were part o f an attempt to dislodge Nazdratenko, whose allies in 
Moscow, it appeared, had lost some influence with Yeltsin. Nazdratenko 
responded to the Izvestiva articles by filing a lawsuit against the newspaper, 
calling the articles “a torrent o f  dirty, shameless lies.”®^
Nezavisimava gazeta commented on Nazdratenko’s case: ‘removing the 
Primorskii krai governor, whom the region’s voters elected in a direct general election, 
merely by decision of central governmental structures, even by presidential decrees, is 
truly impossible today. Besides, the Council of the Federation, of which many members 
are themselves provincial governors, would hardly agree to such a decision.’** Despite 
the fact that Yeltsin, First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and Duma Chair 
Gennady Seleznyov called for him to step down, Nazdratenko remained as governor of 
Primorskii krai. Consequently, Moscow allotted more control over the distribution of 
federal funds to Viktor Kondratov, a General in the Federal Security Service and 
President Yeltsin’s special representative in the region. Kondratov’s role seemed to be 
part of an attempt to remove Nazdratenko’s authority over federal resources and to 
undermine his credibility; Kondratov ordered federal security police to search some 
offices of the gubernatorial administration in an apparent move to seek evidence for 
corruption charges.*^
Nazdratenko’s economic policies in Primorskii krai tightened local state control 
over industrial and trade enterprises. These policies could have been a contributing
87 Moscow Newspaper Attacks Primorskii krai Governor,” RFEU, Vol. VI, No. 9, September 1996, p.
12.
Nezavisimava gazeta. 3 October, 1996, p. 5, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVIII, No. 40, October 30, 1996
p. 20.
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factor in the fall-off in the krai’s level of international trade. His policy of local 
economic isolationism emphasised economic self-sufficiency and actively discouraged 
the trading of Chinese goods. As well as propaganda campaigns against cheap Chinese 
products, the krai cracked down on illegal Chinese immigration in 1994.^ Nazdratenko 
also adopted a hard line on Russian-Chinese border disputes, and opposed Yeltsin’s 
demarcation process along the Amur river (for a full discussion see chapter 5). These 
policies influenced both the anti-Yeltsin and the pro-nationalist movements, which were 
strongly in evidence during the 1995 Duma election^  ^ and in the 1996 presidential 
elections.^*
The diversity of the struggle for local autonomy can be seen in the moves made 
by different regions engaged in it. For example, the Sakhalin regional authority has 
intervened in the Russian-Japanese negotiations over the Kuril islands, adopting a more 
hard-line approach than the centre with regard to the possible return of the islands to 
Japan (this issue is fully dealt with in chapter 5). However, regional leaders were 
prepared to moderate their position on this issue in return for economic concessions 
from the centre. Sakhalin has a variety of natural resources and with the projected 
development of offshore oil fields, these may bring unmatched prosperity to the island. 
There is also the matter of its strong ties to nearby Japan, which may improve the future 
of Sakhalin, especially when the dispute over the Kuril islands is settled.
The governor of Khabarovsk krai, Viktor Ishaev, also functioned as an self- 
appointed spokesperson for the Far East as a whole. Ishaev stated in an interview with
“The Political Situation in Primorskii krai,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 7, July 1997, p. 12.
John Lloyd, Rebirth o f a Nation: an Anatomy o f Russia (London: Michael Joseph, 1998), p. 188. 
Vybory v shestuhi Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu: Itoni i w vody (Moscow: Institut politicheskogo i 
voennogo analiza, 1996), pp. 520-22.
105
Izvestiva that
many people in the RFE were disappointed by M oscow’s empty promises to help 
the RFE economy. They are equally concerned about the difficulty which the 
RFE region faces when trading with neighbouring countries, especially when 
bureaucrats create batriers to foreign trade, such as high export duties. The Far
East should have the right to develop its own economy. For this we needed our 
own banking system, our own custom, tax inspection and tax police. We were not 
looking for separation but for the centre to help us develop our economy and 
solve our social problems.^^
Ishaev served as the representative of the regional association and he also
represented Khabarovsk krai (centrally located in the populated southern part of the
region and the headquarters of the association). Responding to Yeltsin’s April 1996 ten- 
year programme for the Far East, Ishaev called immediate attention to the need for a 
managerial organ. He even proposed that a vice-premier answering for the Far East be 
named as the head of the programme, while adding that the executive office could be 
placed in the directorship of the existing Far Eastern Association. '^*
Some regions in the RFE were dependent upon large subsidies from Moscow. 
This was especially the case in the northern region; Magadan oblast, Chukotka 
autonomous okrug (AO),^* the Koryak AO and Kamchatka oblast all fell into this 
category. The main economic activity in these areas is local industrial development
Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1996 goda: Itoei i vvvodv (Moscow: Institut politicheskogo i 
voennogo analiza, 1996), pp. 228-30,
Izvestiva. 29 November 1995, as cited in Russian Far East Update IRFEUt. Vol. VI, No. 11, November 
1996, p. 6.
Izvestiva tikhookeanskoi Rossii. May 1996, p. 5.
But, in some cases, small minorities in the North in some cases won autonomy from existing 
administrative units, leading to the split o f Chukotka AO from Magadan oblast and o f the Koryak AO 
from Kamchatka. In January 1992 the Chukotka okrug soviet discussed the draft law o f its autonomy 
within the Russian Federation. The chairman o f the soviet, V.M. Etylen, provided a short report and 
discussed the results o f the activities o f the delegation o f  Chukotka parliamentarians in Moscow. See 
Sovetskava Chukotka. 25 January 1992, p. 1, as cited in Sunar Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 132. In May 
1993 the Constitutional Court decided that the law would change and Chukotka autonomous okrug would 
become a direct subject o f the Russian Federation. The constitutionality o f  this law was being disputed by 
the Magadan oblast soviet and one o f  the Russian people’s deputies. Prior to this the Chukotka 
autonomous okrug was part o f the north-eastern half o f  Magadan oblast. This decision o f the 
Constitutional Court was its first verdict concerning relations between subjects of the Federation. Finally, 
the Russian parliament recognised Chukotka’s separation from Magadan. See Sibirskava gazeta. No. 20, 
May 1993, p. 2, as cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 130.
1 0 6
based on the exploitation of natural resources. They had little to gain from pursuing 
greater autonomy from the centre due to their unbalanced pattern of development and 
massive emigration (emigration figures given in chapter 4). In the 1995 Duma and 1996 
presidential elections they demonstrated a high level of support for both pro-govemment 
parties^^ and for Yeltsin/^ In August 1993 Kamchatka oblast appealed to the Supreme 
Soviet to declare it a republic, but this appeal was denied. However, the main aim of this 
appeal was not economic or political independence, rather it was the desired equality of 
the krai and oblasts with the republics within the RF/* In November 1996, Magadan 
oblast (under the newly elected nationalist, governor Valentin Tsvetkov) sought to gain 
the advantages of a free economic zone and its benefits in the exploitation of mineral 
resources (available to the republic of Sakha) while still striving for more central 
assistance.^^
Among the southern regions, Amur oblast and the Jewish AO were in a difficult 
position, having vital connections both with Moscow and with the northern Chinese 
provinces. While they were highly dependent on subsidies from Moscow to overcome 
economic hardship, they were also heavily reliant on trade with China. Politically, they 
demonstrated a high level of support for pro-communist parties and Zyuganov.
The RFE’s search for greater autonomy has been, and will continue to be a 
complicated process. Signs of this can be seen in the many disputes over border 
demarcation with China. For example, arguments between regional leaders in Primorskii 
and Khabarovsk over Chinese immigration into the RFE; also the resulting block to the
Vybory v shestuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu. pp. 528-30.
Vvborv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1996 goda, pp. 228-30
Kamchatskava pravda. 21 August 1993, p. 1, as cited in RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 103. 
Nezavistimaia gazeta. 3 October 1996, p. 2.
100 Vybory v shestuiu Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu. pp. 511-14.
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final demarcation of the Russian-Chinese border (under the terms of the 1991 USSR- 
China Agreement on the Eastern Section of the Soviet-Chinese state border). This had 
repercussions for other parts of the region and Amur oblast suffered severely in mid 
1990s from the sharp drop in trade with China. Its elites and residents blamed 
Nazdratenko and Ishaev for pressuring Moscow to prevent illegal Chinese immigration 
into the RFE. The above are examples of centre-periphery conflict in the RFE; they will 
be dealt with more fully in chapter 5 in connection with relations with China. Despite 
the existence of a Far Eastern Association intended to coordinate the individual regions 
in the RFE, good bilateral relations between its members were not forthcoming, with 
individual regions continuing to appeal directly to Moscow at the expense of each 
other’s interests instead of combining to work more closely together. As Garnett notes, 
‘The local economies are not complementary, but are based on natural resource 
exploitation; local leaders see themselves not as partners but as rivals for export quotas, 
markets, and domestic and foreign investment.
The Far Eastern Republic (FER) also attracted attention as a model for a possible 
independence movement but its presence remained weak. Although the FER reflected a 
re-awakening of regional consciousness in the history of the RFE, it became clear that it 
lacked the power to drive the RFE’s real political autonomy movement. The region’s 
governors also attempted to form a political organisation to represent their economic 
interests, the FEAEC. Conflict between separate regions meant limited success, and the 
failure to constitute a united regional front inhibited the Association’s achievements, as 
did the growing economic and social tensions in the region. The absence of an effective
Vybory Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1996 goda, pp. 244-47.
Sherman Garnet, “The Russian Far East in Sino-Russian Relations,” SAIS Review. Vol. 16, No. 2, 
Summer/Fall 1996, p. 12.
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regional autonomy movement in the RFE was due, in part, to the failure of local 
political leaderships to create any kind of united front. Regional political leaders paid 
more attention to their own individual relationship with central government than to 
common relations with the rest of the RFE. Competing with each other for greater 
economic concessions from federal government, local authorities tended to act in an 
uncoordinated manner, which inevitably reduced the overall impact of their efforts. The 
centre also could not afford to fully approve each region’s development opportunities, 
financially or politically, without some central control over the regions. The present 
changes in centre-periphery relations mean that the social and economic environment in 
the RFE is further affected by policies pursued by the local authorities.^®*
As mentioned in the previous subsection, through bilateral agreements with 
Yeltsin, regional leaders enjoyed a relatively wide authority over areas of interest 
specific to their regions. These included the use of natural resources the liberty directly 
to engage in foreign trade and wider budgetary and tax powers. According to a new 
federal law in 1999, subjects of the Federation can enter directly into relations with 
subnational units in other states and with the permission of the Russian government they 
can also enter into direct relations with foreign states, Such policies have important 
implications for foreign trade activity in the RFE. Within the RFE regional variations in 
trade structure have been important in shaping the geographical distribution of foreign 
trade. Despite intervention by the centre, which periodically strikes down illegal local 
decisions, the trend towards greater autonomy in the RFE is gaining momentum.
Ekonomika i zhizn’. 1992, no. 37, p. 1.
104 ccQ i^ o^ordinatsii mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikh svyazei sub”ektov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,” Sobranie zakonodateFstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii. no. 2, art. 231, 4 January 1999.
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3,4: Man and the Environment
3.4.1: Environmental Pollution in the RFE
Due to the RPE relying heavily on the substantial military presence and exploitation of 
its rich natural resources/®* the region has always had to deal with serious 
environmental issues. These include air pollution in major industrial cities, water 
pollution, the destruction of forests, uncontrolled fires and the disposal of radioactive 
waste into the sea.
Table 3-1: Polluting Air Emissions in 1000s of tonnes by Region in 1994
4000
3000
2000
1000
RFE Sakha Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Magadan Sakhalin
Source: Derived from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezheaodnik. 1995 (Moscow: Goskomstat 
Rossii, 1995), pp. 679-81.
Air Pollution, As can be seen in table 3-1, Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai
n o
Sakha republic, and Sakhalin oblast had the highest air pollution in 1994. Primorskii and 
Khabarovsk were above the RFE average; Primorskii, in particular, exceeded it by almost 
three times, having the highest level of air pollution in the RFE. Table 3-2 shows 
reductions in the level of air pollution in the RFE, this being mainly due to economic 
recession in the last few years. Panel B specifically highlights the three major regions 
(Primorskii, Khabarovsk and Sakha). But it was reported that the importing of private 
vehicles from Japan and South Korea has contributed to the increase in air pollution in 
Primorskii in recent years.
Table 3-2: Polluting Air Emissions in 1000s of tonnes in the RFE and by Region 
From 1991 to 1994
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Source: As Table 3-1, pp. 676-78.
Note: + Primorskii krai, * Khabarovsk krai and O republic of Sakha.
Water Pollution. In the RFE, water remains pollution free where there has been 
no human activity whereas in the developed parts pollution is increasingly evident.
Ruben Mnatsakanian, Environmental Legacy o f  the Former Soviet Republics (Edinburgh: Institute o f  
Ecology & Resource Management University o f  Edinburgh, 1992), p. 184.
I l l
There are many cases of deteriorating water quality (particularly near the sea), pollution 
of reservoir water, and poisoning of fish and waterfowl stocks. The timber industry has 
been a leading culprit Billions of roubles worth of felled timber lie beneath Far Eastern 
rivers, polluting the water, which is desperately scarce in the Amur region, Primorskii 
krai and on the Sakhalin i s l a n d / F o r  example, a critical situation exists in the largest 
river in the Amur region. This has resulted from the metallurgical, chemical, pulp and 
paper plants in Amur and KomsomoFsk-na-Amure where phenols, heavy metals and oil 
are pumped into the river. Also heavy deforestation in the valley of Amur and its 
tributaries has caused the diminishing of valuable fish species.
The following is another example of high levels of water pollution in Primorskii
krai:
The major polluters o f  water reservoirs in Primorskii krai are utility establishments. 
These account for over 50 per cent o f the total sewage discharge, farms (10 per cent), 
mines (9 per cent), metallurgical works (5 per cent) and so on . Many coastal sea 
areas are seriously contaminated by organic and biogenic substances, particularly 
pesticides. About 70 per cent o f  Golden Horn Bay is covered by patches o f  oil. The 
most contaminated body o f water in Primorskii krai is the Peter the Great Bay. A river 
runs from it carrying transit waste water and a large volume o f sewage from 
Vladivostok.
The krai is coucerued about its environment and therefore spends 90 per cent of 
its environmental budget on controlling water pollution.
Destruction o f forests. As Nezavisimava gazeta noted in 1994, 'The Far East has
Vladivostok News, 23 August 1994, p. 4.
Alexei Yu. Roginko, “Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic and the Fate o f Northern Natives,” in 
Massey Stewart (ed.) The Soviet Environment, pp. 227-29.
Mnatsakanian, Environmental Legacv. p. 187.
During my research visit to Vladivostok in September 1996 ,1 worked along the sea shore o f Golden 
Horn Bay and noticed the water was dark blue and very strong smelling; Evgeny E. Jarikov, “The Current 
Situation of Environmental Protection in Primorsky Territory,” in Primorsky Territorv: Its Political. 
Social and Economic Situation and Environmental Protection (Vladivostok: Centre for Pacific Economic 
Development and Co-operation; and Monterey, California: Centre for East Asian Studies, Monterey 
Institute o f International Studies, 1993), pp. 17-8.
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enormous forest resources, with 40 per cent of the total forest area and 25 percent of 
commercial woods of the RF located there. Over a long period of time, the development 
of these resources was b a rb a r i c .T h e r e  was no restriction on timber cutting. As a 
result a considerable amount of waste ground formed with 20 to 30 per cent of trees on 
slopes being cut down. This was causing erosion on a large scale and the complete 
collapse of ecosystems.
Another reason for forest destruction in the area was uncontrolled fires. In 1989 
forest fires destroyed 181,000 hectares in Khabarovsk krai and 132,000 on the Sakhalin 
island.^ The RFE appears to have the worst incidence of forest fires, as an example:
In May 1993 a fire raged for four days in a large area of a forest tract near the 
Sukhanov Pass in southern Primorskii krai and spread towards the Russian and 
Chinese border. Measures were taken to stop the fire from spreading, with servicemen 
trying to put it out, but to no avail. The main dangers were that not far from the fire 
there was an artillery depot o f the Far Eastern Military District and also residents o f  
Primorskii krai.^ '^^
According to the State Committee on Emergency Situations, in 1993 there were 
49 forest fires in Khabarovsk krai, 12 in the republic of Sakha, 14 in Primorskii krai and 
7 in Amur oblast.
Radioactive pollution. Nuclear testing, radioactive dumping and related 
accidents in the Russian Federation have contributed on a major scale to ecological 
pollution. In the RFE there was great concern over the location of a nuclear power plant 
on the Amur river near KomsomoFsk-na-Amure. ^  In October 1992, President Yeltsin 
issued a decree that Yablokov was to carry a study of the military and other agencies
Tsuneo Akaha, “Environmental Challenge in the Russian Far East,” in Akaha (ed.). Politics and 
Economics in the Russian Far East, p. 122.
Nezavisimava gazeta. July 6, p. 6, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 27, 1994, p. 12.
Mnatsakanian, Environmental Legacy, p. 190.
Brenton M. Barr, “Environmental Degradation in the Soviet Forest,” in Michael J. Bradshaw (ed.). The 
Soviet Union: A New Regional Geography? (London: Halsted Press, 1991), pp. 132-33.
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RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 151. 
Sibirskava gazeta. No. 21, May 1993, p. 2.
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involved in nuclear dumping activities. He obtained some alarming results along 
Russia’s Arctic and Pacific shores. The report presented to Yeltsin gave the precise 
location of past radioactive dumping, including that of waste from nuclear-powered 
submarines. Yeltsin signed a declaration confirming that dumping of radioactive 
waste in the ocean was a particular concern and agreed to plans for a survey of 
radioactive pollution in the Sea of Japan.
The dumping site of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan became an area of 
potential environmental disaster. This caused problems for the neighbouring countries, 
Japan and South K o r e a . I n  1993, it was revealed that between 1959 and 1991, the 
Soviet Union had dumped nuclear waste from old battleships into the Arctic, 
specifically at five sites in the Barents Sea and at eight sites in the Kara Sea. These 
included seven nuclear reactors containing radioactive material. The Russian 
government also admitted that the Soviet Union had dumped nuclear waste, including 
two nuclear reactors, into the Sea of Japan. The announcement came as a shock to the 
Japanese and Koreans, especially to those involved in fishing.
Due to a lack of storage and treatment facilities, the Soviet Union and Russia 
dumped tons of nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan and other waters off its coast. The 
uncovering of the decade-long nuclear dumping sparked international protests and led to 
calls for a rapid solution to the storage c r i s i s .Many  reports were written covering the
Pravda, 1 February 1989, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLIV, No. 4, 22 February 1989, pp. 20-1. 
Nezavisimava gazeta. 3 April 1993, p. 1, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLTV, No. 47, 1993, pp. 12-4. 
“Dumping Puts Yeltsin’s Fence-mending at Risk,” Japan Times. 26 October 1993, p. 3.
“Tokyo Offered Russian Uranium,” Izvestiya. 27 October 1993, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLV, 
No. 43, 1993, p. 26.
Yosef and Il’ia Shuster, “What Does the West Know o f the Nuclear Waste Problem in the Russian 
Navy? A Subjective Angle,” Environmental Policv Review. Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1994, pp. 2-4.
121 ttgQ jsfuQiear Submarines Decommissioned,” Tass. 21 January 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-013. 22 
January 1993, p. 40.
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Russian nuclear waste dumped in the Sea of Japan. The Japan Times reported, ‘in 
October 1993 three Russian ships arrived at the dump site, about 550 km from 
Hokkaido. Around 900 tons of liquid waste was dumped from tanks on board the TNT- 
27 (nuclear waste tankers), directly into the Sea of Japan. The waste was primarily 
reactor coolant and cleansing liquid generated while refuelling aging nuclear powered 
s u b m a r in e s . I n  December 1993 according to Mikhail Koreev (deputy chief of the 
Russian Foreign Ministry’s Science and Technical Co-operation) the Pacific Fleet’s 
TNT-5 and TNT-27 tankers, which held a total of 20,000 tons of liquid waste, were in a 
critical condition.^ '^^
Japanese officials were concerned about the potential danger from various 
forms of Russian dumping, particularly radioactive waste and heptyl fuel. Strong 
condemnation came from the Japanese. This caused the Russian government to delay 
further radioactive dumping in the Sea of Japan. The governor of Primorskii krai, 
Nazdratenko, also criticised the navy’s action on nuclear waste dumping. He was further 
backed by local opposition. Conflicting opinions came from local and central 
government, particularly when the Russian government announced in May 1994 that it 
would again dump further radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan. This had been stored 
in tankers at Vladivostok and would be dumped three months later. As a result of the 
controversy over the dumping of nuclear waste into the ocean, an agreement was signed 
between Russia, Japan, South Korea, the United States and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). This ordered a study on the environmental impact of nuclear
Izvestiva. 9 July 1993, p. 6, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLV, No. 27, 1993, p. 19.
Japan Times. 18 October 1993, p. 1.
RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 132.
Feshbach, Ecological Disaster, p. 90.
Hokkaido Shimbun. 3 November 1994, p. 4, as cited in Akaha, “Environmental Challenge,” p. 125.
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waste dumping in the Sea of Japan. Japanese and Russian officials met to discuss ways 
to stop further dumping of liquid radioactive waste into the ocean. Finally a study was 
conducted in March and April 1994. The Japanese and Russians created a Bilateral 
Commission on Nuclear Waste and agreed in principle to jointly build a radioactive 
waste treatment plant in the Far East.
At the same time, Russia and Japan agreed to build a disposal plant for liquid 
nuclear waste near Vladivostok. The Japanese government agreed to the building of a 
mobile storage centre for Russian radioactive waste in Japan. The facility would filter 
radioactive substances from the liquid waste. The plant would be funded from a 
Japanese grant of US$70 million for the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons and 
nuclear waste disposal. In June 1994, Alaskan state officials also stated that the 
environmental risks posed to Alaska by the nuclear power plant Bilibino were due to a 
lack of finance and that there was a need to establish a modem monitoring system. 
Recent Japanese involvement in the construction of the radioactive plant will be dealt 
with later in this chapter.
3,4,2: The Indigenous Peoples of the RFE
As Vitebsky notes, ‘the term northern minorities (indigenous peoples or native peoples) 
covers a number of diverse native peoples across the sparsely-populated Russian Arctic 
and Far East.’ They collectively numbered some 184,000 in the 1989 census and were
Kvdo. 20 May 1994, as cited in RA Report No. 17, July 1994, p. 164. 
Japan Times. 17 April 1994, p. 2.
129 Ibid., p. 1.
A study released by the University o f  Alaska, Anchorage, and the Alaska Department o f  
Environmental Conservation said that the Bilibino nuclear power plant needed US$16 million in 
improvements to bring the facility up to current Russian safety standards. See Japan Times. 5 June 1994, 
p. 9.
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grouped under 26 ethnic names/^^ Their economy, as others have noted, is based on 
primitive skills and their social structures retain ‘many facets of a primitive- 
communalist s o c i e t y / T h e  main indigenous peoples are the Nenets, Evenk, Khant, 
Chukchi, Yakuts, Even, Nanay, Koryak, Eskimo and Dolgan. These peoples are small in 
number and their basic traditional occupations are reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing 
and hunting sea animals. The Khant group, for instance, live traditionally by hunting 
and freshwater fishing. These activities are also important among reindeer-herding 
groups such as the Nenets, Evenk or inland Chukchi, while groups on the east coast 
such as the Eskimo and Coastal Chuchi hunt walrus and whales at sea.^ "^^
Anavgai is one of Kamchatka’s few national villages, where residents of the 
indigenous peoples outnumber Russians. Of the 614 people there, 324 are Evens and 96 
are Koryaks. But the most indigenous residents in central and southern Kamchatka are 
the Itelmen (this word translates as ‘those living here’). At present there are only a few 
more than 1,000 Itelmen left. In Anavgai, it is reported that attempts to preserve the old 
way of life are hopeless. The Evans and the Koryaks are no more suited to a nomadic 
way of life than the Russians are. Long tours of reindeer-herding duty in the tundra are 
just as burdensome for them and the traditions of reindeer herding as a way of life were 
lost for good as soon as children started growing up in boarding schools rather than 
nomad camps.
Piers Vitebsky, “The Northern Minorities,” in Graham Smith (ed.), The Nationalities Question in the 
Post-Soviet States (London; Longman, Second Edition, 1996), p. 94.
S. S. Savoskul, “Urbanisation and the Minority Peoples,” in Alan Wood and R. A. French (eds.), The 
Development of Siberia People and Resources fLondon: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 97-8.
James Forsyth, A History o f the Peoples o f  Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony 1581-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 365.
James Forsyth, The Indigenous Peoples o f  Siberia in the Twentieth Century, Alan Wood and R A. 
French, (eds.). The Development o f Siberia People and Resources (London; Macmillan, 1989), pp. 74-5.
“About Those Who are Leaving,” Novove vremya. No. 32, August 1995, pp. 16-8, as cited in CDPSP. 
Vol. XLVIT, No, 33, 1995, pp. 12-3.
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The native peoples’ ecology and preservation of traditional life style has become 
a significant environmental issue for the RFE. The development of Northern Russia has 
resulted in a deep conflict between conservation and the interests of industrial 
civilisation.^^^ The native peoples in the RFE have made clear that for them, issues of 
ethnic identity are closely tied to ecological and environmental problems. During 
perestroika, most of these peoples went through a process of national reawakening, 
acquiring a sense of ownership of their land. In early August 1989, for instance, the city 
of Khanty-Mansiisk hosted the first congress of the Khanty and the Mansi. These are the 
indigenous peoples of northern Siberia. It was decided to close the still undamaged part 
of the taiga to geologists and oil miners and to restore the traditional use of natural 
resources. In principle, reckless and aggressive exploitation of the northern 
environment by the Soviet Union’s industrial ministries undermined the natural basis of 
the native peoples’ existence. This problem, which confronted the Soviet Union, 
continued to exist for the post-Soviet Union. This is illustrated by the following 
examples:
Human environment and traditional life styles are changed, because o f  isolation from 
traditional trade and the environment which they were accustomed to. As a result the 
tundra natives have considerably reduced their settlement and hunting areas. This also 
caused a reduction in their traditional economic activities, such as reindeer husbandry, 
hunting and fishing. The consequences have led to high levels o f  unemployment, 
crime and suicide rates and alcoholism.*'*®
Gail A. Fondahl, “Siberia: Native Peoples and Newcomers in Collision,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray 
Taras (eds.), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 477.
Zeev Wolfson, “The Threat from the North,” Environmental Policv Review. Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 
1992, pp. 12-3.
Andrei Yablokov, “The Current State o f the Soviet Environment,” Environment Policy Review. Vol. 4, 
No. 1, 1990, p. 10.
Philip R. Pryde, Environmental Management in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 279-81.
*'*® S. B. Lavrov, “Regional and Environmental Problems o f  the USSR: A  Synopsis o f  Views from the 
Soviet Parliament,” Soviet Geosranhv. Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990, pp. 479-80.
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As a result of careless land improvement in the Magadan region, many rivers 
and lakes in the Chukotka area are devoid of plankton. These regions are facing 
disastrous disturbances affecting the ecosystem and human habitat. This is due to
firstly, the lack o f a rational approach regarding the economic development o f  the 
region, secondly, the absence o f strict controls on exploitation of new oil, gas, and 
raw mineral deposits, thirdly, due to the chronic shortfall o f  funds, the implementation 
o f environmental protection measures has limited prospects regarding the region’s 
environment.
The ongoing joint American-Russian sale of permits for exploitation of offshore 
oil and gas deposits, in the Arctic, Chukotka and Kamchatka oblast is also extremely 
worrying. In June 1994, the RF Committee for Geology signed a memorandum on this 
project without consulting the relevant organisations or informing the public or local 
authorities/'^^ In June and July 1995 Novove vremva reported the contradiction between 
preservation of the environment and the development of natural resources in Magadan 
and Kamchatka oblasts. To preserve both the indigenous peoples’ traditional way of 
life and local forest lands, in late 1996 local authorities in Khabarovsk and Primorskii 
krais assisted the indigenous peoples in processing and selling non-timber forest 
products such as ginseng, berries, medicinal plants and mushrooms. This development 
was supported by the RFE Association for the Use of Non-Timber Forest Products.
I will examine the following problems which the native peoples have mainly 
faced: the declining life expectancy, the threat of extinction, and chronic diseases caused 
by radioactivity and alcoholism.
Alexei Yu. Roginko, “Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic and the Fate of Northern Natives,” in 
Massey Stewart (ed.). The Soviet Environment, p. 215.
Emma Wilson, “Hotspots of the Russian Far East,” a paper presented to the BASEES annual 
conference in Cambridge, 4-6 April 1998, p. 1.
“Our Commentary; the Russian Arctic,” Environmental Policv Review. Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1997, 
pp. 58-9.
 ^ “Kamchatka Adrift,” Novove vremva. No. 25 June 1995, pp. 17-9, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, 
No. 33, 1995, pp. 10-2.
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Life Expectancy. In 1959, the average life expectancy of native peoples in the 
RFE was equal to that in North America; 62 and 63 years respectively. By 1989 the life 
expectancy of the North Americans had increased by 10 years, while that of the native 
peoples of the RFE had fallen by 20 years. In the early 1990s the average life 
expectancy of these native peoples was 42 to 45 years, 16 to 18 years less than that of 
the non-indigenous population residing in the same a r e a s . I n  January 1992 Pravda 
reported that ‘The infant death rate of the indigenous population is twice that among 
non-natives. The number of children of the Chukchi, Koryak, Even and other 
indigenous peoples that die before one year of age is about four times higher than in 
other f a m i l i e s . T h e  indigenous peoples’ death rate in 1994 exceeded that of other 
residents in northern areas by 1.5 times. The death rate of the mature indigenous 
population in the northern areas exceeded that of newcomers by 3-4 times. The infant 
death rate was greater than the average figure reported in Russia by 1.7 times. The 
native peoples’ incidence of tuberculosis was five times as high and infant mortality 
twice as high as the average in the RF as a whole. At the same time, housing 
conditions for the indigenous peoples were very poor. As Lavrov notes, ‘one-third of the 
population lives in pestilence and for each inhabitant there is about 7.5 square meters of 
living space. There are quite serious environmental consequences stemming from the 
disorderly development of the t e r r i t o r y . I n  the early 1990s the income of the 
indigenous population was 10 to 30 times less than that of the immigrant population.
145 ‘Non-timber Forest Products,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 11, November 1996, p. 10.
Supar Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 146.
“Stepchildren o f the North,” Pravda. 29 January 1992, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLIV, No. 4, 
1992, p. 31.
RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 176.
Lavrov, “Regional and Environmental Problems,” p. 479.
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The interests of the indigenous peoples have also largely been ignored.
Threat o f extinction. As we have seen, life in the Far North has been 
deteriorating for the native peoples. Furthermore, ethnic minorities in the north of 
Russia are facing the threat of extinction. In 1913, there were about 200 peoples and 
nationalities in Russia; in the early 1990s there numbered about 100. In Yakutia, for 
instance, the number of the indigenous peoples has fallen in each case; during the same 
period Evens (5,100 persons), Evenks (10,400 persons), Yukagirs (442 persons), 
Dolgans (105 persons) and Chukchis (385 persons). Of these, some peoples have not 
been granted a defined area of land for their own cultivation and subsistence. Therefore, 
their hunting areas, deer pastures and fishing locations can be easily confiscated for 
other purposes, dooming the indigenous population to extinction. Although Yakuts 
cannot be considered small with a population of over 350,000 people, the republic of 
Sakha is equally affected by the problem of maintaining traditional uses of the 
environment. The degradation of the nation’s unique and ancient culture is also 
apparent. About 11,500 settlements existed in Yakutia prior to collectivisation and 7,500 
after the implementation of this process. After the ‘union of the settlements’ took place, 
only 4,500 settlements remained. As a result of the recent ‘concentration and 
centralisation’ project by 1992, only 820 settlements remained.
Chronic disease. The nuclear tests of the 1950s and 1960s conducted in the Far 
North have brought tragedy to the native peoples of Chukotka. The poisons 
consequently released into the atmosphere have travelled up the food chain, via reindeer 
and other plants through reindeer to the Chuchi people and others. The result is that 90
Roginko, “Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic,” p. 217.
Andrei Yablokov, “Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia,” Environmental Policv Review.
Vol. 9, No. 2, Autumn 1992, p. 12.
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per cent of the Chuchi people have suffered from chronic lung diseases, and almost 100 
per cent from tuberculosis; there are regular outbreaks of virus and parasitic diseases. 
The incidence of cancer in Chukotka is 2 or 3 times higher (with liver cancer 10 times 
higher) than the Russian average. Data released in 1990 showed that some northern 
regions of the Russian Federation, especially residence of the Evenk, Nenets and 
Taimyr, had a higher infant mortality rate than the regions of central Russia. These 
regions have also suffered from high mortality rates among the working-age population 
as a result of poisoning, trauma, blood-circulation diseases, acute intestinal infections 
and active tuberculosis. Tuberculosis is particularly prevalent in the Khanty-Mansii and 
Koryak districts and the Yamal-Nenets Republic where the rate of infection is 2-3 times 
higher than that in the RF as a whole. In addition, high levels of all forms of malignant 
tumours pervade the region
Another serious problem of the indigenous population is alcoholism. This will be 
dealt with in chapter 4. Along with this, deterioration of the environment has also 
contributed to the disintegration of the traditional economy while causing genetic 
decline. All of these factors have led to depopulation and birth defects. Data on diseases 
in the industrial regions of the North and on the incidence of genetic defects give weight 
to the importance of the ecological factor/
3.4.3: Public Health and Life Expectancy
The health of the general population can serve as an important indicator of the quality of 
the environment. The deterioration in public health in the RF is one of the most
Supar Report. No. 8, January 1990, p. 90. 
Yablokov, “Notes on the Environmental,” p. 2.
122
disastrous consequences of its worsening ecological situation, and has contributed to the
high mortality rate. The Russian population has been declining since the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, For example between 1990 and 1994 life expectancy at birth fell
by 6.2 years for men (from 63.8 to 57.6 years) and by 3.4 years for women (from 74,4 to
71.0 years). The decrease in the average life expectancy in the RF has been reported
in a recent Time magazine article:
By 1965 a Russian male could expect to live 64 years, a Russian woman 72, close to 
the 1965 American figures o f 67 for men and 73 for women. According to the special 
Presidential Commission on Women, the Family and Demography, in 1997 official 
life expectancy in Russia was 59 years for men and a little over 73 for women. It has 
slipped behind Europe, the US, and all o f Asia, except Afghanistan and Cambodia.
The average Russian male died about 17 years earlier than his Swedish counterpart, 
or 13 years younger than a white male American.*^®
Russian mortality as a whole has increased. From 1993 to 1995, more people 
were dying than were being bom. In this period the average birth rate in the RFE was 
higher than the national average but the death rate in the nation as a whole had been 
higher than in the RFE. In the RF as a whole the birth rate per thousand was 9.3 per cent 
in 1995, whereas in the RFE it was 12.0 per cent. This gave the RFE a substantially 
lower rate of natural population decrease than in the RF as a whole. In the RF the death 
rate per thousand was 15.0 per cent in 1995, compared with 12.6 per cent in the RFE.^^^
“Our Commentary,” p. 53.
David A. Leon et al., “Huge Variation in Russian Mortality Rates 1984-94: Artefact, Alcohol, or 
What?,” The Lancet. 9 August 1997, pp. 383-88.
“Russian Roulette,” Time. 11 August, 1997, pp. 14-7.
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1994 (Moscow. Goskomstat Rossii, 1994), pp. 450-52, 1995 
(Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995), pp. 532-34 and 1996 (Moscow: Logos, 1996), pp. 721-23,
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Table 3-3: Births and Deaths Rates per thousand by Region in 1995
Sakha Sakhalin Primorskii Khabarovsk Jewish Amur Kamchatka Magadan 
Source: As Table 3-2.
Note: Birth Rate }'  |
Death Rate mam
Table 3-3 presents the 1995 regional birth and death rates per thousand in the 
RFE. In comparison to the regions in the RFE, the birth rate in the Sakha republic is 
exceptional (15.3 per cent), in that it is almost four times higher than its death rate, 
making it the highest in the RFE. At the other end of the scale, Sakhalin oblast had the 
highest death rate (17.0 per cent) in the RFE followed by the Jewish AO (13.6 per cent). 
Sakhalin’s death rate in 1995 was higher than the RF average (15.0 per cent); it was also 
about five times higher than the local birth rate. In contrast, the death rate in Chukotka,
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Sakha, Magadan, Amur and Kamchatka was lower than the RFE average (12.6 per 
cent); among them Chukotka AO had the lowest death rate, being 8.6 per cent.
Mortality rates reflect social conditions and, in particular, the health of a 
population. The following figures as cited in the RA Report in July 1993, show the 
increase in deaths;
In Khabarovsk krai in 1993, the number o f  births per 1,000 was 9,6, whereas the 
number o f deaths was 12.3, an increase o f 18%, The leading cause o f  death was 
disease o f  the heart and vascular system (51%), followed by trauma and poisoning 
(23%) and neoplasm (14%). In the case o f Kamchatka oblast, the number o f deaths 
with no specified cause increased 3.6 times.
According to specialists from the Mechnikov Medical Society (based in the 
Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology of the Siberian branch of the Russian 
Academy of Medical Sciences), in the last 20 years in Primorskii krai there has been a 
40 percent increase in the mortality rate from cancer. Surveys conducted by specialists 
at a number of enterprises in the mining industry have revealed a direct link between the 
increased incidence of cancer and the state of the environment in the region. In the 
1960s and 1970s in Primorskii krai, the ratio of deaths to births was almost equal. 
However, in recent years it has experienced a decreasing birth rate and a rise in 
mortality that is unprecedented in Russia. In Vladivostok, for instance, the mortality rate 
is six times as high as the birth rate.^ ^®
As can be seen in table 3-4, the infant mortality rate in the RFE was about 23 per 
thousand, higher than the RF average (about 20 per thousand). The Jewish AO had the 
highest infant mortality rate of all the regions in the RFE: 37 per thousand, being 17 
more (almost double) the RF average. Khabarovsk, Magadan and Sakhalin were below 
the national average; among them Magadan oblast had the lowest infant mortality rate.
158 RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 13.
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at 13 per thousand.
Table 3-4: No. of Infants Dying before the Age of One per 1,000 by Region in 1993
40
30
RF RFE Saklia Primorskii Khabaiovsk Magadan Sakiialin Jewish AO Koiyak Chukotka
Source: Sem’va v Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1994 (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1994), pp. 
63-6.
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 show the 1994 regional average life expectancy for males and 
females at birth. The average life expectancy for males was 56 years, also less than the 
Russian average, which was 57.6 years. The RFE average life expectancy for females at 
birth was 68.6 years, lower than the national average, which was 71 years. Overall, the 
RFE average life expectancy for males and females at birth was lower than those in the 
nation as a whole. Elsewhere, in both the RF and the RFE, the average life expectancy 
for females was substantially higher than that for males.
Ibid., p. 167.
“Birth rate falls, death rate rises,” Vladivostok New. No. 185, March 15, 1999, p. 2.
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Table 3-5: Average Life Expectancy for Maies at Birth by Region in 1994
58
57
56
55
54
RF RFE Sakha Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Magadan Sakhalin Chukotka
Source: Derived from Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii (Moscow: Goskomstat 
Rossii, 1995), pp. 90-9.
In this respect, as well, we can see regional variation at work in the RFE. The 
average life expectancy for females at birth in Khabarovsk krai was 69.3 years, making 
it the highest life expectancy for females in the RFE, while in Kamchatka it was only 
67.3 years, which was the lowest. Life expectancy for males in Chukotka was 57.4 
years. Chukotka displayed the highest life expectancy for males in the RFE. In contrast, 
the lowest life expectancies for males in the RFE were in Magadan and Sakhalin: on 
average 54.7 years in both areas.
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Table 3-6: Average Life Expectancy for Females at Birth by Region in 1994
71
70
69
68
67
66
RF RFE Sakha Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Kamchatka Magadan Sakhalin Chukotka 
Source: As Table 3-5.
3.4.4: International Support for Environmental Preservation
The international community has been closely involved in several projects designed to 
avert the deterioration in the RFE’s regional environment. In January 1996 the Tomen 
Corporation (Tokyo, Japan) and Babcock & Wilcox (Lynchburg, Virginia) were awarded 
the right to construct nuclear waste storage facilities and a floating barge. This would 
process liquid radioactive waste (LRW) produced by the Russian Navy. Japan financed 
the project. The facility is being built in KomsomoTsk-na-Amure and will be moored in 
Bolshoi Kamen, Primorskii krai.^ ^  ^The Russian State Committee for Defence Industries 
and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy have co-operated on this project. The 
Russian Far East Update produced a summary of the project:
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It is best described m two stages: (1) construction, testing and approval o f  the barge 
(now fully completed), and (2) construction, installation, testing and approval o f  the 
waste processing facility (it was in the final testing phase in mid 1998). Work took 
place in the RFE shipyards: Amur, Bolshoi Kamen, Vostok and Zvezda.
The low-level radioactive waste processing plant was built by Chem-Nuclear
System Inc (Columbia, South Carolina) and was installed in the Amur Ship Yard
(KomsomoTsk-na-Amure). Further work was done at Bolshoi Kamen in Primorskii krai.
The processing plant has the capacity to process 7,000 cubic meters of low-level, liquid
radioactive waste per year.^ *’'^
In December 1996 it was reported that the Khabarovsk krai nature preserve
{zapovednik) was under threat. The BoFshekhekhtsirskii protected area is the smallest of
five zapovedniks in Khabarovsk krai. It comprises 45,000 hectares. This zapovednik
faces greater risk than other protected areas in Khabarovsk krai due to population
pressure, since Khabarovsk krai city borders BoFshekhekhtsirskii. In a press interview,
S. Spiridonov, BoFshekhekhtsirskii director said, ‘The incidence of violations has
quadmpled in the last three years, these have included poaching of turtles (unique to the
park and considered a delicacy in China) and tree cu t t i ng .S ince  this issue has come
to light, the World Bank has become involved by funding the RFE protected areas. The
World Bank awarded Russia a US$ 20 million grant for the RF Biodiversity
“Controversy over Nuclear Active Waste Processing Facility,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 6, June 1996, p. 6.
"Construction o f Nuclear Waste Floating Barge,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1996, p. 11.
“Nuclear Waste and the Environment,” RFEU. Vol. VDL, No. 6, June 1998, p. 12.
The plant was designed to receive waste from decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines. From this 
raw material, it creates a concentrate which is then packed like cement in 200-litre drums. The drums are 
offloaded onto flatbed trucks for transfer to a permanent storage site. Two tests remain to be completed 
before final approval: (1) inactive commissioning, testing with surrogates o f  radioactive material and (2) 
final testing will take place at the Zvezda Shipyard (Primorskii krai). The Zvezda Shipyard will have the 
operating license for the barge processing plant under supervision of Russia’s Atomic Energy Agency 
(Gosatomnadzor). The vessel has been named: the Lily o f  the Valley (Landish in Russian). See ibid., p. 
12.
He mentioned that extremely low salaries and lack o f financing in general make it difficult to keep 
staff at the zapovednik which in 1996, had only 23 employees. Zapovedniks have traditionally been 
designated as areas where no human intrusion was allowed except for scientific studies.
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Conservation Project. The implementing agency is the State Committee on 
Environmental Protection {Goskomekologiya). Goskomekologiya proposed a tentative 
list of ‘Protected Area Components’ which would receive about 53 per cent of the 
funds.’®
In the following year, in January 1997, a new nature preserve of 91,000 hectares 
was created in the Jewish AO. Zapovednik is the strictest of protected areas in Russia, 
traditionally allowing no human intrusion except for scientific work. The new 
zapovednik, called ‘Bastak’, became operational in 1998. The preserve’s mountainous 
landscape is covered by coniferous forests. It is the home to some rare and endangered 
species, including the black far eastern stork and the white-tailed sea eagle. The 
World Wild Life Fund for Nature (WWLF), based in Geneva, Switzerland, also signed 
an agreement to provide US$ 350,000 for conservation projects in the Sakha Republic. 
The funding will be used primarily to create a network of new protected areas in 
Sakha.
Furthermore, in New Delhi, in March 1998, the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF) Counci/^^ approved a US$ 5.2 million regional project for the Tumen river area 
(the border region where China, North Korea and Russia’s Primorskii krai intersect; this 
is dealt with in chapter 6). The GEF Council created a plan to reduce pollution in the 
Tumen river region. The project focused on two areas: international water pollution and
B ol’shekhekhtsirskii zapovednik administration decided to develop ecotourisra to raise funds. See “News 
on Protected Areas,” RFEU, Vol. VI, No, 12, December 1996, p. 12.
Eight RFE zapovedniks are included: Primorskii krai (Sikhote-Alinskii, Lazovskii, Ussuriskii, 
Khankaiskti), Magadan oblast (Magadanskii), Amur oblast (BChinganskii), Khabarovsk krai (Botchinskii), 
Kurile Islands (Kuriskii). See ibid., p. 15.
“New Nature Reserve for Jewish AO,” RFEU. Vol. VH, No. 4, April 1997, p. 12.
“International agency funding for Sakha,” RFEU. Vol. VH, No. 3, March 1997, p. 5.
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Coimcil is a unit o f the World Bank Group. Its purpose is to 
foster reduction o f  water and air pollution, to protect bio-diversity in situations and involve multiple
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international waterways, and biodiversity conservation. According to local experts, the 
Tumen river is polluted, affecting wetlands and offshore fisheries.
These three examples of environmental preservation, nature reserves, radioactive 
waste and river pollution, demonstrate that there has been recent international co­
operation with the RFE concerning the environment. At present, the RFE is in a difficult 
position. It is economically dependent on exploiting its national resources to the greatest 
extent, and yet it is increasingly necessary to protect and conserve its environment.
3.5: Conclusion
In this chapter I have dealt with two issues, namely, autonomy and environmental 
problems as they appeared at the top of the agenda in the Far East. How did these issues 
reach this prime position on the political agenda in the Far East? In the first instance, 
many issues were evidently raised by regional leaders and government agencies without 
prior approval from above. Regional and local officials could not always know just how 
the top leadership would react to their raising of a particular issue. If the reaction was 
negative, the issue tended to be shunted aside at a higher level. Under the Russian 
Federation, the issue of political autonomy had been high on the national agenda. In the 
Far East particularly regional politicians, local elites and the political parties (e.g. the 
SDPR, Social Democratic Party of Russia) attempted to obtain much greater power in 
addition to their existing economic and political power. Particularly through election
national boundaries. See “New Fund Approved for Environmental Protection for Tumen River Region,” 
RFEU. Vol. Vm , No. 6, June 1998, p. 11.
The project will produce recommendations for subsequent specific individual projects. Funding for 
these specific projects would be provided and based on cost sharing. Projects could range from wetlands 
protection to protection o f the sacred Paektu Mountain (on the China/North Korea border). Participants in 
the planning study would be both international and nationally approved consultants. Several branches o f  
the Russian Academy o f Sciences, Far Eastern Division are likely to be involved, for example, the Far 
Eastern Institute o f Geography. See ibid., p. 11.
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campaigns they frequently discussed issues relating to the autonomy issue on both radio 
and TV broadcasts. The governors played a large role in championing political autonomy 
in the Far East and by virtue of their position received more regular attention from the 
centre.
My discussion of the environmental situation in the RFE makes it amply clear 
that the region faces an enormous challenge. The deteriorating natural environment of 
the RFE is taking a heavy toll on the health of its population. These environmental 
issues have given rise to huge public concern in the Far East. This concern, channeled 
through individuals and groups of citizens, raised publicity over the environment and 
related issues. The issue of environmental health in the Far East climbed to the top of 
the public agenda thiough the persistent efforts of a policy coalition of academics, local 
officials, journalists, environmentalists (Green activists), the associations of indigenous 
peoples and concerned citizens. This growth of environmental consciousness in the 
region suggested to the centre and regional administrations that they should further 
consider how to deal with the challenges of environmental protection and resource 
conservation and management in the Far East.
132
Chapter 4; The Domestic Political Agenda: Socio-Economic Conditions 
4.1: Introduction
The collapse of Communist power in the former Soviet Union and the emergence of a 
reform-oriented government have clearly promoted an increased interest in socio­
economic changes within its former republics. From the socio-economic point of view, 
one of the most important features of Russian society is its distinct regional 
differentiation. As Parkansky notes, the Russian national socio-economic area is not 
homogeneous; the regions differ greatly in their levels of development of industry, 
agriculture and services, as well as economic infrastructure.^ Taking this into account, I 
will examine the current socio-economic situation in the 10 regions of the RFE as 
compared with the 79 other subjects of the RF and I will also focus on the socio­
economic situation within individual regions of the RFE.^
Three major subjects will be dealt with in this chapter. Section one examines the 
demographic dimension, section two focuses upon the social dimension and section 
three deals with the economic dimension. The demographic dimension, for my 
purposes, will include the population of the RFE, and the geographical distribution of 
that population within the RFE. In the RFE the population has rapidly declined in recent 
years and I will examine this decline with reference to the change in the natural 
population, migration and different ethnic groups. In the second section my approach 
will be to focus upon crime rates, the number of registered crimes and the types of
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crime, and also upon the effects of alcohol consumption on alcohol related crimes. In 
section three, in dealing with recent economic developments in the RFE, I will discuss 
changes in employment and unemployment, living costs and poverty levels, the value of 
industrial production, the extent of foreign currency dealings, and the respective rate of 
retail and foreign export-import trade. Before dealing with the above, I will examine the 
limitations of using statistic data of which I make use of in this chapter.
An examination of these issues, while necessarily selective (see table 1-2), will 
demonstrate the effects of post-Soviet reform in the RFE in terms of the region’s own 
political agenda. Throughout this chapter, I shall be concerned to establish the extent to 
which, in these respects, the Far East differs from more general Russian patterns; and to 
explore the role of public, government and organised interests in shaping this part of the 
region’s political agenda.
The Limitations o f Using Statistic Data. There have been many difficulties in 
dealing with the Soviet and Russian statistical data on which much of this thesis 
necessarily relies. As Heleniak and Motivans note, the statistical system had been a 
focus of criticism for a number of reasons, including withholding data, utilising 
erroneous methodologies, and providing inacciuate and misleading information.^ In 
response to such criticisms, in July 1987 the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
passed a resolution on the restructuring and reforming of the statistical system.'  ^ Its 
central purpose was to secure an improvement in the reliability, methodology and
* Alexander B. Parkansky, “The Disintegration Trends in the Eastern Russia and the Russian Economic 
Opportunities in the Northern Pacific Area,” in Osamu leda (ed.), New Order in Post-Communist Eurasia 
(Sapporo, Japan: Hokkaido University, 1993), p. 120.
 ^Some o f the data utilised in my discussion includes all 10 regions and some less than 10.
 ^ Tim Heleniak and Albert Motivans, “A Note on Glasnost’ and the Soviet Statistical System,” Soviet 
Studies. Vol. 43, No. 3, 1991, p. 474.
 ^ Ibid., p. 474; Vladimir G. Treml, “Perestroyka and Soviet Statistics,” Soviet Economy. Vol. 4, No. 1, 
1988, p. 84.
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availability of state statistics/ Following the resolution there was a great increase in the 
number of statistical publications, and this affirmed a greater openness in the 
publication of data. Daily press releases, monthly statistical bulletins and sociological 
surveys were also more widely distributed. In addition, in the late 1980s Goskomstat 
began publishing a series of specialised statistical handbooks on topics such as industry, 
capital investment, communications, labour, population, education, environmental 
protection and health care, among others. This means that govermnent statistics became 
more readily available than in the past, and increasingly compatible with international 
conventions. However, the rush to publish materials, and to over-report ‘successes’, 
continued to undermine the reliability of the data.^ Equally, in the post communist 
period official data expressed in terms of money incomes may give a misleading 
impression of living standards and of relative earnings at times of high inflation, 
irregular payment of wages, and a partial withdrawal from the monetary economy.^ It is 
obvious that these and any other official statistics need to be used carefully and not 
always taken at face value.
4,2: The Demographic Dimension
As shown in table 4-1, although the RFE comprises more than one-third of the RF’s 
territory, the population of the RFE was, on 1 January 1996, just 7.5 million people, 
only about five per cent of Russia’s total of 147 million people. Just over a third (5.6 
million) of the RFE population live in urban centres, considerably less than the Russian 
average. The RFE has a lower population density than the RF as a whole, only 1.2
 ^Heleniak and Motivans, “A Note on Glasnost’,” p. 474. 
® Ibid., pp. 477-78.
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residents per square kilometre compared to 8.7 nationally. Primorskii krai, with its 2.3 
million people and 13.6 residents per square kilometre, was the region with the highest 
population density in the RFE and the largest urban population. The Koryak AO, by 
contrast, has 33,000 people and OT residents per square kilometre and is the region with 
the lowest population density and the smallest urban population.
Between regions within the RFE there exist large variations in population size (as 
seen in table 4-1). In January 1996 approximately two-thirds of the population (6 million 
residents) were concentrated in the southern zone, consisting of Primorskii krai, 
Khabarovsk krai, Amur oblast, Sakhalin oblast and the Jewish AO. This area comprises 1.4 
milhon square kilometres, slightly more than one-fifth of the land area of the region. By 
contrast, the northern zone, which includes the republic of Sakha, Kamchatka oblast, 
Magadan oblast and the Koryak AO, has an area of 5.0 million square kilometres, occupies 
82 per cent of the territory, and yet had only 24 per cent of the population in the RFE, with 
the urban population in the southern zone being relatively higher than that in the northern 
zone. Overall, population density shows an enormous unevenness in the settlement of the 
Far East. As Minakir and Freeze note, a complex interaction exists, as the distribution of 
population is not only an indicator of the development of a territory, but also reflects its 
economic level.^
 ^Richard Rose and fan McAllister, “Is Money the Measure o f  Welfare in Russia?,” Review o f  Income and 
Wealth. Series 42, No. 1, March 1996, p. 77.
 ^ Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory L. Freeze, The Russian Far East: An Economic Handbook (Armonk, New  
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 27.
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Table 4-1: Distribution of Population in the Russian Far East as of 1 January 1996
A rea Size o f  territory P op u lation
1,000s o f sq. % of total 1,000s o f Urban Rural Density
km area residents (1,000s) (1,000s) (sq. km)
RF 17075.4 100.0 14797.6 10812.1 39855 8.7
RFE 6215.9 36.4 7505 5687 1818 1.2
Primorslcii 165.9 2.7 2255 1757 498 13.6
Khabarovsk 788.6 12.7 1571 1270 301 2,0
Amur 363.7 5.8 1038 677 361 2,9
Jewish 36.0 0.58 210 141 69 5,8
Sakhalin 87.1 1.4 648 1270 92 0.6
Southern zone 1441.3 23.2 5722 5115 1321 4.0
Kamchatka 472.3 7.6 411 332 79 0.9
Magadan 461.4 7.4 258 232 26 0.6
Chukotka 737.7 11.9 91 64 27 0.1
Koryak 301.5 4.9 33 8 25 0.1
Sakha 3103.2 49.9 1023 658 365 0.3
Northern zone 5076.1 81.7 1816 1294 522 0.4
3000000
2000000
1000000
m
Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Sakha SaMialm Kamchatka Magadan Jewish Chukotka
Source: Derived from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996 (Moscow: Logos, 
1996), pp. 16-20 and pp. 711-13.
In recent years there has been a considerable decline in the population of the 
Russian Federation as a whole. The RFE follows the national trend of a rapidly
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declining population, although its decline has been less steep. The decreasing 
population of the RF has mainly been due to low birth rates, rising death rates, steady 
emigration, alcoholism, economic decline and health problems,^ and, as discussed in 
chapter 3, falling life expectancy and increasing number of infant deaths before the age 
of one. The chief factor in the RFE population decline in recent years has been a 
relatively high mortality rate, which has far exceeded the low fertility rate and a high 
emigration rate compared with immigration rate. It is these factors, together with 
differences in ethnic numbers, which I will particularly focus upon in the subsection.
In comparing the natural increase of population between the RF and the RFE 
from 1993 to 1995, table 4-2 indicates that there has been a considerable decline in both 
populations. Most of the regions in the RFE had been decreasing in population, except 
in the republic of Sakha and Chukotka where population rates showed some increase. 
Sakhalin, in particular, has experienced a considerable decline in population. Several 
factors have led to this change. Firstly, the fact that death rates have exceeded birth 
rates. During 1993, according to the RA Report. 8,544 deaths occurred, 29.3 per cent 
more than in the previous year. This large increase was due mostly to deaths among 
those of working age through accidents, alcohol poisoning, and trauma. Secondly, the 
number of immigrants into Sakhalin fell during 1993, by 69.6 per cent. Also the number 
of those leaving the island in 1993 was 31,000, an increase of 1.2 per cent from the 
previous year. Many had been driven from the island to other parts o f the RFE and 
mainland due to feelings of hopelessness, lack of work, the difficult climate, shortage of
 ^Richard H. Rowland, “Demographic Trends in Soviet Central Asia and Southern Kazakhstan,” in Robert 
A. Lewis (ed.) Geosraphic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 225.
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bread and electricity,^® and also to the consequences of the earthquake in 1994 and 
1995.
Table 4-2: Population Change by Region from 1993 to 95 (%)
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-S
-10
I
1995
Population Change
Year 93 94 95
RF -5.1 6.1 -5.7
RFE -1.3 2.0 -2.4
Sakha 6 9 5.8 5.5
Prlmorsldi -3.4 3.7 -3.7
: Khabarovsk -2.8 3.4 -3,8
Am'ur -1.7 2.2 -1.9
Jewish AO -0.9 2.0 -2.7
Saldialln -3.2 4.8 -8.1
îCamchatîca -1.2 1.9 -2.1
Magadan -2.3 2.7 -2.6
Chukotlca 2.4 2.5 1.2
RF RFE Sakha Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Sakhalin Kamchatka Magadan Chukotka
Sourcei Derived from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhego^nik 1994 (Moscow: Goskomstat 
Rossii, 1994), pp. 450-52, 1995 (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995), pp. 532-34 and 1996 
(Moscow: Logos, 1996), pp. 721-23.
10 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 22 June 1993, p. 1.
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As mentioned, from the early 1990s, the number of births in the RFE has 
gradually declined. For instance, the number of births in Primorskii krai in the first half 
of 1992 fell by 20 per cent and barely exceeded the number of deaths. The population of 
the krai actually declined by 2,000 in this year due to this situation and because of the 
number of residents choosing to leave. Death rates increased by 2 per cent compared 
with the previous year.^  ^ Since 1992, death rates across the whole country have 
exceeded birth rates. In the RFE, the birth rate per thousand in 1996 (12,6) was 
considerably higher than in the RF as a whole (9.3), and its natural loss of population 
was only half that of the RF. However, there is wide variation within the RFE. The 
republic of Sakha, with a birth rate of 15.3 per thousand, had the highest in the region, 
whereas Magadan, with 8.3, had the lowest. As previously seen, Sakhalin had the 
highest death rate in the RFE, 17 per thousand, whereas Chukotka, with 8.6 per 
thousand, had the lowest (the national average was 15.0). Both populations in Chukotka 
and Sakha are increasing, because the birth rate in these two regions is higher than the 
death rate.^  ^In generational terms, the RFE has more young people (24.6 per cent) and 
more of those of working age (62.1 per cent) than the national averages of 22.5 per cent 
and 57 per cent respectively. Equally, the RFE has relatively fewer old people (13.3 per 
cent) than the country as a whole (20.5 per cent).^^
There are many reasons for the declining birth rate: one of the most important 
factors is a change in reproductive behaviour, caused by the appearance of a new social 
norm of having smaller families. The tendency is sustained at the present time by social 
and economic factors deliberately limiting family size:
"Births, Deaths, Population: Primorskii krai January-June 1992,” Vostok Rossii. no. 32, August 1992, p.
2 .
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996 (Moscow: Logos, 1996), pp. 721-23.
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ïn 1987 some 3 9 3  per cent o f new-boms were the second child in a family; in 1989 
they represented oîüy 35.7 per cent o f  those born. During the same period, the share 
o f those bom as the third child fell from 14.5 per cent to 12.7 per cent. The number 
o f  births fell during this period by almost 20,000, primarily among mothers in the 
20-29 and 30-39 age groups.
The birth rate is also falling because of the declining stability of families. 
Compared with 1991, the number of marriages in Khabarovsk krai declined by 3,300 in 
1992 (22 per cent) to 11,700. Also the number of divorces increased by 5 per cent In 
1991, there were 10 marriages for every 6 divorces. In 1992, this dropped to 8 marriages 
for every 6 divorces, with 8,900 divorces in total.^  ^ The RFE divorce rate in 1995 
remained at a level of 5.3 per 1,000, considerably higher than the RF average (4.5 per 
cent). Chukotka, Magadan and Kamchatka oblasts had the highest divorce rates among 
the regions, with Chukotka’s divorce rates being the highest of all (7.1 per cent).^^
Moving to the relationship between population decline and migration, 
migration to the RFE from other parts o f Russia, the key factor o f population growth in 
previous decades. It has now slowed down considerably, and in recent years, migration 
has only played a small role in population growth. The decline in immigration has led 
to a steady fall in population growth in the region, as this extract illustrates;
In Amur oblast, the number o f people leaving increased. In 1992, approximately 
27,100 people arrived and 39,300 left, resulting in a net loss o f  12,200. In 
Khabarovsk krai, in 1992, 37,223 people arrived in the krai and 50,141 left for a net 
migration loss o f 12,918 people. In 1993, 28,467 came and 38,068 left, a net loss o f  
9,061 people.^®
Ibid., pp. 714-16.
MinaHr and Freeze, The Russian Far East, p. 25.
It was estimated that if the present trend continues, coupled with the outflow o f population, by the year 
2000 the krai population would fell by 6  per cent, and the share of children and juveniles (under 16) will 
drop by 5 per cent, while the number o f pensioners and elderly would increase by 2 per cent. See 
Priamuriskie vedomosti. 26 May 1993, p. 2.
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996. pp. 727-29.
Timothy Heleniak, “Internal Migration in Russia During the Economic Transition,” Post-Soviet 
Geography and Economics. Vol. 38, No. 2, 1997, p. 83.
RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 26.
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As immigration has declined in the RFE, emigration has increased, especially 
since 1991:
If in 1971'1975 some 15.1 per cent o f  those coming to the region stayed, in 1986- 
1990 this figure had fallen to 5.7 per cent. The ratio o f immigrants to inhabitants 
grew from 1:7 in 1971-1975 to 1:17 in 1986-1990. Moreover, in recent years (1989- 
1990), emigration from the Far East amounted to 11,300 inhabitants and increased to 
44,600 in 1992. The latter figure exceeded the natural increase (42,100), thereby 
causing a net decline in the total population.
These figures show that more people are leaving the region now than are 
coming in. According to the 1996 Yearbook, between 1993 and 1995, the RFE 
experienced an overall emigration of more than 351,700 people.^® One of the reasons 
that the RFE has become a region of emigration is because the government’s system of 
compensation and subsidisation of newcomers is no longer functioning.^
In May 1993, Kamchatskava pravda reported that many in Koryak AO who left 
to the other parts of the Russia were professionals:
Judging by orders for freight containers, by the end o f 1992 about 1,600 non-Native 
families would have left the Koryak AO. M ost were going to the Ukraine and the 
central provinces. Some 116 doctors and 93 teachers planned to leave. From the 
village o f  Manily alone, 16 teachers were leaving. That was almost half o f  all the 
teachers in the village.^
In 1994, Chukotka had the highest rate of emigration (1,278 emigrants per
10.000 people), more than six times as high as the RFE average (192 emigrants per
10.000 people). As previously mentioned, Chukotka’s birth rate exceeded its death rate, 
but through emigration its population underwent a decline. Primorskii krai had the 
lowest rate of emigration (24 emigrants per 10,000 people in 1994). 1995 brought a 
decline in emigration across the RF, the RF’s average being 55 emigrants per 10,000 
people in 1994, falling to 34 in 1995. In the same year, Chukotka still showed the
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East, p. 27. 
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996. pp. 733-35.
Elisa Miller and Soula Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide (Seattle: 
Russian Far East Update, Third Edition, 1997), p. 86.
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highest levels of emigration (978 per 10,000) followed by Magadan oblast (759 per 
10,000), whereas Amur oblast had the lowest rate of emigration at 11 emigrants per
10,000. Despite this drop in emigration, overall extremely high levels of emigration 
have been a factor in the decline of the population, especially in northern regions of the 
Far East like Chukotka, Magadan, Kamchatka, Sakha, Sakhalin and Koryak AO (all 
these regions were above the RFE’s average, 136 emigrants per 10,000 in 1995)}^ As 
can be seen in table 4-3, it is worth noting that the rate of emigration in the Far East far 
exceeded that of any other region.
Table 4-3: Migration Loss and Growth per lO^ OOO in 1995  ^RF
200
150
50 56 37 79 62 49 36 33 4
Source: As Table 4-1, pp. 733-35.
Note: (a) RF (b) North (c) Northwest (d) Central (e) Volga-Vyatskii (Q Central Black 
Earth (g) PovolAiskii (h) North Caucasian (i) Urals (j) West Siberia (k) East Siberia (1) 
Far East.
“People Leaving Koryak AO,” Kamchatskava pravda. 15 May 1993, p. 1. 
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996. pp. 733-35.
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Table 4-4 presents the result of a Russian government survey of 91,904 
respondents regarding the reasons for migration in 23 of the territorial units of the RF 
between 16 September and 21 October 1991, Of these 23 territorial units, pnly two were 
from the RFE. The main reasons for emigration from the RF as a whole, and from 
Primorskii krai and Magadan oblast in particular, were closely related to the lack of 
social infrastructure such as family circumstances, change of workplace, study, lack of 
social facilities and health problems due to a change of climate.^ "^  As Kontorovich notes, 
‘the progressive depopulation of the Far East is a reality and will continue in the coming 
decades.
Table 4-4: Reasons for Migration in 1991
Area Reasons for Migration
A B C D E F G H 1 Total
RF 37,088 21,431 17,913 13,073 7,583 4,040 3,015 2,041 6,732 91,904
Piimorsldi 2,186 2,069 1,469 980 159 224 218 175 447 6,360
Magadan 624 77 548 210 14 30 44 49 31 1,385
Source: Narodnoe khozvaistvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1992. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 
(Moscow: Respublikanskii informatsionno-izdateFskii tsentr, 1992), pp. 102-4.
Note: (A) family circumstances, (B) study, (C) change of workplace, (D) lack of social 
facilities, (E) national tensions, (F) health problems due to change of climate, (G) 
inability to find work, (H) unwillingness to live in the country, (I) miscellaneous.
We have seen that birth and death rate and migration contribute to population 
decline. A third element of population change is ethnicity, in other words, the 
differential impact of population change upon the RFE’s ethnic composition. Table 4-5 
shows the ethnic composition in the RFE in 1979 and in 1989. The ethnic composition
Narodnoe khozvaistvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Respublikanskii 
informatsionno-izdatei’skii tsentr, 1992), pp. 102-4.
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of the RFE in the latter year consisted of the following nationalities; Russians (75.6 per 
cent), Ukrainians (9.1 per cent), Yakuts (3.3 per cent), Belorussians (1.2 per cent), 
Tatars and peoples of the north (2,8 per cent), and various other nationalities (5.1 per 
cent). Yakuts comprise one of the most sizeable native minorities in the Russian Far 
East. Other ethnic minority groups have administrative territories named after them, for 
example the Koryaks in the Koryak autonomous okrug and the Chukchi in Chukotka.
Table 4-5: Ethnic Composition of the RFE in 1979 and 1989
Area Nationality groups ranked on their % age of the population (1979/89)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
%
Naf nality
%
Nafnality
%
Nat’nality
%
Nat* nality
%
Naf naKty
%
Nat’nahty
Sakha Russians Yakuts Ukrainians Northerners Others Tatars
50.4/50.3 36.9/33.4 5.4/7.0 22112 1.4/L7 1.3/1.6
Frsm orsîcîi Russians Ukrainians Others Belorussians Tatars Mordvins
871/86.9 8.2/8.2 1.2/1.5 0.9/1.0 1.0/0.9 0.4/0.4
Khabarovsk Russians Ukrainians Others Northerners Belorussians Tatars
85.4/86.0 5.8/6.2 1.3/1.7 1.3/1.3 1.0/1.1 1.1/1.0
A m u r Russians Ukrainians Others Belorussians Tatars
88.8/86.8 6.2/6.7 14.0/1.9 1.5/1.7 0.8/0.9
Jewish AO Russians Ukrainians Jewish Others Belorussians Tartars
84.1/83.2 6.3/7.4 5.4/4.2 2.3/2.9 1.0/1.0 0.8/1.9
Sakhalin Russians Ukrainians Koreans Belorussians Tatars Others
81.7/81.6 6.1/6.5 5.3/5.0 1.7/1.6 1.7/1.5 1.1/1.4
Magadan Russians Ukrainians Northerners Others Chukchi Belorussians
75.0/72.5 13.7/15.4 3.8/3.8 3.1/3.5 2.5/2.3 1.8/1.9
Kamchatka Russians Ukrainians Northerners Others Belorussians Koryak
82.9/81.0 7.9/9.1 2.S/2.6 1.9/2.3 1.4/1.6 1.6/1.5
Chukotka Russians Ukrainians Chukchi Northerners Others Belorussians
68.9/62.0 14.0/16.8 9.9/9.8 8.1/73 5.0/5.4 1.8/1.9
Koryak Russians Koryaks Ukrainians Chukchi Northerners
64.6/66.1 16.2/16.4 5.7/7.2 3.5/3.6 3.0/3.5
Source: Derived from NatsionaFnvi sostav naseleniva RSFSR: no dannvm 
Vsesovuznoi nerepisi naseleniva 1989 (Moscow: Respublikanskii Informatsoinno- 
izdateTskii Tsentr, 1990), pp. 144-53.
25 Vladimir Kontorovich, “Can Russia Resettle the Far East?” Post-Communist Economies. Vol. 12, No. 3,
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As can be seen in table 4-5, the profile of the composition of nationalities in the 
RFE differs from region to region. The largest majority in the RFE, are, of course 
Russians, but the number of Russians in each region has been declining. In contrast, the 
second largest ethnic group, the Ukrainians, have been increasing considerably, and the 
third largest group, the Belorussians, have in each region also been increasing slightly. 
The number of Yakuts in the population of the republic of Sakha, however, dropped 
from 36.9 per cent of the total in 1979 to 33 percent in 1989. In addition, the population 
of Koryaks in the Koryak autonomous okrug decreased significantly from 19.1 percent 
of the total in 1979, to 16.4 percent in 1989. The Chukchi reside for the most part in 
Magadan oblast, Koryak autonomous region and Chukotka itself, and are slowly 
declining in Magadan oblast and Chukotka. The Jewish population has also fallen from 
5.4 per cent of the total Jewish AO population, in 1979, to 4.2 per cent in 1989. The 
Jewish AO was settled by Russian Jews deported by Stalin in the 1920s, while other 
Jews have steadily emigrated to Israel and the West The Jewish Agency of Russia 
estimated that more than 15,000 of the region’s 20,000 Jews have left since 1985.^ ® 
Also, Koreans living in the RFE are mostly concentrated in Sakhalin oblast, where in 
1989 they comprised 5 percent of the local population. This figure has declined over the 
following the years. A further discussion about Koreans in the RFE will be included in 
chapter 6. In addition, as mentioned in chapter 2, after opening the border with the 
northern part of China in the early 1990s, the number of Chinese has increased in the
September 2000, p. 365.
“Jews quit ‘homeland’ for Israel,” Guardian. 26 February 1997, p. 12; for a further discussion o f the 
Jewish AO, see Allan Laine Kagedan, Soviet Zion: The Guest for a Russian Jewish Homeland 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) and Robert Weinberg, Stalin’s Forgotten Zion: Birobidzhan and the 
Making o f a Soviet Jewish Homeland: An Illustrated History. 1928-1996 (Berkeley: California University 
Press, 1998).
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southern part of the RFE, Even the illegal Chinese settlement in the RFE has become a 
political and social issue.
It can be seen that Yakuts, Koryaks, Chukchi and Jews are all decreasing in 
numbers within the RFE, while the number of Ukrainians and Belorussians is slightly 
increasing. The sharpest changes in ethnic minority demography are the rapid drop in 
numbers among Jews and the large growth in Chinese immigrants. Izvestiva has 
reported that for the last 10 years the number of Chinese in Russia has increased 
substantially and no one knows the exact figures; estimates are between 100,000 and 2 
or 3 million.^^
4,3: The Social Dimension
Among the many complex issues of social change I have chosen to concentrate on two 
that figured particularly prominently on the RFE’s political agenda: crime rates and 
alcohol consumption. With respect to crime in the RF as a whole, the level of concern 
‘has been currently greater than concern over the shortage of food products and prime 
necessities, the deterioration of the environment, the increase in unemployment, the 
crisis of morals and culture, and the aggravation of relations between nationalities.’^  ^
This was shown by data from mass surveys conducted among Russia’s urban and rural 
population by the All-Russia Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in 
1993.
As White has noted in his book After Gorbachev, the rate of crime was already 
rising in the late 1980s and early 1990s:
Izvestiva. 30 September 1999, p. 8.
Izvestiva. 23 July 1993, p. 4, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XIV, No. 29,1993, p. 26.
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The overall level o f  reported crime, per head o f  population, rose by 17.8 per cent in 
1988 compared with 1987; violent murders were up by 14 per cent, grievous bodily 
harm was up by 32 per cent, and robbery in various forms was up by a massive 43 
per cent. There were fiirther increases in 1989 and 1990, and in 1991 crime in Russia 
alone rose by a further 18 per cent, with an increase o f nearly half in burglaries, 
Altogether, over the years o f  perestroika, reported crime more than doubled.
The causes of all types of crime in Russia are diverse, as they are in other 
countries. Specialists have suggested the following;
a. the imperfect regulation of economic relations;
b. the declining standard of living of the population;
c. the collapse of state and social discipline;
d. the decline of morals, the loss of social values, and growing feelings of 
hopelessness;
e. the decline in the crime protection system.^®
It seems that the steady increase in crime has been a side-effect of political and 
economic reform in the RF. The worsening economic situation has been the greatest 
cause of the growing crime rate.^  ^As Izvestiva reported in September 1995, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reforms involved a weakening of the state’s role 
and the loss of a number of its important functions. In particular, the decentralisation 
and reorganisation of coercive structures led to a weakening of social protection and an 
increase in c r i me . The  rise in crime has also been related to a general loosening of 
social restraints and a weakening of the law enforcement agencies. In addition, an 
aspect of the crime problem with which it is particularly hard to cope is corruption
Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 85 
“Crimes in Sakhalin,” Svobodnyi Sakhalin. 28 March 1992, p. 2; Mary Buckley, Redefining Russian 
Society and Polity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 74.
Phil Williams. Russian Organised Crime: The New Threat? (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 4.
“Mafia’s Growing Power Detailed by Sociologist,” Izvestiva. 21 September 1995, p. 5, as cited in 
CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 38, 1995, p. 1.
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among government officials, especially those who control activities in the commercial 
sector/^
Organised crime in particular has been the fastest-growing force to emerge 
from the collapse of Soviet communism. '^^ As Jeffries notes, the so-called Russian 
‘mafia’ has undermined reform, and generated extraordinary levels of violence in major 
cities. In June 1992, Deputy Russian Internal Affairs Minister Andrei Dunayev 
blamed the explosion of criminal violence on the mafia. In July 1993, to stamp out the 
growing smuggling trade, Moscow reversed its effort to relax control over foreign 
exports.^® According to the document, ‘Organised Crime and Prospects for the Coming 
to Power of National-Sociahsts in Russia,’ published in January 1994, the growth of 
organised crime has become entangled with Ministry of Internal Affairs (MYD) 
agencies and local executive authorities. The report pointed out that organised crime 
was threatening Russia’s political and economic development and creating ideal 
conditions for the nascent power of national-socialism.^’
In Russia, organised crime controls all types of activity :
In May 1994 mafia-type structures controlled roughly 40,000 businesses, including 
2,000 state enterprises, 4,000 joint-stock companies, 9,000 co-operatives, 7,000 
small enterprises, 400 banks and exchanges, and more than 700 markets.^^
In Russia’s cites and district centres, meanwhile,
practically all owners o f  retail trade booths, stores, cafes and restaurants have paid 
tribute to gangster groupings. Tribute has been paid by all vendors on all goods 
markets and by automobile importers. Between 70 per cent and 80 per cent o f all
Komsomolskava pravda. 17 July, p. 1 ,1993, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLV, No. 29, 1993, p. 25.
“The Mafia Faces a Crisis, too,” Nezavisimava gazeta. 24 December 1994, pp. 1-2, as cited in CDPSP. 
Vol. XLVII, No. 1,1995, p. 20.
Ian Jeffries, A Guide to the Economies in Transition (London; Routledge, 1996), p. 149.
Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: The Theft o f the Second Russian Revolution (London: Michael 
Joseph, 1994), pp. 11-12.
"Crime, Corruption Pose Political, Economic Threat,” Izvestiva. 26 January 1994, pp. 1-2, as cited in 
CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 4 ,1994 , p. 14.
“Head o f the Chief Administration for Combating Organised Crime Discusses Organised Crime,” 
Sevodnva. 18 May 1994, p. 7, as dted in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 20,1994, p. 16.
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privatised enterprises and commercial banks have had extortion payment exacted 
from them. The amount o f the tribute (a kind o f tax for the benefit o f gangster 
groupings and corrupt officials) ranges from 10 to 20 per cent o f their turnover, 
which frequently come to over half o f  an enterprise’s gross profits?^
According to the MYD, in September 1995 criminal structures controlled over
50 per cent of all economic entities. The exacting of protection money from commercial
structures, in the form of stock, has become particularly widespread/^® According to
calculations by the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Analytic Centre, 35 per cent of all
capital and 80 per cent of all ‘voting’ shares have become a part of criminal capital,
through the exacting of protection from commercial structures in the form of stock. This
enables the mafia to delegate a representative to a company’s board or council of
directors."^^
Table 4-6: Who’s really running things in the Far East?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mafia 30 22 21 40 49 26 24
Govt officials 23 28 33 7 12 23 37
New businesses 17 12 26 20 12 10 15
Business 6 12 8 3 3 0 4
Banlts 4 3 4 4 4 5 0
Media 4 1 1 5 1 8 4
New parties 2 1 1 3 0 4 0
Trade unions 1 1 0 1 0 5 0
Difficult to say 14 20 7 16 19 10 13
Total 101 100 101 99 100 101 97
Source: Reported in Svobodnyi Sakhalin. 1 July 1992, p. 2.
Note: (1) RFE as a whole, (2) Blagoveshchensk, (3) Aiabarovsk, (4) Vladivostok, (5) 
Magadan, (6) Sakhalin, (7) Kamchatka.
The opinion poll reported in table 4-6 was conducted in the middle of May 
1992 by the Siberian and Far East departments of VTsIOM. The survey was carried out
Izvestiva. 26 January 1994, pp. 1-2. 
Izvestiva. 21 September 1995, p. 5,
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in nine cities, with 995 respondents. Three cities were in Siberia and others in the RFE. 
The table indicates that residents of the RFE as a whole believed that the mafia had the 
greatest degree of influence on the development of events. In particular, half the 
respondents of Vladivostok thought the mafia influenced their daily life very much. 
From this, we can point that a similar situation exists in other areas of the RFE.
Mafia groups in Russia also are particularly violent and inhumane. The Russian 
Far East Update reported the case of a man who had an experience with the mafia in the 
RFE;
1 worked for the General Director o f  à very large company. I personally watched 
while two mafia types came into my office, entered the closed door o f the General 
Director’s office, took my boss by the necktie, choked him until he became red, and 
said either he paid back the money he owed them, or he found the money that day 
and paid."*^
It can be seen that mafia-rim activities such as business infiltration and mafia- 
funded business ventures are a powerful new type of crime in post-Soviet society.'^^
Although it is difficult to quantify mafia-run crime, statistics regarding all 
fonns of reported crime are more readily available than in the Soviet period. We now 
turn from the total figures on reported crime to standardised measures in relation to 
population. Table 4-7 shows the number of registered crimes per 100,000 population 
committed in 1995 by people aged 14 or older. The figures show that the RFE average 
was higher than the RF as a whole, with more than 3,000 crimes per 100,000 population 
whereas in the RF the figure was less than 2,500. Crime patterns, however, are far fi'om 
uniform throughout the RFE. Significant variations are a consequence of cultural
Ibid., p. 4.
Many cases such as this have been reported. See “Mafia Groups, Officialdom and Government in the 
RFE,” Russian Far East Update (RF EÜ1. August 1996, Vol. V f  No. 8, p. 4.
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differences, levels of urbanisation and patterns of migration, together with opportunities 
(obviously greater, for instance, in a port city). Stable, more traditional communities, by 
contrast, usually have lower rates of crime than do areas recently populated by migrants. 
Rural crime rates are also lower than those in urban areas. In rural areas the social 
controls exercised by family and neighbours tend to hold down the level of crime.'’'^  For 
example, as shown table 4-7, the republic of Sakha and Chukotka had a lower level than 
the RF average.
Table 4-7: Number of Registered Crimes per 100,000 Aged 14 or Older in 1995
5000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000
RF RFE Saklialin Chukotka Jewish Primorskii Kiiabarovsk Kamchatka Magadan Sakha
Source: Derived from Prestupnost’ i pravonarusheniva 1991-1995 (Moscow: 
Statisticheskii Komitet, 1996), pp. 19-20.
The highest crime rates, by contrast, are found in the larger population centres, 
in urban and industrialised areas, and newly established regions of the RFE. It can be
Mark Galeotti, "Crime, Corruption and tlie Law,” in Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (eds.), Russia 
After the Cold War (Longman: London, 2000), p. 144.
Louise I. Shelley, ‘Crime in the Soviet Union’, in Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor and David E. Powell 
(eds.), Soviet Social Problems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 262.
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seen from table 4-7 that the area with the highest decline in population, Sakhalin oblast, 
showed the highest level of crime (almost 4,500 crimes per 100,000 population) in the 
RFE, a figure was almost twice as high as the RF average. In Sakhalin, hooliganism is 
the highest recorded crime, followed by robbery and then aggravated assault (see table 
4-8).
A more recently established region, the Jewish AO, has a relatively small 
population, but had the second largest incidence of registered crimes; more than 4,000 
crimes were recorded per 100,000 population. According to the RA Report in January 
1994, law enforcement bodies in the Jewish AO had voiced concern about the soaring 
crime rate in the area. In the first ten months of 1993 the number of serious crimes, 
including premeditated murders, assaults, burglaries and rapes increased by 20 per cent 
over the same period in 1992."^  ^The high crime rate in this particular area leads one to 
speculate on the contributing factor of the border opening -  easing the passage of illegal 
Chinese immigrants and perhaps Chinese involvement in crime, among other reasons.
Following Sakhalin and the Jewish AO, the highly industrialised Khabarovsk 
krai and Primorskii krai also have high levels of registered crime, as shown in table 4-7: 
more than 3,500 crimes were recorded in each case per 100,000 population aged 14 or 
older. In terms of reported crime in 1995, Primorskii krai had the greatest number 
(70,079 offences) in the RPE.""^
In Primorskii krai, in the period from January to June 1993, there were over
68,000 crimes, 9.7 per cent more than in 1992. As the RA Report in 1994 commented:
The largest numbers o f crimes (53.2 per cent) were connected with the theft o f  
personal property. These amounted to 32,600 and about half o f those involved 
apartment break-ins. The number of robberies and thefts by force was up 7 per cent
RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 129.
Prestupnost’ i pravonarusheniva 1991-1995 (Moscow: Statisticheskii Komitet, 1996), pp. 15-18.
153
and 29 per cent respectively, compared with 1992. Serious crime was up 23.2 per 
cent; this was about 20 per cent o f the total crime. There were 754 murders or 
attempted murders, 1,704 serious bodily injuries and 266 rapes. Of the investigated 
crimes, 8,066 were group crimes (up 14.9 per cent), and o f  these about 6,000 were 
committed by juveniles or with their participation."^
Looking more closely at Primorskii krai, in Vladivostok the crime rate grew by 
a considerable 50 per cent in the first half of 1992, fuelled by a battle between two 
gangs for control of the lucrative trade in used Japanese cars that merchant sailors bring 
back with them. Police reported that they handled an average 16 murder cases per week 
in May 1992, double the level of the same month in the previous year."^ The causes of 
the increase in crime in this region were well known: unstable conditions, social and 
political collapse, deep economic crisis, and the fragility of the state institutions. Other 
reasons for the increase in crime apply more specifically to this region. For example, 
there has been a notable increase in criminals coming into the area in connection with 
the opening of Vladivostok. The relative openness of the region to the outside world is 
also important, with the border crossing into China, the establishment of a free 
economic zone in Nakhodka, and several busy trading and fishing ports. These 
developments brought in foreign cars,''^ a massive influx of Chinese goods and also the 
possibility of dealing in drugs. All of this encouraged a substantial ‘market o f intimate 
services’ centred around restaurants, and illegal trade in weapons centred around the 
armed forces based in the region.^^
RA Report. No. 17, M y  1994, p. 18.
'*** “Vladivostok Strives to Survive,” Japan Times. 14 June 1992, p. 7.
Utro Rossii. August 3, 1993, p. 3, as cited in RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 128.
“Crime Problems Faced by Vladivostok Region,” Seaodnva. 1 September 1995, p. 5.
There was also a narcotics trade, in which the region had specialised since pre-revolutionary times; 
Vladivostok connected the ‘golden triangle’ in south-east Asia with lucrative markets in Europe and the 
USA, and levels o f addiction were themselves higher than in the parts o f  Asia from which the drugs 
originated. Other forms of organised crime were more characteristic of the country as a whole, such as the 
improper operations that had taken place in the privatisation o f the fish processing industry and the illegal 
export o f capital through fictitious joint enterprises which brought together and the interests o f  former state
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We have looked at mafia-nm crime, reported crime and registered crime, and 
now focus on the different forms in which these crimes are manifested. Table 4-8 shows 
the types of crime by region in 1995 per 100,000 population aged 14 or older. 
According to these statistics, the RFE average was higher than the RF average in every 
case except aggravated assault. Compared with other types of crime, hooliganism was 
the most common offence in both the RF and the RFE, whereas bribery, forcible rape 
and attempted rape were the least common. The figures show that about 180.9 
hooliganism crimes were committed per 100,000 population in the RFE, whereas in RF 
the rate was a lower 161.3. The republic of Sakha, Primorskii krai, Magadan oblast, and 
Sakhalin oblast had more than the RFE average; among them, Sakhalin oblast had the 
greatest number of cases (243.5), whereas Amur oblast had the lowest (100.6).
Table 4-8: Types of Crime by Region in 1995 (per 100,000 population aged 14 or 
order)
Area Types of Crime
Murder &
Attempted
murder
Hooliganism Aggravated
assault
Robbery Embezzle
ment
Forcible
&
attempte
d rape
RF 26.8 161.3 31.8 118.7 32.0 10.6
RFE 34.4 180.9 28.8 126.5 38.5 10.9
Saltha 34.9 290.1 14.2 69.1 39.5 10.9
Primorski: 35.2 210.2 48.0 179.4 33.8 8.9
Khabarovsk 43.4 204.8 34.3 195.2 28.1 11.3
Amur 25.4 100.6 18.0 91.7 29.7 9.4
Jewish AO 38.7 120.6 25.6 37.8 83.4 19.4
Kamchatka 23.9 142.0 33.4 78.8 32.0 12.1
Magadan 43.6 196.8 34.7 133.6 52.7 12.9
Salthalin 37.4 243.5 46.9 196.6 17.5 12.9
Chukotka 26.8 119.5 3.7 156.2 29.5 13.4
Source: As Table 4-7, pp. 61-116.
directors, the new nomenklatura and the largest criminal groupings. See Problemv bor’bv s prestupnost’vu
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In the opinion of internal affairs agency officials, the entire economy has 
become increasingly criminalised. Financial fraud, embezzlement of funds and stealing 
of public, private and state property, for instance, are becoming more sophisticated, 
professional and organised.^^ As shown in table 4-8, robbery and embezzlement, in 
particular, are much more common in modem Russia than in the USSR. As Izvestiva 
reported:
Some 61,500 economic crimes were detected in mid 1993, including 22,000 cases o f  
embezzlement and 4,300 cases o f  the illegal export from Russia o f  raw materials and 
o il Criminal proceedings were initiated in 140 cases o f embezzlement in the 
banking system, and 2,700 crimes associated with the operation o f  voucher-based 
auctions and investment funds were discovered.
Robbery was the second most common type of crime recorded in both the RF 
and the RFE in the mid-1990s. In the RFE 126.5 robberies were recorded per 100,000 
head of population aged 14 or older, whereas in the RF the rate was 118.7. Thus, in 
terms of robbery, the RFE average was slightly more than the RF average. Regions like 
Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai, Magadan oblast, Sakhalin oblast and Chukotka had 
more than the RFE average, which itself was higher than the RF average. Among them, 
Sakhalin oblast had the highest number of robbery incidents, 196.6 cases per 100,000. 
The Jewish AO had the lowest rate, 37.8 cases. Embezzlement was the third most 
common offence in both the RF and the RFE, but figures showed that the RFE average 
once again was higher than the average in the country as a whole. About 38.5 cases of 
embezzlement were recorded per 100,000 head of population aged 14 or older, whereas 
in the entire RF the rate was 32.0. The republic of Sakha, Magadan oblast and the 
Jewish AO recorded a higher level than the RFE average. Among them, the Jewish AO
(regional’nvt aspektl  (M. VNII MYD Rossii, 1996), pp. 34-40.
Tanya Frisby, “The Rise o f Organised Crime in Russia: Its Roots and Social Significance,” Europe-Asia 
Studies. Vol. 50, No. 1,1998, p. 30.
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had the highest number, 83.4 cases, while Sakhalin oblast had the lowest number, 17.5
cases per 100,000 population aged over 14. In both these cases of economic crime, the
RFE average was higher than that of the RF, indicating the higher incidence of crime in
the RFE as a whole.
Interpersonal violent crime, including such offences as homicide, aggravated
assault, murder, attempted murder and rape, is often committed in groups, and a greater
proportion of offenders are either intoxicated or are individuals with serious drink
problems.^"  ^These cases are cited in Izvestiva in June 1995:
In the first half o f  1993 the number o f  crimes committed in the RF was 1,372,700.
The figures were much higher than in the past: murders stood at 14,800, inflictions 
o f  grave bodily harm were 35,000, and rapes were 7,400. The overall numbers o f  so- 
called serious criminal assaults reached 253,300.^^ In addition, some 15,000 women 
died in 1994 as a result o f domestic violence. During the same period, 56,000 
women sustained bodily injuries.
Unlike the usual pattern, the figures in table 4-8 show that in the case of 
aggravated assault, the RF average was higher than the RFE average. In the RF 31.8 
crimes were recorded per 100,000 population aged 14 or older, whereas in the RF the 
number was 28.8. In the RFE, Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai, Kamchatka oblast, 
Magadan oblast, and Sakhalin oblast had more than the regional average; among them 
Primorskii krai, with its international port cities, had the highest number, 48.0 cases per
100,000. By contrast, the more traditional society of Chukotka had the lowest number, 
only 3.7 cases.
In the case of murder and attempted murder, Magadan oblast, Sakhalin oblast.
“Crime Continues to Rise in Russia, but a Little More Slowly,” Izvestiva. 21 July 1993, p. 2, as cited in 
CDPSP. Vol. XLV, No. 29, 1993, p. 26.
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Shelley, Crime in the Soviet Union, pp. 260-62. 
Izvestiva. 21 July 1993, p. 25.
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and the Jewish AO were higjier than the regional average. Of these, Magadan oblast had 
the highest number, 43.6 cases (per 100,000 population aged over 14), while Kamchatka 
oblast had the lowest number, 23.9 cases. Perhaps, this has to do with the fact that 
Magadan is a male-dominated mining community, while society in Kamchatka is based 
on more traditional, undeveloped trades like fishing. In terms of forcible rape and 
attempted rape, Khabarovsk krai, the Jewish AO, Kamchatka oblast, Magadan oblast, 
Sakhalin oblast, and Chukotka had more than the RFE average. Of these, the Jewish AO 
had the highest number, 19.4 cases, while Primorskii krai had the lowest number, 8.9 
cases.
Once again, it is not surprising that the southern urbanised areas have higher 
incidences of crime. It is also interesting to note that the Jewish AO had the lowest rate 
of robberies in the region, but had the highest recorded number of embezzlement cases. 
In contrast to this, Sakhalin oblast had the highest rates for hooliganism and robberies, 
but the lowest for embezzlement. In the case of murder and attempted murder, Magadan 
oblast had the highest number.
As can be seen in table 4-9, there was a rise in drug-related crimes between 
1991 and 1995, in both the RF and the RFE. Throughout the country, in 1995, there was 
a total of 52,668 recorded crimes associated with narcotics and similar substances. The 
greatest number involved illegal manufacture, storage and transportation. In this same 
year, the increase in this type of crime was up by 13,087 cases in comparison with 1994. 
Virtually all of Russia’s regions have become involved in spreading narcotics around 
the country.
“The Weak are the First to Die,” Izvestiva. 20 June 1995, p. I, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 25, 
1995, pp. 24-5.
57 Sevodnva. 11 March 1994, p. 6, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. No. 1994, p. 20.
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This table indicates that in 1995 the RFE’s total drug-related crimes was 6,608, 
meaning that this type of crime in the RFE increased by 1,337 cases within a year. Most 
regions experienced a rise in such crimes. The republic of Sakha showed a different 
trend to the other regions, as it increased from 1993 in 1991 to 1,621 in 1994, and then 
dropped sharply to 381 in 1995. Among them, Primorskii krai had the highest number 
of incidents, with drug-related crime increasing by 630 cases in 1995; Magadan had the 
lowest number, 210. A report on drug trafficking in the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok 
port, as cited in the RA report in 1994, noted:
Even, cynical detectives from the krai police department in. Vladivostok were 
flabbergasted by an ad on the gate o f  a Pacific Fleet building unit: “wide range o f  
chemical drugs and grass available.”  The “legalised” drugs trafficking point was 
immediately busted. Its organisers, privates Vasilii Orlov and Igor Trofimov, were 
taken into custody. But officers from the military prosecutor’s office wondered how 
the building unit command could overlook a shop selling dmgs openly.
In 1995, more than two-thirds of drug-related crimes in the RFE were in the so- 
called southern zone, the area along the Chinese border in Primorskii krai (2,241), 
Khabarovsk krai (1,340) and Amur oblast (1,221). In these areas, we can see that drug- 
related crimes have also been involved with the neighbouring countries, such as China 
and North Korea. Each case will be dealt with in chapter 6 and chapter 7, respectively.
Some problems closely related to crime are excessive drinking, alcohol abuse, 
and alcoholism. These have been an important part of Russian life for a long time.^ ® As 
Treml has noted in his article, The absolute level of consumption of alcohol per head 
and the rate of increase in the 1960s and the 1980s were clearly high and alarming.’®® 
This problem worsened further in the 1990s. It was reported in 1997 that the World
RA Report No. 16, January 1994, p. 129.
David Lane, Soviet Society Under Perestroika (London and New York, Routledge, Second Edition, 
1992), p. 364.
Jones, Connor and Powell, Soviet Social Problems, p. 120.
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Health Organisation (WHO) considered it dangerous for any country to have an average 
per capita consumption of the equivalent of 8 litres of pure alcohol per year, Russian 
consumption, however, is currently in the range of 13 to 14 litres annually and over
30,000 people die of acute alcohol poisoning each year.®^  In fact, in the RF as a whole, 
heavy drinking and alcohol abuse have had tragic consequences including crime, 
violence, suicide, disintegration of the family, decreasing life expectancy, fatal 
poisoning and other perils.®^
Table 4-9; Number of Drug-related Crimes from 1991 to 1995
Area/year Number of Crimes
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
RF 13,069 18,895 24,065 39,581 52,668
RFE 2,432 3,201 ___ 4,855 5,271 6,608
Sskba 293 439 1,158 1,621 381
Primorskii 766 884 1,087 1,611 2,241
Khabarovsk 440 747 796 1,049 1,340
Amur 372 464 790 1,220 1,221
Kamchaftm 65 67 61 158 238
Magadan 97 106 137 234 210
Sakhalin 66 79 158 281 352
Source: As Tab le 4-7, pp. 125-27.
Before Gorbachev’s campaign began in May 1985, health authorities officially
classified about 4.3 million people as chronic alcoholics.®  ^ Even afterwards, as White
has shown in his book, there were many alcohol-related crimes:
As many crimes were committed in a drunken state as before the campaign; the 
proportion o f  drunken murders had even increased. The number o f  drunken driving 
incidents that took place in 1990 was two and a half times greater than had taken 
place at the start o f  campaign. Alcoholics were selling their flats, under the 
privatisation programme which allowed them to do so, and were abandoning their 
children; there was even a case o f the sale o f  a three-month-old baby for two bottles
“Russian Roulette.” Time. 11 August 1997, pp. 15-7. 
Leon et al., The Lancet, pp. 383-88.
Treml, Drinking and Alcohol Abuse, p. 125.
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o f wine. More than 400 died in the Far East after consuming Chinese alcohol to 
winch ether and other toxins had been added at up to fifty times the permissible 
level.
According to a report that appeared in the press in May 1995, the majority of 
all deaths among children aged one to four were caused by parental negligence, various 
injuries, or directly by the parents’ own hands, and were sustained while the parents 
were intoxicated. Instead of mother’s milk, children sometimes received alcoholic 
beverages to keep them from being a nuisance.®  ^In family life one of the main sources 
of domestic difficulties was identified as alcohol, and one of the main reasons given for 
divorce was husbands’ drinking. The increase in alcohol consumption from 1987 to
1992 was also associated with a decrease in the average life expectancy of both men (to 
62 years) and women (to 73.8 years). In 1992, in Primorskii krai, as compared to 1987, 
deaths from alcohol poisoning were up 3.5 times.®® In 1993, Primorskii krai recorded 
13,200 crimes that were alcohol-related.®^ Even though Kamchatka oblast had the 
lowest alcohol consumption in 1992, alcohol poisoning led the way among unnatural 
causes of death. According to the RA Report, ahnost 25 per cent of unnatural deaths in 
Kamchatka in 1992 were due to alcohol poisoning.®^
For 1992-1994, the mean annual increase in violent deaths was 37.7 per cent 
for those who were intoxicated and 15.4 per cent for those who were sober. The year
1993 was particularly dramatic for Russia, with the number of alcohol-related psychoses 
increasing by 141.4 per cent and fatal alcohol poisoning rising by 75.6 per cent. About
In his book, we can see the issue o f  alcoholism unfolded in greater depth in Soviet and post-Soviet times. 
See Stephen White, Russia Goes Pry: Alcohol. State and Societv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 166.
“Put My Mama Behind Bars,” Argumentv i faktv. No. 21, May, 1995, p. 5, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 
XLVn, No. 21, 1995, p. 15.
“Demographic Situation in Primorskii Krai,” Utro Rossii. 25 May 1993, p. 2.
"'^ RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 18.
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60 per cent of murder victims and nearly 80 per cent of murderers in 1996 were under 
the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime. Alcohol is a contributing factor in 
many other categories of deaths.®^
Table 4-10; Sale of Hard Liquor by Litres per Head of Population by Region in 
1992
KF RFE Sakhalin Magadan Sakha Primorskii Khabarovsk Amur Kamchatka
Source: Derived from Pokazateli sotsiaFnogo razvitiva Rossiiskoi Federatsii i 
regionov v 1993 g. (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1993), pp. 257-59.
Table 4-10 summarises the average consumption of alcoholic beverages in 
litres per head of population by region, in 1992. In this table, the figures show that in 
levels of alcohol consumption of the RFE average was higher than the RF average. In 
the RFE, 9.7 litres were recorded per head of population, whereas in the RF the rate was
6.6 litres. Thus, the RFE as a whole consumed 3.1 litres more than the national average 
per head. All regions in the table had higher than national average levels of alcohol 
consumption, except for Sakha and Kamchatka. Alcohol consumption in Sakhalin oblast
Ibid., p. 13.
Komsomolskava pravda. December 17, 1996, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVQI, No. 50, 1996, p. 21
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and Magadan oblast was the highest (about 10.2 litres each). Of the indigenous peoples 
(the Nikhvi) in Sakhalin oblast, one in twelve was a registered alcoholic, and not a 
single one had been successfully treated.^®
With regard to this, the following example shows the life of the village of 
Nivkhi^^ in Sakhalin:
The local people, the Nivkhi, had up to now lived ‘free o f  the harsh and cruel vices 
o f civilisation’. But now they had encountered a civilisation that existed ‘exclusively 
in the form o f alcohol, syphilis and commercial fraud'. Local traders took away 
salmon and caviar from the natives, leaving them with vodka, cheap wine, home­
brew and even household solvents. Some became so drunk they fell o ff their sleds 
and had to be tied on; others slaughtered their reindeer herds, which began to 
disappear.^^
White notes that the number of infant deaths had increased as a result of 
parental negligence. New and infectious diseases were brought in by the settlers, and the 
local population began to die out. Their language was Russified, their land was 
exploited for its natural resources, and the Nivkhi themselves were herded into towns 
where they adopted the unhealthy habits of their neighbours. It was predicted that by the 
end of the century the native language would have disappeared entirely.
As with the incidence of crime, the rates of alcoholism are higher in the RFE 
than in the RF. Together, these factors indicate deep social problems for the RFE. But 
the fact remains that crime and alcohol consumption are not just localised but nation-
™ White, Russia Goes Dry, pp. 145-46.
Grant writes, “tliroughout the nineteenth century, living primarily as fishermen and secondarily as 
hunters, increasing numbers o f  Nivkhi who lived along the Amur and Sakhalin had cause to travel 
throughout the North Asian Pacific Rim in the interests o f  trade." In July 1931 it was discovered that 86 per 
cent o f the local Nivkhi population was illiterate. From 1962 to 1986, the number o f Nivkhi communities 
was reduced from 82 to 13. Before the October Revolution, when Russian Orthodox missionaries hounded 
Nivkhi to convert to Christianity, Grant identified the following division o f Nivkhi culture: being 
discouraged (Nicholas II) and then encouraged (Lenin), repressed (Stalin) and then revived (Khrushchev), 
ignored (Brezhnev) and then revived again (Gorbachev). See Bruce Grant, “Nivkhi, Russians and Others: 
The Politics o f  Indigenism on Sakhalin Island,” in Stephen Kotkm and David W olff (eds.) Rediscovering 
Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 161-68.
White, Russia Goes Dry, pp. 14546.
Ibid., p. 146.
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wide issues for Russia as a whole.
4.4. The Economic Dimension
Turning from social issues within the RFE, we now focus our attention on the economic
dimension, and will consider how different regions within the RFE and the RF compare
in tenns of wealth and poverty. Because the present market reform programme in the
RF has introduced substantial changes to relations between the central and regional
governments, it is rather difficult to predict the Russian Far East's economic
development. The sharp change in the price of raw materials that are produced in the
region has led to a negative balance in inter-regional relations and limited the
development of investment. The liberalisation of transport tariffs also brought a sharp
increase in the transportation costs of Far Eastern products. Many enterprises in the Far
Eastern regions have been working under a limited electricity supply due to a lack of
finance. Although it is difficult to predict economic development, it would appear that
the objectives include: to stimulate economic development, to develop a regional Far
Eastern market; and to identity specific geographical and developmental priorities. With
this in mind, 1 will deal with the present economic structure of the RFE by examining
the levels of employment, industrial production, retail and foreign trade, and income.
Finally, in the last section, I will focus on living standards in the RFE in order to
examine levels of wealth in comparison with the rest of the RF.
The following extract from the RA Report of July 1993 shows the growth in
the number of unemployed in Primorskii krai in 1992 and in 1993:
In Primorskii krai, in 1992, over the year, more than 36,000 people turned to the 
Employment Service. That was more than 1.6 times the number for 1991. Only 
about 25 percent found work On January I, 1993, the number o f  citizens seeking 
work, counted by the Employment Service, was 9,500. Of them, 5,000 (52 percent)
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had the status o f unemployed. 86 percent o f  them were women. In comparison with 
the beginning o f the year, those numbers had increased by 2 and 3 times.
This local example serves to illustrate the steady rise in unemployment across 
the RF. This is true in every sense - the numbers of unemployed, the number of 
registered unemployed, the numbers receiving benefit, and the unemployed as a 
proportion of the 'economically active population'. In the RFE in 1995 the size of the 
economically active population was 3,781,100, which was 5.1 per cent of the Russian 
total (73,531,000). As in the RF as a whole, the economically active population in the 
RFE has been declining slightly: between 1993 and 1995 it declined at the rate of about 
0.1 per cent a year. Primorskii krai had the largest economically active population of the 
RFE regions (1,082,100), which was 1.5 per cent of the Russian total. Chukotka had the 
smallest economically active population, just 48,000.^^
As of 1995 there were about 6.5 million unemployed in the country as a whole, 
of whom about 2.5 million were registered in labour exchanges. More than 8 
unemployed were registered for every vacancy. Overall, 3.2 per cent of the 
economically active population were registered as unemployed, up from 0.8 per cent in 
1992. Levels of unemployment were slightly higher in the Far East than in Russia as a 
whole, with 10.9 unemployed for every vacancy and 3.8 per cent of the economically 
active population out of work. Within the RFE, levels of unemployment in turn varied 
widely: from 5.2 in Chukotka to 15.9 per cent in the Jewish AO and 13 per cent in the 
Amur region. However, in most areas these figures were higher than average levels in
RA Report No. 15, July 1993, p. 27.
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996, pp. 736-40.
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the RF as a whole. Of the nine RFE regions that reported figures, six were above the RF 
average and only three below it.^ *'
A survey has shown that the RFE and the RF were remarkably similar in terms 
of the composition of their unemployment. For example, the average age of the 
unemployed in Russia as a whole was 33.9, with nearly half aged between 30 and 40. In 
the Far East, the average age varied between 31.8 and 37.8, with about half in the range 
of 30-49. In Russia as a whole, women accounted for 47.4 per cent of the unemployed 
in 1995 (but 62.5 per cent of those who were registered at labour exchanges). Women 
were much less likely to be unemployed in Sakha (36.7 per cent of all the unemployed 
in that region), reflecting its rather different economic structure. The other RFE figures 
were very similar to the Russian average, apart from the Jewish AO, where women were 
61.1 per cent of the regional unemployed - the second highest figure (after the Altai 
region) in the whole of Russia.^^
In short, it is evident that unemployment levels are slightly higher in the RFE 
than the national average, with regional variations. The composition of unemployment 
between the RF and RFE is not very different, however, the age range of imemployment 
in the RFE is wider than that of the RF. In terms of education, there were few 
differences between the RF and the RFE, and no real imbalance between male and 
female unemployment existed in the whole of Russia.
Table 4-11 shows the proportion of employment by sector in 1990 and in 1994. 
This table indicates that while the number of people employed in agriculture, transport 
and communication, and trade increased, it fell slightly in the industry and construction 
sectors. However, industry still had the highest employment figures. As can be seen in
76 Tbid., pp. 736-41.
166
table 4-11 (panel B), the RF as a whole had more people employed in industry and 
agriculture than the RFE. By contrast, the RFE as a whole had more people employed in 
transport and communications, in construction and trade than the RF. Of these sectors in 
the RFE, the greatest increase in employment figures from 1990 to 1994 was in trade: 
an increase of 1.5 per cent.
In 1990 and in 1994, the Far East diverged from the RF in terms of the sector 
of industry in which the Far Eastern residents were able to obtain employment. This 
occurred in two ways: firstly, by having fairly low levels of industrial and agricultural 
employment; and secondly, by having a fairly high level of employment associated with 
the transport and communications, and trade sectors. It is evident that although most 
people in the RFE were employed in industry, there was an increasing interest in non­
production sectors, such as transport and communication and trade.
In order to consider these employment trends further, we will compare 
employment figures in the regions of the RFE. As can be seen in table 4-11 (panel A), 
the industrial sector accounted for 23.7 per cent of those employed in 1994 in the RFE 
as a whole, 1.6 per cent less than in 1990. Khabarovsk krai had the highest proportion of 
employees in the industrial sector, 28 per cent, which was 4.3 per cent higher than the 
RFE average. The agricultural sector had 8.9 per cent of the total share of employment 
in 1994, 1.3 per cent higher in 1990. The republic of Sakha, the Jewish AO, Primorskii 
krai and Amur oblast were above the RFE average for agricultural employment; 
particularly the Jewish AO and Amur oblast. The most industrialised area, Khabarovsk 
krai, had the lowest proportion of agricultural workers. About 12.4 per cent of the 
workforce were employed in transport and communication in 1994, slight higher than in
77 Tbid., pp. 754-55.
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1990. The percentages of people employed in transport and communication were higher 
in all the RFE regions than in the RF as a whole.
Table 4-11: Employment by Sector in 1990 and 1994 (%) (Panel A)
Area
Sector
Industry Agriculture Transport & 
communication
Consti’uction Trade
90 94 90 94 90 94 90 94 90 94
RF 30.3 27.1 12.9 15.0 7.7 7.8 12.0 9.9 7.8 9.5
RFE 25.3 23.7 7.6 8.9 11.7 12.4 14.6 10.7 9.5 11.0
Sakha 16.4 17.5 10.7 12.8 11.4 11.1 15.6 8.9 9.7 9.3
Frimorsldi 29.9 24.6 7.5 9.0 12.3 12.6 12.8 11.3 9.0 11.2
Khabarovsk 29.0 28.0 4.9 4.1 10.5 11.9 15.8 11.4 9.4 10.6
Amur 19.4 17.6 13.3 15.2 13.1 15.7 16.5 11.7 9.0 11.9
Jewish AO - 22.7 - 16.5 - 10.2 - 6.5 - 11.1
Kamchatka 25.7 27.1 5.8 7.3 11.8 9.8 13.0 8.1 9.6 11.4
Magadan 23.4 24.6 5.9 6.6 11.8 12.4 14.2 10.1 10.5 10.9
Chukotka - 20.5 - 7.0 - 15.7 - - - 12.0
Sakhalin 26.8 27.6 4.6 4.9 11.2 12.3 14.2 10.6 10.6 12.0
Panel B; Employment by Sector in 1994 in the RF and the RFE Average (%)
RF RFE RF RFE RF RFE RF RFE RF RFE
Industry Agriculture Transport & Communication Construction Trade
Source*, Adapted from StravniteTnve pokazateli ekonomicheskogo polozheniva regionov 
R-Ossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1995), pp. 29-30.
As with industry, the percentage of these employed in the construction sector
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has declined in relative terms. In 1994, it was 10.7 per cent, 3.9 per cent lower than in 
1990. Sakhalin oblast showed the highest proportion of employees in the construction 
sector, 12.2 per cent, 1.5 per cent higher than the RFE average. Chukotka had the lowest 
proportion employed in construction, only 6.5 per cent, which was 4.2 per cent lower 
than the RFE average. The trade sector claimed 11.0 per cent of the workforce, 1.5 per 
cent more than in 1990. Apart from the republic of Sakha (9.3 per cent), the other 
regions had a higher share than the RF average (9.5 per cent). Of these, the Jewish AO, 
Chukotka, Primorskii krai, Amur oblast, Khabarovsk krai and Sakhalin oblast had more 
than the RFE average. Both Chukotka and Sakhalin oblast showed the highest 
proportion, 12.0 per cent.
Table 4-12: The Far East’s Share of Russian Industrial Output in 1994 (%)
Region Industrial Output
All
industry
Extracting Processing Electrical
energy
Fuel Population
RFE 6.0 14.5 4.5 7.2 4.3 5.2
Saldma 1.6 8.2 0.4 1.4 1.6 0.7
Primorskii 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.3 1.5
Khabarovsk 1.1 1.1 l.I 1.6 1.2 1.1
Amur 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.7
Kamchatka 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.7 - 0.3
Magadan 0.4 1.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.2
Sakhalin 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.8 - 0.5
Source: SvraniteTnve pokazateli ekonomicheskogo polozheniva regionov Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1995), pp. 54-5 and Rossiiskii statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik 1995 (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995), pp. 523-25.
Table 4-12 shows each region's share of total Russian industrial production in 
1994. The RFE as a whole contributed 6.0 per cent of the total; Sakha contributed 1.6
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per cent, the highest figure in the RFE. Of all Russian extracting industry, the RFE 
contributed 14.5 per cent; it ranked second among the eleven economic regions in the 
RF. This shows the extracting industry in the RFE is relatively more important than in 
other large regions. Sakha alone produced 8.2 per cent by value, making it the greatest 
producer of the extracting industry in the whole of the RF. Per head of population, 
Magadan also had a considerable share of the extracting industry within the RFE. This 
shows that an enormous number of people in Magadan are employed in the extracting 
industry. We can see therefore that the republic of Sakha and Magadan derive their 
wealth particularly from the extracting industry, especially the mining of precious 
metals. Compared with other regions, the RFE does not contribute greatly towards the 
processing industries, electrical energy and fuel.
Table 4-13 shows the extent to which the RFE contributed to Russian industrial 
output by sector in 1994. The RFE (22.9 per cent) ranked second among the eleven 
economic regions in the extraction of non-ferrous metals. The RFE as a whole is one of 
the largest producers of raw materials for the Russian market, with a near-monopoly on 
precious metals such as diamonds, gold, tin, tungsten, and boric materials. The RFE 
ranked second of all the economic regions in the food industry. It is exceptionally clear 
in the case of the fisliing industry that although the statistical yearbook includes no 
specific figures, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Primorskii derive their income mainly from 
fishing and fish processing.^® The RFE also ranked highly in the production of certain 
other materials: second in the electrical energy sector (16.1 per cent), and fifth in the 
wood and paper industry (4.9 per cent). By contrast, the RFE's engineering industry.
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East, p. 45.
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and the production of ferrous metals and building material was below the national 
average.
Table 4-13: Industrial Production by Sector in 1994 (%)
Region Sector
Electrical
energy
Ferro
us
Non-
ferrous
Building
material
Engineering Wood and 
paper
Light
industry
Food
RF 13,4 'W 4 8 — 1#,6 --34 42.5
RFE 161 W 4 7 '4:9 - %9 23,8
Salcha 12.0 - m à 1.4 1.4 5.6 0.3 4.5
Primorskii 6.8 O.l 4.2 13.9 6.1 5.8 1.1 m
Khabarovsk 20,3 5.4 8.5 15 5 8.5 3.9 0.8 12.7
Amur 0.2 17.6 6.6 6.7 5.8 0,9 13.7
Jewish AO 20.4 0.4 1.3 37:1; w # 14.2
Kamchatka 18.1 - 0.5 10.7 1,6 2.2 0.4
Magadan 31 & 0.1 46.6 4.1 0.8 2.2 0.4 8.7
Chukotka 318 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.2 4.2
Sakhalin 11.7 - 0.2 @ 0 8.9 3.4 0.4
Electrical Ferrous 
eneigy
nil
Non-ferrous Building Engineering Wood& Light Food
material paper industry
Source: As Table 4-10, pp. 62-73. 
Note: RF ■  RFE □
On comparing the regions in the RFE, it can be seen, in table 4-13, that Sakha, 
Chukotka and Magadan led the production of non-ferrous metals: they recorded 58.4
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per cent, 47.6 per cent, and 46.6 per cent respectively, very high figures in their own 
right - especially so when compared with the RFE average (only 22.9 per cent). In fact, 
Sakha achieved the highest production of non-ferrous metal in the RF. In the food 
industry, Kamchatka, Primorskii and Sakhalin produced substantially more than the 
RFE average (23.8 per cent). Of these, Kamchatka oblast (64.9 per cent) and Primorskii 
krai (49.5 per cent) were leaders in the food production industry in the RF. Kamchatka 
especially seems to have focused all its energy on food production at the expense of 
other industries. In the wood and paper industry, Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai, 
Amur oblast, the Jewish AO and Sakhalin oblast contributed more than the RFE average 
(4.9 per cent). Of these, Sakhalin oblast had the highest production (8.9 per cent). It is 
interesting to note that the engineering industry within the Jewish AO is not only higher 
than the national average, but is also proportionally much greater than its output in other 
sectors.
As shown in table 4-14 (panel A), every region in the RFE registered above the 
national average in terms of retail trade, with Sakha, Kamchatka, Magadan, and 
Sakhalin showing the highest figures, greater even than the RFE average. From amongst 
these, Magadan and Sakhalin registered at nearly double the national average, in terms 
of foreign currency dealings in 1994, as shown in table 4-14 (panel B), all the regions in 
the RFE were above the national average excepting Amur. Sakha, Magadan and 
Kamchatka have the highest foreign currency expenditures, just as they had the highest 
share in retail trade. Thus it is clear that they are the most commercialised regions of the 
Far East, and among the most commercialised of the whole RF.
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Table 4-14: Retail Trade by Region in Thousands of rubles per Head of 
Population in 1994 (Panel A) and Foreign Currency Dealings, US$ million 
divided by million population in 1994 (Panel B)
Panel (A) Panel (B)
Area Retail Trade Area Received Spent
RF 1,438.5 RF 192.9 190.3
RFE 1,789.8 RFE 347.3 354.5
Sakha 2,374.2 Sakha 549.6 614.8
Magadan 2,579.8 Magadan 566.4 557.3
Kamchatka 2,448.7 Kamchatka 539.4 560.8
Sakhalin 2,094.4 Khabarovsk 455.5 444.2
Primorskii 1,634.9 Primorskii 324.3 321.5
Amur 1,513.3 Sakhalin 318.2 325.2
Khabarovsk 1,443.4 Amur 8.6 8.2
Source: Derived from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (1995), pp. 523-25, pp. 649- 
51 (Panel A), and pp. 873-75 (Panel B).
Table 4-15: Foreign Exports and Imports per Head of Population in 1993
Region Exports Imports
RF 102,153 72,631
RFE 118,758 69,196
Khabarovsk krai 258,130 76,071
Sakhalin oblast 196,993 76,239
Kamchatka oblast 159,022 179,656
Primorskii krai 96,240 53,860
Sakha republic 41,689 21,522
Magadan oblast 21,303 124,266
Amur oblast 19,370 80,531
Source: As Table 4-14, pp. 869-72.
The RF has become primarily an exporter of raw materials rather than being 
able to concentrate on manufactured goods. According to statistics shown in table 4- 
15 on exports and imports per head of population in the nation as a whole, the value of 
exports greatly exceeded the value of imports. In terms of exports, the RFE average
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exceeded the national average. Within the RFE, Khabarovsk had the greatest total 
exports, followed by Sakhalin and Kamchatka and. In only three regions (Kamchatka, 
Magadan and Amur) do imports exceed exports. We can see that most regions of the 
RFE are highly dependent upon exports. Exceptionally, Kamchatka, while taking third 
place in exports, was also the largest importing region. Hence, we can assume that the 
majority of its residents are employed in the trade industry.
We can also see that most regions in the RFE depend greatly on foreign export 
and import relations (chapter 6 will further expand on their foreign trade partners). The 
RFE has become primarily an exporter of raw materials rather than manufactured 
goods. As previously seen, Kamchatka, Sakhalin and Primorskii’s exports consisted of 
fish and fish products, and nearly half of Khabarovsk krai's exports were timber. Other 
major RFE exports were gold (from Magadan), and diamonds (from the republic of 
Sakha). Major RFE imports were food and food products, electric appliances, second­
hand cars and other consumer products.
Finally, let us consider income and living costs in the RFE. For a long time, the 
Far East has been known as a higher income area. But prices, including food prices, are 
among the highest in Russia. The Far East is unusual in this respect, namely, a higher 
level of income than the national average (see table 4-16), combined with very high 
living costs (see table 4-17). In the nation as a whole wages are still the main source of 
income. But in the RFE, according to the Russian Far East Undate. The notion of 
average income is giving way to wide discrepancies in income distribution.’ For 
example, some groups, like the elderly, the ill, and single mothers are rapidly becoming
Robert C Stuart and Paul R. Gregory, The Russian Economy: Past. Present and Future (New York: 
Harper ColUns College, 1995), p. 117.
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impoverished, while others, the new commercial wealthy, are demonstrating incomes 
much greater even than their counterparts in the West The average worker's salary in 
Khabarovsk in October 1995 was 809,900 rubles (US$ 178). The highest wage came 
from the energy sector at 1,418,000 rubles (US$ 315), the lowest from light industry at 
452,000 (US$ 100).*^
Table 4-16: Average Monthly Income per Person in 1,000s of rubles by Region 
in 1994
700
600
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300
200
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RF RFE Chukotka Jewish Magadan
Source: As Table 4-15, pp. 583-85.
Sakha Kamchatka Sakhalin Primorskii Khabarovsk
As figure 4-16 shows, in 1994, the level of monthly income per person in every 
region of the RFE exceeded the RF average. The exception was the Jewish AO, which 
was identified as the lowest income region, whilst Chukotka had the highest level of 
income. From these figures we can see the large gap between the highest and the lowest
Andrei Illarionov, Richard Layard and Peter Orszag, “The Conditions o f Life,” in Anders Aslund (ed.). 
Economic Transformation in Russia (London: Pinter. 1994), p, 146.
Miller and Stenopoulos, The Russian Far East, p. 90.
“Average Salaries in Khabarovsk krai," Russian Far East Update tRFEUJ. Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1996,
p. 11.
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regional incomes. The higher wages generated in the profitable mining industry may 
account for the relatively high income in this area. However, as previously seen, the 
Jewish AO relies mainly upon agriculture and light industry, which in the post-Soviet 
era has been steadily declining. Another factor is the emigration of some wealthy Jews 
to Israel and other parts of Russia.
Taking account of living costs, incomes in the country as a whole were 202 per 
cent greater than the level of subsistence. But in the RFE, only Kamchatka oblast had a 
higher ratio than the national average, while Magadan was the same as the national 
average, and the rest of the RFE was below it. The region with the lowest incomes in 
relation to subsistence was Primorskii krai.®^  This suggests that, adjusting to local price 
levels, incomes in the RFE were in fact substantially below the national average.
Taking into account a 19-item food basket survey in 1995, Chukotka was the 
most expensive place to buy food in the nation as a whole. Seven Far Eastern cities also 
headed the list of the most expensive in Russia (see table 4-17).®'^  Of these, northern 
regions of the RFE spent more money to buy food than the southern regions. Within the 
RFE, horn the result of this survey, we can also deduce that the northern population was 
paying more money for consumer goods, which suggests a link between high living 
costs and geographical location. The remoteness of the area and its sporadic distribution 
of its population must in general give rise to high transportation costs.
^ Ibid., pp. 789-91; in June 1992, it was once announced, “Vladivostok has the highest cost o f  living in the 
country as a whole: 2,500 rubles.” See “Vladivostok Cost o f Living Highest in Country,” Radio Tikhii 
Okean. 17 June 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-117,17 June 1992, p. 43; in May 1994, the Tass reported 40 
per cent o f Primorskii krai's population were below the poverty line. See RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 
92.
“Chukotka Town Most Expensive in Russia,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1996, p. 6.
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Table 4-17: Costs of a Basket of 19 Basic Food Products in 1995 (in 1,000 
rubles)
Region City Food Basket Cost
Chukotka Anadyr 626
Sakha Yakutsk 544
Kamchatka Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii 514
Magadan Magadan 501
Sakhalin Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 444
Frimorsldi Vladivostok 396
Khabarovsk Khabarovsk 342
Moscow Moscow 287
RF average 245
Source: “Chxikotka Town Most Expensive in Russia/" Russian Far East Update. Vol. 
VI, No. 4, April 1996, p. 6.
According to Goskomstat figures (which are borne out by other investigating 
bodies including the All-Russia Centre for the Standard of Living), all regions of the 
RFE are below the mid-point in terms of real income.^^ Thus, we can see that people in 
the RFE are not better off than the national population as a whole; in fact, levels of 
poverty are higher than the national average.
In terms of monthly income, we can say that the RFE is a relatively rich region 
compared with the other regions in the RF. But in terms of purchasing power, all the 
regions in the RFE have the highest level of living costs. Chukotka, in particular, scored 
the highest in monthly income but was also the most expensive place to buy food. 
Attempts to assess income and the cost of living lead here, as elsewhere, to ambiguous 
results. However, income is slightly more evenly distributed in the RFE than in the
Izvestiva. 25 October 1997, p. 25; Far Eastern regions have been found to be among the poorest in 
several other investigations. For instance, in terms o f the purchasing power o f  pensions (Chukotka emerges 
with the lowest real values o f pensions in tlie entire Russian Federation): Izvestiva. 26 November 1997, p. 
6, or in the purchasing power o f average individual incomes. The Jewish AO and Chukotka again emerged 
as ‘poor regions’, and most others were ‘relatively poor’ Amur region, Magadan region, Primorskii krai, 
and Sakhalin region: Izvestiva. 15 April 1998, p. 6.
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country as a whole, especially in Sakhalin where income is more evenly distributed than 
anywhere else in the entire Federation.®^ The RFE, equally, has more cars, doctors and 
hospital beds than the national average, but it has fewer phones and less housing space, 
which might also serve as an indicator of living standards. There is also wide variation 
within the RFE, and within individual regions.®^
Towards A Multivariate Analysis
In the last part of this discussion, I will focus on two scattergrams which show the 
relationship between income and cars and phones respectively. Clearly, monthly 
incomes expressed in rubles are of limited value as a guide to living standards in post­
communist Russia, and so I want to examine how income can be evaluated in relation to 
the income spent on cars and phones as two popular and necessary commodities.
Scattergram 4-1 shows us the relationship between income and cars in the 89 
regions of the RF, highlighting the 7 major regions of the RFE. One would suppose that 
a high income would necessarily involve ownership of a greater number of cars, and the 
position of Magadan oblast, Kamchatka oblast and the republic of Sakha would support 
this supposition. However, it is remarkable that Sakhalin has the greatest ownership of 
cars in the whole of the RF, given its level of income. Similarly, compared to their 
income, Sakhalin oblast, Amur oblast, Khabarovsk krai and Primorskii krai have a high 
level of car ownership. We cannot therefore readily take car ownership as an indirect 
measure of wealth in the RFE. Within the RFE, the rich areas in the north (Magadan, 
Kamchatka and Sakha) have a higher income than the southern areas (Sakhalin, Amur,
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996. pp. 808-10. 
Ibid., pp. 835-44 and pp. 1072-80.
178
Khabarovsk and Primorskii) but car ownership in the south is generally greater.®® One 
might infer from this that the southern part of the RFE had begun to import second-hand 
cars cheaply and easily from Japan and South Korea and possibly other Pacific 
countries due to their close proximity. This would provide an answer to Sakhalin’s 
anomalously high level of car ownership. Therefore, geographical location can have an 
influence on ‘wealth’ as defined by the relationship between income and cars, which 
leads us to question whether this relationship is a valid way of judging wealth.
Scattergram 4-1; Income (in 1,000s of rubles per month) and Cars (per 1,000 
people) by Region, in 1995
1000-
. . KamchatK 
Sakha
Amut "'^ •’^ Ï T O o r s k
Sakhalin
,
0 .
0 100 200 !
Source: Derived from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1996. pp. 789-91 and pp. 
1072-74.
On a visit to Vladivostok, the capital city o f Primorskii krai in September 1996,1 myself observed a large 
number o f second-hand Korean and Japanese cars.
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Scattergram 4-2: Income (in 1,000s of rubles per month) and No. of Homes with 
Telephones by Region, in 1995
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Source: As Scattergram 4-1, pp. 789-91 and pp. 1075-77.
However, if we look at the relationship between income and phones in scatter­
gram 4-2, we can see a clear correlation between high income and a high level of phone 
ownership. Thus, the relationship between income and phones seems to be a more 
reliable way of evaluating wealth. These two scattergrams show that the RFE has a 
relatively high level of income compared to the RF as a whole. Also in the RFE, the 
northern part has a higher income than the southern part. However, they also remind in 
that figures, especially in Russia, should never be taken at face value, and that we need 
multiple measures of living standards to reach well founded conclusions.
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4.5: Conclusion
How did the socio-economic issues dealt with in this chapter gain such wide coverage in 
the Russian mass media? In the Soviet Union, bad news from official sources was 
generally a commodity in short supply. Such matters as crime rates, aeroplane crashes, or 
drug abuse were rarely mentioned. At present, the impact of the Russian press on popular 
thinking is high and vice versa. In general, a socio-economic problem as it appear in the 
press is any situation that a significant element of society finds unsatisfactory: lack of 
adequate housing, unpopular leaders, high living costs, declining life expectancy, high 
levels of unemployment, excessive crime and high levels of alcohol consumption.
As previously noted, the freedom of the press exists now in Russia, and there is no 
more overall control of the press by the government. In the RFE the media (especially local 
press and television) focus heavily on the deficiencies of contemporary life, organised 
crime, unemployment and corruption, causing (according to some critics) a high level of 
anxiety about public safety and well-being. The extent to which the Far Eastern people are 
aware of such problems depends both on their personal circumstances and on the media. 
Many social problems that were given publicity in the mass media, have aroused official 
concern and thus climbed high on the political agenda; they generally reflected the same 
public concerns as were apparent in opinion surveys.
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Chapter 5: The International Political Agenda; Relations with China 
and Japan
5.1: Introduction
Until recently the unsettled international boundary between Russia and the People’s 
Republic of China created a major obstacle for the development of relations between the 
two countries/ Gorbachev, from the moment of his election, adopted a flexible and 
accommodating approach towards the Soviet-Chinese boundary question/ During his 
visit to China in May 1989, normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations encouraged prospects 
for economic co-operation along the two countries’ border regions. Gorbachev’s new 
approach led to a series of meetings over the following two years aimed at clarifying the 
contentious areas of the Sino-Soviet border.^
The political normalisation of Soviet-Chinese relations in 1989 was followed 
by growing prospects for economic co-operation, beginning along the Far Eastern 
border regions."  ^The border, which had been closed for decades, opened officially after 
the signing of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Ties in Beijing in March 1992.
 ^Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 48-9.
 ^For a fuller discussion o f Russia’s border problem see Georgi F. Kunadze, “Border Problems Between 
Russia and Its Neighbours: Stable for Now, But Stubborn in the Long Run,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail 
G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe (eds.), Russia and East Asia: The Century Securitv Environment 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 133-49.
 ^Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy o f  Russia: Changing Systems. Enduring 
Interests (Armonk, New York; M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 239. After a slow and steady process o f border 
normalisation, in May 1991, the USSR and China signed an agreement on the eastern section o f the 
boundary. Later, in September 1994, an agreement was also signed on the western section. See 
Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 17-18, 1994, pp. 16-19; “Disagreement Over Russo-Chinese Border 
Territories Noted,” Kommersant-Dailv. 17 January 1995, p. 4, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-023. 3 February 
1995, p. 3. For forther details o f  the agreement on the western section o f boundary see Li Jingjie, “The 
Progress o f Chinese-Russian relations: From Friendship to Strategic Partnership,” Far Eastern Affairs 
(Moscow), No. 3, 1997, p. 35; Vladimir Miasnikov, “Russia and China: Prospects for Partnership in the 
Asia-Pacific Region in the 2U  ^Century,” Far Eastern Afiairs (Moscow), No. 6, 1998, p. 19,
For discussion o f the Russian-Chinese military, political and economic relations from since the late 
1980s see Yurii Tsyganov, “The General Framework o f Sino-Russian Relations,” Russian and Euro-Asian 
Bulletin. Vol. 7, No. 6, June 1998, pp. 1-8.
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This agreement guaranteed favourable economic conditions to each side and also eased 
customs regulations/ However, it also led to a massive Chinese influx into the RFE. 
The Chinese emigrant population in the RFE has gradually increased since the early 
1990s and we can see the expanding number of Chinese people living and working in 
the Far East.^
The overwhelming dominance of these two issues - the border demarcation 
agreement and the expansion of Chinese into the RFE - can be seen (in table 1-2) as top 
priority issues among for Far Easterners concerning the development of relations with 
China. The aim of this first subsection is to focus on the border agreement, particularly 
looking at the historical dispute along the Amur and Ussuri river, the process of 
negotiation between Russia and China (from 1991 to 1997), and Russia’s centre- 
periphery conflict over this issue. I will also be treating the Chinese expansion into the 
RFE exploring three major areas: border trade, Chinese immigration, and criminal 
activity. Finally I will deal with the Russian government and local authorities’ response 
to these issues.
Both present-day Russia and the former Soviet Union have had a long history of 
territorial conflict with Japan.^ This continues in the drawn-out dispute surrounding
 ^Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 7, 1992, pp. 18-19; Xinhua. 5 March 1992, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 
13, July 1992, p. 39; Izvestiva 9 March 1992, p. 4, as cited in PBIS-Sov-92-54. 19 March 1992, pp. 26-7. 
The agreement determined the volume o f  trade between the two countries. This was based on exports o f  
parts and equipment for construction projects underway or completed in China with technical aid from 
Russia. The greater part o f bilateral trade consisted o f  direct dealings, as well as border and barter trade. 
See “Trade, Economic Agreement Signed,” Tass. 5 May 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-87. 5 May 1992,
p. 21.
 ^ Vladimir S. Miasnikov, “Present Issues between Russia and China: Realities and Prospects,” Sino- 
Soviet Affairs. Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 34.
 ^ Japan has called these islands the ‘Northern Territories’ while the Russians refer to them as the 
‘ Southern Kuril Islands. ’ From the end o f World War II to the present post-Soviet era, the ownership 
dispute over the islands has been an obstacle both to the conclusion o f a peace treaty and to more wide- 
ranging economic co-operation between the two countries. “Problems o f  Kurile Islands Reflected in 
Mirror o f Sociology,” Sovetskava Rossia. 3 September 1992, p. 3 as cited in CDPSP. Vol. 44, No. 9, 
1992, p. 20: Itogi. 3 December 1996, p. 33; Konstantin Sarkisov, “The Northern Territories Issue after
183
ownership of the Kuril Islands/ Japan has claimed that the Soviet occupation of these 
islands is illegal and that the islands must be returned to Japan before full political, 
economic or diplomatic relations can be restored/ Until the late 1980s, the Japanese 
trade and investment policy towards the RFE was limited because of the dispute over 
the islands. Japan’s guiding principle prior to early 1990 was ‘politics first, then 
economics,’ but has since shifted to place a greater emphasis on economics.
Gorbachev demonstrated a flexible attitude towards Japan over the Kuril 
dispute. Relations with Japan were improved through the plans for restructuring the 
Soviet domestic economy and the increased openness of the Soviet system. Gorbachev’s 
successor, Yeltsin, was also been keen to establish closer relations with Japan for 
obvious economic reasons and made it clear that he intended to conclude a peace 
treaty. Every effort has been made to gain access to Japanese investment, trade and 
technology for the improvement of the economy of the Far East.^^ In November 1998, 
Russia and Japan exchanged proposals on the signing of a peace treaty at their planned
Yeltsin’s Re-election; Obstacles to a Resolution from a Russian Perspective,” Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1997, p. 357.
® Both countries have experienced three periods o f direct conflict: the Russian-Japanese War o f 1905, the 
presence o f Japanese troops in Vladivostok during the Russian Civil War (1918-22); and the territorial 
dispute since the end of World War II over ownership o f the southern Kuril islands. See B.Tkachenko, 
“Kurilyskaya problema: Istoriya i pravo,” Rossiva i ATR (Vladivostok), No. 3, 1995, pp. 24-5.
 ^ “Japan Visit ‘95 %’ Success Despite Kurils Dispute,” Kommersant-Dailv. 3 May 1995, p. 4, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-95-086. 4, May 1995, p. 15; “Japanese Cooperation Depends on Kurils,” Vladivostok News. 
No. 166, 30 April 1998, p. 3. •
Although the dispute remains unresolved, Japan is the one o f the greatest trade partners and investors 
with the RFE. Japan is heavily involved in Sakhalin oil and gas projects, for example.
Russians have argued that economic relations should separate from political issues, but Japan has 
adhered to the concept of political linkage, thus demonstrating a very different approach to economic and 
trade ventures. See Paul Marantz, “Russian Foreign Policy During Yeltsin’s Second Term,” Communist 
and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1997, p. 342.
“Kurils Officials on Relations with Japan,” Tass. 13 January 1994, as cited in FBIS-94-10. 14 January 
1994, p. 39; Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (London: Praeger, 1996), p. 
173.
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Moscow summit in the year 2000/  ^Peaceful negotiations over the Kuril islands have 
progressed, but as yet no concrete agreements have been reached/'^
According to my content analysis, the issue of the Southern Kuril islands still 
remained one of the most important political issues for the RFE in relation to Japan (see 
Table 1-3). In the post-Communist era, it is evident that domestic political influences in 
the form of a revived nationalism have further stimulated the territorial dispute with 
Japan/^ Many solutions have been suggested concerning this issue, but according to my 
research there are three major obstacles to the return of the islands to Japan, as stated by 
the Far Easterners themselves. Firstly, economically these islands are very significant for 
the fishing industry. Secondly, the islands are still of military significance despite Russia 
withdrawing its troops. The final and most important factor is the political attitude of 
Russia in regard to the islands. To highlight this last area I will utilise public opinion 
polls to reveal that the majority of Russians, and Kuril residents in particular, are strongly 
opposed to any return of the islands to Japan. Here, as elsewhere, the political agenda is a 
complex construct of public and institutional interests, made still more complex by the 
interpenetration of domestic and international factors.
Chuson Bbo (Seoul), 13 November 1998, p. 9; With tbi& achievement, they agreed to establish a 
borderline demarcation sub-commission within the framework o f  the existing joint Russian-Japanese 
commission to conclude the peace treaty. See Rossiiskava gazeta. 14 November 1998, p. 2.
Japan demanded that its sovereignty be recognised over all Kuril islands and that the corresponding 
border be confirmed in the treaty. Russia continued to strive towards the signing o f a peace treaty that 
would ensure both sides’ readiness to settle the territorial dispute in the near future. Russia took an 
indirect approach, simply suggesting that the border issue should be formalised in a separate agreement 
and that its signing should be postponed ‘until later.’ See Izvestiva. 14 January 1999, p. 1.
Japan Ernes. 20 January 1994, p. 3; for further discussion on Nationalist influence on Russian foreign 
policy see Roger E. Kanet and Susanne M. Birgerson, “The Domestic-Foreign Policy Linkage in Russian 
Politics: Nationalist Influences on Russian Foreign Policy, Communist and Post-Communist. Vol. 30, No. 
4, 1997, pp. 335-44.
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5.2: China and the Russian Far East
5.2.1. The Demarcation Agreement
Firstly, I will focus on the historical dispute over the demarcation of the Russian- 
Chinese boundary. Russia acquired the Amur region in the treaty o f Aigun in May 1858 
and the Ussuri region in the Beijing treaty in November 1860. This can be seen in map 
5-1. The treaty of Aigun created a new Russian-Chinese boundary in the Far East. This 
ran from the Argun river, along the Amur, to the Sea of Japan. The Chinese claim that 
this involved the loss of 185,000 square miles of territory and describe the Aigun treaty 
as the first of the Russian-Chinese ‘unequal treaties.A ccording to the provisions of 
the Beijing treaty, the Chinese were obliged to concede a further 40,000 square miles of 
territory to Russia between the Ussuri river and the Sea of Japan. Both countries were 
agreed that after the installation of border posts the border would be unchangeable. In 
accordance with this treaty, the boundary line in Khasanskiy rayon was established 
along the watershed and the left bank of the Tumen river, which belonged to China. In 
the mid-1930s, during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the Soviet Union took 
control of all islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers. At that time, the boundaries on a 
number of land sections became confused, China did not recognise that boundaries 
differed from one legal bilateral agreement to the next.^^
Peter S. H. Tang, Russian Expansion into the Maritime Province: The Contemporary Soviet and 
Chinese Communist View (Washington, DC: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962), pp. 29- 
32; R.K.I. Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History (Sydney: George Aden & Unwin, 1984), p. 
74.
P. P. Karan, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute,” Journal o f Geography. Vol. 63, No. 5, May 1964, pp. 
216-22; Tsien-hua Tsui, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute in the 1970s (Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1983), p. 
25.
“Russo-Chinese Border Conflict Detailed,” Sevodnva. 17 February 1995, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95- 
041, 2 March 1995, p. 1.
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Map 5-1: The Russian-Chinese Far Eastern Border
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Relations improved after the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party 
in 1949, but this only lasted until 1960. Chinese claims to the boundaries of the RFE 
were raised publicly in 1963.^^After this, in March 1969, border clashes along the 
Ussuri river occurred. The most severe armed conflict was witnessed on the Damanky 
island, in the Ussuri region:
Armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese jSrontier guards, caused considerable loss 
o f life. This occurred on 2 March and 15 March 1969, on the Ussuri river. The scene 
o f  the fighting was a small uninhabited island one and a half miles long by half a
Since 1960, Chinese servicemen and civilians systematically violated the Soviet frontier. In 1963 there 
were over three thousand cases o f  illegal entry to Soviet islands by Chinese citizens. For more analysis o f  
the historical disputes and the current progress for the settlement o f the Russian-Chinese border issue, see 
George Ginsburgs, “The End o f  the Sino-Russian Territorial Disputes?,” The Journal o f East Asian 
Affairs. No. 7. Vol. 1, 1993, pp. 261-63.
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mile wide, known to  the Russians as Damanski island and to the Chinese as the 
Chenpao island. This lies about 110 miles south o f Khabarovsk and 250 miles north 
of Vladivostok.^^
This conflict led to a greater mistrust between the two neighbouring peoples 
and contact was severed?^ The two communist countries did not allow for the free 
movement of their peoples, immigration, or extensive contact.^^ Up until 1984, this 
border region remained isolated from foreign influences and the Soviet-Chinese military 
presence remained at a high level along the border?^
The agreement between the Soviet Union and China on the eastern section of 
the border resulted from many years of negotiations. During and after Gorbachev’s 
rapprochement this region gradually opened up to extensive, direct contacts between the 
two countries. In August 1987, Gorbachev initiated talks on the border issue. This was 
to prevent the re-emergence of tensions over the disputed areas. By the end of that year, 
the Soviet Union and China had reached an agreement on the ‘Thalweg’ prineiple.^"  ^By 
October 1988, agreement turned to the western section of the border and working 
groups were fonned for this purpose. The border was mapped by a joint aerial survey. 
After Gorbachev’s summit visit to Beijing in May 1989, the Soviet Union and China
Alan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union 1949-84 (London; Longman, 1985), p. 92.
“Moscow and Beijing Try to Clarify Who Owns Islands in Amur and Ussuri ” Izvestiva. 26 April 1994, 
as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVT, No. 17, 1994, p. 20.
James Clay Moltz, “Russo-Chinese Normalisation from an International Perspective: Coping with the 
Pressures o f  Change,” in Tsuneo Akaha (ed.) Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing 
ties with Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 187.
Gerald Segal, The Soviet Union and the Pacific (London: Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 
1990), pp. 88-9.
By the end o f 1987, the Soviet-Chinese leaders had held the second round o f  their negotiations on the 
border question, In their meeting, the two delegations agreed to settle the matter on the basis o f the 
principle o f international law. In accordance with this, the demarcation should pass through the main 
channel on the navigable rivers, which include the Amur and Ussuri rivers. In other words, the border 
should pass through the middle o f the Amur and Ussuri rivers. In order to conduct this, they also should 
establish a working group o f  experts to examine concretely the location o f the boundary line through the 
entire length o f its eastern border. The signature o f  the Agreement was recorded in Vestnik Ministerstva 
inostrannvkh del SSSR no. 3, 1987, pp. 20-21, and no. 4 ,1987, pp. 25-6.
Ibid., no. 16, 1988, p. 30, and no. 22, 1988, p. 22.
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signed a demarcation agreement. This agreement covers the Russian and Chinese 
border, from Mongolia to North Korea, along the borders of Chita, Amur oblast, 
Khabarovsk krai and Primorskii krai. It is about 4,300 km, with 3,700 km along the 
rivers. This does not change the existing land border between the two countries. 
Negotiations continued on a treaty for China’s border with Central Asia?^
The Soviet and Chinese leaders finally signed an agreement on the state border 
in its eastern section on 16 May 1991.^  ^ In accordance with Article 10, the agreement 
had to be ratified by the supreme legislatures of the two countries. In November 1991, it 
was approved by the Supreme Soviet’s Committee for International Affairs and Foreign 
Economic Ties.^  ^Under this agreement, the Soviet Union was to give approximately 
1,500 hectares of Primorskii land to China, including a small part of the Tumen river. 
This potentially gave China access to the Sea of Japan .The  hectares would be divided 
up, with China receiving 300 hectares of fields in the Khankai region, 960 hectares of 
the cedar forests in the Ussuri region and 330 hectares along the Tumen river in the 
Khasan region.^ ^ It was interesting to note that the treaty did not mention the status of 
the two islands near Khabarovsk, Bolshoy Ussuriyskiy and Tarabarovskiy (their overall 
area is 350 square kms), and the Bolshoy island in the upper reaches of the Argun river 
(whose area is 58 square kms).^  ^ Regarding these three islands, Foreign Minister
The two countries agreed to work out mutually acceptable solutions on the eastern and western parts o f  
tlie border m the spirit o f  equitable consultations, mutual understanding and flexibility regarding the 
international law. See Ibid., no. 9 ,1989, p. 30.
Ilkhookeanskava Zvezda. 5 March 1993, p. I, as cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 57.
"S^ stnrk Ministerstva inostrannvkh del SSSR. no. 7,1991, pp. 38-9.
Ibid., no. 11, 1991, p. 4; “Kozyrev Presents Sino-Soviet Border Treaty,” Moscow Russian Television 
Network. 13 February 1992, as cited in FBlS-Sov-92-031, 14 February 1992, p. 52.
Vladivostok News. 17 April 1996, No, 6, p. 1.
According to a Prim orsk krai administration source, this last area is important for the international 
plan to create the Tumen Free Economic Zone. “Yeltsin Representative Warns Against Ceding Land to 
China," Interfax. 8 February 1995, as cited In FBIS-Sov-95-026, 8 February 1995, p. 6.
“Commentary on History o f Chinese Border Accord,” Radio Moscow. 19 February 1992, as cited in
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Andrei Kozyrev stated that Russia would have to continue talks to decide their future 
with China. Yet these three islands remain disputed and are still under Russia’s 
jurisdiction.^^
After the Soviet breakup, in February 1992, the Russian Federation Supreme 
Soviet endorsed the agreement of May 1991 between the Soviet Union and China on the 
eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese state border '^  ^ with 170 votes in favour, none 
against and 6 abstentions. The agreement specified for the first time the border between 
Russia and C h in a . I n  late February 1992, China’s National People’s Congress also 
ratified the treaty/^ and during a visit to Beijing, in March 1992, Kozyrev met the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, and exchanged official documents.^^ Russia 
proposed joint economic use of the islands which were to be handed over to China. 
Demarcation of the border began in the spring of 1993 and would finish by the end of
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This settled 98 per cent of the 7,500-km border, covering the territories from 
the Amur and Ussuri rivers in Primorskii krai, to the republic of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, 
and Tajikistan in Central Asia.^^ Negotiations on China’s border with Kazakhstan,
FBIS-Sov-92-038. 26 February 1992, pp. 30-1.
“Russia, China Border Demarcation Problems,” Tass. 13 April, 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-1994-92. 14 
April 1994, pp. 15-6.
The Russian Federation continued to exercise the rights and to ftilftll the obligations stemming from the 
international treaties concluded by the former USSR. See Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 4-5, 1992, pp. 72- 
3; “Kozyrev Presents Sino-Soviet Border Treaty,” Moscow TV. 13 February, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92- 
031, 14 Febiiiary 1992, p. 52.
Genrikh Kireev, “Strategic Partnership and a Stable Border,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 4, 
1997, p. 17.
Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Westport: Praeger, 1996), p. 191. 
“Minister Kozyrev Interviewed on PRC Visit,” Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television 
First Programme Network. 16 March 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-052. 17 March 1992, p. 22; Beijing 
Review. No. 13, 1992, p. 12.
38 Border Issues Resolved; Status Quo Until 1997,” Tass. I October 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93- 
189, 1 October 1993, p. 15.
“Envoy to PRC on Remaining Border Issue,” Izvestiva. 22 April 1992, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92- 
79, 23 April 1992, pp. 17-8.
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (which included Russia as a partner) began in 1990. In 
December 1992, a joint delegation of the Central Asian states and Russia met with 
Chinese officials in Beijing to reconfirm their commitment to the Russo-Chinese 
agreement of 199lj° During the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin’s visit to Moscow in 
September 1994, ministers of the two countries signed the western border section 
agreement regulating a 55-km stretch of border between Mongolia and Kazakhstan."^  ^
An Agreement on the Consolidation Military Trust in the Five Countries’ Common 
Border Area was also signed in Shanghai in April 1996 by the leaders of Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan/^
The eastern border agreement, however, has been constantly under attack from 
the nationalist opposition in Russia, and from regional leaders in the RFE."^  ^ The 
reactions to the Russian-Chinese border agreement were varied, with a number of 
nationalists, military leaders and also local leaders of both countries opposed it/"^  
Multiple reports were made on this issue at the time, with many feeling that the 
concessions involved had been made at the national level without consultation with 
regional leaders.Local administrations, for their own political reasons, began an active 
campaign against the 1991 Russian-Chinese border agreement. The local media was
RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 35.
“Chinese Leader Arrives in Moscow, Tass. 2 September 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-94-172. 6  
September 1994, p. 9.
For a report on its signature see Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 5, 1996, p. 17; for a further discussion on 
this topic see Grigory Karasin, “Long-Term Strategy for Russian-Chinese Partnership,” Far Eastern 
Affairs CMoscowJ. No. 2, 1997, p. 27.
“Officiai Warns Against Abrogating Treaty With China,” Interfax. 7 February 1995, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-95-026, 8 February 1995, p. 6.
South China Morning Post. 17 March 1992, p. 10, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 44; 
Evgeniy Plaksen, Paper prepared for the Khabarovsk Conference on “Russia in the Pacific; the Past and 
tlie Present,” (Khabarovsk krai), August 1995, p. 14.
For more details about the regional leaders*^  discussions about the governmental decision over the 
border demarcation issue agreements to the border demarcation issue see James Clay Moltz, “Regional 
Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement,” Asian Survey. Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1995, pp. 517-18.
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filled with news and commentary devoted to these problems/^ According to 
Shlapentokh, regional leaders assumed that ‘Russia was giving China indigenous 
Russian land/'^^ As Moltz has pointed out, ‘RFE leaders were involved in several 
protests because of the adverse economic effects that followed from a loss of 
historically held grazing lands, fishing areas and other economic assets. Regional 
frustration had been heightened by a portion of the 1991 agreement which allowed the 
free passage of Chinese vessels in the Amur River.
Regarding the Russian response, the RFE regional leaders complained of 
Moscow’s level of control on the issue, and they blocked the final demarcation of the 
Russian-Chinese agreement on the eastern section of the border.^^ In this case, the 
conflict between the centre and peripheral regions became obvious by the end of 1993. 
The Far Eastern authorities protested because the Russian National Boundary 
Demarcation Committee proposed to hand the disputed islands over to China. As a 
result, some representatives from the Far Eastern administrations refused to participate 
in a visit to China/°
The main arguments of the local leaders in the RFE were that the border treaty 
had been negotiated in secret and there had been little opportunity for them to express 
their views. They began a campaign aimed mainly at the central govermnent in 
Moscow, who continued to insist on the implementation of the 1991 border treaty.^* The
“Commentary on Border Agreement,” Moscow Voice o f  Russia World Service. 25 February 1995, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-95-Q38, 27 February 1995, pp. 5-6.
Vladimir Shlapentokh, “Russia, China and the Far East: Old Geopolitics or a New Peaceful 
Cooperation?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 28, No. 3, September 1995, p. 310.
Moltz, “Regional Tensions," p. 517.
“Rozov Criticises Lukin’s Remarks on Russian-Chinese Border,” Interfax 9 March 1995, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-95-050.15 March 1995, p. 17.
5a “QffiQjal Visit Border Areas Ceded to China.” Interfax, 7 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-045. 8 
March 1995, p. 13.
Aexander Lukin deals with the process o f demarcation further in his article, “The Image of China in
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Governors of Khabarovsk krai and Primorskii krai launched a fierce campaign against 
the treaty. Local residents especially attacked the return of the Damansky island in the 
Ussuri river to the Chinese, remembering the Russian lives lost in the March 1969 
border clash over this very island.^^ In late September 1993, Khabarovsk Governor 
Viktor Ishaev highlighted Article 8 of the 1991 border treaty, which allowed Chinese 
vessels to follow the main channel of both the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Russia had 
accepted that the main channel represented the border under Article 5 of this treaty. 
His argument in a letter to the Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin was that
since autumn. 1992 Chinese naval vessels were taking the liberty o f  navigating along 
the main channel o f  these rivers which brought them past Khabarovsk city itself, 
therefore, intruding into Russia’s internal waters. Thus the Chinese were violating 
the Russian security as well as fishing and other rights. He also emphasised that the 
treaty allows an uncontrolled flow o f Chinese into Khabarovsk krai. H e chastised 
Moscow for coming to an agreement with China without consulting local 
authorities. The situation on the border has drastically deteriorated and he demanded 
that the 1991 border agreement be reinstated
Iti addition, it was reported that the Governor of Primorskii krai, Nazdratenko, 
had declared that the border had been set unjustly and in an irrational manner. 
Nazdratenko strongly denounced the treaty, which (as we have seen) was nonetheless 
ratified in February 1992. He pointed out, that under the treaty 15 square kms of 
Primorskii krai was to be transfeiied to China, including two strategic sections of the 
Tumen river, which would provide the Chinese with direct access to the Sea of Japan, It 
was well known that the Chinese were expected to build a seaport in the area which 
would compete with existing RFE ports.^^ Nazdratenko said, ‘We will not give up an
Russian Border Region,” Asian Survey. Vol. 38, No. 9, September 1998, pp. 826-28.
“Russian Governor Upsets China Accord,” Financial Times. 1 March 1995; “Yeltsin’s Chance to Rattle 
the West,” Guardian. 22 April 1996, p. 8,
Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 196,
“Khabarovsk Asks Chernomyrdin to Stop Chinese Ship’s Access,” Radio Rossii Network. 29 
September 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-189. 1 October 1993, p. 14.
“Yeltsin Representative Warns Against Ceding Land to China,” Interfax. 8 February 1995, as cited in
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inch of our soil to China,’^ *" and this issue became a point of political contention in 
Moscow,
Other central and local authorities shared Nazdratenko’s opinion. The 
presidential representative in Primorskii krai^ Vladimir Ignatenko^ stated in an interview 
with Interfax that ‘We checked the I860 Beijing treaty and compared a century-old map 
with a modern one. We wanted friendship with our great neighbour, but if we give away 
one inch of land, tomorrow everyone will start demanding more from R u ss ia .T h e  
Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council, Anatoliy Dololaptev, also made a trip to 
the border areas of Primorskii krai and declared the border settlement to be unfair.^* In 
February 1995 the Primorskii krai Duma in Vladivostok passed a resolution to send a 
letter to the Russian President to the effect that all demarcation activities on the Russo- 
Sino border must be suspended. According to this letter, the President should start 
renegotiating the agreement’ s clauses concerning Primorskii krai. The Duma Chairman, 
Igor Lebedinets, emphasised that the territorial integrity of Russia must not be 
compromised by unjustifiable concessions to China.^^
Despite both the local leaders and nationalists’ strong criticism of the border 
issues, the process of demarcation continued. During the Moscow summit in September 
1994, Yeltsin confirmed that the leaders of the two countries would continue to settle
FBIS-Sov-95-026. 8 February 1995, p. 6; “Pavel Grachev Creating Security System in Northeast Asia,” 
Sevodnva. 17 May 1995, p. 2, as cited in CPPSP. Vol. XLVn, No. 20, 1995, p. 22.
“Maritime Kray’s Nazdratenko on PRC Border, Trade Issues,” Obshchaya Gazeta. 11-17 May 1995, 
No. 19, p. 8, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-112. 12 June 1995, pp. 48-9.
“China Helps Build Bridge Over Amur River,” Tass. 7 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-045. 8 
March 1995, p. 13.
“Border Dispute Could Explode our Relations with China,” Izvestiva, 10 February 1995, p.3, as cited in 
CPPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 6 ,1995, p. 29.
“Primorskii Duma Protests Concession,” Tass. 22 February 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-036. 23 
February 1995, pp. 13-4.
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the issue ‘of the two rivers (the Amur and Ussuri rivers) on the eastern b o rd e r .T h e  
Russian Foreign Ministry said that this would be the basis of stability in Russian- 
Chinese relations and that it would be wrong to try to raise the question of reviewing the 
1991 agreement which dealt with the eastern section. The diplomat also pointed out, 
‘Russia is not only giving away, but is also gaining territory. In the Hangkai District, the 
Chinese government is handing over about 80 hectares of land to Russia. In other 
words, the demarcation means exchange of territory. But the Primorskii krai authorities 
preferred not to speak about it and so u ^ t their own political goals by raising the 
issue .A nother comment made was that ‘Local officials of the Far East administration 
neglected the fact that new tensions in border areas could damage overall Russian- 
Chinese relations. Nevertheless, attaching importance to the development o f Russian- 
Chinese relations is one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy.
In March 1995, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev visited Beijing and reassured 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that Moscow intended to implement its 
commitments under the 1991 agreement, on the eastern section of the border. Kozyrev 
told Qichen that his government expected approval from the Duma of the 1994 bilateral 
agreement on the western border.^^ He also stated that:
the Russian government’s commitment to the 1991 border on the eastern section
[would] promote friendship and mutual confidence between the two countries.®'*
“Yeltsin Comments on Relations,” Tass. 3 September 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-94-172. 6 September 
1994, p. 12.
“Diplomat Against Review o f  Sino-Russian Border Agreement,” Interfax. 8 February 1995, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov“95-Q27. 9 February 1995, p. 8,
“Commentary on Border Agreement,” Moscow Voice o f  Russia World Service. 25 February 1995, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-95-038. 27 February 1995, pp. 5-6.
“Optimistic Note in Kozyrev Beijing Talks,” Izvestiva. 3 March 1995, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95- 
042,3  March 1995, p. 4,
64 Official Commends Border Talks With Kozyrev," Tass. 2 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95- 
043, 6 March 1995, p. 9.
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During his visit, the border issue became one of the principal items on the 
agenda, following the move made by the administration of Primorskii krai in 
denouncing the 1991 agreement on the border with China.^^
Once again, the Chinese State Council Premier Li Peng and Yeltsin met in 
Moscow in June 1995. They signed a Joint Communique which affirmed that there 
would be ‘joint adherence to the letter and spirit' of the 1991 agreement on the eastern 
section of the Russo-Chinese border.^^ In July 1995, the sixth session of the Russo- 
Chinese commission on the demarcation of the state border was held. Representatives of 
the two countries approved a number of important documents concerning the 
demarcation of the state border between Russia and China, including the Amur and 
Ussuri rivers.D uring his visit to Beijing in April 1996, Yeltsin once again pledged to 
strictly observe the 1991 border agreement and to continue talks on the demarcation of 
disputed sections.^^ This issue was almost finalised according to the boundary 
agreements and Russian Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov declared in January 1997 
that the demarcation would be completed by the end of the year.^^ Finally, after long 
and intense negotiations, in November 1997, Yeltsin signed a Declaration on the final 
demarcation of the joint border in Beijing.Despite objections from Far Eastern local
“Referendum on Demarcation o f Russian-Chinese Border Proposed,” Sevodnva. 25 March 1995, p. 2, 
as cited in CPPSP. Voi. XLVH, No. 12,1995, p. 25.
For the text o f  the joint communique see Diplomaticheskii vestnik no. 7, 1995, pp. 4-7; “Communique 
Issued,” Tass. 27 June 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-123. 27 June 1995, p. 6.
For the text o f  the agreement see Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, No. 3, 1996, pp. 6-10; “Joint PRC 
Commission Begins Border Demarcation,” Tass, 20 July 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-139. 20 July
1995, p, 6.
“Yeltsin Frightens Chinese Communists with Russian Communists,” Kommersant-Dailv. 26 April
1996, p. 3, as cited in CPPSP. Vol. XLVBI, No. 17,1996, p. 7; Financial Times. 25 April 1996, p. 4. 
Harada, “Russia and Northeast Asia,” p. 42.
For the text o f the joint Russia-Chinese declaration see Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 12, 1997, pp. 9- 
10.
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leaders and Russian nationalist groups, a couple of tiny disputed Amur and Ussuri areas 
were settled by a joint border commission.
5.2.2: Chinese Expansion into the Russian Far East
Having covered the border agreement, we now turn our attention to the issue of Chinese 
expansion into the RFE. Since early 1991, the economic crisis and the end of state- 
supported immigration resulted in a decline in the population of the RFE. The rate of 
emigration overtook the natural increase, and there was a decline in birth rates and a rise 
in death rates. This change was dealt with in Chapter 4.
An immigration service representative estimated that in some areas of the RFE 
Chinese settlers equalled the number of local Russians or even outnumbered them. In 
June 1994, Izvestiva reported that the population of Pogranichnyi in Primorskii krai was 
18,000, of which Chinese settlers accounted for 8,0007^ Another exemple of this was 
found in the Lazo district of Khabarovsk krai, where in a village with a population of 
100, there was a privately owned farm which employed 50 Chinese workers and only 
three Russians. The villagers were worried about the long-term settlement of Chinese in 
the village. Yet again, in the Fartizansk district, the Russian population of 7,000 was 
overwhelmed by 15,000 Chinese. In addition, at one collective farm near Khabarovsk 
krai, more than 100 Chinese farmers attacked local policemen, accusing them of not 
protecting their crops from thieves, and riot police had to be called in to calm the angry 
Chinese.^^
For a full collection o f documents on these agreements see Nekotorye voprosv demarkatsii rossiisko- 
kitaiskoi granitsy. 1991-1997 gg. Sfaomik state! i dokumentov (Moscow: Nezavîsîmaya gazeta, 1997); 
The Times. 10 November 1997, p. 15.
Izvestiva. 7 June 1994, p. 1.
Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 139; RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, pp. 44 and pp. 47-8.
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It is evident that the rise in the number of people crossing the border from 
China has become a m^or political and social problem in the RFE7"  ^ It was reported 
that there were no reliable figures on the number of illegal Chinese settlers in Russia, 
but by 1992, some 500,000 Chinese had began to cross the border into Russia for visits 
and trade/^ Another source stated that the number of Chinese crossing the border was 
1.38 million in 1992 and 1.76 million in 1993.^  ^ In March 1995, the figures for legal 
and illegal Chinese in Russia varied from 3 million to 5 million.^^ Far Eastern federal 
officials reported that in May 1998 approximately 100,000 to 150,000 Chinese were 
living illegally in the RFE as traders and labourers. Thousands more were on tourist or 
temporary work visas. Many Russians were concerned about this new social 
phenomenon. Ivan Fedotov, chief o f the service’s immigration directorate, said, 
‘Another 20 to 30 years of such expansion and the Chinese will become the majority. 
This may lead to territorial losses/^^ The Federal Migration Service also warned that the 
rapid influx could lead to the Chinese becoming the dominant population in parts of 
Primorskii krai and Khabarovsk krai within the next century/^
Many residents and local authorities in the RFE are discontented with the 
influx of Chinese into their regions.A lthough many benefit substantially from 
economic cooperation with the Chinese, Russians are still hostile to their southern
“Illegals’ on the Banks o f  the Amur,” Rossiiskiye vesti. 6  May 1997, p. 3, as cited in CPPSP. Vol. 
X U X , No. 19, II June 1997, p. I; Elizabeth Wîshnîck, “Prospects for the Sino-Russian Partnership: 
Views from Moscow and the Russian Far East,” The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs. Vol. XII, No. 2, 
Summer/Fall, 1998, p. 428.
RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 43.
David Kerr, “Opening and Closing the Sino-Russian Border; Trade, Regional Development and 
Political Interest in Northeast Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 48, No. 6, 1996, p. 949.
“Just Neighbours so far without Aspirations towards an Alliance,” Kommersant-Dailv. 2  March 1995, 
p. 4, as cited in CPPSP. Vol. XLVB, No. 9, 1995, p. 18.
 ^“Border Chief Warns Russia May Lose Land,” The Moscow Times. 27 May 1998, p. 4.
“Russia’s Chinese Population Grows,” Vladivostok News. No. 171, 10 July 1998, p. 1.
Guardian, 30 April 1996, p. 9.
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neighbours.®* They complain about the following:
a. the seizure of Russian privatised firms as well as real estate;
b. the lack of apartments, which are also often occupied by wealthy Chinese;
c. the corruption of the local bureaucracy by Chinese businessmen;
d. the purchase of Russian strategic raw materials at low prices;
e. the sale of fertiliser, equipment, transport and consumer goods of low 
quality;
f. the growth in the level of Chinese involvement in crime;
g. the slaughter of rare animals, as well as the famous health-giving plant 
‘Ginseng’ in the taiga;
h. a large influx of illegal Chinese workers and traders.®^
Hyer states that given the present trends, ‘The push-pull economic and
demographic pressure has resulted in new tensions along the Russian-Chinese border.
The question has been raised about the long-term national security and national integrity
in the minds of the local Russians.’®^ They are dissatisfied with the quality of Chinese
goods and the behaviour of the Chinese traders. This has resulted in an increase in anti-
Chinese sentiment within the RFE.®'*
Rabochava Tribuna wrote in similar terms concerning the number of Chinese
entering the RFE and other parts of Russia:
It was like a “storm” when the Chinese entered southern Siberia and the Far East.
About a million people have moved to Central Russia in the past year. In about two 
decades there will be a “Chinese majority.” The scientist Zhores Medvedev believes 
that, ‘it is already clear that the government is unable to effectively oppose this 
phenomenon.’**^
Lukin also suggested that one of the major side effects of cross-border 
economic cooperation was the growth of the Chinese presence in border areas, and he
Guardian. 22 April 1996, p. 8.
Shlapentokh, “Russia, China, and the Far East,” p. 315; “China and Russia Uneasy Rartners,” 
Vladivostok News. No. 171, 10 July 1998, p. 1.
^  Eric Hyer, “Dreams and Nightmares: Chinese Trade and Immigration in the Russian Far East,” The 
Journal o f East Asian Affairs. Vol. X, No, 2, Summer/Fall 1996, p. 295.
“Illegals' on the Banks o f  the Amur,” Rossnskle vesti. 6  May 1997, as cited in CPPSP. \b l. 49, No. 19, 
1997, pp. 1-3.
“Chinese Population Rises in Siberia, Far East," Vecherniv Novosibirsk. 2 February 1995, p. 3, as cited 
in FBIS-Sov-95-032. 16 February 1995, p. 45.
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anticipated fears of a Chinese ‘demographic expansion’ into the RFE.®^  As Huntington 
notes, ‘the economic dynamism of the Chinese has spilled over into Siberia and the 
RFE. It is not only Chinese businessmen who are exploring and exploiting opportunities 
there but the Korean and Japanese also/®^ Ttenin highlights the question of the Chinese 
expansion in his book Russia’s China Problem, in his view certain regions of the RFE 
(Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk krai and Amur oblast in particular) are becoming 
exclusively orientated towards the Chinese market.®® Apart from issues of cross-border 
economic co-operation between the two countries, Trenin also notes that, ‘the lack of 
clear and consistently implemented immigration policies virtually guarantees inter­
ethnic frictions that may easily lead to violent clashes between the local Russians and 
the Chinese immigrants, which in turn could escalate to an inter-state conflict between 
Russia and China.
There have been many reasons suggested for the expansion of the Chinese into 
the RFE. I will deal particularly with four in the following section. One reason given is 
the change in economic relations between the Chinese and Far Eastern border regions. 
Before 1992, Chinese regulations limited Chinese border companies that engaged in 
trade with Russian enterprises. Due to the success of border trade, these regulations 
were changed in early 1992 to allow spending of US$1 million in export trade and 100 
JV workers.^ ** Since that time, cross-border trade, particularly between the RFE and the 
Chinese province of Heilongjiang, has gradually increased. From the early 1990s, the
^  Lukin, “The Image o f China,” p. 824.
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking o f  World Order (London: 
Touchstone, 1998), p. 243.
Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s China Problem (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 1999), p. 40.
Ibid., p. 41; for a further analysis o f  the Chinese question in Russia see Galina Vrtkovskaya, Zhanna 
Zayonchkovskaya, and Kathleen Newland, “Chinese Migration into Russia,” in Shernan W. Garnett, 
(ed.), Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Rlations in a Changing Asia (Washington, DC.:
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Chinese government has granted greater economic freedom to the three cities of Heihe, 
Suifenhe and Hunchun,^* which border Russia, in order to promote trade and regional 
development. Chinese regional officials have also created certain zones in a number of 
towns along the border, to encourage Russians to shop there7^ An example of this is 
highlighted in the local paper Vladivostok News:
Suifenhe pharmacies and barbershops display signs in Chinese and Russian. Russian 
shuttle traders come with wallets foil o f one-hundred-dollar bills, ready to spend, to 
dine on exotic food and to buy cheap consumer goods to resell in the markets back 
home. The city is virtually empty when there are no Russians around, transportation 
is limited, the electricity shuts down and all the shops close. The city basically 
operates only for the Russians. According to the Far Eastern branch o f the Federal 
Customs Service, in 1996, Russian tourists and traders bought an estimated $1.5 
billion worth o f consumer goods in China. Also Vladivostok’s Institute for 
Economic Affairs and Forecasting estimated that in 1997 tourists from Primorskii 
krai spent $350 million on everything from hotels to sunglasses.”
The Chinese have also made an impression in the RFE by creating well
established Chinese markets in Primorskii krai. For instance, about 1,000 to 2,000
Chinese people live and trade in Ussurisk, which is 72 kms from the Chinese border and
the third-largest city in Primorskii krai.^ The market there has stalls and wholesale
warehouses offering goods from Harbin, Suifenhe, Mudangfiang and other cities. The
shops are very similar, selling wallpaper, fabric bouquets, calculators, sweaters.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), pp. 347-68.
SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 38.
The Chinese government granted Heihe and Suifenhe cities (both in Heilongjiang), Hunchun city (Jilin 
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opened up for forther trade with other countries. Heihe, in particular, used to be a sleepy town, almost 
unknown to outsiders, and even Chinese from outside the area had to apply for a special permit to visit it. 
But now the city has been developing rapidly in the past few years. See Xinhua. 15 June 1992 and FBIS- 
China-92-115, 15 June 1992, p. 13, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 42.
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saucepans, TVs etc7^ The living conditions of the Chinese traders in Ussurisk are 
described below:
The Chinese seldom leave the market which is like a compound surrounded by 
concrete walls and is heavily staffed by security guards. Hundreds o f men and 
women live in cargo containers, rail cars, and a so-called “hotel complex.” On the 
ground floor, the hotel is a line o f stalls, each the size o f a cargo container, with roll­
up steel doors. The rent for each shop is, 2,000 rubles a month ($323), this includes 
a tiny room upstairs for the proprietor. There is barely enough space for sleeping.
There is no running water in most rooms, one woman kept two large milk jugs, one 
for water, another for sewage. Once a week a truck comes and the residents haul 
their sewage in buckets to the truck.”
As can be seen in picture 5-1, another Chinese dominated market has opened in 
Vladivostok city centre. Border trade of this kind allows daily necessities including 
cheap Chinese consumer goods, food supplies (especially fruits and vegetables) and 
clothing to flow into Primorskii krai.^^
A good example of Russia and China’s efforts to work together for their mutual 
benefit is the construction of a three-kilometre-Iong highway bridge spanning the Amur 
river. This was a joint venture, announced in March 1993. The bridge will connect the 
city of Heihe (in the Heilongjiang province) and its neighbouring Blagoveshchensk, 
capital of Amur oblast in the RFE. On completion of the bridge, Russia and China plan 
to enhance direct trade and co-operation, and to expand other border regions^®
”  “Russia’s Chinese Population Grows,” Ibid., p. 2. 
” lbid., p. 2.
During my research visit in September 1996,1 met some Chinese traders.
“China, Russia to Build Bridge over Amur River," Xinhua. 2 March 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-1993-
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Picture 5-1; Chinese Traders at Leninskaya Square, Vladivostok, Primorskii krai
Source: I took this picture on 21 September 1996 during my research trip in 
Vladivostok, Primorskii krai.
In May 1993, the Russian-Chinese coordinating council for the construction of 
the bridge over the Amur river met in Blagoveshchensk. At this meeting, both sides 
affirmed their readiness to undertake further practical work on preparations for the 
construction of the bridge.^ In January 1994, they agreed to create a transit centre for 
goods and passengers (in what would be a free economic and trade zone) along each 
side of the proposed bridge.*"** In April 1995, experts from both sides met in Beijing to 
further discuss plans for the construction of the bridge.*"* Later, in June, when Chinese
41 ,4  March 1993, p. 5; Amurskaya pravda. 4 March 1993, p. 1.
^  “Chinese, Russian Amur Bridge Committee Meets,” Amurskaya pravda. 15 May 1993, p. 2.
The new economic zone is 10 square km o f land from each country, see “Chinese, Russian Cities in 
Link-up," Financial Times. 5 January 1994, p. 3.
“Russia, China Cooperate To Build Bridge Across Amur River,” Rosstvskive vesti. 29 March 1995, p.
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leader Li Peng visited Moscow, it was calculated that the construction of the bridge 
would cost Russia and China ^proximately US$50 million each.*"  ^ As time passes, 
continuing steps are being made towards the bridge becoming a reality. In December 
1998, total costs were estimated at US$250 million (the Russian share of the 
construction cost being US$125 million). It is estimated that the bridge will be 
completed within tour years.
A second reason for the Chinese expansion is the importing of foreign workers 
to solve the labour shortage problem. In 1988, there were 30,000 foreign workers in 
Soviet farms and factories in the Far East and since then the number has increased.*"'* A 
delegation from the Chinese province of Heilongjiang signed agreements in the summer 
of 1988 for the construction of houses, youth facilities, hotels, airports and surface 
facilities for a coal mine. Agreements were also signed for joint ventures, such as timber 
processing, concrete plants and building material plants.*"  ^In early 1992, companies in 
the RFE, with the approval of the local authorities, began to hire Chinese contract 
workers.*"*^  Between 1988 and 1993, about 1,302 cooperation agreements were signed 
and 76,000 Chinese crossed the border on the basis of this contract.*"^ In 1993 the 
Chinese constituted a third of the 30,000 contracted foreign workers in the southern 
zone of the RFE. About 85 per cent of foreign labourers are concentrated in Primorskii
3, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-06T. 7  April 1995, p. 15.
“Accord Signed on Amur River Bridge,” Segodnya. 27 June 1995, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-123. 
27 June 1995, p. 7.
For the Russian side, 10 per cent o f the cost will come from Russian banks, while 90 per cent will 
come from foreign sources. See “Bridge to China gets a sponsor,” RFEU. Vol. 8, No. 12, December 1998, 
p. 4.
Hao Yufan, “The Development o f the Soviet Far East; a Chinese Perspective,” Korea and World 
Affairs. Summer 1991, p. 239-40.
SUPAR Report. No. 6, January 1989, p. 4.
Lukin, “The Image o f China,” p. 822.
Kerr, “ Open and Closing the Sino-Russian Border,” p. 950.
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krai.*"® Also in the Jewish AO, the number of Chinese workers has gradually increased. 
In August 1999, about 600 Chinese seasonal farm workers were working in the capital 
city of the Jewish AO, Birobidzhan. In this post-Communist era after steady emigration 
to Israel and the West, only 10,000 of its 210,000 residents are Jews.*"" According to the 
Russia Far East-Siberia News, the number of Chinese workers in Primorskii krai was 
7,895 in 1994 and 8,349 in 1995, and it is still increasing,**" China clearly contributes 
the greatest percentage of foreign labour in the RFE, followed by North Korea. The 
Soviet Union contracted North Korean woikers for the development of the RFE. They 
have been involved in the timber industry since 1967 in Khabarovsk krai and also in 
Amur oblast since 1975 (North Korean labour is considered in more detail in chapter 
6).***
Thirdly, until early 1993, it was relatively easy for Chinese to enter Russia 
across the border using one of three types of passport. Diplomatic, Official or Regular. 
Chinese holding Official passports did not need to obtain a Russian visa, and because it 
was easy to obtain an Official passport fraudulently through Chinese state-owned 
companies a large number of Chinese were able to enter illegally.**  ^ Chinese traders 
entered under false pretenses and did not return to China. Due to these unforeseen 
consequences, Russia insisted that Clhna renegotiate the interstate travel agreement. 
After the Russian Parliament passed a new law on entry and exit in 1992, Russia
Won Bae Kim, “Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East,” Asian Survey. 
No. 34, Vol. 12, 1994, pp. 1064-65.
The Chinese workers, Mr Zhuang and his wife, Lizhe (a 35-year-old couple), have made about 
US$120 a month, ortwicetheir regular wage in Harbin. See New York Times. 1 August 1999, p. Y3.
Data provided by the Immigration Office in Primorskii krai as cited in Russia Far East-Siberia News. 
No. 47, 31 October 1997, pp. 5-7.
Ann C Helgeson, “Population and Labour Force,” in Allan Rodgers (ed.). The Soviet Far: 
Geographical Perspectives on Development (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 75.
“Maritime Kay to Expel Illegal PRC Visitors,” Interfax. 17 November 1993 as cited in FBIS-Sov-93- 
221, 18 November 1993, p. 9.
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abolished its official passports (leaving only diplomatic and regular). But China did not 
reciprocate, and problems continued with the Chinese use of questionable passports. 
This led Russia to place pressure on China’s formal negotiations for a new customs 
regime in February 19937 * ®
The Russian authorities also enforced regulations more strictly, in conjunction 
with the local police and border guards. In addition, the pressure of public opinion, 
especially that of regional administrations, led to a unilateral Russian decision to close 
the border. After nearly a year of further negotiations, China and Russia narrowed their 
differences on customs controls and completed a new agreement in Moscow in 
December 1993.**'* Following this agreement, in January 1994, Russia implemented 
new travel restrictions to prevent Chinese immigration. Under the terms o f this new 
regime, the official passport would be abolished and any Chinese person would require 
an invitation from a Russian counterpart to obtain a Russian visa, which could take 
months to arrange. China agreed to adopt the Russian system, which required an 
invitation letter and visa for all Chinese holders of regular passports. This took effect at 
the end of February 1994.**^
Since China’s acceptance of the 1994 visa policy, it has been reported that the 
Chinese have discovered a way to enter Russia without a visa. This alternative method 
of immigrating involves joining a Chinese tour group and then abandoning the group 
once across the border. Existing regulations allow registered Chinese tourist agencies 
and their Russian counterparts to bring Chinese tourists to the RFE for short-term, visa- 
free trips. But thousands of Chinese have simply left their tours soon after arrival, found
Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 43, 
Ibid., p. 37.
Izvestiva. 22 April 1994, p. 3.
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illegal residences and begun seeking work.**" Once again this has led regional 
authorities to adopt yet stronger measures against illegal Chinese immigrants. They 
believe that illegal immigration is not only China’s problem, but also the result of a lack 
of control on the part of the Russian government.**^ According to border guard data at 
that time, only 50 per cent of Chinese ‘tourists’ left Russia after the tour. To control this 
type of illegal immigration, Chinese tour companies are now held responsible for tour 
group members. They are obliged to pay the costs of deporting ‘drop outs’ and their 
license can be revoked for not controlling illegal Chinese people trying to enter 
Russia.**® The Russian government also imposed higher import duties on trade with 
China to control the import of Chinese products.**  ^ In 1994, the local government in 
Primorskii krai periodically arrested and repatriated illegal Chinese immigrants. Out 
of the 1,657 people caught in Primorskii krai, 75 per cent were Chinese.*^*
Moscow’s decision to impose visa restrictions on the entry of Chinese into the 
RF, and the growth of customs duties, resulted in a significant decrease in the numbers 
of Chinese entering Russia and of Chinese residents in the RFE. This also led to a 
significant decline in cross-border trade, in Chinese exports to Russia and vice versa.
In Amur oblast during the first quarter, Russian exports to China dropped by 81 per cent
Moltz, “Regional Tensions,” p. 523-.
fgor Rogachev, “Russia-CMna: Coopération in the 2 Century,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 3 
1996, p. 8.
RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 48.
South China Sunday Morning Post. 10 July 1994, p. 8,
In May 1994, there were 200 violators o f passport and visa regulations in Primorskii krai. O f these, 48 
were Chinese. More than 4,000 Chinese entered since January 1994, but in May, just over 1,000 left. See 
Izvestiva. 14 May 1994, p. 2.
Kfasnoe Znamya (Vladivostok Daily), 2  July 1994, p. 2.
According to official data released by the Chinese customs office, Russian-Chinese trade in 1994 went 
down by 30 per cent and amounted to $5.1 billion. “Russian-Chinese Trade Set to Grow this Year,” Tass. 
16 April 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-075. 19 April 1995, p. 34.
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(from US$100 million in 1993, to US$19 million in 1994)7^® The dominant partner in 
border trade with Russia - China’s Heilongjiang Province - showed a decline in trade of 
45 per cent compared to the same quarter in 19937 '^*
The deputy head of the Amur administration’s Department for Foreign 
Relations, A. A. Kuleshev, lodged a complaint with the federal authorities in relation to 
the new visa regime. He accepted that problems had arisen because of the free entry of 
foreigners into the oblast. He stated, however, that Amur oblast had lobbied Moscow 
throughout 1993 not to introduce a new visa regime. When visa regulations were 
introduced in 1994, he wanted a return to the previous visa-free system, which he 
believed had been able to create favourable conditions for Amur oblast’s cooperation 
with China. A memorandum from early 1994 shows the impact o f the new visa policy 
in Amur oblast:
Trade with China was not just a matter o f satisfying food needs, but a hvelihood for 
those engaged in the re-export o f  Chinese goods. The measures introduced by the 
federal authorities have deprived the region o f  Chinese workers and has significantly 
reduced business profits which will affect the tax paid to the city and to oblast 
budgets. The financial losses for the first quarter o f  1994 were calculated at 5 billion 
rubles for firms involved, and some 2 billion rubles in customs duties for the federal 
budget.
Later, in order to prevent further decline in the border trade and mutually 
complementary market demands, officials from the Heilongjiang province and Amur 
oblast signed a series of agreements in June 1994 in the hope of enhancing economic 
and trade relations and developing bilateral co-operation.*^^
RA Report. No 17, July 1994, p. 46,
“Dropping Volumes of Russian-Chinese Trade,” Tass, 7 July 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-1994-109, 7 
July 1994, p. 11.
Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 198.
^^®Ibid., p. 198.
The 17 agreements covered the following investment policy: the basis structure o f developing 
economic co-operation with foreign countries; exchanges in science, technology, and culture; the transit 
process; and bilateral work in offering coordination and notice. Both sides agreed to conduct all
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In contrast, local security organisations were in favour of the strict visa policy, 
showing that views on this issue varied according to region and also to occupation. 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Panov, said that other regions also welcomed the 
new visa regulations because shuttle traders and barter trade had been exhausted as a 
means of furthering economic relations, and other forms of economic cooperation were 
now needed.*^ ®
A final consequence of Chinese expansion into the RFE that I wish to highlight 
is a reported increase in crime among Chinese residents in the RFE. The Interior 
Department and the krai administration believed the cause of the growing crime rate 
was the open border with China.*^" In 1991, only 90 Chinese intruders were detained, 
and fewer than Î50 in 1992, but in the first eight months of 1993 the number reached 
200. They accounted for 80 per cent of illegal transactions and had been secretly 
entering Russia for ginseng gathering, poaching and smuggling.*^" In early 1994, 
Primorskii krai detained over 20 Chinese wild ginseng poachers in the taiga and a large 
group of smugglers hoping to avoid paying customs duty.*^ * The border guards 
discovered the poachers had with them goods to a value of about 7 million rubles. 
Chinese smugglers often tried to smuggle alcoholic beverages, drugs, clothes and shoes 
into Russia, and wool, furs, precious metals, consumer goods and wild plants back into
transactions in cash or in barter trade and to transit all related forma o f trade in cash. For full details on 
the agreements, see Heilongjiang nbao. 20 June 1994, p. 1; FBIS-Chma, 1994-125,29 June 1994, p. 12, 
as cited in RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 36.
“Parts o f Maritime Territory Have One Chinese Foreign Resident for Every Inhabitant," Izvestiva. 27 
April 1994, p. 3, as cited in CPPSP. Vol. XLVT, No. 16, 1994, p. 26.
The Chinese even organised their own criminal gangs. It was reported that they clashed with Russian 
authorities. See “Siberia and China,” Sibirskava nazeta. no. 3, 21-27 January 1994, p. 3; Peter Ferdinand, 
“Working Towards a Serious Partnership with China,” Transition. Vol. 1, No. 17, 22. September 1995, p. 
68.
“Border Violations Grow More Frequent in Far East,” Segodnya. No. 59, 30 September 1993, p. 6, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-93-189, p. 1, October 1993, pp. 14-15.
Vostok Rossii. N o 33, 18 August 1993, p. 2, as cited in RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 128.
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China.*^  ^Some Chinese illegally entered the RFE to catch endangered species, for use 
in food or in traditional Chinese medicines. In 1998, for instance. Far Eastern customs 
inspectors seized eveiything from deer antlers (worth US$400 per kilo) to $13,000 
worth of illegally harvested ginseng. Also, according to Vladimir Nesterenko, a 
biologist with the Institute of Biology and Soil Studies in Vladivostok, the Chinese 
people in Russia put a strain on the natural population of frogs, soft-shelled turtles and 
other edible species. He said, ‘The damage is increasing, because it is easier for them to 
do it from inside Russia,’*®®
Russians themselves are also involved in facilitating illegal Chinese 
immigration. Birobidzhan, located along the Amur river, is a notorious entre for illegal 
Chinese immigration. It was here that a Russian organisation smuggling Chinese into 
Russia was disbanded. To combat the problem in the region, a frve-km border zone 
along the river was established, and entry restricted to local residents and those with 
special permits.*®'* Russia has also become known as a transit centre for Chinese 
attempting to go on to Europe and the United States. Russian border guards are easily 
bribed to let illegal immigrants through the border. The US government has complained 
about the lack of cooperation from Russian authorities in tackling this problem.*®" US 
State Department specialists considered that Russia had become a new centre for 
Chinese mafia activities.*®"
In an attempt to solve Chinese crime and Russian involvement, a meeting was
RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 127.
“Russia, China Eager for Trade Growth,” Vladivostok News. 10 July 1998, No. 171, pp. 1-2.
“Russia’s Jewish Regions Sets up Border Zone with China,” Priamurskie vedomosti. 26 April 1994, p. 
2; la ss , B  April 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-1994-71, 13 April 1994, pp. 18-19.
Merle lin d a  Wolin, “From China to America Via Moscow,” The New York Ernes. 25 August 1993, p. 
A15.
i3fi «y g  See Russia as Conduit for illegal Chinese Migrants,” Komsomot’skava pravda. 22 June 1994, p. 
2 .
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held between Russian and Chinese border guards in August 1992.*®^  After frequent 
contact, in February 1995, each side of the border delegations met in Khabarovsk krai to 
sign an agreement which allowed border guards of both countries the right to stop the 
Illegal transportation of weapons, drugs, hard currency and other goods across the 
border. As part of this agreement, the Chinese government supported the use of the 
Russian law against illegal Chinese immigrants and criminals.*®® In August 1995, the 
two sides met again to consider the issue. According to the Federal Border Service’s 
international treaty administration, more than 500 border violators were detained at 
checkpoints on the Russian-Chinese border within the first seven months of 1995. 
About 50 weapons were also confiscated.*®"
Although the agreements were successful, the Primorskii krai police 
periodically reported illegal Chinese residents and continued to arrest Chinese 
smugglers.*'*" The border service in the RFE deported more than 13,000 Chinese 
between 1994 and 1998, including 3,000 in the first five months of 1998.*'** Since this 
time, Izvestiva has reported a drop in the Chinese population within the RFE, bringing 
with it a fall in the number of illegal Chinese residents.*'*  ^ According to the Border 
Patrol in Blagoveshchensk (Amur oblast), due to the economic crisis of August 1998, 
the number of people crossing the border each day dropped from 2,500 to less than 250. 
Also in Primorskii krai, the Grodekovskii railroad crossing has seen the daily flow of
Krasnaya zvezda. 21 August Î992, p. 2,
“Border Agreement Signed with Chinese Region,” Tass. 11 February 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95- 
029, 13 February 1995, p.
“Russian and China wiU have a Friendly Border,” Kommersant-Dailv. 26 August 1995, p. 4, as cited 
in CPPSP. Vol. XLVn, No. 34,1995, p. 26.
Izvestiva. 27 December 1995, p. 1.
The Moscow Times. 27 May 1998, p. 4.
Izvestiva. 30 June 1999, p. 3.
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tourists into China shrink from 550 to SS.*'*®
5.3: Japan and the Russian Far East 
5.3.1: The Southern Kuril Islands
Pressures on the Russian government from the military, from local and other nationalist 
groups, and from public opinion have prevented a policy that might have contemplated 
returning the territory to Japan. In this context, T will analyse the Kuril situation by 
looking at the following three areas: the historical background, the socio-economic 
situation and the development of the relationship between Russia and Japan (through 
visa-free exchange visits, negotiations on Japanese fishing activities near the Kuril 
islands, and joint economic activity). Finally, I will examine the reasons why Russians 
continue to find it difficult to transfer ownership of the islands to Japan.
As can be seen in map 5-2, geographically the territories in question comprise 
the following four islands: Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Hobomai group of 
islets. These islands cover an area of 10,500 square kilometres. The first two, Etorofu 
and Kunashiri, are the most southerly of the Kurils. These stretch for about a thousand 
kilometers between Hokkaido and the Kamchatka Peninsula. The remaining two, 
Shikotan and Habomais, lie off the northeastern coast of Hokkaido.*'*'*
From a constitutional point of view, the first international document 
concerning the possession of the disputed islands was the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855.
“Foreign, Trade,” RFEU. Vol. 8, No. 10, October 1998, p. 3; for a further comprehensive discussion o f  
Russian and Chinese cross border relations see Elizabeth Wishnick, “Chinese Perspective on Cross- 
Border Relations,” in Garnett, (ed.). Rapprochement or Rivalry?, pp. 227-56.
For a detailed discussion o f  the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan, see Andrew 
Mack and Martin O’Hare, “Moscow-Tokyo and the Northern Territories Dispute,” Asian Survev. Vol. 30, 
No. 4, April 1990, pp. 380-94; Vitaly Gaidar, “The South Kuriles: A  Problem Awaiting Solution,” Far 
Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 6 ,1994, pp. 43-52.
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This recognised Japanese sovereignty over the four Southern Kurile i s l a n d s . I n  1875 
the Treaty of St Petersburg was signed, through this Russia conceded the islands to 
Japan in return for Russian control over the larger island of Sakhalin. In 1905, after the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese regained control over the southern half 
of Sakhalin. At the end of World War II, under the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, 
Japan handed Sakhalin and the all of the Kuril islands over to the Soviet Union.
Map 5-2; The Southern Kuril Islands
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Yu. V. Georgiev, corap., Kurilv-ostrova v okeane problem (Moscow; ROSSPEN, 1998), pp. 88-93. 
Ibid., pp. 115-117; John J. Stephen, The Kuril Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 245; Itogi. 3 
December 1996, p. 31.
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The Soviet Union prepared a draft peace treaty with Japan for the 1951 San 
Francisco peace conference, during which Japan claimed the four disputed islands, 
Later, in October 1956 the Soviet Union offered a Joint Declaration between the USSR 
and Japan. Under the terms of this declaration, Khrushchev sought to establish full 
diplomatic relations between the two countries and open up the possibility for possible 
economic co-operation. He promised the return of the two southern islands, Shikotan 
and the Habomai islands, to Japan after the conclusion of a formal peace treaty. 
During his visit to Japan in January 1972,^^° Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
again reinforced Khrushchev’s proposal. Japan did not accept the offers of 1956 or 
1972, but has consistently demanded the return of the four Kuril islands before signing a 
peace treaty with Russia.
The current Russian Constitution stipulates that any territorial changes in 
Russia are only possible on the basis of the expression of voters in an all-Russian 
referendum. However, on 22 August 1992, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail 
Poitoranin noted that President Boris Yeltsin and his government generally ‘adhered to
Boris Stavinskii, deputy editor o f  Far Eastern Affairs, found the peace treaty draft and other related 
documents at the Russian Foreign Minister Archives. He said the Soviet side withdrew it one month 
before the start o f  the San Francisco peace conference in September 1951. See RA Report, No. 16, 
January 1994, p. 39.
V. Kozhevnikov, “TerritoriaFnyi vopros k 40-ietiyu sovmestnoi Sovetsko-yaponskoi deklaratsii 1956 
soda,” Rossiva i ATR (Vladivostok), No. 3, 1996, pp. 48-9.
5Ü “{Kozyrev Holds News Conference,” Tass. 21 March 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-056. 23 March 
1992, p. 26.
He followed the principle o f Article 9, Joint Declaration o f  the USSR and Japan in October 1956. See 
V. K, Zilanov, A. A.Koshkin, T. A.Latyshev; A.Va. Plotnikov, and Ï. A. Senchenko, Russkie Kurily: 
Istoriya i sovremennosF (Moskva: SAMPO, 1995), p. 131.
Japan has maintained the plan to solve the territorial dispute in a two-phase process: the proposal calls 
for Russia to initially return the two small islands at the conclusion o f the peace treaty and also stipulate 
in tlie document the timing o f  a return to Japan o f  the two larger islands (Etorofu and Kunashiri). See 
“Miyazawa on Kurils,” Moscow Radio World Service. 23 March 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-056. 23 
March 1992, p. 27; Japan Times. 18 April 1992, p. 1; "^Japanese Envoy Visits Sakhalin for First Time,” 
Kyodo (Tokyo), IQ October 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-195. 10 October 1995, p. 37.
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the principle of the 1956 treaty.’ Two days later, according to Yuri Petrov, head of 
the Russian presidential administration, ‘intensive consultations [were] under way on 
the territorial problem in Russia and Japan, but there [has not been] not any final 
decision yet/^ "^^  In mid 1995, according to sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry and 
in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, progress was made in drafting the Russian and 
Japanese peace treaty. Since then, there has been continued consultation between the 
two countries concerning this matter. However, no peace treaty has yet been concluded 
and the disputed islands remain under Russian jurisdiction.
Now I turn to look at the current socio-economic situation in the Kuril islands. 
The population on the four islands has been decreasing for several years in the main due 
to a slump in the seafood processing industry and the deteriorating living standards. 
This acute problem has been aggravated by food and energy shortages on the islands.
In April 1998, when Sergei Yastrzhembsky, deputy head of Yeltsin’s administration, 
visited the islands, the islanders complained about their deplorable living conditions.
The following is a description of life on the island of Etorofu, highlighting the 
worsening economic situation in the Kurils in the 1990s;
Burevestnrk airport on Etoroftt was sometimes closed for a week or more because o f  
fog and rain. The island has no paved roads except on its army base. The 5kms 
journey from Burevestnik to Kuril, the main fishing village o f  8,000, requires a 4-
RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 46.
At that time, Yuri Petrov was dealing with the agenda for the forthcoming visit to  Japan by the 
president o f Russia. This was the central question o f  his meeting with Japan’s  deputy foreign affairs 
minister. See “Yeltsin Aide Holds Preparatory Talks in Japan,” Tass. 24 August 1992, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-92-165,25 August 1992, p. 13.
“General Briefs Japanese Symposium on Relations,” Tass, 19 March 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92- 
055, 20 March 1992, p. 7; “Certain Progress’ in Drafting Treaty with Japan,” Tass. 4 May 1995, as cited 
in FBIS-Sov-95-086. 4 Mav 1995, p. 15.
The fullest discussion o f Soviet and Russian relations with Japan, from Brezhnev to  Yeltsin, is Hiroshi 
Kimura’s Distant Neighbours. 2  vols (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
“Economic Crisis Prompts Mass Exodus From Kuril Islands,” Tass. II June 1993, as cited in FBIS- 
S o v -9 3 -in , n  June 1993, p. 48; Peter Rutland, “Struggle over the Kuril Islands,” Transition. Vol. 1, No. 
17, 22 September 1995, p. 17.
“Yehsitt Rep Visits Islands,” Vladivostok News. No. 166, 30 April 1998, p. 1.
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wheel drive vehicle and takes an hour. The road goes through a rushing stream, past 
old Japanese bunkers, onto beaches littered with rusting shipwrecks and into green 
hills roamed by brown bears. Kuril has a small hospital and a school, no restaurants, 
one bar and a roach-infested barracks-like guesthouse frequented by volcano 
researchers and weather-bound pilots. Wooden planks serve as sidewalks and 
chickens scamper about the courtyards o f  the fishermen’s cottages.
Fishing is the major industry on all the islands. It was reported in December 
1992 that the fishing industry on the islands was comparable to that on ‘Kamchatka, the 
fish shop of the country.’ The fishing grounds in 1992 annually produced up to 22 per 
cent of Russian fish, worth about 32 billion rubles. However, due to some factories 
facing financial difficulties, the fish industry has declined. For instance, in 1993, the 
fish factory on Kunashiri was unable to pay for diesel fuel delivered by a tanker and the 
local bank refused to give an easy-term credit to local fish processors. A similar 
situation rose on Iturup and Shikotan. The fish processing company, Ostrovnoi, used 
to have six factories on Shikotan island, which heavily depends on fish processing. By 
1993, two factories completely closed down, and since October 1993 the remaining four 
factories have ceased to operate/^^ While the situation today remains relatively 
unchanged, the factories have endeavoured to improve their lot through government and 
local support, joint ventures through attracting foreign investment.
Local and government officials implemented a series of programmes for the 
purpose of coping with their economic difficulties. On 8 July 1992, the Sakhalin oblast 
administration adopted a decision, ‘On urgent measures for stabilisation of the social
Japan Times. 12 September 1992, p. 67.
“Kuril’s Contributions to Economy,” Moscow TV. 14 October 1991, as cited in FBlS-Sov-91-201, 17 
October 1991, p. 74.
Tass. & December 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-237. 9 December 1992, p. 5.
“Emergency Declared on Disputed Kuril Island,” Tass, 5 April 1993; Japan Times. 7 April 1993, as 
cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 155.
Nofauo Arai and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Russian Far East in Russo-Japanese Relations,” in Akaha 
(ed.), Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East, p. 179.
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and economic situation of the Kuril i s l a n d s . A  decree on socio-economic 
development of the Kurils was signed by President Boris Yeltsin on 2 December 
1 ^ 9 2  165 Yhis involved the establishment of a special economic zone for the Kuril 
islands and permitted the leasing of land to foreign investors for up to 99 years. This 
decree also promised to provide subsidies and social benefits among other privileges.
On 17 December 1993 the Federal Programme of Socio-economic Development for the 
Kuril Islands was approved by the President of the Council of Ministers, and was to run 
until the year 2000.^^  ^Not all these plans, however, have been carried forward and most 
of the federal programme has remained merely an idea, due mainly to lack of funds.
Socio-economic conditions in the Kuril islands worsened in the wake of an 
earthquake in October 1994.^^  ^ The earthquake swept away the already poor 
infrastructure, leaving more than 60 per cent of residential buildings in Shikotan 
completely destroyed/™ The earthquake caused twelve deaths, widespread injuries and 
homelessness, and considerable material loss. Three days after this disaster, the Russian 
government allocated 100 billion rubles for relief measures in the region/^^ One of the
Sovetskti Sakhalin. 21 August 1992, p. 1.
Rossiiskaya gazeta. 23 December 1992.
The Supreme Soviet approved a plan to develop the Kuril islands. The plan envisaged promoting the 
processing industry using such resources as fisheries, and developing the continental shelf as well as the 
tourist industry. The plan was estimated to cost 92 billion rubles and U S$2.1 billion during the first 2 
years. See “Draft Development Plan,” Kyodo. 26 October 1992, as cited in FBïS-Sov-92-210. 29 October 
1992, pp. 49-50; Yeltsin approved the draft on 17 November 1992 and finally issued a decree in 
December. See “Draft Edict Approves Leasing o f  Kuril Islands Land," Kommersant-Dailv. 2 December 
1992, pp. 1-2, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-235. 7 December 1992, pp. 14-15.
The Federal Programme o f  Socioeconomic Development for the Kuril Islands o f  17 December 1993 is 
a Council o f  Ministers resolution in Sobranie aktov Prezidenta i PraviteFstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii. no. 
51, 1993, item 5002.
RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 66; P. Minakir, “Russian Far East: The History o f  Reform,” 
P a l’niv Vostok Rossii (Vladivostok!. No. 1,1998, p. 19.
“Japanese Officials on Kuril Economic Proposal," Kyodo (Tokyo), 12 October 1994, as cited in FBIS-  
Sov-94-197, 12 October 1994, p. 8.
“Japanese Boat Sunk as Russia Seeks Disaster Aid,” Izvestiya. 7 October 1994, p. 3, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-94-196, 11 October 1994, p. 19.
The Japanese government also decided to co-operate with the Russian government in the relief 
operation. Japan told Russia it would offer humanitarian assistance to the islands’ residents. See
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most unfortunate consequences of the earthquake was the exodus of residents from the 
affected islands. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Demurin, more 
than 10,000 residents of the southern Kurils off Hokkaido applied to move to Sakhalin 
or other ports of Russia/™
5,3.2: Development of Relations between the Kuril Residents and Japan
There has not yet been an agreement over ownership of the disputed islands between 
Russia and Japan, however, there have been developments in the following three areas: 
firstly, in a visa-free exchange visit programme, secondly, in the continuing negotiations 
to provide safety for Japanese fishermen around the Kuril islands, and thirdly Russian 
proposal for joint economic activities with Japan on the islands.
As mentioned previously, Gorbachev took a somewhat flexible stance with 
regard to Tokyo’s claim on the southern Kuril islands. On 20 April 1991, he visited 
Japan and signed a Soviet-Japan Joint Communiqué with Japanese Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu. In recognition of the special status of the islands, the Gorbachev 
govermnent proposed to establish a visa free exchange policy between Japan and the 
islands/™ Following this, in April 1992, a group of 19 Russian residents of the disputed 
islands returned home after a six-day visa-free visit to Japan. The group included 
administrators of the islands, journalists, pensioners and fishery industry workers from
“Japanese To Help in Kuril Islands R elief Efforts,” Moscow Radio Moscow. 7 October 1994, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-94-196. II October 1994, p. 20, A Japanese diplomat pointed out, “Even though Japan’s aid is 
not particularly big in terms o f volume, Tokyo’s readiness to grant it is more important to us.” See 
“Foreign Ministry on Aid for Kurils,” Interfax. 10 October 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-94-196, 11 
October 1994, p. 20.
“Spokesman Refutes Japanese Reports on Kuril Islanders,” Moscow Radio Moscow. 14 October 1994, 
as cited in FBIS-Sov-94-200. 17 October 1994, p. 18.
Gorbachev stated that the question o f who rightfully owned the four disputed islands should be 
discussed in a dialogue between the two governments. The visa-free visit programme was the first step in 
a bold diplomatic initiative between the two countries. Sergei V. Chugrov, “Russia and Japan: Drifting in
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Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. The visitors were the first residents of the islands to 
enter Japan without visas/™
On his visit to Japan in October 1993,^™ Yeltsin signed 18 documents with 
Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa Morthiro. These included the Tokyo Declaration on 
Russian-Japanese relations and the Declaration on Prospects for Trade, Economic, 
Scientific and Technical Relations between the Russian Federation and Japan. Yeltsin 
also supported exchange programmes for the residents of the islands.™  ^ On 11 May
1994, the first group of Japanese people left for the Kuril islands in accordance with the 
visa-free exchange programme. Tass reported that the group consisted of 48 people: 24 
former Japanese inhabitants of the Kuril Islands; 9 representatives of the national 
movement for the return of the ‘northern territories’; and 15 journalists. On 4 May
1995, Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, visited Japan and stressed at a news
Opposite Directions,” Transition. Vol. 1, No. 17, 22 September 1995, p. 13.
Japan Times. 28 April 1992, p. 2.
After the postponement o f  Yeltsin’s September 1992 visit, he rescheduled his trip to Japan to October 
1993 due to a serious argument over the disputed islands in the Russian Parliament. See “Parliament 
Official Dismisses Ado Over Japan Trip,” Teleradiokompaniva Ostankino Television First Programme 
Network. 13 September 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-178. 14 September 1992, p. 14.
176 ujg Docirmentsto be Signed,” Tass. 12 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-196. 13 October 1993, 
p. 11. Regarding the territorial issue, at the news conference in Tokyo, Yeltsin commented, “a definitive 
solution to this question in relations with Japan can only be reached on the basis o f  developing bilateral 
relations and bringing the two peoples closer together.” See “Yeltsin Discusses Territorial Issue at News 
Conference,” Tass. 13 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-196. 13 October 1993, p. 14. The Tokyo 
Declaration states that territorial disputes should be settled on the basis o f  law and justice. Yeltsin 
confirmed that Russia was the legal heir of all the Soviet Union’s agreements with Japan. Both agreed to 
respect past treaties and an international agreement was signed between the two countries including the 
1956 Japan-Soviet joint declaration in Moscow which promised to hand over two o f the four islands after 
the signing o f  a peace treaty. See “Yeltsin, Hosokawa Sign ‘Tokyo Declaration’,” Tass. 13 October 1993, 
as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-196. 13 October 1993, p. 12; “Holds News Conference,” Moscow Ostankino 
Television First Channel Network. 13 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-196. 12 October 1993, p. 
16.
Tokyo Declaration o f  October 1993, document 68, in Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 5, 1993, pp. 3-5.
During their stay on the Kunashiri island, the Japanese guests met local inhabitants and visited a 
secondary school and several enterprises. Like the previous groups o f Japanese guests, they lived in the 
homes o f local citizens. See “Japanese Visit South Kurils Without \4sas,” Tass. 11 May 1994, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-94-091. p. 10.
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conference that both sides had agreed to discuss in detail the expansion of visa-free 
exchanges/™
Discussion over visa-free exchanges brought to the surface the issue of 
Japanese fishing rights in waters surround the Kuril islands. As negotiations over 
fishing rights continued, so too conflicts persisted between Japanese fishermen and 
Russian border guards/^^ Russians fired on Japanese fishing vessels in the vicinity of 
the Kuril islands in a series of incidents that led to several deaths and arrests among the 
Japanese. On 11 March 1993, a Russian helicopter fired six warning flares in the 
direction of Japanese fishing boats near the Kunashiri island. Gennadiy Dolin, head of 
administration for the Kuril District in Sakhalin oblast, observed ‘six Japanese fishing 
vessels were spotted catching fish at the island’s northern extremity, two of the ships 
were fishing too close to the shore (within 3 miles of Russia’s zone). After the warning, 
flares were fired, the Japanese vessels left the area and the incident did not develop any 
fu r t h e r . Ano th e r  two shooting incidents occurred in the region of the Etorofu 
island/™
On 28 December 1993 Grigoriy Karasin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, pointed out ‘the number of violations of the Russian maritime frontier by 
Japanese ships for illegal fishing has not decreased over recent years. There were 7,558 
violations in 1991, 7,932 in 1992 and 7,690 in 1993.’ ™^ In March 1994, Sevodnva
“Comments on Results o f  Visit to Japan,” Tass. 4 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-043. 6 March 
1995, p. II.
“Japan Protests Shelling o f Schooners OfFKurils,” Tass. 6 April 1995, as cited in FBTS-Sov-95-066. 6 
April 1995, p. 15.
“Helicopter Fires Flares at Japanese Boats Near Kurils,” Interfax. 11 March 1993, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-93-047, 12 March 1993, p. 4.
“Incidents Explained,” Krasnava Zvezda. II March 1993, p. 3, as cited m FBIS-Sov-93-047 ,12  March 
1993, pp. 4-5.
“Comments on POW’s, Karabakh, Kurils," Interfax. 28 December 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93-248, 
29 December 1993, pp. 3-4.
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reported that 80 Japanese fishing vessels had entered Russian territorial waters in the 
vicinity of Kunashiri Island between 21 and 22 January 1994/^ After a series of similar 
incidents, on 4 April 1994 the mayor of the Southern Kuril District, Nikolai Pokidin, 
proposed that Japanese fishermen be granted the right to engage in commercial activity 
in the waters surrounding the disputed islands, on a compensatory basis (payment of a 
fishing fee)/™ However, as Kimura has noted, this raised the question of what form 
compensatory payments would take; Japan opposed the Russian proposal on the 
payment of fishing fees, and instead proposed payment should be in the form of 
economic aid/™ On 6 October 1994, the Commander of the Russian Border Guards 
again reported the illegal entry of Japanese fishing boats into Russian territorial waters 
for the purpose of poaching.
Tn late October 1994, Moscow and Tokyo exchanged views on the Russian 
coastguard attacks on Japanese fishing boats in the Kuril island waters. A bilateral treaty 
was discussed^™ and in November, Moscow and Tokyo began negotiations on the safe 
passage of Japanese fishing vessels near the islands/™ In March 1995, negotiations that 
would permit the Japanese to fish around the southern Kuril islands actually began. 
Before a settlement was reached, in August 1996 another fishing incident occurred in 
which two Japanese schooners off the Kuril islands were fired at by a Russia border
“Japanese Fishermen Again Intrude Into Russian Territorial Waters,” Sevodnva. 31 March 1994, p. 1, 
a& cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVI, No. 13, 1994, p. 24.
Izvestiya, 8 April 1994,
Hiroshi Kimura, “Primakov’s Offensive; A  Catalyst in Stalemated Russo-Japanese Relations?,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1997, p. 372.
The commander reported one fishing boat later sank but none o f its crewmembers were rnjured. See 
“Officials Comment on Fishing on Boat,” Moscow Radio Moscow. 7 October 1994, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-94-196, 11 October 1994, p. 20,
“Soskovets, Japanese Official Discuss Relations,” Kyodo (Tokyo), 26 October 1994, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-94-207,26 October 1994, p. 9.
Kimura, “Primakov’s Offensive,” p. 372.
“Japan Calls Kozyrev’s Visit ‘Substantive,” Tass. 7 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-044. 7
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patrol boat, wounding two fishermen. According to the Russian government, the 
incident was the eighth case of Japanese entry into Russian waters in 1996.™^  Despite 
this fact, in late July 1997, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto claimed that 
fishing co-operation in the Kuril islands had improved during bilateral relations. 
Subsequent meetings to negotiate fishing regulations in the Kuril area have taken place 
and both sides look closer to signing an agreement, although some differences still
. 192remain.
After more than two years and thirteen negotiating sessions, the two countries 
finally signed a new bilateral fishing agreement on 21 February 1998. According to its 
regulations, Japanese fishermen were allowed access to previously prohibited areas, 
within the bounds of two restrictions: in the number of vessels and the volume of catch 
permitted. During 1998, Japanese fishermen were permitted forty-five fishing vessels 
to catch around 2,230 tons of fish in these allocated areas. It was decided that Japan 
would pay a total of 35 million yen as fees. The Japanese government intended to 
allocate an additional 240 million yen in furtherance of the agreement and possibly 
make multi-million investments into the fishing industry in the future.™"*
Apart from the two issues mentioned above, negotiations for joint economic 
activities on the disputed islands continue. When Yeltsin visited Japan in January 1990 
as a member of the USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies, he emphasised that
March 1995, p. 13.
“Russian Border Guards Injure Japanese Fishermen in Kurils,” Vladivostok News. No. 14, 4 
September 1996, p. 2.
“Japanese Prime Minister Announces New Policy Towards Russia,” Izvestiya. 26 July 1997, p. 3, as 
cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLIX, No. 30, 1997, p. 23.
There are two unrestricted areas: (a) o ff the minor Kurils to the ocean, where the Japanese will be 
allowed to catch 130 tons o f  octopus; (b) o ff Kunashir island in the Sea o f  Okhotsk, where the Japanese 
will be permitted to catch 2,100 tons o f  Alaska pollock, and flounder, Pacific cod, and some other species. 
See “Russian View on new Bilateral Fishing Agreement with Japan,” RKEU, Vol. S, No 4, April 1998, p. 
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territorial issues could not be solved immediately and must take account of Soviet and 
Japanese public opinion. He proposed a five-stage plan in which (in the third stage) he 
mentioned the creation of Japanese and Soviet joint enterprises. Yeltsin proposed that 
this plan should not be resolved for another 15-20 years.™  ^ Later in April 1990, 
Gorbachev also proposed joint economic activity with foreign enterprises on the islands. 
These, in turn, would be involved in joint ventures on territories owned by Russian Free 
Economic Zones (FEZs). After the earthquake in the Kuril islands in early October 
1994, Russia officially proposed to Japan a plan to set up a FEZ. This, however, was 
rejected by Japanese Foreign Minister Yobei Kono. The head of the Japanese foreign 
policy department stated that ‘We cannot accept any proposal which proceeds from the 
premise that the disputed islands are under Russian jurisdiction.’™^
Russia has continued in its attempts to expand economic relations with 
Japan, Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov visited Tokyo in November 1996, and 
made another proposal for Russo-Japanese joint economic development in the islands. 
He suggested that joint economic activities could be conducted in areas such as fishing, 
fish processing, development of infrastructure for tourism and improvement of the 
transportation system on the islands.*™ in August 1998, Sakhalin Governor, Igor
Rossttskaya Gazeta. 23 October Î998, p, 4.
Yeltsin’s five-stage solution; (1) official recognition that a problem exists and the reshaping o f public 
opinion to open the way for a settlement. This would take 2 to  3 years; (2) demilitarisation o f  the islands 
(may take 5 to 7 years); (3) declare the islands as a free enterprise zone open to Japan. Japan will be 
granted the most favoured partner status (3 to 5 years); (4) the signing o f  a peace treaty with Japan, This 
involves a concession on Japan’s part since it will have to sign a peace treaty without getting the islands 
back. (These 4 stages will take 15 to 20 years); (5) allow a new generation o f politicians to work out a 
solution. See STJPAR Report. No. 9, July 1990, p, 50; Robert Legvold, “Soviet Policy in East Asia,” The 
Washington Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 140.
M. Valencia (ed.). The Russian Far East in Transition: Opportunities for Regional Economic 
Cooperation (Boulder; Westview Press, 1995), pp. 42, 77 and p. 211.
“ Japan Rejects South Kuril Economic Zone Plan,” Krasnava Zvezda. 15 October 1994, p. 2, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-94-201,18 October 1994, p. 8.
Donaldson and Nogee, The Foreign Policv o f  Russia, p. 250.
The visit was reported in Diplomaticheskii vestnik. no. 12, 1996, p. 26.
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Farkhutdinov, and Hokkaido Governor, Tstsuya Hori, agreed on a joint exploration of 
the Kuril island volcanoes/**** Later, in November, they signed a friendship and 
economic collaboration agreement in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. During the meeting, the two 
Governors discussed the energy problem in the Kuril islands. The Japanese side hoped 
to create a geothermal energy system on the islands.^* At the same time, Moscow 
offered Tokyo the opportunity to create a ‘special district’ in the Kuril islands with a 
view to building joint projects, as its option for the settlement of the territorial 
dispute.^ **^  A concrete agreement has not yet been reached, however according to 
Izvestiya in January 1999, the two countries’ Foreign Ministers have discussed joint 
economic activity in the islands.^ **^
5.3.3: Obstacles to the Settlement of the Kuril Islands Ownership
The Kuril islands are of importance to the RFE for economic reasons, such as fishing 
and access to ports. As mentioned previously, even though the industry has declined, 
many residents on the islands are still involved primarily in fishing. The abundance of 
fish in the area has also attracted many Japanese workers from Hokkaido during the 
summer fishing season.™'* The disputed islands contain the largest fishing enterprise in 
the Far East and a unique reserve in early 1990s they fffovided approximately 1.1 
million tons of fish and marine products.^ **^  According to the calculations of the Russian 
Federation State Fishery Committee, the fishing industry in the RFE stands to lose
“Sakhalin and Hokkaido to Sign Agreement,” Vladivostok News. No. 175,4 September 1998, p. 2.
At a meeting, oil and gas projects on Sakhalin island were the priority for cooperation between 
Sakhalin and Hokkaido. See Sakhalin Governor, Igor Farkhutdinov, “Hokkaido, Sakhalin Governors Sign 
Pact,” Vladivostok News. No. 180, 24 November 1998, p. 2.
Izvestiya. 4 November 1998, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 1.
Mack and O’Hare, “Moscow-Tokyo,” p. 380.
“Kuril Population Appeals to Russia and Japan,” Tass 16 September 1991, as cited in FBIS-Sov-91-
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between US$1 and US$2 billion a year if the Kuril islands are transferred to Japan. The 
necessary loss of this valuable industry constitutes a major obstacle to any proposal of 
the islands being completely returned to Japan. In 1994, the Russian Cabinet discussed 
the islands’ Social and Economic Development Flan, which encompasses development 
on Sakhalin, including the Kuril islands, from 1995 through to the year 2000, According 
to the plan, approximately US$8 billion in additional revenues would be earned every 
year if the fish caught in the Kuril waters were processed and exported.™  ^Russia has 
also allowed Russian fishermen to transport their fish and other marine products to 
Hokkaido (Japan), to sell at a profit. The Russian Far East Update reported that 
Hokkaido ports were busy with Russian fishing vessels, bringing a significant source of 
revenue to this northern territory. In 1995, approximately 3,000 Russian vessels docked 
at ports in Hokkaido. These vessels had an average of 10 sailors per ship and made a 
profit of approximately US$1,000 per sailor.™^
Besides the fishing industry, the Kurils have planned to attract foreign trade 
and business to develop their own economy. In January 1992 First Deputy Chairman of 
the Russian government, Gennadii Burbulis, endorsed the proposal of Sakhalin oblast to 
‘include the Kurilsk, Severo-Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk ports of Sakhalin oblast in the 
service of regular international maritime passengers and freight communication.’™^ 
Russia also granted a Hong Kong development company, ‘Carlson and Caplan Ltd.’ a 
50-year lease of nearly 300 hectares o f land on Shikotan island on 4 September 1992.™^
181, 18 September 1991, p. 6.
Konstantin Sarkisov, “The Northern Territories Issue after Yeltsin’s Re-election: Obstacles to a 
Resolution from a Russian Perspective,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 30, No. 4, 
December 1997, pp. 359-40.
RFELT, VoL YE, No. I, January 1997, p. 10.
Svobodnvi Sakhalin. 29 January 1992, p. 3, as cited in SUFAR Report No. 13, July 1992, p. 53.
The company was permitted to build a recreation complex, consisting of hotels, casinos, a cycling 
track, horseback riding, among other facilities. “Hong Kong Leases Section o f Kuril Island,” Tass. 11
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This contract was met with strong opposition from Japan, who claimed they would 
annul the deal when they recovered the island and would demolish the complex at the 
expense of the Hong Kong firm. Due to this threat, the company decided to shelve the 
project/*** The Chairman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Sergey Yastrzhemhskiy, was 
doubtful about the legality of the Russians development plan, but experts from the State 
Legal Department of the Russian Federation insisted that officials (in the Sakhalin and 
the South Kuril region) who signed the lease agreement, were acting within their 
authority.^**
The Kuril islands are also valued for their military importance. Although since 
the end of the Cold War, some troops have been withdrawn from the islands, they are 
still considered important as a guarantee of forward air-defence screen and ice-free 
access for Russian submarines from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean.^™ Tn 
addition, the two largest islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri, provide access to and from the 
Sea of Okhotsk, where a part of the Russian nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBNs) fleet is stationed/*^ This is one of the main reasons why the 
Russian Federation has refused the transfer of the islands to Japan.
Gorbachev, during his visit to Tokyo in April 1991, was the first to state that 
Soviet troops would soon withdraw from the Kuril Islands. The second phase of 
Yeltsin’s five-stage plan also included demilitarisation of the islands. Yeltsin expressed 
his intention to remove all Russian troops from the islands, except for border guards.
September 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-178. 14 September 1992, p. 13.
“Kuril Plan Abandoned,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 5 November 1992, p. 12.
“Further on Shikotan Island Dispute,” Interfax. 18 September 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-183. 21 
September 1992, p. 22.
“South Kurils Handover Termed Security Risk,” Krasnava zvezda. 22 July 1992, p. 3, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-92-141. 22 July 1992, pp. 16-17.
Andrei Krivtsov, “Russia and the Far East,” International Affairs (Moscow), January 1993, pp. 77-84.
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Although the original timetable for troop withdrawal was delayed for various reasons, 
the plan for demilitarisation continued. In October 1991, Soviet Foreign Minister Boris 
Pankin stated that the Soviet Union would withdraw 30 per cent of Soviet troops 
stationed on the islands (comprising about 7,000 solders). However, by 1992, this had 
not been achieved, and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in his visit to Japan in March 
of the same year, again confirmed that Russia would cut its troops following Pankin’s 
plan/*"* In October 1993, Yeltsin also promised to withdraw some of the remaining 
Russian troops (between 3,500 and 10,000 men).^*  ^There has been strong opposition to 
Yeltsin’s plan, however, among the so-called military-patriotic groups/*^ fn October 
1994, the Russian Federation Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, visited Yuzhno- 
Sakhalinsk, where he stated, ‘Russian troops have been, are, and will remain in the 
Kurils,’ and he also stressed that ‘special attention is devoted to the Far Eastern military 
district and [to] the Pacific Fleet ensuring Russia’s security.’ *^^
In addition to the above economic and military considerations^ currently 
political reasons are also at the forefront of the issue. In early September 1992, the 
Japan Times reported that the new governor of Sakhalin, Evgenii Krasnoyarov, had 
proposed the abandonment of any attempt to resolve the territorial dispute between 
Russia and Japan, He stated that it should be left to future generations, and also 
suggested that the issue could not be resolved until the gap between Russia and Japan 
had narrowed, in terms of living standards. According to press commentators, this
“Ends Visit to Japan,” Tass. 22 March 1992, as cited in FBIS-Sov-92-056, 23 March 1992, p. 28; 
Kyodo, 20 March 1992, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 55.
215 «Yeltsin Announces Withdrawal o f  Troops from Kurils,” Tass. 13 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-Sov- 
93-196', p. 14.
Zilanov, Koshkin, Latyshev, Plotnikov, and Senchenko, Russkive Kurilv. p. 152.
217 «Gi-achev Says Troops to Remain in Kurils," Tass, 24 October 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-94-205. 24 
October 1994, p. 35.
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message was prompted from fear that the Russian islanders would opt to move to 
wealthier Japan. An editor of the local newspaper, Krasnvi Mavak, said some residents 
anticipated an economic boom if Japan regained the islands, but the vast majority were 
against handing over the islands/*^ Tn addition, when former Russian Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Khabarovsk krai in August 1993, he said he would 
welcome Japanese visitors to the islands, with the hope of further exchanges between 
the Kuril islanders and Japan^*^ However, he told reporters that ‘as long as the present 
Russian cabinet exists, we will never hand over any part of our territories/^™ Valentin 
Fedorov, a former head of administration on Sakhalin, was also opposed to the islands 
being transferred to Japan.™*
In the post communist era, Russian leaders have had to pay more attention to 
national and regional opinion. The following section focuses on the results of many 
opinion polls conducted among Russians, Japanese and the Kuril islanders themselves. 
These polls indicate that Russia as a whole, as well as the residents of the islands, is 
strongly opposed to any territorial concessions. The government and local leaders of the 
RFE also hold this view, as will be seen from the following examples.
Russian National Opinion Polls. Table 5-1 presents four national opinion polls 
(1991, 1992, 1994 and 1998) regarding the disputed islands. The question asked was, 
‘Do you personally favour or oppose the prospect of Russia giving the disputed islands 
back to Japan?’ As can be seen from the table, the results differed each year, reflecting a 
gradual strengthening in opinion against a handover.
Japan Times. 12 September 1992, p. 3.
219 See Premiei 's View on Kurils as ‘Purely Emotion,”’ Izvestiya. 21 August 1993, p. I, as cited in
FBIS-Sov-93-165. 27 August 1993, p. IT,
Zilanov, Koshkin, Latyshev, Plotnikov, and Senchenko, Russkive Kurilv. p. 157.
Japan Times. 29 August 1993, p. 2.
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I will begin by comparing November 1991 results with those of August 1992. 
Both surveys were conducted by the Moscow-based survey organisation ‘Vox Populi/ 
with 1,590 responding. Little difference in attitude is seen between November 1991 and 
August 1992. The percentage in favour of returning the islands to Japan was very low in 
both years: 14 per cent, and 13 per cent respectively. In contrast, over two-thirds of 
respondents were against a transfer. Opposition increased by 5 per cent from November 
1991 to August 1992. There was generally a ratio of 6 to 1 against the handover to 
Japan. It is interesting to note the variations in terms of generations, occupation, and 
level of education. Among those over 60, workers, pensioners and those without 
secondary education the ratio was 10 to I against, while the under 30s, executives, 
professionals and students were 4 to 1 against.™  ^ Those who are less well educated, 
older and on a low income are therefore more likely to be strongly opposed to the 
returning of the islands as compared to the younger generation, those in education and 
well-paid work.
Secondly, we shall consider the results of November 1994 and compare them 
with those of April 1998. Before Yeltsin and the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto’s “no-necktie” meeting in April 1998, the All-Russian Centre for the Study 
of Public Opinion (VTslOM) interviewed a national sample of 1,600 people aged 
eighteen and over to discover public opinion concerning the Kuril islands.^™ As can be 
seen in table 5-1, in both 1994 and 1998, those in favour of the islands return to Japan 
constituted only 7 per cent of those surveyed. This was considerably lower than the 
figure in both 1991 and 1992. In 1994, 76 per cent of respondents were against the 
transfer of the islands. This figure rose slightly to 79 per cent in 1998, giving an overall
222 Mtr rrmenn r mnenrva o mrre. No. Î0, October 1992, p. Î.
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increase of 8 per cent between 1991 and 1998 (the figure increased 3 per cent in the 
latter four years).
Table 5-1: Attitudes to the Return of the Kuril Islands to Japan (%)
For
Against
Nov. 91 Aug. 92
14% 13%
76%
Nov. 94
7%
76%
Apr. 98
7%
79%
Source: Based upon Mir mnenii i mneniva o mire. No. 19, October 1992, p. 1; 
“Economic Partnership and Territorial Disputes,” RIA-Novosti Daily Review. No. 79, 
27 April 1998, p. 10. The question wording was: “Do you personally favour or oppose 
the prospect of Russia giving the disputed islands back to Japan?”
Combining the results of these four surveys, it can be concluded that the 
percentage in favour of transferring the islands decreased by half, from 1991 to 1998, 
while opposition increased by 8 per cent during this time (71 per cent in 1991 to 79 per 
cent in 1998). In this result, we can see that the majority of Russians strongly disagree
223 ‘Economic Partnership and Territorial Dispute,” RIA-Novosti Daily Review. No. 79, 27 April 1998, p. 10.
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with the prospect of transferring the Kuril islands to Japan.
Table 5-2: ‘‘How do you think this territorial problem should be settled?”
Nov. 1994 Apr. 1998
Japan should be given back all of the disputed islands. 
Japan ought to be given back Habomai and Shikotan, as 
promised in the 1950s, while the transfer of the other 
disputed islands should be discussed separately.
Russia should return Habomai and Shikotan while 
retaining
the other two disputed islands.
The islands should be governed by a joint Russian-
Japanese
Administration.
The islands should be declared a free economic zone to 
encourage Japanese investment
Russia should continue to exercise full control over the 
territory without allowing Japanese access.
For the time being, matters should be left the way they 
are.
Difficult to answer.
2 %
2 %
1 %
6 %
13%
36%
28%
12%
2 %
2 %
2 %
1 1 %
14%
30%
25%
12%
Source: Adapted from RIA-Novosti Daily Review. 27 April 1998, p. 10.
The additional information in table 5-2, drawn from the same surveys, shows 
how Russians responded to the question concerning the ownership of the islands and 
how it should be settled.™"* The responses further support the conclusion that Russians 
are not favourably disposed towards Japanese ownership, part ownership, or even a 
share in authority over the islands. A mere 2 per cent of respondents in both 1994 and 
1998 were interested in returning the two islands (Shikotan and Habomai) to Japan. A 
very low percentage also were in favour of joint Russian-Japanese ownership of the 
islands (6 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively). Also over this four-year period, there
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was only one per cent increase in those in favour of encouraging Japanese investment 
on the islands, A proposal gaining strong support was that Russia should continue to 
exercise full control that and Japanese access should still be denied.
Another opinion poll was carried out by VTslOM in August 1994 revealing 
that approximately 66 per cent of Russians were interested in the immediate signing of a 
peace treaty with Japan (this has not yet been followed through) and only 13 per cent 
were committed to a Russian military presence on the islands. Views over the joint use 
of the disputed territories varied considerably with 30 per cent of respondents in favour, 
and 44 per cent against.^^^ According to a second survey by VTslOM in November 
1998, the majority of Russians (62 per cent) were against the proposal to recognise 
Japan’s right to the islands but preserve their Russian management, and only 13 per cent 
were in favour of this proposal.™^
Many scholars have commented on this issue and I will focus on two in 
particular: Valery Tishkov and Charles Ziegler. Tishkov (the former Minister of 
Nationalities and author of Ethnicitv. Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet 
Union) in the summer of 1994 posed the question to three villagers ‘Are we really going 
to give up the Kuril islands to Japan?’ None of these villagers had ever been to the Far 
East and two of them had not even visited Moscow, some 250 kilometers away. They 
each responded with a definite ‘No’ to the question. Tishkov used data from the Colton, 
Hough, Lehimann and Guboglo survey to describe attitudes towards a possible transfer 
of the South Kuril Islands to Japan/™ His findings supported those of Vox Populi and
Ibid., p. 10.
225 “pfeferences o f  Russian People in Foreign Policy,” Argumentv i Faktv. No. 8, 8 December 1997 as 
cited in RIA-Novosti Daily Review. 8 December 1997, p. 9.
Izvestiya. 4 November 1998, p. 4.
Valery Tishkov, Ethnicitv. Nationality and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union (London: Sage,
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VTslOM, with nearly two thirds of the sample opposed to a transfer of ownership (62 
per cent, compared to 11 per cent). According to Tishkov, for many Russians, the Kuril 
islands issue had become a matter symbolising their national pride. Russians saw the 
Kuril islands issue as being a symbol of national pride. Another scholar, Ziegler, agrees 
with Tishkov that among the Russian population, the Kuril islands territorial issue is 
linked with emotive questions of nationalism.^™ He also notes that Russians are 
strongly averse to ‘selling or returning’ part of their homeland, no matter how small.™^
Russian and Japanese Opinion Polls. Opinion polls have also been conducted 
on Russian and Japanese attitudes towards each other’s countries. A survey was 
conducted in 1989, for instance, by the Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of 
Sociology and the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun. Results showed that attitudes 
differed considerably between the two countries. Some 88 per cent of the Soviet 
respondents were ‘sympathetic,’ and only 2.4 per cent were ‘antipathetic/ Only 17.6 per 
cent of Japanese people, however, considered their attitude towards the Soviet Union 
and its people ‘sympathetic/ while 47.4 per cent described their attitude as 
‘antipathetic.’™** Soviet respondents were more favourably inclined towards Japan and 
its people than vice versa.
Before Gorbachev’s visit to Japan in April 1991, a public opinion poll was 
conducted by Kvodo and Tass news services. The result once again indicated a wide 
gap between Russian and Japanese expectations over the Kuril islands. Only 9.8 per 
cent of Soviet respondents were willing to return all four islands immediately; 2.5 per
1997), p. 254.
Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptatîoa in the Gorbachev Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. SS.
Ibid, p. 101.
Ibid, p. 87.
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cent thought they should be returned in stages. In contrast, 46 per cent of Japanese 
respondents favoured the immediate return of all four islands, with 26 per cent agreeing 
to a gradual return.™*
In November 1992, according to the RA Report, a joint survey was conducted 
by a Central Research Service and a private polling agency based in Moscow, which 
compared Russian and Japanese opinion over various issues concerning the disputed 
islands. The poll surveyed 2,000 Japanese people aged 20 and above, and 1,600 
Russians aged 16 and above (responses were obtained from 71 per cent of the Japanese 
and 95 per cent of Russians surveyed). The Russian results revealed that among military 
servicemen, 23 per cent supported the return of the islands to Japan. Those who were 
particularly reluctant to embrace the idea included pensioners, housewives and the 
unemployed. About 7 per cent of Russians supported Japan’s position that all the 
islands should be returned simultaneously. Others held the opinion that the two islands, 
Shikotan and the Habomai group of islets, should be returned and negotiations 
continued on the others. Not surprisingly, a large majority of Japanese (approximately 
84 per cent) supported their government’s claims to the islands; 44 per cent of the 
Japanese favoured simultaneously returning all of the islands; 23 per cent supported the 
proposal that two islands be returned then later, another two (the two plus two formula); 
and only 9 per cent said that they did not necessarily see the need for a quick settlement 
of the dispute. Overall, 73 per cent said they had favourable feelings towards the 
Russians, a huge positive change as compared with 1989.™^  These results indicate that 
much conflicting opinion still exists between the two countries over the Kuril islands.
SUPAR Report. No. 10, January 1991, p. 31. 
RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 43.
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Kuril Islands Opinion Poll Now I shall focus on the views of the Kuril 
islanders with regard to the fate of their homeland’s ownership. The general feeling on 
the islands was against Japanese ownership.
In September 1991, the Yuzhno-Kuril soviet sent a resolution to the Russian 
government and Japanese people. This was done on behalf of the 15,000 residents, and 
it declared their views on the disputed islands. It included the following two main 
points. Firstly, since several generations have lived on the islands, the residents consider 
it to be their native land and an inalienable part of Russia. Secondly, they appealed to 
Yeltsin, to the government and people o f Japan, and to world public opinion not to 
ignore the rights and interests of the population of the islands.™  ^In October, there was a 
rally in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Participants adopted a resolution saying that, ‘if Russian 
leadership bows to Japanese demands, they will commit a crime that will not be 
forgiven by their descendants/^^"* Sakhalin fishermen also appealed to the Russian 
people, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, saying that, ‘if the Kuril islands are handed back to 
Japan, the fishing grounds that are a supporting pillar of the Far East economy will be 
destroyed.’ They declared that they would accept proposals to exploit the rich fishing 
grounds jointly.
I will also focus specifically on the opinions of the Kuril islands residents 
themselves. Caught in a tug of war between two great nations, it is of considerable 
importance to turn to the views of those whose lives will be most affected by the 
conclusion of this debate.
Svobodnvi Sakhalin. 18 September 1991, p. 1.
“Sakhalin Rallies against Return o f  Kurils,” Interfax, 6 October 1991, as cited in FBIS-Sov-91-194. 7 
October 1991, p. 65.
“Sakhalin Fishermen Protest Return o f  Kurils,” Tass. 8 October 1991, as cited in FBIS-Sov-91-196, 9  
October 1991, p. 60.
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The Central Research Service and a private polling agency based in Moscow 
conducted a public opinion poll in the Kurils in November 1992, They targeted 99 
residents living on the islands, of whom 69 responded. From the Kunashiri island 27 
responded (5 men and 22 women), 19 from Shikotan (9 men and 10 women) and 23 
from Etorofu (12 men and 11 women). The respondents’ ages ranged from 19 to 67 with 
an average age of 44.9 years. These residents had lived on the islands from 3 to 43 
years, with an average of 25.2 years.
Table 5-3; “The Japanese government insists on the return of the four islands, 
what do you think?”
Island Agree Oppose NA
Kunashiri 26% 52% 22%
Shikotan 37% 26% 37%
Etorofu 18% 78% 4%
Total 26% 4% 20%
Source: The questions and answers were derived from RA Report, No. 14, January 
1993, p. 43.
As can be seen from table 5-3 and table 5-4, residents on the islands showed 
different opinions over the possible resolution of the Kuril dispute. According to table 
5-3, Kunashiri and Etorofu residents showed more opposition to the return of the islands 
than their counterparts on Shikotan. Residents on Etorofu island were nearly 4 to 1 
against the return, whereas residents on Shikotan showed a more positive attitude 
towards an agreement that would involve Japanese ownership of all four islands. It is 
interesting to note that those on Etorofu had a very strong opinion on this matter, with
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only 4 per cent of respondents unsure. However, Shikotan islanders had relatively 
mixed views and 37 per cent of those surveyed did not give an opinion at all.
Table 5-4: “Should the Russian government return the islands to Japan?”
Yes
Etorofu
9%
Kunashiri Shikotan
74%
22%
No
91%
26%
57%
Source: As Table 5-3.
Table 5-4 also illustrates that the Shikotan people showed a fairly high level of 
support for returning the islands to Japan (nearly three quarters of the residents favoured 
this option). This result is partly due to the fact that the Shikotan islanders were at this 
time experiencing deteriorating economic circumstances and placed their hope in Japan
237
for the aid they needed?^^ The people of Etorofu and Kunashiri, by comparison, showed 
a high percentage of opposition to the return. The Etorofu residents displayed 
particularly strong views, nearly 9 to 1 against it. Two conclusions can be drawn from 
these two tables. Firstly, on the whole the majority of Kuril residents are not in favour 
of the transfer of the islands to Japan. Secondly, the residents of the Shikotan island had 
a more favourable attitude to thq return of the islands than did the other three islands.
In late 1998, residents on Shikotan island started gathering signatures in 
support of a proposed Tease' of the island to Japan for 99 years. This plan came from 
Yeltsin’s decree of 1992 on the social and economic development of the Kuril islands. 
The reason for implementing this stemmed from the islands’ worsening economic 
conditions and the government’s indecisiveness. The head of county administration for 
Shikotan, Vladimir Zema, said, 'about five years ago, only 10 per cent of residents 
supported this issue, now a majority of the islanders support this idea. This is not 
separatism and we are still under Russia’s jurisdiction. But we can’t wait until the 
government pays attention to us.’^ ^^  It can be assumed that the Shikotan islanders are 
not outrightly opposed to Russia ownership, but their immediate needs demand 
attention and they look to Japan for economic aid. Much of the island is still struggling 
in the aftennath of the October 1994 earthquake.
In conclusion, regarding this issue, it is clear that Russia holds a more positive 
and flexible attitude to the islands than Japan; and that Japan and the Kuril islanders 
hold very contrasting views on the future ownership of the islands. Russians and 
Japanese both maintain their claims to the land, while opinions of the islanders 
themselves vary according to island. Shikotan islanders favour Japanese ownership
236 Svobodnyi Sakhalin. 3 June 1992, p. 1 ; Tzvestiya. 16 December 1998, p. Î .
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more than the other islanders. At the national and local levels, the political leaders still 
recongnise the value of the Kuril islands in terms of their fishing industry, foreign trade 
and business, and in military positioning. On the whole, the islanders appear to be more 
in favour of Russian ownership than Japanese. Since these two nations have been 
continuing negotiations over this issue since the early 1990s, a more positive 
relationship between them has developed. At the present time no conclusion has been 
reached over ownership of the islands and they remain under Russian control. However, 
Russia wants to conclude a peace treaty with Japan (to be signed, they promised, in the 
year 2000); Russia also intends to consult with Japan over the islands’ joint economic 
development, and will lean towards the principle that the matter should be left to future 
generations of the Kuril islanders.
5*4: Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen that many Russian economists and government officials 
exercised influence on central government to maintain that improved relations with China 
and Japan were the key to the Far East’s successful integration into the Asian Pacific 
region. However, Chinese relations in particular became the subject of a conflict of 
priorities between the centre and local leaders. With the opening of the border concerns 
were raised among the Far Eastern public over the large number of illegal Chinese 
immigrants and the use of cheap Chinese labour. These issues then topped the political 
agenda, particularly in the region, regarding the development of the relations with China. 
Nationalist groups, regional governors, and local administration openly appealed to the 
centre not to expand trade with China and also attempted to block finalisation of the
“Residents Want to Rent out Kurd Tsland,” Viadivostolc News. No. Î79, 30 October 1998, pp. 1-2.
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border demarcation process. The local press and scholars began to deal more frankly with 
these two issues. The press drew on trends in popular sentiment and many journalists 
published the figures for the Chinese immigration into the Far East.
The dispute over the Kuril islands became one of the most pressing regional and 
national issues when Yeltsin launched a new relationship with Japan. The newspapers 
gave elaborate coverage to letters from citizens, and there were mandatory procedures for 
following up on complaints regarding the conclusion of this issue with Japan. The local 
press began to deal more frankly with some of the unpleasant realities of the worsening 
socio-economic situation on these islands. Professional journalists, local and even 
national press repeat published sharp criticisms of what appeared to be the central 
government’s policy: the centrally proposed action of returning the islands to Japan. 
According to several national and regional opinion polls, Russia should retain the 
disputed islands. Governors, military groups, some politicians, fishermen, and residents 
on the islands showed high levels of opposition to the return of the islands and put 
pressure on the government on this issue.
In issues of both Chinese and Japanese relations, we can see a conflict of 
interests in the agendas of central government and those of local leaders and their public 
in the RFE. The result, not surprisingly, was a stalemate.
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Chapter 6: The International Political Agenda: Relations with the 
Korean Peninsula
6.1; Introduction
The Far East has maintained relations with the states in the region for many years and 
particularly Japan and China. This has been through development of Far Eastern 
resources and exchanges of raw materials for hard currency. China, for its part, has 
expanded its economic relations with the RFE through border trade. Even North Korea 
has maintained its economic contacts since the late 1960s mainly through the timber 
industry. Development of economic relations was hindered by the state of political 
relations between South Korea and the RFE.
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1990, however, 
Russia has pursued frequent contacts with South Korea both official and cultural, which 
have provided a fertile environment for trade and investment opportunities for South 
Koreans in the RFE. The improvement of political conditions in Northeast Asia, 
together with the policy of relative economic liberalisation of foreign economic 
activities in the RFE, has aided this development, and South Korea has gradually 
replaced the education and social relations that were previously maintained with North 
Korea in the RFE. South Korea and Russia initiated a cultural agreement that was 
expected to promote Korean traditions among ethnic Koreans living in Russia. ^  Mutual 
benefits are derived in this respect: in Korea’s case, from supplying consumer goods 
and capital investment to the RFE and in the RFE’s case from exporting raw materials 
for Korea’s industries. Korea hopes that this economic co-operation with the RFE will
 ^Yonhap. 14 September 1992; FBIS-EAS-1992-179. 15 September 1992, p. 13, as cited in RA Report, No. 
14, January 1993, p. 57.
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continue to provide a stable political environment on the peninsula and ultimately 
further the prospects of reunification.
As noted in chapter 1, the relationship with South Korea has clearly been a 
major element on the international political agenda in the RFE in the post-communist 
era. South Koreans and their business activities have been frequently mentioned in the 
local news coverage. North Korea has still appeared to be significantly involved in 
economic and political relations with the Far Eastern public.
This chapter^, therefore, will consist of four main sections. First of all, I will 
deal with Koreans living in the Far East. Secondly, the relationship between North 
Korea and the RFE will be investigated. Thirdly, as the main part of this chapter, I will 
explore the development of the relationship between South Korea and the RFE. Finally, 
I will attempt to draw some conclusions about the problems of South Korean economic 
activities in the RFE. My concern is, once again, to examine the play of domestic and 
international issues that has been engaged in the shaping of this part of the RFE’s 
political agenda.
6,2: Koreans in the Far East
Historically, the RFE has been a popular destination for Korean migration due, in part, 
to the geographical proximity of the region. However, more important were economic 
and political reasons, which I now intend to address.^
The first exodus of Koreans to the Far East was primarily economically
 ^ The main sources I will be using in this chapter are the interviews I conducted and the published 
materials and data that I collected during my research visits to Vladivostok, Primorskii krai (September 
1996) and Seoul, South Korea (September 1996 and July 1998) and, finally to Moscow in April 2000,
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motivated (dating from the time of the Russian acquisition of Primorskii krai from 
China in I860), As I mentioned in chapter 1, in that year Russia acquired most of the 
Far East, including Primorskii Krai. The Czarist regime made various concessions to 
attract immigrants to develop the area. These included permanent immunity from tax, 
free land grants to each family (approximately 290 acres were exempted from land tax 
for twenty years), and minor grants.'  ^In 1863, the first substantial Korean migration to 
the Far East began. Groups of farmers from thirteen households in northeastern Korea 
crossed the Tumen River into the Russian Far East. The steady flow of Koreans 
culminated in a mass exodus in 1869 as a famine in Korea contributed to an influx into 
Primorskii krai.^ By 1906, about 34,400 Korean immigrants were resident in Primorskii 
krai. By 1910 this figure had reached approximately 80,000.^
In 1910, Japanese annexing of the Korean peninsula produced another mass 
departure into the RFE for both political and economic reasons/ This provided a 
critically important sanctuary for the anti-Japanese movement;
Some Korean immigrants established political organisations. For instance, the 
New Korean Community, bands of anti-Japanese guerrillas were formed, notably 
in Nikolsk-Ussurisk and Vladivostok. In 1916, the Korean National Council, a 
kind o f Korean government in exile, was organised. It instantly became the largest 
and most influential Korean organisation up to that time. At the same time, about 
half o f  the Koreans in Russia were naturalised and during World War I many were 
drafted into the tsarist army (to avoid service, many fled to Manchuria).^
 ^Lee Ki-baik, A  New  History o f Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Schultz (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 13-5; Hoon K. Lee, “Korean Migrants in Manchuria,” The 
Geographical Review. Vol. XXQ, No. 4, April 1932, p. 196.
Dea-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1967), pp. 4-5.
 ^ John J. Stephan, “The Korean Minority in the Soviet Union,” Mizan. Vol. XIII, No. 3, December 1971, 
p. 139. Official diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia opened in 1884 when the two countries 
concluded a Mutual Commercial Agreement. Bilateral relations between them, however, were halted in 
1910 after Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904- 
1905), because Japan annexed Korea by force. See Chong-Sik Lee and Kim Wan Oh, “The Russian 
Faction in North Korea,” Asian Survey. Vol. 8, No. 4, April 1968, pp. 270-71.
 ^ “Koreans in the Russian Far East before 1917,” Russian Far East Update (RFEUI. Vol. VTI, No. 2, 
February 1997, p. 15.
 ^Lee, “Korean Migrants in Manchuria,” p. 196.
 ^Suh, The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948. pp. 5-7.
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At the same time, a Korean Communist movement began to develop in the 
RFE. Koreans participated in revolutionary events taking place in Russia between 1917 
and 1922. Many Koreans were heavily involved in Soviet activities and participated in 
the Civil War on the Bolshevik side.^ Some even joined the Bolsheviks in order to 
expel the Japanese from the Soviet Union. It is recorded that by 1923 Koreans made up 
20 per cent of the Soviet Communist Party in Primorskii krai.^^
At the end of the 1920s, Koreans began to play an important role in the 
development of agriculture in Primorskii krai and Amur oblast. By 1929, the 
population of Koreans in the USSR was estimated at over 200,000. Koreans constituted 
the third largest ethnic group in eastern Siberia (after Russians and Ukrainians). They 
were granted voting rights, allowed to print newspapers, operate schools, and generally 
develop their language and culture. Between 1927 and 1932, however, the Politburo 
three times discussed the 'Korean question’, with the clear intention of reducing the 
number of Koreans within the Far East.^^ A decision was made by the Council of 
People’s Commissars and the Central Committee on 21 August 1937, which resulted in 
the deportation of Koreans from the border areas of the Far Eastern region, and later.
 ^Hee-Youg Kwon, “The Soviet Union and Divided Korea,” in II Yung Chung (ed.), Korea and Russia 
towards the Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 32-3.
Boris Park, "Koreitsy v Sovetskoi Rossii (1917-konets 30-kh godov),” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka. 
No. 3,1996, pp. 149-50.
Koreans introduced Northeast Asian crops such as rice and soybeans. Methods o f land cultivating, 
agricultural management and new trades like silkworm breeding were also introduced. At the same time, 
a number o f fishing co-operatives were established. In 1925, in the Vladivostok area there were 18 
Korean fishing artels. The largest o f  them was Primorskii krai Fishing Association. The Association 
comprised 800 Koreans who held Russian citizenship and 300 Russian fishermen. See RFEU. Vol. VII, 
No. 2, February 1997, p; 15.
Lee and Oh, The Russian Faction, pp. 273-74.
‘“White Paper’ on Deportation o f Koreans in Russia,” RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 147; Boris 
Park, Koreitsy v Sovetskoi Rossii n917-konets 30-kh godovl (Moscow and Irkutsk: Diplomaticheskaya 
Akademiya MID Rossii, 1995), p. 228.
Ibid., p. 229.
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on 28 September 1937, from the entire territory/^ Scholar N. F. Bugai describes this as 
the ‘planned genocide of the Korean p e o p l e / B y  25 October 1937, approximately 
180,000 Koreans had been deported from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia. Park 
notes that many other Koreans were shot, and casualty figures from this exercise 
remain unknown. It is widely believed that the main deportation stemmed from 
Stalin’s fear that Koreans would try to form an autonomous movement. Primorskii krai 
was the most affected area, as it contained 95 per cent of all Russia’s Koreans. Yet 
another possible reason for this mass deportation was that many Koreans were 
suspected of being Japanese espionage agents within the Far East.^^
Soviet Koreans survived these ordeals by forming large communities in 
Central Asia, and indeed many Koreans were able to attain high posts in the Soviet 
administration. Second and third generation Koreans proved particularly valuable to the 
Soviet Union when in August 1945 it occupied the northern half of Korea/^ Koreans 
who had lived and trained inside the USSR then became the leaders of the Korean 
Communist state. Among them was Kim Il-Sung (the ruler of North Korea up to his 
death in July 1994), who returned to North Korea with the Soviet occupation force 
following Japan’s surrender in August 1945.^° As a result of this strong cormection 
between North Korea and the USSR, South Korea set in place a resolute policy
Ibid., p. 233.
Ibid., p. 230.
Ibid, p. 234; for a detailed discussion o f  the resolution o f  the ‘Korean question’ in the 1930s, involving 
mass deportations from the Far East to other parts o f the USSR, see Khon-Eng Sim, “K izucheniyu 
prichin deportatsii sovetsklkh koreitsev,” Etnograficheskoe obozrenie. No. 2, 1999, pp. 93-102.
® The report on “Features o f Vladivostok,” published by Ministry o f Culture and Tourism (Seoul), 
August 1999, p. 1; Wada Haruki, “Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937,” in Dae-Suk Suh (ed.), 
Koreans in the Soviet Union (Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 24-59.
Hakjoon Kim, “The Emergence o f  Siberia and the Russian Far East as a ‘New Frontier’ for Koreans,” 
in Stephen Kotkin and David W olff (eds.). Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far 
East (Armonk. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 305.
A. N, Lankov, Sevemava Koreya: Vchera i seaodnva (Moskva: Izdatef skaya Firma, 1995), pp. 20-22.
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prohibiting all interaction with the USSR. This included cultural and scholarly 
exchanges as well as economic relations, and lasted until the late 1980s/^
After the renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in September 
1990, South Koreans have officially been allowed to resettle in the Russian Far East. At 
present there are quite a number of Koreans in this region, some of whom hold Russian 
citizenship.^^ For the purpose of this discussion, I will divide Korean minorities in the 
RFE into four distinct groups in terms of their date of arrival and economic activities; 
Far Eastern Koreans (Korean immigrants who returned from Central Asia to the RFE), 
the Sakhalin Koreans, North Koreans, and finally South Koreans.
Far Eastern Koreans, After Stalin’s death in 1953 the first group to resettle in
the Russian Far East were the Korean immigrants, most of whom were first and second
descendants of the Koreans who had been deported in 1937 to Central Asia.^  ^ Far
Eastern Koreans (South Koreans call them ‘Koryoin’) were officially rehabilitated in
the early 1960s. But by 1991 only 8,000 had succeeded in moving back. '^  ^One of them
was Svetlana Kan, whose family were among the first returnees:
Her mother was deported with her family from Vampaushe (Shkotovsky) Country 
in 1937. Kan’s father lived in a Russian orphanage in Temei. He was 14 years old 
when he was taken from the orphanage and sent to Kara-Kalpakiya, Uzbekistan.
Most o f the Koreans arrived at the steppes in the late autumn, when it was very 
cold. Since there was no shelter, they dug holes in the ground to live in. The 
Uzbeks, however, accepted their new neighbours. “Koreans even brought some 
civilisation to the land,” Kan said.^^
Larisa Zabrovskaya, “Rossiya i Koreya,” Severnaya Patsifika. No. 1, March 1997, p. 92.
According to a 1996 regional census, ethnic Koreans consist o f  1.4 per cent o f  the total population of 
the RFE; most o f them live in Khabarovsk krai (0.5 %), Sakhalin oblast (0.5 %) and Primorskii krai (0.4 
%). See Reeionv Rossii. 2 vols (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1997), pp. 331-55.
In 1999 Far Eastern Koreans numbered approximately 130,000 in the Russian Federation as a whole. 
Their number has gradually increased due to the resettlement o f migrants from Central Asia. See The 
Russian Federation (Seoul: the Foreign Trade Ministry, 1999), p. 103.
Nonna Chernyakova, “Coming Home,” Vladivostok News. No. 149, 4 September 1997, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
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Svetlana Kan is today in her early fifties, and currently works as a travel 
agents in the Hyundai Hotel (which opened in Vladivostok in August 1997). Like her, 
some returnees are working for South Korean companies in the Far East as they can 
speak both Korean and Russian. A recent returnee from Central Asia, whom I 
interviewed, explained that most of the Far Eastern Koreans regard the RFE as ‘their 
spiritual hometown,’ which they will return to and in which they will settle down/^ 
When South Korean President Kim Young-Sam visited Vladivostok in June 1994, he 
addressed the need to provide assistance to the ethnic Koreans living in Primorskii 
krai/^ The plans included construction of a residential community in Partizanskaya 
Dolina and a Korean cultural centre in Ussuriisk. When the South Korean industrial 
park in Nakhodka is finally built, it will result in an even larger resettlement of Far 
Eastern Koreans in the area/^
In February 1991, the chairman of the Primorskii krai soviet and the vice 
president of the All Union Association of Soviet Koreans discussed the organisation of 
the resettlement of Koreans to the south of the Far East. They examined the migration 
of 45,000 Koreans to the agricultural districts of Primorskii krai.^  ^ Since 1992 there 
have been official and frequent contacts between the Chairman of the Korean and 
Russian Far East Association, Chang Chi Ok, and the Governor of Primorskii krai, 
Evgenii Nazdratenko. Among other things, they have dealt with the resettlement of 
Korean immigrants in the Far East. On 19 January 1998, Nazdratenko himself offered 
the Association of the Far Eastern Korean Revival Fund 1,753 hectares of land without
The interview was conducted in Vladivostok in September 1996. 
Izvestiya. I June 1994, p. 4.
Korean Business Community to Help,” Vladivostok News. No. 25, 24 June 1994, p. 4. 
Tikhookeanskaya zvezda. 23 February 1991, p. 1, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 11, July 1991, p. 
132.
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charge for the use of the Far Eastern Koreans/^ This gesture was in line with Yeltsin’s 
apology (through the ‘Russian and Korean Joint Declaration’ of November 1992) for 
Stalin’s ill treatment of the Soviet Koreans. Soviet Koreans were also exonerated from 
Stalin’s charges of spying/^ Yet another incentive for Koreans to return to the RFE 
stemmed from the regional Supreme Soviet decree of March 1993, which encouraged 
‘the rehabilitation of Soviet Koreans and the establishing of a federal programme to 
help the Korean populat ion.As a result of all these new approaches, the numbers of 
returning Koreans from Central Asia to the RFE increased. On 1 January 1996 there 
were approximately 18,000 Far Eastern Koreans resident in the region (10,000 more 
than in 1991).^  ^The Russia Far East-Siberia News has predicted that the number of Far 
Eastern Koreans will increase by 150,000 within two or three years.
In a further development in February and March 1998, a total of 3,700 hectares 
was given indefinitely for the construction of Far East Korean Resettlement Villages in 
Primorskii krai, consisting of five separate areas.^  ^ These areas had previously been 
army base camps, each containing militaty buildings, living quarters, schools.
Report on the Construction o f  the Korean. Resident Village Primorskii krai by the AsaociatiotL o f  the 
Korea and Russia Far East, 20 May 1998 (mimeo), p. 1.
Yeltsin also reiterated his support for the unification o f the two Koreas in a peaceful manner through 
dialogue between the two countries, and assured South Korea that Russia had already stopped the supply 
o f  offensive arms to North Korea. Russia and South Korea signed some agreements during the November 
meetings as follows. The first, a basic relations treaty providing a legal framework for closer economic, 
political, scientific, and cultural co-operation, binding both countries to common goals on human rights 
and market economics. The second, a military agreement on exchange visits. In addition, his address to 
the South Korean National Assembly, Yeltsin expressed his government’s intention to work as a partner 
with South Korea, and also expressed Russia’s desire to play a major role in establishing a new Northeast 
Asian security system. Yeltsin’s visit to South Korea contributed to the promotion o f co-operative ties 
between the two countries. See “Yeltsin’s Speech to the Korean National Assembly November 1992” and 
“Russian-Korean Joint Declaration November 1992,” in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, Vneshnvaya PoHtika Rossii: Sbomik Dokumentov 1990-1992 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniya, 1996), pp. 565-74.
This is the official letter from the Governor o f Primorskii krai, Nazdratenko to the Chairman o f  the 
Korea and Russian Far East Association, Chang Chi Ok (in Russian), No. 64-p, 19 January 1998.
Vladivostok News. No. 149, 4 September 1997, p. 1.
Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoub. No. 47, 31 October 1997, p. 34.
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electricity, water supplies and drainage equipment/^ The first village will be repaired to 
accommodate 1,000 households comprising of 4,000 Far Eastern Koreans/^ In April 
1998 the Head of the Far Eastern Korean Revival Fund, Telmir Kim, visited South 
Korea to raise a large amount of financial support for the apartments that are being 
reconstructed. He required US$146 million to repair the buildings in three years. He 
mentioned that this building would not only be for the Far Eastern Koreans but also for 
other Koreans in the Far East. He has continued to contact South Koreans and even 
Korean residents in America and Japan in order to raise the resources that will be 
needed.
It was reported in November 1999 that in 1998, 10 of 70 Korean households 
that had settled in a village in Kazakhstan had returned to Primorskii krai. Among them 
several Koreans have settled in one of the Far East Korean Resettlement Villages in 
Primorskii krai despite the fact that this particular village does not have electricity.^^
The Sakhalin Koreans, The Sakhalin Koreans first arrived on Sakhalin island 
in the 1870s. During the 1920s, they worked the mines on the northern part of the 
island. Then in the Second World War, approximately 150,000 Koreans were sent to 
Southern Sakhalin by Japan, where they were exploited in labour camps.'^  ^ After the 
war about 100,000 Koreans emigrated to Japan and 50,000 remained in Sakhalin. 
Between 1947 and 1957 about 10,000 moved into Khabarovsk krai and other regions of
I conducted an interview with vice president o f  the Korean and Russian Far East Association in Seoul, 
July 1998. 
izvestiva. 3 February 1999, p. 2.
Hankyk Ilbo (SeouO. 17 April 1998, p. 31.
Joonaan Ilbo ('SeouO, 16 April 1998, p. 7.
Chosun nbo (Seoul), 8 November 1999, p. 31.
“Japan, Korea, Russia Consider Fate o f Sakhalin’s Koreans,” Russian Regional Report. 20 February 
1997, p. 1; Stephan, The Korean Minoritv in the Soviet Union, p. 144; Asahi (Tokyo), 14 May 1991, p. 
22 .
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the Soviet Union. About 2,000 Sakhalin Koreans moved to Japan in the same period.'^  ^
According to a 1994 census, the Sakhalin Koreans numbered approximately 43,000 
first generation and their children."^  ^ Although they were offered North Korean 
citizenship after 1948, few emigrated to the North because of their South Korean roots. 
The same census also revealed that some were not granted Soviet citizenship and 
needed to apply for Russian citizenship: 89.5 per cent (38,500) of them had Russian 
citizenship, 1.2 per cent (500) had North Korean citizenship and 9.3 per cent (4,000) 
had no citizenship."^^
Some of the elderly population still consider themselves Korean and most 
speak Japanese better than they do Russian. First and second generation would like to 
settle down in Korea permanently,"^ According to South Korean Foreign Ministry in 
December 1993, among them about 13,000 Koreans wanted to return to South Korea."^  ^
During the Soviet period, it was necessary for many of their children to marry Russians 
in order to become citizens. The resulting offspring and their children make up a 
sizeable Korean minority in the region. Many of them have engaged in agriculture, 
construction, livestock industry and private enterprises. Vladivostok News reported in 
1994, ‘These people, many of whom are prominent members of the region’s business 
and political communities, could be serving as Russia’s unofficial envoy in South
Report on the General Meeting o f  the Sixth Sakhalin Incorporation in Sakhalin oblast by the 
Committee o f  the Korea and the Russian Far East, 21 to 26 August 1997 (Seoul), p. 18.
Izvestiya. 20 November 1998, p. 3.
Report on the General Meeting o f the Sixth Sakhalin Incorporation in Sakhalin oblast, p. 18.
Ibid., p. 18.44
“Japanese-South Korean Team to Leave for Sakhalin on Repatriation Mission,” RA Report. No. 16, 
January 1994, p. 144.
Most o f them manage to speak Korean and have settled down in most parts o f the RFE. After they 
married Russians, they left Sakhalin to look for jobs. Some are employed by Korean companies as well 
as by Christian missionary workers. I conducted interviews with two families in Vladivostok in 
September 1996. Each of their parents were married to Russians. I found out that their children are 
looking for their future in South Korea.
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Korea, spreading information about life in the country and encouraging South Koreans 
to invest. South Korea has been using Russian Koreans to acquire detailed information 
about the country’s economic and political situation, including the purchasing of real 
estate/"^ ^
From September 1989, the first official visit of Sakhalin Koreans to South 
Korea took place. At this time Moscow permitted Soviet Koreans from Sakhalin to 
obtain visas through the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. About 40 Sakhalin Koreans were 
able to visit their homeland for the first time since 1945. Since then some have returned 
to their Korean roots and have benefited from the opportunity to learn Korean. Unlike 
many of the Far Eastern Koreans, they wish to return to South Korea and do not view 
the RFE as their permanent homeland."^  ^Until 1996, the total number of Koreans who 
visited South Korea from Russia and the other CIS countries was approximately 9,581 
with Sakhalin Koreans being the most numerous visitors. In December 1996, 100 
households in Sakhalin oblast applied for permanent residence in South Korea through 
the Policy Committee for Korean Residents Abroad. In January 1997 the Korean Red 
Cross processed their applications and at that time, 223 Koreans applied for a visit to 
their country of origin.
Larisa Zabrovskya, “Russian-South Korean Relations in the early 1990s-part n ,” Vladivostok News. 
No. 12, 19 March 1994, p. 4.
Hankvk Ilbo (Seoul), 17 April 1998, p. 31.
The report o f the General Meeting o f the Sixth Sakhalin Incorporation in Sakhalin oblast, p. 19; 
According to Izvestiya. in January 2000, about 150 Sakhalin Koreans settled in the city 50-km from 
Seoul, South Korea. Many o f them have faced difficulty in this cultural and economic transition. See, 
Izvestiya. 28 January 2000, p. 2.
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6.2: North Korea and the Russian Far East
Russia and North Korea share a 12-mile border. As a result of this closeness, they 
benefit both from low transportation costs and also the opportunity to establish 
economic relations at a local level rather than at an inter-state level. In the RFE these 
relations economic have been concentrated particularly in Primorskii krai, Khabarovsk 
krai and Amur oblast. North Korean economic activities in the RFE have been 
primarily in the timber industry,^ ^ and followed by fishing and fish processing joint 
ventures. At present, a large number of North Korean workers are employed in the 
construction industry. In 1995, after long negotiations, North Korea and the RFE 
renewed their agreement on the joint development of the timber industry in Amur 
oblast and Khabarovsk krai. This positive shift has also strengthened the hand of local 
nationalists, such as Primorskii Governor Nazdratenko. His anti-Chinese sentiment has 
led to the encouragement of cheap North Korean labour to supplement the labour 
shortage/^ However, the recent renewal of ties with the North has not been 
unproblematic, as an increase in criminal activities in the RFE has been reported, 
particularly the violation of human rights taking place in timber camps and the 
smuggling of drugs.
In the following subsection, I will focus on the recent development of North 
Korean activities in the RFE in the above mentioned context. Firstly, I will consider
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Russia and North Korea: The End o f an Alliance?,” Korea and World Affairs. 
Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 1994, p. 500.
Vladimir B. Yakubovsky, “Economic Relations between Russia and DPRK,” Korea and World 
Affairs. Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall 1996, p. 467.
Yu. Stolyarov, “The Soviet Far East: The Economy and Foreign Economic Relations,” The Journal o f
East and West Studies. Vol. 20, No. 1, April 1991, p. 9.
“Twilight is Descending on Russia from Maritime Territory,” Izvestiva. 8 October 1996, pp. 1-4, as
cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVIII, No. 40, 1996, p. 19.
252
reported North Korean criminal activity in the RFE. Secondly, I will examine the 
question of North Korean workers in the timber industry; their human rights and the 
negotiation of a new agreement on this issue. Thirdly, I will deal with North Korean 
workers’ activities in Primorskii krai. It can be seen that the number of these workers 
has gradually increased with the development of joint construction projects. Finally, I 
will examine how the Tumen River Development project has affected economic co­
operation between North Korea and the RFE.
6,3,1: North Korean Criminal Activity in the RFE
The Far Eastern press has published many reports concerning North Korean drug 
smuggling as well as other forms of crime. For example, the Federal Security Service 
(FSS) administration commented on the detention of a North Korean citizen, Han Chan 
Gyong, in Primorskii krai. In November 1995 he had tried to purchase secret weapons 
in Vladivostok as part of a broad-scale programme being conducted on Russian 
territory by the North Korean special services. The FSS administration believed that 
drug trafficking in general took place in order to obtain hard currency for North Korea. 
This was based on the testimony of North Korean smugglers detained in 1994.^ "^  In 
addition to this, there was an incident in which a large shipment of heroin (over 8 kg) 
from North Korea was seized in Primorskii krai in June 1994. In 1995 there were no 
reports of North Korean drug smuggling, but in 1996 four cases were discovered.^^
Vladivostok News reported more drug smuggling activities involving North 
Koreans. A Korean smuggler was arrested in 1997, near Lake Khasan. He was carrying
“Fleet Counterintelligence Suspects Pyongyang’s Special Services,” Kommersant-Daily. 24 November 
1995, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVIÏ, No. 47,1995, p. 28.
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a large amount of opium and subsequently committed suicide in his cell. Another two 
North Korean opium dealers were arrested in June 1998 when they were caught trying 
to sell narcotics on a pier in Nakhodka. The FSS agents confiscated three kilograms of 
opium worth US$20,000. Since then, in a year-long investigation, the said North 
Koreans revealed they had bought the opium in Nakhodka to resell it at a profit. But the 
FSS proved the narcotics came from North Korea. In June 1999 a Nakhodka city court 
finally sentenced the dealers to five and eight-year prison terms.
Apart firom drug smuggling, in January 1996, 17 North Koreans employed by 
a Russian fish processing enterprise were caught by the Russian authorities trying to 
infiltrate a Pacific Fleet submarine facility. Furthermore, there was an unsettling 
incident involving the murder of a South Korean diplomat in Vladivostok on 1 October 
1996, North Korean officials were suspected of this crime even though no evidence that 
implicated them has been found^^ Two years later on October 1998, the Russian 
government finally decided that this incident was unrelated to North Korea. However, 
the South Korean government still disagrees with this conclusion/^
“The Protection for North Korean and Chinese illegal immigration to Russia,” Russia Far East-Siberia 
News (Seouiy No. 42, 31 May 1997, p. 35.
Zolotoi Rog, “Court Jails North Korean Drug Dealers,” Vladivostok News. No. 190, June 11, 1999, p.
1.
Kommersant-Datlv. 24 November 1995, p. 3.
Duck-Keun Kim, a consul o f  the South Korean consulate in Vladivostok, was found murdered at his 
apartment. The incident happened a few days after I returned from Vladivostok to Seoul in September 
1996. At that time I stayed for two weeks to do field research on the Russian Far East. According to the 
police investigation, he was murdered by poisonous injection. Two North Koreans were suspected. Korea 
Times (Seoul), 2 October 1996; “Two Korean Officials die,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 11, November 1996, p. 
10.
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 1 October 1998, p. 4.
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6.3,2 î North Korean Economic Activities in the RFE
The timber industry has been one of the major North Korean economic activities in the 
Far East. In 1956 North Korea and the USSR signed their first joint timber contract in 
Khabarovsk krai and Amur oblast. Under this joint venture agreement, about 20,000 
North Korean workers were employed in Amur and Chegdomyn, near Khabarovsk krai. 
According to the above agreement. North Korea would receive 40 per cent of the 
profits in return for providing cheap labour. The agreement was extended in 1960, 
1967,1972 and 1981.“
It is known that North Korean loggers have contributed to the revival of the 
dying timber industry in the Far East. By the mid-1980s the North Koreans had already 
created ten large forestry plants in Khabarovsk krai, with an annual output of 5 million 
cubic meters of timber. Also, five North Korean timber enterprises, with an annual 
capacity of 2.4 million cubic meters, were set up in the Amur region. About three 
million cubic meters of wood chips were produced and the Soviet Union exported 
almost the full amount to Japan and other East Asian countries. In turn, these 
enterprises allowed North Korea to meet nearly 60 per cent of its requirements for 
timber.^ ^
In Amur oblast. North Korea has been working with the Tindales Timber 
Industry Complex. In 1994, approximately 3,800 North Korean workers cut down a 
total of 563,000 cubic meters of timber in the region. On 24 February 1995, Russia and 
North Korea signed an agreement that the Korean side would take part in timber felling.
“Moscow and Pyongyang Sign New Logging Agreement,” Sevodnva. 17 March 1995, p. 3, as cited in 
CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 11, 1995, p. 27.
Vladimir F. Li, “Russia’s Far East in Contemporary Russian-Korean Relations,” in Tsuneo Akaha 
(ed.), Politics and Economics in the Russian Far East: Changing Ties with Asia-Pacific (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 200.
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reforestation and construction work on the timber processing plant/^ In August 1998 
North Korea’s Forestry Minister, Lee San Moo, visited Amur oblast. This resulted in an 
extension of 5 years to the previous 15-year forestry contract. The press reported that 
under the agreement, Korean workers were to produce timber from Russian logs. About 
40 per cent of the logs would be exported to North Korea, while 60 per cent would go 
to T indales.A part from timber, the Russian Far East exports mainly soya beans to 
North Korea, while North Korea provides consumer goods to the RFE. There are also 
Russian-North Korean agricultural joint ventures in Amur oblast, examples of which 
are Tatianovskoe and Rinrado-Volnoe. They specialise in growing cereals, soya, 
vegetables, melons and pumpkins.^"^
The first Chegdomyn (Khabarovsk krai) logging agreement between the 
Soviet Union and North Korea was signed in March 1967.^  ^However, in late 1991, this 
relationship deteriorated as North Korean loggers were expected to return to their 
country when the Soviet Union refused to renew the agreement. This situation was 
worsened by the fact that Soviet residents repeatedly complained about the North 
Korean workers’ behaviour, such as the way that they hunted animals and illegally 
exported food products, and by their refusal to plant trees to replace those they had cut 
down.^  ^A Soviet authority investigation team was sent to Chegdomyn logging site to
Yuri Moskalenko, “External Economic Co-operation Between the Amur Region and Countries o f  
Northeast Asia, Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 1996, p. 49.
63 Amurskaya Oblast Extends Contract with North Korea,” RFEU. Vol. VIII, No. 9, September 1998, p. 
6 .
Moskalenko, “External Economic Co-operation,” pp. 50-51,
“N. Korea Guest Workers Exploited, Oppressed,” Izvestiva. 26 March 1994, p. 4, as cited in FBIS 
Sov-94-61,30 March 1994, p. 6.
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 18 May 1991, p. 1; Charles E. Ziegler, “Russia and the Korean Peninsular: New  
Directions in Moscow’s Asia Policy?,” Problems o f  Post-Communist. Vol. 43, No. 6, 
November/December 1996, p. 7.
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investigate this matter in July 1991; this was the first investigation of its kind in twenty- 
two years/^
Following this investigation, Khabarovsk and the Soviet Forestry Minister 
attempted a reconciliation and pushed for a renewal of the USSR-North Korean forestry 
agreement which had expired six months earlier. Negotiations were completed in 
Pyongyang by mid July 199l/^ The Soviet Union supported the proposal (which North 
Korea confirmed) that North Korea would continue to take timber from the Soviet 
Union, Moscow also considered holding talks with North Korea about timber 
production, and the Soviet customs discussed duty free pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs and 
clothing for North Korean workers.^^ Finally, a new agreement between the North 
Korean Foreign Minister and the Soviet Union was signed in August 1991 which 
included all the above proposals.
Yet another issue to be addressed in the RFE logging industry was human 
rights. This problem, residing within closed settlements of North Korean workers, had 
been increasingly brought to public attention from the late 1980s. This led to further 
curtailment of timber-cutting co-operation between North Korea and Russia. Many 
contradictory reports were made on the situation. The Japan Times in June 1993 
reported that ‘Valerii Shubin, chief of the Russian Forest Service, revealed that the 
North Koreans lived under conditions that did not differ greatly from those under which 
the Russian loggers l ived .O thers  insisted that 20,000 North Korean loggers, living in 
the Chegdomyn camp, had laboured under inhumane conditions for many years. They
Seoul Sinmun. fSeouD. 11 July 1991, p, 1.
Moscow News. No. 29, 14-21 M y  1991, p. 3, as cited in FBrS-Sov-91-I52. 7 August 1991, pp. 5-6. 
Radio Moscow. 29 July 1991, as cited in FBIS-Sov-91-149, 2 August 1991, p. 20.
FBIS-EAS. 1991-153, 8 August 1991, p. 15, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 12, p. 100.
Japan Times. 19 June 1993, as cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 75.
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were officially volunteers, but they lived and worked under conditions similar to those 
in Russian prison camps, or even worse/^ Further, it was said that many were unable to 
endure the mistreatment at the hands of local guards and the appalling working and 
living conditions, and some attempted to escape/^
One particular interview was conducted in December 1993 with a man who, 
with help from Korean and Chinese in the RFE had managed to reach Vladivostok and 
board a Russian freighter at Pusan, bound for South Korea. The following is taken from 
an interview with him:
He said that there were about 10,000 North Korean labourers who led ‘animal- 
like’ lives due to the lack o f daily necessities. The loggers were forced to earn 
rubles by doing household chores at Russian homes or manual work at Russian 
industries. The extra work was by command o f Kim Chong II after the logging 
failed to earn money because o f the lack o f transport. Workers were obliged to 
contribute up to 90 per cent o f the money they earned in extra work to North 
Korea.^ "^
In addition to this case, in February 1994 more than 100 North Koreans 
sought to obtain political asylum in either South Korea or Russia. About 100 to 150 
loggers contacted either the embassy in Moscow or the South Korean consulate in 
Vladivostok.^^
Due to the large numbers of North Korean loggers wishing to defect to South 
Korea, complicated diplomatic negotiations resulted between Russia and the two
Izvestiya. 26 March 1994, p. 4.
Korea Times (Seoul), 24 May 1995, p. 3.
Yonhap (Seoul), 30 December 1993.
According to the Christian missionary workers, North Korean loggers lacked food and clothes. Most of 
them had malnutrition and wanted to escape from the camp. The Christian missionary workers I met 
provided humanitarian aid which consisted o f food, clothes among other needs. Later some o f  them in 
early 1994 escaped from the camp and settled down in South Korea. However, missionary workers could 
not continue to help other North Korean workers in Vladivostok because their escaping became wide 
known politically and internationally. Interviews were conducted with Christian missionary workers in 
Vladivostok in September 1996 with regards to the escaped loggers.
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Koreas/^ South Korea, for its part, felt unable to accept all the defectors, not wishing to 
exacerbate this unsettled relationship further. Instead, South Korea considered other 
alternatives, such as turning to the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Its government meanwhile asked Russia to recognise the escapers as 
international refugees, thereby ensuring their safety and basic rights/’ In February 
1994, South Korean President Kim Young Sam commented on this issue, stating:
“The number o f people who asked for asylum is tremendous. However, the 
majority o f  them do not have passports. In other words, they are stateless. This is 
strange. We may think that they are Koreans because they speak the Korean 
language. It is very easy and simple for us to accept their asylum if they ask for it 
directly from North Korea. In this case, we can easily decide on it. Because they 
have asked for asylum from another country’s territory, there are many 
international problems. Therefore, w e must consider those international issues in 
the light o f international law. We are carefrilly and positively dealing with them in 
light o f  humanity and human rights.
After the president’s statement, in March 1994, South Korean Foreign 
Minister Han Sung Joo stated at a press conference (at the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Club) that he favoured bringing North Korean loggers to Seoul despite the legal 
complications. He was extremely concerned about the kind of conditions to which 
North Koreans were being subjected. As mentioned by the President, one of the 
problems with bringing the loggers to South Korea was their unclear status in Russia. 
They also lacked passports or any form of identification. The South Korean government 
suggested that they could be flown to South Korea, but the Russian government would 
first have to determine their identity, define their status and arrange for their 
departure.’^
“North Korean Loggers Discussed,” Vladivostok News. No. 22, 3 June 1994, p. 4. 
”  Japan Times. 22 February 1994, p. 5.
78 KBS-ITV (Seoul), 25 February 1994. 
Yonhap (Seoul), 8 March 1994.
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Finally, in April 1994, South Korea asked the UNHCR to screen North 
Korean loggers who were fleeing from the RFE camps. This was in order to determine 
whether they were criminal offenders before they settled in South Korea. The South 
Korean government tried to find homes in third world countries for those seeking 
settlement outside South Korea. However, the focus was on blocking their repatriation 
to North Korea and this was in co-operation with the UNHCR. South Korea 
announced it would give asylum to approximately 170 North Korean loggers who had 
escaped from the Far Eastern logging camps.
Subsequently in the same month, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev 
met with South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo in Moscow. It was agreed that 
Russia would co-operate with North Korea in logging, would offer a guarantee of 
personal safety and uphold human rights in accordance with the highest international 
standards for any who were resident in the Russian Federation.®  ^Before this agreement, 
in June 1993, Russia implemented the North Korea defector protection law. 
Programmes were developed to help the loggers. These included job training and 
placement, housing assistance, and security steps to ensure their safety. Civil 
organisations and religious groups were encouraged to hold fund-raising campaigns.®^
In May 1994 a Russian delegation visited Pyongyang and renewed an 
agreement with North Korea which allowed them to continue logging in the RFE in the 
following five years. It was agreed that Pyongyang should abide by Russian laws.
“Russia To Help Resettle DPRK Loggers in ROK,” Yonhap (Seoul), 15 April 1994 as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-94-73, 15 April 1994, p. 19.
Yonhap (Seoul), 16 April 1994.
“DPRK Loggers to Work in Eastern Russian Regions,” Tass. 14 April 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-93- 
73, 15 April 1994, p. 18.
^  Yonhap (Seoul), 11 May 1994.
“DPRK ‘Warned’ to Observe Logger’s Human Rights,” Tass. 12 May 1994, as cited in FBIS-Sov-94- 
93, 13 May 1994, p. 18.
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including those relating to the human rights of North Korean loggers. Moscow insisted 
that North Koreans working in the Far East should have all the democratic rights 
enjoyed by citizens of Russia. For example, Moscow allowed them the right to strike, 
an eight-hour working day and the opportunity to move anywhere/^ Then in February 
1995, representatives of Russia and North Korea signed an inter-govemmental 
agreement in Pyongyang, stating that logging in Russia was permitted up to 1998. 
According to the new agreement. North Korea would establish work quotas and 
working conditions for the 7,000 Korean loggers who came under Russian labour laws. 
Russia could earn about US$57 million annually from timber cutting by the Korean 
workers,®®
The first article of the agreement specified the share of output allotted to the 
two countries:
Russia’s share in Amur oblast is 59 per cent and in Khabarovsk krai, 61 per cent.
North Korea’s share is 42 per cent and 38.5 per cent, respectively.^^
Other regulations of new agreement were as follows:
North Korea will pay for the transport o f  timber from Russia to Korea’s border, but
it will export the timber duty-free. Hunting or trapping o f wild animals or birds, as
well as fishing, except for sport and personal consumption, by loggers from North
Korea is prohibited.*
The new agreement was to be supervised by local Russian authorities. 
However, while the two countries are making considerable efforts to improve their 
economic relations in the timber industry, the issue of human rights under the new 
agreement still remains unclear.
“Korean Loggers’ Fate to be Decided at Pyongyang Talks,” Izvestiva 12 May 1994, p. 3, as cited in 
FBIS-Sov-94-93, 13 May 1994, p. 18; “Pyongyang-Moscow Logging Agreement Renewed,” North 
Korea News. No. 738, 6 June 1994, p. 6.
“Enhanced Human Rights Cited in New Felling Pact,” Tass. 26 February 1995, p. 2; “Pyongyang 
Committed to Strengthened Human Rights for Loggers in Siberia,” Korea Times (Seoul), 16 February 
1995, p. 2.
Segodnya. 17 March 1995, p. 3.
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As mentioned earlier, there are a growing number of North Koreans employed 
in the construction sector, and also in agriculture. This number has increased every year 
up to late 1997 in both these industries, concentrated mainly in Khabarovsk krai, 
Primorskii krai and Amur oblast. Whilst the Chinese are the largest single foreign 
workforce in the RFE, North Koreans make up a relatively sizeable contribution to the 
total labour.®  ^Most of the North Korean contracted workers are in Primorskii krai and 
table 6-1 shows that this number has been increasing in the area compared to that of the 
Chinese, although the latter still remain the larger presence.
Table 6-1: Number of Foreign Workers in Primorskii Krai
Country Year
1994 1995
China 7,895 8,349
North Korea 2,872 3,956
Sourcei Data provided by the Immigration Office in Primorskii krai as cited in Russia 
Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 47, 31 October 1997, p. 7.
The Primorskii krai local administration has reported that North Korean 
workers generally respect their contracts and show a high level of working interest. But 
the same administration restricted the importing of foreign workers annually by 1,500 
in total due to their significant impact on the Russian labour market.
In November 1994, the Foreign Economic Committee of North Korea and the 
Primorskii krai government signed an agreement creating the North Korean General
p. 3.
“Increasing North Korean Workers into the Russian Far East (in Korean),” Russia Far East-Siberia 
News (Seoul), No. 47, October 1997, p. 5.
262
Society for Foreign Construction. The document proposed dozens of possible projects, 
including North Korean assistance in the construction of a twenty-five floor office 
block across from the Golden Horn harbour, overlooking the centre of Vladivostok. 
North Korean delegates visiting Khabarovsk in January and Vladivostok in March 1995 
considered further projects in a variety of fields.
In September 1997 the Mayor of Vladivostok, Viktor Cherepkov, also visited 
Pyongyang and proposed that a treaty should be concluded on the matter of town 
construction and service industry. This would be in co-operation with the Foreign 
Economic Committee of North Korea. According to this proposal. North Korea would 
be involved in construction projects: the building of six bridges, underground markets, 
creating cross roads, bus stations and building overpasses in Vladivostok. In addition, 
North Korea would renew its suspended housing construction and plan the creation of 
town centre services. North Korea would provide skilled labourers, while Russia would 
take charge of construction design, secure accommodation, provide transport and 
ensure the provision of construction materials.^^
Overall, economic contacts between Russia and North Korea have gradually 
been restored since the worsening their relationship following Moscow’s establishment 
of diplomatic relations with South Korea. The two countries have resumed exchanges 
in the electricity and transportation sectors and in medical services, all of which had 
been suspended in 1991. In early July 1998 in Pyongyang the two countries signed a 
protocol on co-operation in transportation.^^ As can be seen in table 6-2, the analysis of
Ibid, p. 7.
James Clay Moltz, “Russia and the Two Koreas: The Dilemmas o f  ‘Dual Engagement,’' 
Demokratizatsiva. Vol. 6, No. 2, Spring 1998, p. 386.
Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 47, October 1997, p. 6.
Radio Russia (Moscow), 21 July 1998, as cited in Naewoe Press. August 1998, p. 1.
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the official figures show that positive trends have continued to dominate trade relations 
between Russia and North Korea, Russia’s exports to North Korea have considerably 
exceeded to its imports from North Korea. Although the turn-over in 1996 was slightly 
decreased, as compared with that in 1995, total amounts of export-import operations 
have increased since 1996, Russia mainly exports iron, fertiliser, timber and fuel to 
North Korea and it imports electric goods, textiles, and food from North Korea. Barter 
trade, which traditionally predominated, has at present declined. Economic relations 
between the two countries have also gradually been established at a local rather than at 
an inter-state level.^
Table 6-2: Russia’s Trade with North Korea from 1994 to 1998 (US$ millions)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Export 43 70.1 35.3 67.3 75
Import 17.9 15.3 28.7 17 15
Total 60.9 85.4 64 84.3 90
Source: The Deputy Director of the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA) kindly provided me with this data in April 2000 during my visit to Moscow,
6.3.3, Economic Co-operation between North Korean and the RFE with regard to 
the Tumen River project
Economic co-operation between North Korea and the RFE has continued in the Tumen 
river project,^^ which is a long-term development involving several other neighbouring 
countries. With regard to this project, since early 1991, North Korea has opened a port
The Russian Federation, pp. 112-13.
For a detailed discussion o f  the development o f the project see Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk, 
Rossivskii P a f  niv Vostok t severo-vostochnava aziva (Moscow; URSS, 1998), pp. 154-68.
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at Rajin, expanded railroads between Nakhodka and Rajin, and organised a trade 
exhibition house associated with the Tumen river development,^^ The project is a good 
example of multinational economic agreement in Northeast Asia/^ The United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP) has backed this project, and has organised many 
international seminars and conferences to discuss its development.^® The cost of 
developing this project was estimated at US$30 billion by the UNDP and the time it 
would take at 15 to 20 years. With the completion of a four-year preliminary 
consultation on the drafting of the project (concluded in the UN Headquarters, in early 
December 1995), Northeast Asia’s first multilateral mter-govemmental agreement on 
economic co-operation was decided. According to this agreement, a meeting is to be 
held every year in the capital of each country. The order was decided alphabetically, as 
follows: China 1996, North Korea 1997, Mongolia 1998, South Korea 1999 and Russia 
in the year 2000
As can be seen in map 6-1, the Tumen River Economic Development Area 
(TREDA) covers an area from the city of Chyongin in North Korea across to Yanji in 
China and up to Nakhodka in Russia. It includes the Free Economic and Trade Zone
Chosun Ilbo CSeouO. 29 August 1994.
“Tumen River Project Develops Apace,” RA Report. No. 16, January 1994, p. 18.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) officially adopted the idea o f multilateral 
development co-operation in the Tumen river area in July 1991, on the basis o f agreements reached with 
the government o f North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Mongolia, with Russia joining later. See 
“Russia’s Interests and Prospects for Co-operation in Northeast Asia,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), 
No. 3, 1995, p. 4L
“Tumen R ver Project Faces Hurdles,” Asian Wall St Journal. 27 May 1992, pp. 1-8, as cited in 
SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 37; “Japan Firms to Join Tumen River Project,” Nikkei Weekly. 29 
August 1992 p. 28, as cited in RA Report. No. 14, January 1993, p. 24.
The package o f these agreements includes: an agreement on setting up a Consultative Commission for 
the TREDA and for the development o f Northeast Asia (signed by Russia, China, North Korea, South 
Korea and Mongolia); an agreement on setting up a Co-ordinating Committee for the TREDA (signed by 
Russia, China and North Korea); and a Memorandum on mutual understanding regarding the guiding 
principles o f environmental protection in the TREDA (signed by Russia, China, North Korea, South 
Korea and Mongolia) See Evgeni Tomikhin, “The Tumangan Project with the Agreements Signed,” Far 
Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1997, pp. 91-2.
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Rajin-Sattbong (North Korea), and the Yanbian-Korean Autonomous District of the 
Jilin Province (China). It also includes the Special Economic Zones of Jilin and 
Hunchun, the Russian city of Vladivostok, and the Free Economic Zone of Nakhodka 
(including the port Vostochny).^®  ^ China, North Korea, Mongolia and the Russian Far 
East are building ports and towns on the river’s estuary, which has a population of 
approximately 6 million. This development will aid the favourable economic 
environment being created in the territoiy and the countries involved are acquiring 
access to the Sea of Japan. The original plan of the project was as follows: the 
Russian Far East would provide the natural resources; labour and mineral resources 
would come from China and North Korea and Mongolia; Japan, South Korea and 
Western countries would provide the capital and technology.
During its first meeting in February 1992, the Tumen River Area Development Programme’s 
Programme Management Committee (TRADP-PMC) established the Tumen River Economic Zone 
(TREZ, or ‘small triangle’) and Tumen Economic Development Area (TEDA or ‘large triangle’), as can 
be seen in map 7-1. The TREZ, which is located within a radius o f  40 to 50 km from the estuary o f the 
Tumen River, includes Sonbong, Rajin (North Korea), Hunchun (China) and Posyet (Russia). The larger 
TEDA includes the TREZ as well as the cities o f  Vladivostok (Russia), Chongjin (North Korea) and 
Yanji (China) which are all located within 80 to 120 km o f the estuary. See “UN Zone Has Turned Into a 
Programme o f Development,” Kommersant Dailv. 22 July 1995, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-Sov-95-154-S. 10 
August 1995, p. 2.
“Maritime Softens Stance on Tumangan Project,” Moscow Radio Rossii Network. 19 August 1995, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-95-161. 21 August 1995, p. 44.
Larisa Zabrovskaya, Rossiva i Respublifca Koreva: of. konfrontatsn k sotmdnichestvu 11970-1990-6 
gg.l (Vladivostok: DO RAN, 1996), pp. 82-3; Igor Korkunov, “On the Project o f the Tumenjiang Free 
Economic Zone in the Territory o f Russia, China and North Korea,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 
2-3, 1994, p. 38.
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Map 6-1; Tumen River Area and Its Large and Small Development Zones
R u ssia
China
North East Asia Regional Oevolopmont Area 
(NEARDA) ______ ^
Tumanz^ ;—^
Hunchun ' 'Yanji
RWor Economic Zone)NEARDA
Tumen Rivar
Democratic People 's 
Republic of Korea
Tumen River Delta Area
with Large/Small Development Zones
Source: “Tumen River Delta: Far East’s Future Rotterdam,” Beiiing Review. 20 June 
1992, p. 5; Andrew Marton, Terry Mctee and Donald G. Paterson, “Northeast Asian 
Economic Co-operation and the Tumen River Area Development Project,” Pacific 
Review. Vol. 68, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 8.
Russia and North Korea have shown a high level of interest in developing the 
areas adjoining the Tumen River which runs along the border. In July 1991 at the 
Northeast Asia Sub-Regional Programme Meeting of UNDP (held in Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia) the Soviet Union presented a plan to designate three international ports: 
Nakhodka, Vladivostok and Posyet as part of a ‘Greater Vladivostok Free Economic
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Area.’^^"^ This area covers approximately 15,200 square km and is populated by 1.4 
million people,^^  ^North Korea also released its own proposal for the development of 
the areas near the Tmnen River. In December 1991 the North Korean govermnent 
designated the Rajin-Sonbong area as a Free Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ). It 
covers 621 to 746 square kms as part of its ambitious economic programme aimed at 
attracting more foreign investment.
Since January 1993, North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly has 
promulgated laws aimed at attracting more foreign capital, including a law on FETZ. 
The intention of the law is to encourage foreign capital and technology to the FETZ in 
the Rajin-Sonbong area.^^  ^ In February 1994, a three-stage plan was put forward to 
develop an international port and industrial complex in the Rajin and Sonbong FETZes, 
The North Korean Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Co-operation
The idea for the Greater Vladivostok project was outlined as a development strategy for integration o f  
the RFE with the Asia Pacific Region (APR) in 1991. In May 1992, the city o f  Vladivostok established a 
special account for financing work on the project out o f local budgetary funds, allocating about 1.5 
million rubles to local a research group during the summer o f 1992. This group presented tentative plans 
for this project, but later faced financial problems and conflict ensued between local and central 
government, and therefore was faced to disband. In September 1992, a unit o f Khabarovsk’s Economic 
Research Institute, the Pacific Economic Development and Co-operation Centre, based in Vladivostok, 
replaced this group that promote a Free Economic Zone and foreign economic linkages. The centre 
suggested two alternatives: the Primorskii krai gain economic independence from the RF and associate 
itself with the Tumen river project; and to obtain better economic integration with the European part o f  
the RF and become the essential link between Russia and the APR. To examine this project in greater 
depth, see Gaye Cliristofferson, “The Greater Vladivostok Project: Transnationl Linkages in Regional 
Economic Planning,” Pacific Affairs. Vol. 67, No. 4,1994/1995, pp. 513-31.
Kommersant Dailv. 22 July 1995, pp. 2-3; “Tumen River Ptpjcct,” TED Case Studies. No. 247, 
January 1999, p. 1,
“North Korea’s Plan for Tumen River Development,” Don-A Ilbo (Seoul), 10 November 1993, p. 
ll;Y oung Namkoong, “An Analysis o f  North Korea’s Policy to Attract Foreign Capital: Management 
and Achievement,” Korea and World Affairs. Vol. XIX, No. 3, Autumn 1995, p. 466.
Kyodo. 2 May 1994, as cited in RA Report. No. 17, July 1994, p. 66; further discussion on the 
economic development in North Korea can be found in Nicholas Eberstadt, “Self-Reliance and Economic 
Decline: North Korea’s International Trade, 1970-1995,” Problems o f Post-Communism. Vol. 46, No. 1, 
January/Febmary 1999, pp. 3-13; According to a report by People’s Korea, by 1997 the total amount o f  
investments in Rajin-Sonbong in terms o f contracts had reached US$750 million, in 111 projects. See 
Korea Herald (Seoul), 26 September 1998, p. 1.
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proposed this p r o j e c t . T h e  Committee issued a 40-page booklet entitled ‘Golden 
Triangle Rajin-Sonbong.’ Some of its master plans are summarised below:
(a) o f two new harbours in Rajin, one will be 1,000 meters long and the other 
3,500 meters-long. This will accommodate freighters up to 200,000 tons with 
storage facilities o f  500,000 sq.m. By 2010 it writ be built a  terrninal capable o f  
handling 40 million tons o f  cargo and also will house 36 freighters weighing
20.000 to 200,000 tons, (b) Saonbong port will have an annual freight capacity o f  
10 million tons, while Chongjin port will be modernised to support the 
international role o f Najin and Sonbong. (e) The 168-km Chinese railroad, 
Hoeryong-Haksong, will be duplicated, and tracks linking Najin to  Kyryongpyong 
and Hyonyong expanded, (d) Railroads will be modernised to Hunchun (China) 
and Khasan (Russia). Also express highways will be constmcted to connect 
Hoerying, Chongjin, Najin, Sonbong and Khasan. (e) The plan also included a
300.000 kw power plant and an international airport in Sonbong. Connections to 
Niigata in Japan, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in Russia, Hunchun and Jilin in will 
be expanded. North Korea will install 100,000 telephones and data exchange 
circuits in Rajin; fiber submarine cable will link Rajin-Hunchun and Poset 
(Russia).
The following advantages are hoped for upon the completion of the project. It 
will form part of the 13,000-km section of the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), which 
has long served the Far East and Europe. An 11,000 km alternative route, via 
Lionyungang port (China) and Kazakhstan, was opened by China in 1992. A new short­
cut via Northeast China and Mongolia will also shorten the Siberian route by about 
1,000 km.^^  ^This project is a vital requirement for furthering economic development in 
China’s Northeast, and will give Chinese’s Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces access to 
the Sea of Japan.^^  ^ The RFE will further extend its economic co-operation in the Asia 
Pacific Region (APR). Eventually it will integrate into the regional economy, and this 
will create a favourable climate for foreign investment which is needed to build the
Erina Report. Vol. 3, 1994, p. 35; North Korea News. No. 725, 7 March 1994, p. 5.
Yonhap (Seoul), 22 February 1994.
Hifokazu Shiode, “Tumen River Area Development Programme; The North Korean Perspective”, in 
Myo Thant, Min Tang and Hiroshi Kakazu (eds.) Growth Triangles in Asia: A  New Approach to 
Regional Economic Co-operation (Asian Development Bank: Oxford CJniversity Press, 1994), p. 292.
Nikkei Weekly. 6 June 1992, p, 27, as cited in SUPAR Report. No. 13, July 1992, p. 37; Ludmila 
Zabrovskaya, “The Tumanggang Project: A View From Primorie,” Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 
1995, p. 34.
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transport infrastructure in the Far East/^^ South Korea will benefit from the project in 
terms of cheaper and faster transportation of goods to and from the inland areas of 
Northeast Asia and even to and from Europe in the future.
The Russian government adopted a decree in July 1995, ‘On Participation of 
Russia in the Realisation of the UN Draft Development Programme and Programme for 
Development of the Tumen River B a s i n . T h e  Governor of Primorskii krai, 
Nazdratenko, showed his interest in the RFE-oriented element of this programme. He 
stressed the international character of the project, which covers the development of a 
transit transport complex from the Russian and Chinese border to Kraskino customs at 
the Zarubino settlement. He also said that it would be closely connected with the 
establishment o f free economic territories in the city of Hunchun (China) and in the 
town of Sonbong (North Korea). Objectively, there are opportunities for reinstating 
and developing economic ties between the RFE and North Korea in this project 
However, there do exist some serious obstacles. Russians and North Koreans lack the 
necessary finance for the development of the project. The primary problems are the 
unstable economic situation in both two countries; the complicated process of economic 
reform; uncontrollable transportation costs; and a lack of investment of foreign 
capital. In the light of this, any major progress in economic co-operation in this area 
is bound to be relatively slow.
Mikhail Titarenko, “A Post-Cold War Northeast Asia and Russian Interests,” Far Eastern Affairs 
(Moscow), No. 4-5, 1994, p. 34.
113 Plans Busiest Port in Far East,” South China Morning Post. 22 September 1992, p. 11; “Sea of  
Japan and Tumen River Project,” Nikkei Weekly. 18 July 1992, p. 3, as cited in RA Report. No. 14, 
Januaiy 1993, p. 24.
Kommerant Dailv. 22 July 1995, p. 2.
Erina Report. Vol. 8, 1995, p. 21.
Zabrovskaya, Rossiva i Respublika Koreva. pp. 85-6.
I conducted an interview with a specialist on the Russian Far East in Birmingham on 20 May 1998.
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Despite recent progress, there remain a number of other impediments to the 
realisation of effective multilateral co-operation among the major participants of the 
Tumen river project. In February 1996, for instance. North Korea cancelled its seminar 
on investment opportunities in the Rajin-Sonbong FETZ. This was to be held at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. North Korea was expecting more 
countries to attend but only South Korean businesses signed up.^^^  From the beginning. 
South Korea agreed with North Korea’s proposals for the development of the Tumen 
River. South Korea regarded these proposals as a means of ‘opening’ North Korean 
ports to South Korean trade. An example of this ‘opening’ is the tourist promotion 
that has taken place through the South Korean company Hyundai since late 1998 over 
the spectacular mountainous area of Kyum Kang in North Korea, which is considered 
to be a symbol of national pride and identity by South Koreans. This is a sign of both 
countries’ willingness to work together for their mutual benefit Hyundai has also 
invested heavily in the Rajin-Sonbong area in North Korea, further cementing co­
operation between the two countries. Eventually these efforts are expected to create an 
environment that will encourage political contacts and exchanges on the unification 
policy. South Korea has actively participated in the Tumen river project, not only with 
a view to economic relations with the Russian Far East but also to encourage the 
reunification of the whole peninsula.
Although South Korea resumed normal relations with China in 1992, Japan 
and North Korea have not as yet done so. In the past years, Japan has made a move to 
develop its relations with North Korea, despite the lack of diplomatic links between 
them. Relations between Japan and Russia, meanwhile, are hindered by a longstanding
118 “North Korea’s Free Trade Zone,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 3, March 1996, p. 6.
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territorial dispute. The Japanese government is not willing to provide full economic 
support to Russia because of this dispute over the southern Kuril islands (dealt with in 
Chapter 5). Japan also decided not to participate in the Tumen River project. Due to the 
aforementioned difficulties, and also recent economic problems in Northeast Asian 
countries, in the short term work on this project does not look very promising, but work 
still slowly progresses, supported by the UNDR As Shiode comments, given these 
major problems, an international effort may have a greater chance of success than 
bilateral initiatives.^^^
6.4: South Korea and the Russian Far East
Geographic, economic, cultural and political reasons have all influenced both South 
Korea’s short and long-term interest in the RFE. Increased opportunities for interaction 
can be traced mainly to geographic proximity and natural resources. Since early 1990, 
the South Koreans have made every effort in specific areas to reinvigorate their 
economic contacts with the RFE as they consider it as one of the most promising 
regions for economic co-operation. South Korea also hopes that this kind of economic 
development in the RFE will provide a stable political environment for the unification 
of the peninsula at some point in the future. Korea and the RFE could benefit from 
mutual help in this respect. This would mean that Korea would supply consumer goods 
and the RFE would export raw materials to Korea’s industries.
This trend has produced a favourable environment for the improvement of 
relations between the RFE and South Korea. Korea has begun to develop trade and
’^^Zabrovskaya, Rossiya i Respublika Koreva. p. 81.
Sbiode, “Tumea River Area Development Programme/’ p. 296.
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investment vWth the RFE, with companies opening branches and developing investment 
in the region. To facilitate increased bilateral commercial contact, the Soviet Chamber 
of Commerce opened a semi-official trade office in Seoul in April 1989. In July of that 
year, the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) opened an office in 
Moscow and in February 1992 a regional office was also opened in Vladivostok. In 
July 1992, a Consulate was also established in Vladivostok.
Relations were not only developed economically, but also at the religious and 
cultural level. Korean missionaries built churches and distributed Bibles in Khabarovsk 
krai, Primorskii krai^^  ^and Sakhalin oblast and still continue their work in these areas. 
In terms of education, in October 1995, a five-year course in Korean studies was 
opened in a Korean College in Vladivostok, in the grounds of the Far Eastern 
University. In 1997, a total of 200 students enrolled and it has become a popular college 
for Far Eastern students.^ '^^
In the following subsection, I will focus primarily on South Korean economic 
activities in the RFE. Firstly, I will deal with South Korean bilateral trade with the 
RFE, and compare it with two other major economic partners; China and Japan. I will 
also examine the Russian petty traders who are called ‘shuttlers’ (chelnoki in Russian 
and Botari Changsoo in Korean), who provide a new pattern of small-scale economic
Larisa Zabrovskaya, “Russian-South Korean Relations in the early 1990s,” Vladivostok News 
(Vladivostok), No. 11, 18 March 1994, p. 2.
This information I obtained from the KOTRA in Vladivostok in September 1996.
I stayed with a Christian missionary family when I went to Vladivostok in September 1996 to conduct 
my research. Through their kind and sincere help, I succeeded in accomplishing my task without any 
difficulties.
The Chairman o f the Koryo Synthetic Fibre Group (Kohap) in South Korea, Chang Chi Hyok, is from 
a wealthy Korean industrialist family who lived in Primorskii krai during the Japanese occupation. It was 
due to Chang’s ancestral history in Primorskii krai that it was here he choose to open a new Korean 
College, which he funded himself to expand the interchange o f  cultural and educational contacts between 
Russia and Korea. It was reported that Chang was the first Korean to be awarded Russia’s ‘Order o f
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activity between South Korea and the RFE.^^  ^ Secondly, I will investigate South 
Korean investment in the RFE, with particular emphasis on major individual regions. I 
will also give attention to the proposed Korean-Russian industrial park in the Nakhodka 
FEZ which is being developed. Finally, I will discuss some of the main problems faced 
by South Korea in the development of economic relations with the RFE.
6.4.1: Trade Relations between the RFE and South Korea
Now I turn to focus our attention upon the RFE’s foreign trade between 1992 and 1996, 
as shown in table 6-3 (panel A). Although trade gradually increased over the period, 
there are considerable fluctuations. From 1992 to 1993 RFE trade increased steadily, 
but in 1994 it sharply declined. In 1995, the figure rose again, to drop slightly in 1996. 
This second decline was likely due to some of its neighbouring countries (including 
South Korea and Japan) experiencing their own economic difficulties. As the Russian 
Far East Update reported in October 1998: ‘External trade levels in the RFE have fallen 
by 50 per cent as compared with the same period last year, with imports shrinking more 
than exports.
Friendship’ medal. This information was taken from interviews which I conducted in Vladivostok, 
Primorskii krai, in September 1996, and in Seoul, South Korea, in July 1998.
Charles E. Ziegler, “Russia and the Korean Peninsula: New Directions in Moscow’s Asia Policy?” 
Problems o f Post-Communism. Vol. 43, No. 6,1996, p. 7.
“Exports Down, Imports Way Down,” RFEU. Vol. VM, No. 10, October 1998, p. 3.
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Table 6-3: Foreign Trade in the RFE from 1992 to 1996 (US$ millions) (panel A) 
and Major Trade Partners in 1996 (US$ millions) (panel B)
Panel (A) Panel (B)
4.087 3.933
3.121
= 2
1993 19961992 1995
400
Year
China Japan Korea us CIS 
Country
Source: Adapted from “1996 Russian Far East Trading Statistics^” Russian Far East 
Update. Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1997, p. 15; Elisa Miller and Soula Stefanopoulos, 
The Russian Far East : A Business Reference Guide (Seattle: Russian Far East Update, 
Third Edition 1997 and 1998), p. 165.
China has been the RFE^s most important single trade partner for several 
years. While it is still the leading partner, ahead of Japan and Korea, since 1993 total 
RFE trade with China has been declining. This is partly due to the shift in trade towards 
Japan, South Korea, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which in turn has 
boosted the quality and diversity of the RFE food markets, In addition, imports of 
Chinese foodstuffs and consumer goods have been reduced, due to their low quality^^  ^
and the new and more restrictive travelling rules imposed by the Russian government in 
early 1994 (see chapter 5). From my interviews, it was evident that RFE consumers
Elisa Miller, The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide (Seattle: Russian Far East LTpdate, 
Second Edition, 1996), pp. 155-56.
David Kerr, “Sino-Russian Relations and the Development o f the Russian Far East," a paper 
presented to the BASEES annual conference in Cambridge in March 1996, p. 2.
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rank Japanese goods the best in terms of quality, and South Korean goods the most 
reliable.
As can be seen in table 6-3 (panel B), Japan was the RFE’s second biggest 
trading partner in 1996. The RFE's exports to Japan are greater than its imports, for 
instance, in 1996, the RFE exported goods to a value of to a value of $737 million to 
Japan, but imported only $146 million (mostly machinery and steel pipe)/^^ Japan’s 
main interests in the RFE are fish, timber, oil and gas (Japan is a major partner in the 
offshore oil and gas projects at Sakhalin) but there is also an interest in developing the 
ports of the RFE to facilitate the movement of commodities and to boost transit trade 
with neighbouring China.
I will now consider trade relations, in particular those between Russia and 
South Korea. Bilateral economic co-operation between Russia and Korea is best 
demonstrated in the trade field According to KOTRA data, in 1996 nearly 400 Korean 
companies were trading with Russia, 40 of them established in permanent offices there. 
In 1995, approximately 20 major Korean firms accounted for about 95 per cent of this 
trade, with 90 per cent dominated by just seven major companies: Hyundai, Samsung, 
Daewoo, LG, Sunkyong, Kohap and Jindo.^^  ^ Table 6-4 shows South Korea’s trade 
with Russia from 1992 to the first half of 1998. As can be seen, there exist considerable 
fluctuations, the total trade volume suddenly dropping US$347 million in 1993. This 
followed a sharp fall in Korean imports from Russia. However, from 1993 to 1996, the
I obtained this information from my own interviews in Vladivostok in September 1996.
130 “ 1 9 9 5  Russian Far East Trading Statistics,” RFEU. Vol. VII, No. 10, October 1997, p. 15.
“Russia and Japan: Trade Relations,” Sevodnya. 2  October 1993, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLV, 
No. 40, 1993, p. 35; “Disputed Islands Appraised At 5 %,” Kommersant-Dailv. 3 May 1995, p. 4, as 
cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 18,1995, p. 20.
Report on the Analvsis o f Foreign Investment in the Russian Far East (in Korean) by the Korea Trade 
and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), in Vladivostok, September 1996 (mimeo), p. 4.
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total trade volume has increased steadily. From 1996 to the first half of 1998 the total 
trade volume fell sharply due to economic difficulties in both countries. An 
imbalance in trading occurred during 1992, with Korean imports from Russia 
exceeding exports by 3 times. However, in 1996, the situation was reversed, with 
Korean exports to Russia exceeding imports. Exports to Russia have steadily decreased 
by 10 per cent since 1997 while imports from Russia have significantly dropped since 
1996." ^
Table 6-4: South Korea’s Trade with the Russian Federation from 1992 to 
1998 (US$ millions)
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Source: Adapted from Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik: statisticheskii sbomik 
(Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1997), p. 578; Report on the Influence of Declaration of 
Russia’s Moratorium by KOTRA (in Seoul), August 1998 (mimeo), p. 4.
Note: * Export + Import
As mentioned previously, Korea was the RFE’s third largest trade partner in
Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik: statisticheskii sbomik (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 1997), p. 
578.
Izvestiva. 19 August 1998, pp. 1-2.
277
1996 (table 6-3). Table 6-5 shows trade between South Korea and the RFE. Unlike 
South Korea’s trade with the RF as a whole, this developed steadily between 1991 and 
1996 except for a slight decline in 1993. In 1996, South Korea accounted for 32 per 
cent of the REE’s total foreign trade, and between 1993 and 1996, Korean-RFE trade 
tripled in value. Trade was balanced in 1996, with Korean exports slightly exceeding 
imports.
Table 6-5: South Korea’s Trade with the RFE from 1992 to 1996 (US$ millions)
Totaf Trade
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Sourcex As Table 6-3, p. 15 and p. 172.
As can be seen in table 6-6, Russian and Korean trade has primarily been 
based on an exchange of raw materials for finished goods. Russia exports mostly raw 
materials (metals, timber, seafood, coal, oil, chemical and fishery products), while 
Korea exports electronic goods, machinery, movement vehicles, textiles, footwear, and 
furniture to Russia. Korean investors are particularly interested in consumer goods
Report on the Influence o f  Declaration o f Russia's Moratorium (in Korean) by the KOTRA in Seoul, 
August 1998 (mimeo), p. 4.
278
manufacturing, especially home electronics/^^ These are very popular in the RFE and 
are the main reason why Korean exports to the RFE are relatively high/^^ Korea has 
gained significant shares due to an aggressive home-office policy. As a result of this, 
three major Korean home-electronics companies (Hyundai, Samsung, and Lucky 
Goldstar), have retail stores and plants operating in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.
Table 6-6: Structure of South Korea’s Trade with Russia in 1996
Exports % Import %
Primary products 13.31 Agro-fishery products 21.90
Chemical goods 1.15 Mining products 4.43
Plastics, rubbm' and leather products 1.67 Chemical products 19.49
Non-metal mineral products 3.26 Steel, metal products 45.70
Clothes & textile 9.10 Machineiy & vehicles 5.19
Necessities 2.81 Electronic & electrical goods 0.31
Steel, metal products 1.74 Clothes &  textiles 2.71
Electronics & electiical products 51.81 Others 0.26
Machinery & movement vehicles 14.78
Miscellaneous products 0.38
Total 100.00 100.00
Source: Korea International Trade Association in 1997,
Russian Shuttle Traders in South Korea. Yet another beneficial development 
between the RFE and South Korea has been the increase in Russian shuttle traders. 
Since 1991, Russian shuttlers have been trading very actively in Pusan and Seoul in
Russia Far East-Siberia News tSeouh. No. 53, 18 September 1998, pp. 8-9,
Sun Khun Kim, “Sostayanie i prioritetnye napravleniya vneshneekonomicheskogo sotnidichestva 
mezhdu Rosslei Î Respublikoi Koreya,” Problemv D afaego Vostoka. No. 3, 1996, pp. 88-9; "RFE 
Company to Market Korean Electronics,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 9, September 1996, p. II.
This information was provided in an interview I conducted with a Director o f  the KOTRA in 
Vladivostok in September 1996,
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Korea, as they have with Russia’s East European neighbours and Turkey. Small-scale 
activities of shuttlers between the RFE and Korea can be seen as a new phenomenon in 
the business field. In the past years a considerable proportion of Far Eastern shuttlers 
have transferred from China to South K o rea /T h ese  traders are not only from the RFE 
but also from as far as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Many Russian 
consumers prefer to purchase Korean rather than Chinese and Turkish goods.
In Pusan there has gradually developed a market for Russian traders. These 
visitors arrive by ship and stay for about a week, buying various consumer goods in 
large quantities to take back to Russia for resale. Approximately 100,000 Russians 
visited Pusan in 1994; some 45,000 journeyed to Seoul. According to KOTRA, 
purchases were made from the so-called ‘Texas’ market of necessities in Eastern Pusan. 
The ‘Texas market’ hired Russian-speaking students and ethnic Koreans from Sakhalin 
in early 1993, and set up shops exclusively for Russians to meet the growing demand 
As these traders brought in more and more duty free goods, Moscow decided to lower 
the duty free limit from US$5,000 per person to US$2,000/'^^ In September 1996, there 
was a Korean TV documentary on Russian traders in Pusan, which reported that they 
could buy cheap quality Korean goods and sell them in their own country. According 
to my interviews in September 1999, it was not only Russian traders who arrived in
He also kindly provided kindly me with some information on the Russian shuttlers’ economic 
activities.
Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), February 3 1998.
Ziegler, “Russia and the Korean Peninsula,” p. 7.
Yonhap (Seoul), 4 January 1994; FBIS-EAS-94-3, 5 January 1994, p, 21, as cited in RA Report No. 
17, July 1994, p. 71.
A TV interviewer indicated that there was also a Russian-Texas town in Pusan. This part o f the town 
has made every effort to accommodate Russians by translating adverts into Russian.
280
Pusan, but also some university students and unskilled workers came to make money, 
most of them employed by the service sector/"^ "^
The second largest trade market for shuttlers is the Dongdaemoon (Eastgate) 
market in Seoul. Many of the shops and stalls at the market are set up primarily to sell 
large and small scale clothing to Russian traders. This has created over 1,000 jobs for 
Koreans who deal in shipping and the handling of purchased goods. Transactions can 
sometimes involve very large amounts. The greater availability of flights from the RFE 
to Seoul makes it easy for Russian buyers to travel to and from Seoul. Purchases are 
also transported by ship from Pusan to Vladivostok.
According to the KOTRA report, in 1996 Russian shuttlers had contributed a 
fifth of the total trade with Korea. As can be seen in table 6-7, shuttle trade has been 
stable, or contracting, between 1991 and 1998. However, since August 1998 the trend 
has reversed with the number of shuttlers increasing. Approximately 200,000 Far 
Eastern Russians were at the time involved in the shuttle trade. In early 1998 the 
Korean government considered making visa application procedures easier for Russian 
shuttle traders to promote this trade. Pusan and Seoul have become major centres for 
small and large scale clothing, cars, electrical goods and computers being exported to 
Russia. According to KOTRA in February 1999, this increasing trend is likely to 
continue in future years. Their prospects are very optimistic.
Shuttle trade has been a large unexpected contributor to the improvement of 
economic relationships between Russia and South Korea. Although Russia and South
I conducted an interview with anonymous Russian students in Pusan in October 1999.
Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 3 February, 1998.
Report on the Activities o f Russian Shuttle Traders in Korea (in Korean) by the KOTRA (Seoul), 
March 1999 (mimeo), pp. 4-5.
I obtained this information in March 1999 from the KOTRA, Seoul.
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Korea were at this time both experiencing economic difficulties, as can be seen in table 
6-7, shuttle trade was bringing much needed cash into both countries^ hands.
Table 6-7: Russian Shuttle Trade with South Korea from 1991 to 1998 
Total Trade No of Shuttlers
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Source: Adapted from Choson Ilbo (Seoul), 3 February 1998; Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 3 
February 1998; Report on the Activities of Russian Shuttle Traders in Korea (in 
Korean) published by the KOTRA (Seoul), March 1999 (mimeo), pp. 4-5; and data 
provided by the Korean Embassy (Moscow), April 2000.
6.4.2: South Korean Investment in the RFE
Moving from trade relations, I now turn my attention to foreign investment in the RFE, 
and will finish by focussing on South Korean investment in particular. Since the early 
1990s, joint ventures (TVs) have dominated foreign trade operations in the RFE. 
Chinese firms were the first to establish foreign investment in Khabarovsk krai in 1988. 
In 1989 there were 8 joint ventures (or enterprises with foreign investment) in 
Khabarovsk. By 1991 this figure had risen to 39 and in 1992 it rose to 155. By January 
1993 in Khabarovsk about 73 enterprises with Chinese investment (63 of them joint 
ventures) were registered, this being the largest number of joint ventures in the RFE. A
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reason for this was the fact it was more advantageous to sell Chinese goods via joint 
ventures, so the Chinese were looking for p a r t n e r s . A t  the end of 1995, foreign 
investment in the region was concentrated in Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, with 
1,672 foreign firms between therm They received 66.5 per cent of all foreign 
investment in the region. Foreign investors were mainly involved in the fishing, food, 
trade, and manufacturing industries. TVs in 1995 accounted for 85 per cent of total 
investment. Among them the largest number was still with Chinese, followed by 
those with the Americans, Japanese and South Koreans. Also, China’s share in total 
foreign investment was the largest (40.2 per cent) followed by the LTS (16.0 per cent), 
Japan (12.9 per cent) and Korea (7.2 per cent).^^°
Although investment is a top priority between Russia and Korea, the 
expansion of trade has not been accompanied by a fast growth in direct investment in 
Russia, The first South Korean investment in Russia was a US$1.47 billion loan^^^  and 
in 1997, after 6 years, this had only increased to US$3.3 billion. Izvestiva also notes.
Priamurskie vedomosti. 2 March 1993, p. 2, as cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 91.
Report on the Analysis o f Foreign Investment in the Russian Far East (in Korean) published by the 
KOTRA in Vladivostok, September 1996 (mimeo), p. 1.
Ibid., p. 4.
In April 1991 South Korea concluded an agreement with Moscow to provide US$3 billion in loans 
over three years, US$1 billion o f which was to be granted as a cash loan during 1991. See Izvestiva. 5 
December 1991, p. 5, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLIIï, No. 49, 1991, p. 17. After the disintegration o f the 
USSR, however, the South Korean government halted loans to Moscow after it had released a total o f  
US$1.4 billion by the end o f 1991. At the same time, South Korea began to insist that Russia repay the 
overdue debt. Problems over Russia’s interest payment on this loan put further strain on their bilateral 
relations. In May 1992, Russia agreed on repayment guarantees on all aid, including paying the US$500 
million in tied aid, and some US$36.8 million in overdue interest, on a US$1 billion commercial bank 
loan, In return. South Korea released the second half o f a US$3 billion loan to Russia. See “ROK 
Prepared to Partially Unfreeze Loan,” Interfax Business Report. 27 May 1992, as cited in FBIS-SOV-92- 
103, 28 May 1992, p. 27. In June 1994, South Korean President Kim Young Sam visited to Moscow. He 
promised not to link economic cooperation to the repayment o f overdue debt. See Diplomaticheskii 
vestnik. 13-14 June 1994, pp. 13-5. After endless talks on the debt issue, in July 1995, Russia and South 
Korea agreed that Moscow would pay over a four-year period through deliveries o f  various raw 
materials, including non-ferrous metals, as well as civil helicopters and military hardware. See Izvestiva. 
10 October 1995, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP 1995, Vol. XLVII, No. 41, 1995, p. 24; Kommersant-Dailv. 2 
October, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 40, 1996, p. 30.
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‘the potential for economic co-operation is very high but the reality is not.’^^  ^Overall, 
Korean investment in Russia is slowly increasing but still remains very modest, 
Table 6-8 displays South Korean investment in Russia by sector (as of 1997). The 
highest numbers of Korean investment projects are in the manufecturing sector, 
followed by those in trade. The manufacturing sector also displays the largest share of 
the actual investment followed by the mining sector. The number of joint Russian- 
Korean companies has steadily increased in Russia. In 1998, there existed more than 
200 in Russia as a whole.
Table 6-8: South Korean Investment in Russia by Sector (as of 1997)
Number of Projects Amount of Investment (1,000 US$)
Sector Planned Actual % (Act) Planned Actual % (Act.)
Mining 2 1 1.2 25,140 25,121 21.7
Forestry 2 2 2.4 1,500 493 0.4
Fishery 7 6 7.2 5,568 2,481 2.1
Manufacturing 41 26 31.3 64,999 47,549 41.1
Trade 33 25 30.1 13,294 6,148 5.3
Otiiers 27 23 27.7 78,159 33,807 29.2
Total 112 83 100.0 188,660 115,599 100.0
Source: The Korean Federation of Banks. Overseas Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook, 1998, p. 41.
Within Russia as a whole, the RFE has become the most attractive region for 
Korean investment. As Bradshaw states. South Korean investment in the RFE made up 
nearly 60 per cent of its total foreign investment by the end of 1996, followed by the
Izvestiva. 25 April 1998, p. 3,
Russia Far East-Siberia News ISeoull N o. 45 ,30  August 1997, p. 16.
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Central region, Moscow and East Siberia. Looking in greater depth at individual 
regions in the RFE, Primorskii krai had the highest level of Korean investment 
followed by Sakhalin oblast and then Khabarovsk krai (as can be seen in map 6-2).^^  ^
Another leading foreign investor in Primorskii krai is China, representing 69 per cent of 
the share of foreign investment in 1997. In the same year, about 39 Chinese firms 
registered (among them 33 were solely owned by Chinese but investment was on a 
small scale). South Korea is the second largest investor in Primorskii krai, followed by 
the US.^ ^  ^ In the first half of 1998, South Korean investment in Primorskii krai was 
$1,290 million. This figure showed South Korea accounting for almost half of the total 
foreign investment in the region. South Korean enterprises totalled 38, among them 15 
sole Korean investors and 23 Korean-Russian TVs. Korean investors are mainly 
involved in the catering services, hotels, travel agencies, transport and shipping.
As can be seen from table 6-9, among South Korean companies, Hyundai is 
one of the major investors in Primorskii krai. The Koreans are particularly interested in 
joint investment projects that enable them to produce raw materials on a permanent 
basis and to export them from Russia. Most of these projects have involved Korean 
assistance in exploiting Russian natural resources in the Far East. One of the largest
For further information on trends in South Korean Investment in Russia (from 1990-1997) see 
appendix 2 .
* “South Koreas Boost Economic Zone,” Vladivostok News. No. 189, 4  June 1999, p. 2.
Choongbea Leo and Michael J. Bradshaw, “South Korean Economic Relations with Russia,” Post- 
Soviet Geography and Economics. No. 8 , Vol. 38, 1997, pp. 470-72.
By the end o f  1995, these three regions accounted for 89.5 per cent o f  the total investment in the RFE. 
See “The Analysis o f Foreign Investment in the Russian Far East,” the KOTRA in Vladivostok, 
September 1996, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 4.
“The Economic Co-operation between South Korea and Primorskii krai in the first half o f  1998 (in 
Korean),” Russia Far East-Siberia News ISeouB. No. 55, 31 December 1998, p. 35.
The main industries, in which Korean investors are especially interested, are consumer goods 
manufacturing, production o f  electric and electronic goods, industries where the rich natural resources 
can be used, timber processing industries, and industries advanced technologies See Rossiiskie vesti. 7 
February, 1995, p. 3, as cited in CDPSP. Vol. XLVII, No. 6 , 1995, p. 29.
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joint projects under discussion has been the construction of a natural gas pipeline from 
the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) to South Korea. Koreans also have been involved in 
consultations over possible participation in Sakhalin oil and gas projects. As well as 
these, there were two other well-known JV projects in Khabarovsk krai and Amur 
oblast. Table 7-9 summarises the major Korean projects in the RFE, including those 
which have not been completed, either through cancellation or postponement.
Map 6-2: The No, of South Korean Firms by Region in the RFE in the first half of 
1996
■Chukotia,
Roryak'
Magadan
Sakha (Yakutia)
Kamchatka
Khabarovsk (42)
Sakhalin (50).mur
'Jewish AO-
Primorsky Krai (7 0 )
Others : 19 •
Source: Report on the Analvsis of Foreign Investment in the Russian Far East (in 
Korean) published by the KOTRA in Vladivostok, September 1996 (mimeo), p. 4.
Note: The total number of Korean firms in the RFE in the first half of 1996 was 181.
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Table 6-9: Major Investments of South Korea by Regions in the RFE from 1990 to 
1998
Region
a. Hyundai's Svetlaya Forestry JV Project
This was the biggest Hyundai investment in the RFE. This joint timber project 
was signed in August 1989 in Primorskii krai.^ ^^  It began in 1990, and by the end 
o f  1993, Hyundai invested US$16 million on the project. At some stages, 
investment was hindered due to worsened conditions in Russia. Hyundai faced 
local and international environmental protests. One in 1993 involved, a lawsuit by 
a local group which resulted in Hyundai losing millions o f  dollars when it was 
forced to slash operating capacity. Because o f this, Hyundai was unable to 
succeed in its original production targets o f one million cubic meters.
b Hyundai Hotel Vladivostok
Another recent project by Hyundai in the RFE was the construction o f the 
Vladivostok Business Centre (The Hyundai Hotel) which opened in August 
1 9 9 7  1Û4 original project cost was estimated at US$52 million, but the final 
cost was US$96 million. Hyundai expected this hotel to serve as a milestone 
for the company’s ventures in the RFE. Although it is too early to assess the 
performance o f the project, it is known that Hyundai suffered from heavy taxes 
by the federal government and is a deficit operation.
Sakbaltn Oil and Gas Projects
Sakhalin oil and gas projects are at various stages o f development.^^® Sakhalin-1, 
2, and 3 projects have been operated and the other two projects, SakhaIin-4 and 
Sakhalin-5, have yet to be tendered for. At present, Korea has not directly been 
involved in the Sakhalin oil and gas projects. Only Daewoo has been involved in 
the refurbishment contract on the Sakhalin-2 project. The only way for South 
Korea to participate in the Sakhalin-3 project is to buy a Russian share, but the 
prospect is unlikely on a large scale due to Korea’s current economic 
difficulties.
Zabrovskaya, Rossiya i Respublika Koreya, p. 92.
“Status o f Russian Trade With South Korea Examined,” Rossivskive vesti. 7 February 1995, p. 3, as 
cited in FBIS-Sov-95-027. 9 February 1995, pp. 14-5.
“South Korea and the Russian Far East: A  Review,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 2, February 1996, pp. 8-9.
When I was in Vladivostok undertaking field research in September 1996, the hotel was under 
construction. It consisted o f 13 luxury floors, which included a convention centre, boutiques, restaurants, 
a bank and a health club. This information was adopted from a brochure which the Hyundai Hotel 
provided.
“Russian-Korean Official Events,” RFEU. Vol. VH, No. 9, September 1997, p. 12.
“Risky Business,” Vladivostok News. 17 October 1998, p. 2.
I gathered this information during my research visit to Korea in July 1998.
Sakhalin oil and gas projects have been started by Japanese co-operations since the 1970s. American 
and British companies have also been heavily involved in these projects. For further detail on these 
project, see the Oil and Gas Report.
“Sakhalin’s Offshore Projects: The Impact o f  Russia’s Financial Crisis,” Oil and Gas Report. Vol. I, 
No. 3, October 1998, p. 2.
“Sakhalin Oil,” Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 46, 30 September 1997, pp. 15-20.
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Khabarovsk Hankook Mill and Steel Corporation
The JV, Stal-Ha, was made up o f  a partnership between Amurstal (28 per cent) 
and a Korean company, Hankook Mill and Steel Company (72 per cent). Under 
the terms o f the JV, Korea contributed US$20 million. Most o f the steel plate 
produced went to Korea, the remainder to Japan. It has operated since September 
1995 but since then Amurstal faced bankrupcy and Stal-Ha also experienced 
financial difficulties)^^
Sakha Natural Gas Pipeline Froject^ ^^ ’
In 1992 Yeltsin first proposed*^ an intergovernmental agreement between Russia 
and South Korea which was signed in 1995)^^ Two plans were discussed: one . 
was at high cost and risk as the route crossed North Korea, the other was through 
Mongolia and China. In August 1996, the Korean Hanbo Group participated in 
the project by investing US$25 million so as to acquire 27.5 % o f Russian 
Petroleum. However, in 1998 the bankrupt Hanbo sold it o ff to  British Petroleum 
(BP) ending Korea’s involvement in the project.*^®
Amur ; Kohap Group: Soya Bean JV
Since May 1994 the Kohap Group has considered setting up a promising JV for 
production and process o f soya beans. In March 1995 this project was set up and 
called Korus-1 JV. In July 1998, according to one o f the Korean managers, the 
project had not succeeded in generating good results. They may withdraw from 
this joint project because o f  three major defîcit-caiises foimd in 1997: flooding, 
Russian farmers’ negligence, and worn out farm equipment.
6,4.3. The Korean-Rassian Industrial Park in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone 
(FEZ)
As part of its investment in the RPE, South Korea is working with Russia to establish 
an industrial park in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (FEZ). First we shall look at 
how Russia established the Nakhodka FEZ and later assess Korea’s investment in this.
Amtirstal, a steel plant in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, RFE's only iron and steel plant, was declared 
bankrupt and forced to face restructuring with the help o f foreign investment. Hankook Mill and Steel 
Corporation are backed by South Korea’s Export and Import Bank and operate an offshoot company that 
makes steel plates, in a Joint Venture (JV) factory with Amurstal, called Stal-Ha. See Miller and 
Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East, p. 29.
"A Restructuring Plan for Joint Stock Company Amurstal,.” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 12, December 1996,
p. 1 1 .
On 31 March 1992, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Sakha concluded an agreement ‘On 
Mutual Relations between the Government o f  the RF and the republic o f Sakha’ which provided the 
republic with the right to develop, extract and sell natural resources in its territoiy. For the text, see 
Federativnyi Dogovor. Dokumentv. Kommentarii (Moscow: Respublika, 1992).
Korea Times (Seoul), 21 November 1992,
Korea Times (Seoul), 28 February 1995.
Lee and Bradshaw, “South Korean Economic Relations with Russia,” p. 475.
I conducted an interview in Seoul in July 1998.
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On 14 July 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR passed a resolution ‘On 
the Creation of Free Economic Zones on the Territory of the Russian Federation)^^^ In 
a decree on foreign investment in October 1990, President Gorbachev approved the 
creation of zones of joint entrepreneurship)^^ On 4 July 1991, the RSFSR legislation on 
foreign investment finally established the legal framework for the creation of FEZs on 
Russian territory. Between 1990 and 1991 the Far East led the way in the 
development of Russia’s FEZs in Primorskii krai (Vladivostok and Nakhodka), 
Sakhalin oblast and the Jewish AO. The Nakhodka FEZ became one of the 11 FEZs as 
a direct result of a Russian Federation government decree)®^
The Nakhodka FEZ has been given special status through various tax 
incentives (such as duty free imports and exports), and through the relaxation of visa 
regulations. It was hoped these would promote trade, scientific and technological co­
operation with foreign countries, and encourage the comprehensive development of 
local natural resources and the exporting and importing of goods. The major industry 
of this region is fishing and fish processing, ship repair and light industry. The 
Nakhodka FEZ has the largest transportation capacity in the Far East; the Trans-
Vedomosti S”ezda narodnvkb deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 7, 1990, art. 107.
Ibid., no. 44, 1990, art 944.
Ibid., no. 29, 1991, art. 1008.
There are FEZs in the Far East, each zone planned to specialise in two or three activities: Nakhodka 
and Vladivostok in export oriented activities, ship repair and fishing; and Sakhalin in oil and gas, forest 
and fishing. See Sergei Manezhev, The Russian Far East (London: Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs, 1993}, p. 26.
Mirovava ekonomika i mezhdunarodnve otnosheniya. July 1995, p. 1 1 0 ; John P. Hardt, “Soviet 
Global Integration Prospects," in John P. Hardt and Ybng C. Kim (eds.). Economic Co-operation in the 
Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 10-7; R. Sean Randolph, “The Soviet 
Economic Rote in Asia and the Pacific: A Business Perspective,” Asian Survev. Vol. XXX, No. 12, 
December 1990, p. 117.
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Siberian railway passes through. There are road links with all areas of Primorskii krai 
and a 900-kilometre highway directly to Khabarovsk krai)^^
Major ports in the FEZ Nakhodka and Vostochny are. Nakhodka was the only 
open port city in the Far East during the Soviet period. This commercial port handles 
primarily timber, metal and chemicals and has the second largest cargo turnover in the 
RFE after Vostochny. The largest container port, Vostochny, has historically had 
importance for exporting goods, and such a location is advantageous in attracting 
foreign investments for plants and warehouses. This port also has the h ipest 
productivity among the other ports of the Far East for loading containers and bulk 
freight. According to figures from Nakhodka and Vostochny ports from 1991 to
1997, Vostochny exceeded Nakhodka in terms of cargo turnout, although cargo 
turnover at both ports has fallen gradually from 1991 to 1997.^^  ^ In addition, the 
continuing economic crisis was not helped by the devaluation of the ruble in August
1998. This caused a dramatic fall in cargo shipments to both these ports in the latter 
part of that year.
The Nakhodka FEZ is controlled by an Administrative Committee (AC) 
whose primary responsibility is the planning and implementation of policies for the 
FEZ’S development. The committee also examines foreign investors’ project proposals 
and registers corporations for membership. The Mayor of Nakhodka and the magistrate 
ofPartizansk District were both nominated the post of head of the committee. Under
Erik Azulay and Ahegra Harris Azulay, The Russian Far Bast (New York; Hippocrene Books, 1995), 
p. 71.
“Update on Nakhodka’s Ports,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 12, December 1996, p. 4.
“Focus: Port o f  Vostochny,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. II , November 1996, p. 7.
18& «Vladivostok, Nakhodka and Vostochny.” RFEU. Vol. VUI, No. 11, November 1998, p. 9.
At present (M y 1999), the head o f AC is chair o f Primorskii krai Duma. See “Russo-Korea Project 
Now Looks More Probable,” Russia and F SU. Vol. 3, No. 4, July 1999, p. 7.
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the AC there is a Council of the FEZ. The Council determines the policy for 
distribution of productive forces in the FEZ and gives top priority to the processing of 
investment. In January 1994, Sergei Dudnik, general director of a construction 
organisation, was appointed head of the Nakhodka FEZ AC. Utro Rossii reported that 
this was seen by many as a strengthening of control over the FEZ by the local executive 
authorities. The Nakhodka FEZ has subsequently been modifying its economic 
course. The new head of the committee, Dudnik, stated that in accordance with recent 
Russian laws priority would be given to the construction of three merchant posts and a 
canning factory. The construction of these facilities would be assisted by various 
customs and tax privileges and would be sponsored by Russian and foreign investors. 
The Nakhodka FEZ developed in accordance with a special resolution adopted by the 
government.
The Committee has been making every effort to establish one of the world’s 
most competitive FEZs. It visited major FEZs around the world to investigate how 
Russia could improve its legal investment environment, its administrative process and 
its upgrading of the infrastructure in the development of the FEZ. In June 1994, the 
Nakhodka FEZ joined the World Export Processing Zones Association. The official 
ceremony was held in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur during a conference of the 
Association. In May 1998, the Governor of Primorskii krai, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko,
The council prepares expert analyses o f  proposals that require budgetary financing,, administrative 
privileges and preferential treatment. It also evaluates concrete proposals to locate entities in the 
productive and non-productive spheres. See Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory Freeze, The Russian Far East: 
An Economic Survev (Khabarovsk; Economic Research Institute, 1996), pp. 257-58.
“New Head o f Nakhodka FEZ,” Utro Rossii. 19 January 1994, p. 2, as cited in RA Report. No. 17, 
July 1994, p. 95,
“Nakhodka FEZ Pushes Port Construction,” RA Report No. 17, July 1994, p. 95.
This Association united more than thirty zones from various countries. Membership in the Association 
would allow the Russian enclave to obtain information on the transactions o f its partners, to take part in 
the Association’s conferences and exhibitions on preferential terms, and also to draw on the experience
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created a Supervisory Board for Nakhodka’s FEZ in order to effectively realise its 
intentions. It is evident that one way local governors have fried to maintain control over 
industrial policy in their regions is to exert voting influence on the boards of directors 
of all the major industrial enterprises)^^
The total number of foreign firms in the region gradually increased between 
1993 (231) and 1994 (469).^^  ^By June 1995  ^a total of 472 foreign firms had registered 
with the AC. Of these, 195 were joint ventures; 145 enterprises with 100 per cent 
foreign-capital; 77 affiliates, 28 foreign company representatives; and 27 branch offices 
of joint venture firms. China accounted for 55 per cent of the total firms registered with 
the Administrative Committee followed by the US, Japan, Hong Kong and South 
Korea. The total number of foreign workers being employed within the Nakhodka FEZ 
was 1,132, of which 974 were Chinese and 105 North Korean. Trade and retail 
services are the major field for foreign investment, followed by transportation.
of the developed free economic zones in Southeast Asian countries. See “Nakhodka Joints World Export 
Processing Zones Association,” Ibid., p. 95.
Members of the board are; Vice-Governor, Primorskii krai Chairman-regional duma, Mayor of 
Nakhodka, Chairman o f Nakhodka city duma. Head o f administration for Patizaask district and 
Chairman o f Administrative Committee o f the Nakhodka SEZ. See “Supervisory Board for Nakhodka 
Free Economic Zone,” RFEU. Vol. VIII, No. 6 , June 1998, p. IQ.
Korea Times. 3 June 1993, p. 8 ; Pavel A. Minakir and Gregory L. Freeze, The Russian Far East: An 
Economic Survev (Khabarovsk; Economic Research Institute, 1996), pp. 261-62.
Kook Hwan Oh, “Nakhodka Free Economic Zone and Korea-Russia Industrial Park” (Seoul: Korea- 
Russia Far East Siberian Association, 26 March 1996, mimeo), p. 113.
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Map 6-3: The Korean-Russian Industrial Park in the Nakhodka FEZ
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Source: Adapted from Elisa Miller and Soula Stefanopoulos, The Russian Far East: A 
Business Reference Guide (Seattle; Russian Far East Update, Third Edition 1997 and 
1998), p. 101.
Since the Russian government approved regulations for the Nakhodka FEZ in 
early 1990, it has been struggling to find a solid legal foundation for the industrial park 
as well as investment partners. At present, in the Nakhodka FEZ, two projects have 
been created: a Korean-Russian industrial park (see map 6-3) and an American-Russian
195 Ibid., p. 114.
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industrial park/^^ The Korean-Russian industrial park is known to be potentially one of 
the most important economic agreements of its kind between South Korea and the RFE. 
Negotiations between Russia and South Korea have been ongoing since November 
1992/^^ When Korean President Kim Young Sam visited Vladivostok in June 1994, he 
met the Governor of Primorskii krai, Nazdratenko. In their official meeting, they 
discussed the construction of a Korean industrial park in Nakhodka FEZ. After his visit, 
negotiations to establish a Korean industrial park have carried on through frequent 
contacts. A further agreement was reached in July 1997 for the Korean industrial 
park development project of export-oriented enterprises. The bilateral agreement 
committed the Russian side to provide power and water up to the park’s boundaries, 
and obligated the Korean side to provide infrastructure inside the park’s boundaries.
The Korea Land Corporation (Koland), a government-backed agency, is the 
real estate developer of the project for the Korean side. Its goals for the park are to keep 
Korean industries competitive internationally, to secure a gateway to the markets in 
Russia, Central Asia and China, to rejuvenate stagnating regional economies, and to 
develop the existing advanced industrial technology and management in the RFE. The 
Korean park is also intended to vitalise the regional economy in the RFE and to 
alleviate Korea’s high land and labour costs, which have been undermining Korean 
industries’ competitiveness.The park is located in the valley of the Partizansk district
For more detail on the Russian-American industrial park see Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far 
East, p. 264.
“Nakhodka SEZ,” Utro Rossii. 18 March 1993, p. 1, as cited in RA Report. No. 15, July 1993, p. 94. 
Zabrovskaya, Rossiva i Respublika Koreva. pp. 67-9.
Won JoQ Hong, "The Plan for Development o f  Trade and Industry Co-operation between South 
Korea-Russia,” Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 45, 30 August 1997, p. 40.
200 “Nakhodka Free Economic Zone,” p. 116; Mirovava ekonomika 1 mezhdunarodnve otnosheniya. 
July 1995, p. 110.
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of the FEZ. The site is 12 kilometres from Nakhodka^ *^  ^ and 6 kms from Vostochny, 
and there are facilities for moving goods by both rail and sea. A four lane paved road 
runs between the city of Nakhodka and Vostochny. The Trans-Siberian Railway 
(TSR) runs about 3 kms away from the park. The Korean government hopes to bring 
the TSR into the park when it is completed so that goods can be shipped to Europe or to 
Vostochny.
I will now deal with two major problems which Korea faces in the 
development of the park: both the infrastructure, and the legal status of the park, and I 
will discuss their possible solutions. Water and electricity are not supplied to the whole 
area designated for the FEZ. This is the first major problem. To solve this the 
Administrative Committee is planning to develop the zone’s power supply. The 
Russian Far East Update reported in November 1996 that several Japanese firms and 
organisations and the AC had completed a feasibility study funded by the Japanese 
government. In addition, in 1997, the Russian government decided to develop the 
poor infrastructure by providing funds taken from the federal budget. Russia continues 
to support the project financially by borrowing money from foreign institutions to 
improve the electricity and water supply. Another area of concern is the poor quality 
of transportation lines that exist, and this needs to be dealt with if the project is to 
progress further.
Minakir and Freeze, The Russian Far East, p. 264.
Azulay and Azulay, The Russian Far East, p. 71.
The special report on the Plan for Korean-Russian Nakhodka FEZ Project was provided by the Korea 
Land Corporation (Koland), February 1999, p. 4.
"More Power for Nakhodka,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 11, November 1996, p. 5.
205 Y  y  Spaskü^ “The Problems on the Trade and Economic Co-operation between Korea and Russia,” 
Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul), No. 45 ,30  August 1997, pp. 20-21; for example, Russia borrowed 
US$2,490 million from the Japanese Export and Import Bank "Construction o f a new Water Supply 
Project,” See Russia Far East-Siberia News f Seoul). No. 39, 28 February, 1997, p. 32.
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Secondly, legal status is very important for foreign investors. The 
inconsistency and the frequent changes in laws have prevented preferential benefits 
being distributed to investors.^® Major progress was made in December 1995 through 
joint efforts with the In March 1996, President Yeltsin signed a decree which
established legal grounds at the federal level for the Korean enterprises who were to be 
involved in the park. The AC reported that The Primorskii krai administration and the 
federal government were responsible for developing a federal programme to support the 
project. The decree also confirmed federal financing for the park infrastructure.
According to an interview which I conducted in August 1998 and a report 
which I received on the recent progress of the project from Koland in February 1999, 
Koland has struggled to make a success. This reflects both the sudden economic 
difficulties in Korea and the political and economic instability in Russia over the past 
year or two. Some Korean businessmen think it risky to pour large sums of capital into 
the park. It seems that the real process is going to be slow and modest due to the above 
mentioned problems. Koland, understandably, wants its commitment to be a sound 
one.“"
At their summit conference in Moscow in May 1999, the RF and South Korea 
finally approved a development plan for the first phase of the project.^ According to 
the new agreement, the two countries agreed that the size of the Korean-Russian
206 Scheme for the development o f  Natural Resources between Korea and Russia (in Korean),” 
Russia Far East-Siberia News (Seoul). No. 45, 30 August 1997, p. 28.
This provided 5 tax-free years for all local taxes after their first return was reported and a 50 per cent 
tax reduction for 5 years afterwards. See Oh, “Nakhodka Free Economic Zone,” pp. 116-17.
“Russia Far East and its Neighbours,” RFEU. Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1996, p. 5.
I received the information from one o f the Koland managers from Seoul in February 1999.
President Kim Dae Jung visited Moscow and signed a protocol which will support for the Korean 
Industrial park project for the coming decade. In addition, Kim and Yeltsin discussed a partnership role 
to establish a new Northeast Asian security system. Kim emphasised a constructive and mutually
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industrial park would be reduced. It was originally allocated 330 hectares, but later this 
was reduced to 100 hectares in 1992, and was finally to consist of only 20 hectares. The 
first phase will be more of a ‘model’ or mini-park. The construction period for the site 
was extended from three years to six years. South Korean companies will also have a 
special legal status. Any company that exports at least 50 per cent of its product will be 
entitled to favourable treatment in local and federal tax privileges. These include 
waivers on custom duties for imported machinery and materials: a reduction of VAT 
tax, and of federal and regional profit taxes during the first five years. The present 
availability of water, electricity and sewage facilities for this particular area will reduce 
the need for Russian infrastructure improvements during the first phase.^”
Koland is presently seeking companies to locate on lots inside the park (the 
average lot size will be approximately 5,00D square metres).^^  ^The first phase will be 
dominated by processing plants, including fish and wood processing, and garment 
manufacture. These can be either joint ventures, or 100 per cent Russian companies. 
According to Koland, the second and third phases will incorporate a greater land area 
(in a different location) and high-tech companies.^Koland planned to invest between 
US$800 million and US$1 billion in the construction of the industrial site within the 
next six years. Once finished, the complex should give jobs to 15,000 workers. The
beneficial relationship through building up strong economic co-operation. See Izvestiya. 27 May 1999; 
Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 28 May 1999.
During my interview with the Consul General o f  the Korean Embassy in Moscow, Jae Keun Choi, in 
April 2000, he kindly provided me with "the joint pact o f Korean-Russian Industrial park project in 
Nakhodka FEZ” (in Russian, mimeo) which was signed on 28 May 1999 by both South Korean and 
Russian governments.
In March 1999, the Koland announced that 10 Korean companies had already applied to move into the 
site. It prospects that the numbers will increase because o f the advantages they can find in the RFE. 
These are cheap and skilled labourers, low labour charge with the favourable legal stalus for Korean 
companies. See Han Kvoreh (Seoul), 29 March 1999.
I conducted an interview with the one o f the Koland managers in Seoul, September 1999.
Vladivostok News. No. 189, 4 June 1999, p. 1 .
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new jobs created within the park will be available not only to Koreans and Russians but 
also to workers from neighbouring countries, such as North Korea and China.^^^
Koland expects that the park will have excellent prospects: ‘This will open a 
new era for the actual and substantial economic co-operation between Korea and 
Russia. This will be the place with best investment environment and a transportation 
and logistics hub connecting Asia-Pacific and Europe.
6.4.4: Major Problems and Prospects in the RFE: The South Korean View,
As discussed in the previous section, South Korea has become one of the RFE’s most 
important economic partners. But like other countries. South Korea has experienced 
some difficulties in developing economic relations with the region. The current market 
economic transition in the RFE has had a marked impact, resulting in a clear worsening 
of international trade and investment within it. The same problems are found 
throughout all the regions of the RFE, but for the purpose of this paper I will focus 
specifically on Primorskii krai as it can be seen that this is the area that is the most 
involved in foreign economic business in the RFE.
The main problems which have arisen due to the financial crisis in Korea 
since 1997, and the continuing economic difficulties in Russia (since the ruble 
devaluation in August 1998) have caused a dramatic fall in trade and investment 
relations between them. There has also been a crisis in the economy, accompanied by 
social instability and a sharp decline in Russia’s credit worthiness.^All these
215 Planning to Invest in Nakhodka Economic Zone,” Tass. 28 September 1995, as cited in FBIS- 
Sov-95-188,28 September 1995, p. 49.
Oh, “Nakhodka Free Economic Zone,” p. 120.
A. Starichkov, “Financial and Economic Crisis in East Asia,” D afniv Vostok Rossii CVladivostokl, 
No. 1, 1998, p. 48.
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circumstances reduced Korea’s investment in short and mid-term trade and operations, 
and much of these were substantially contracted or suspended following these 
problems/^^ Some long-term projects have been suspended or cancelled, without any 
proper explanation. Examples of these are Korean involvement in a gas pipeline project 
in the republic of Sakha and gas and oil projects in Sakhalin. In addition, the currency 
difficulties of Korea’s trading partner have meant pressure to import less, and a 
reduction in exports to the RFE.
Another major difficulty is the poor economic environment for foreign 
investors. Primorskii krai was not ready for the sudden interest by foreign companies in 
this area. The market economy is young, the regional government has faced financial 
difficulties and remnants o f the old Soviet bureaucracy remain.^^^ In addition, the 
infrastructure is poor, the city loses power occasionally without notice, the roads are 
filled with potholes and the rail lines are deteriorating.^^^ According to the Chairman of 
the Primorye Chamber of Commerce, Vladimir Brezhnev, his government has not 
managed to solve all these problems yet. He also comments that, ‘We are at a stage of 
moving from one economy to another. Our business laws are definitely not perfect, but 
of course these are going to be problems.
Other problems arise due to a clash in cultures as Koreans go into business 
with Russians. While Russians apply for loans, Koreans prefer selling. Since Russia 
declared its moratorium in August 1998, Primorskii krai businessmen noticed a clear
“Rossiya-Yuzhnaya Koreya,” Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 October 1998, p. 6.
Zabrovskaya, Rossiva i Respublika. p. 61; Judith Thornton and Nadezhda N. Mikheeva, “The 
Strategies o f Foreign and Foreign-Assisted Firms in the Russian Far East: Alternatives to Missing 
Infrastructure,” Comparative Economic Studies. Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996, pp. 88-9.
Report on the Outline of the Russian Far East was issued by the KOTRA in Vladivostok in September 
1996, p. 13; I had experience when I was in Primorskii krai in September 1996.
Vladivostok News. 17 October 1998, p. 2,
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worsening of the trade and investment climate with South Korea. Seeing this, Korean 
businessmen have increasingly favoured cash transactions and their companies require 
advance payments more frequently. Another problem for investors is the legal, tax 
and customs systems; laws vary depending on place, time and flnanciat situatioiL^^ By 
the time a foreign company signs an agreement with a Russian firm and gets ready to 
implement it, the tax laws will have changed, perhaps radically. There are also few 
safeguards for foreign investors. For instance, struggling Russian companies are known 
to declare bankruptcy, empty their accounts, and defeult on their debts. Often foreign 
investors are unaware of the laws that exist in any case.^^^
On the other hand, the prospect for the longer-term future must be considered. 
As Korean Consul General Choi En Sam pointed out in October 1998, Things are going 
to take a long time. It’s impossible to get things done right now, and there is a lot of 
Korean resistance to investing because of Russia’s financial problems. It is not only the 
tax system that disturbs South Koreans, but also the temptation to simply go elsewhere, 
where the global economy is better established.’^ ^ In regard to the Hyundai US$96 
million hotel venture. General Manager Young Kung has openly accepted that the 
company will ‘not make a profit for nine years.’ Otherwise, South Korean companies
Report on the Influence o f  Declaration o f  Russia’^ s Moratorium was issued by the KOTRA (mimeo), 
August 1998, p. 6,
There was a conference, “the RFE: Prospects for the N ew  Millennium” organised by the Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs in London in September 18 1998. I attended there and conducted an 
interview with a scholar from Vladivostok.
This interview was conducted with an anonymous Korean businessman. He experienced the 
inconsistent Russian laws when trying to set up a furniture factory. He told me his own experience and 
emphasised not only the problems for himself but for other Korean businessmen and companies facing 
the same problems. In addition, I conducted another interview with the manager o f the Kohap Group in 
August 1998, in Seoul. At that time the Group faced serious financial difficulties after investing in the 
agriculture and textile industries in the RFE.
I took an interview with the General Director o f World Vending Co., LTD in Moscow in April 2000. 
He has worked for in Russia for three years and kindly explained his experiences to me. Although there 
exists the above mentioned problems, he expected that his company would continue to expand in the 
market for vending machines in Russia.
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profit from the area without risking significant investment. South Korean businesses, 
particularly in the food industry, simply import goods into Russia through small traders, 
eliminating the need for risky partnerships or local offices. On the export side, South 
Korean companies find that, despite tax problems, buying Russian gas, fish, timber, and 
scrap metals are excellent ways to pump money back into Primorskii krai without 
coming away empty-handed.
Another more positive view was mentioned during my interviews with Lee 
Kwang Hee, director of the KOTRA in Vladivostok in September 1996, and with a 
manager of the Kohap Group in Seoul in July 1998. They both pointed out that a 
Korean unification would result in many benefits. A united Korea would share a border 
with the RFE and the resulting reduction of transport costs between Seoul and 
Vladivostok, for instance, would mean that Koreans would possibly be more attracted 
to trade and investment In the short and mid-term period. South Korea will continue to 
import from the RFE, primarily fish, timber, coal, metals, and other raw materials. In 
turn. South Korea will export automobiles, telecommunications equipment, electronics 
and other finished goods. It is still expected that shuttle traders will further contribute 
their much needed business, promoting small and medium scale trade. South Korea 
will also extend further political, cultural, and educational contact with the RFE. South 
Korea will continue expecting Russia to play a positive role in encouraging North 
Korea to open its territory further and to normalise with its neighbouring countries.
Finally, as previously mentioned, there exists the jointly run Korean-Russian 
industrial park project (in the mid and longer-term basis), which was finalised at a 
Moscow summit in May 1999. It is known that this was one of the first milestone
Vladivostok News. 17 October 1998, p. 3.
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projects on the agenda for implementation between Russia and South Korea since 
Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul in September 1990. The Moscow 
summit led to the establishment of a regional venture fund, designed to further attract 
Korean investment and encourage the growth of small and medium-size private 
enterprises in the industrial park and in the RFE as a whole. The development concept 
incorporated in the new agreement does not differ substantially from the original plan, 
although it reflects a more modest but feasible approach and gives more meaning to 
Nakhodka’s FEZ.^^  ^ Difficulties are evident, but an optimistic view still needs to be 
taken. The project is still hindered by poor infrastructure, inefficient processing time 
and confusing tax laws. Despite all these challenges, the South Korean government 
attaches considerable significance to the development of relations with the RFE in the 
medium and longer term.
6.5: Conclusion
In this chapter, I have traced the newly developing relations of the Far East with the two 
Koreas in the transitional period. As revealed earlier by content analysis, we can see that 
these relations formed an issue high on both central and local international agendas. In 
the post-Soviet period, the agenda of Russian international news has dramatically been 
extended to include a vast range of topics and themes previously banished to the ‘zones 
beyond c r i t i c i sm .T he  press has moved further and faster in opening up new subjects 
for public discussion and interests regarding international news.
How did these developing of relations with the two Koreas reach this prime
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
I conducted an interview with, the one o f  the Koland managers in Seoul, September 1999.
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position on the international political agenda in the Far East? Generally, Russia’s 
transformation from a command economy to a market economy, its integration into the 
global economy and its increasing reliance on the global market has particularly led to its 
new relations with these two Koreas. In the light of this, it has been in the interests of 
federal government, and regional governors, local elites, businessmen and the Far Eastern 
public to draw attention to South Korea as an important country in terms of developing 
economic relations. The press published articles giving a positive image of South Korea 
as a country engaged in successful economic activities, producing hi^-quality goods, 
and there were frequent mentions of the Russian and South Korean industrial park project 
in the Nakhodka FEZ. At the same time the dominant theme in relation to North Korea 
was its poverty, political oppression, economic failure, and its Far Eastern criminal 
activities. However, both the central and regional leaders (in particular, both Primorskii 
and Khabarovsk krais) regard North Korea as providing useful cheap labour in the 
timber, agriculture, and construction sectors.
In analysing the construction of the international political agenda in the Far 
East, with regard to the relationship with the two Koreas, we can see the influence of 
such factors as geographical proximity and new foreign policy as well as the interests 
of federal administrators, regional governors, private business and the Far Eastern 
public. This issue looks set to continue to be of great significance to the RFE in the mid 
and long term future, especially with the prospects for Korean unification.
Mary Dejevsky, “Glasnost” and the Soviet Press,” in Julian Graffy and Geoffrey A. Hosking (eds.). 
Culture and the Media in the USSR Today (Londo: Macmillan, 1989), p. 202.
303
Chapter 7: Conclusion
As noted in chapter 1, an agenda is a set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy 
of importance at any given point in time. Agenda-setting offers us an explanation 
regarding the scope and nature of the information about certain issues that is available 
to the public in democratic and other societies.^ Agenda scholars (see section 1.1) 
suggest that the political agenda consists of problems which have been brought up for 
consideration by the political authorities. This political agenda setting deals primarily 
with the transformation of social conditions into political questions and with the 
selection of political issues.
Most discussions of agenda-setting centre on the influence of the news media on 
the agenda of the public. The agenda-setting process begins with an issue climbing the 
media agenda. The media agenda is usually indexed by content analysis of the news 
media determining the number of news stories about a given issue or issues of study. 
Media coverage of an issue causes an increase in the number of people concerned about 
that issue.^ In agenda-setting studies, media content is usually operationalised as the 
number of some countable unit, such as the number of newspaper column inches or the 
number of front-page stories an issue receives, or the number of seconds of airtime 
given to an issue during a year of TV newscasts.^
In my thesis I have explored political agenda-setting based on content analysis 
in the RFE within the Russian Federation. With the collapse of the Soviet communist
 ^ Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics o f  Agenda- 
Building (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, Second Edition, 1983), p. 14.
 ^ Kim A. Smith, “Newspaper Coverage and Public Concern About Community Issues,” in David L. 
Protess and McCombs (eds.). Agenda Setting: Readings on Media. Public Opinion, and Policymaking 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991), p. 75.
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regime, the disintegration of the USSR and the discrediting of the centrally-planned 
economic system, economic decentralisation and political démocratisation have become 
the major development issues in the federation. In this process, opening up the market 
and enhancing political autonomy advanced at the regional level. In this context, in my 
research, I have dealt with what regional leaders and their public perceived as the most 
important domestic and international political issues on the agenda in the early post­
communist era in the RFE.
According to my content analysis, the development of local autonomy was 
revealed as one of the most important issues in post-Soviet politics (see section 3.1). At 
the national level, decentralised political and economic policies led to a decisive 
increase in the autonomy of regional and republican leaders in the Russian Federation 
after 1991. During this period, we can see that there were conflicting views on the type 
of federation Russia should become, and this conflict characterised the relationship 
between centre and periphery. The periphery was pushing for a more decentralised form 
of federalism while the centre was pressing for a more unitary system. The RFE 
specifically was working towards its establishment as an autonomous region (see section 
3.2). In the early 1990s Far Eastern regionalism grew and spread, with some local 
leaders beginning to support the idea of the rebirth of the Far Eastern Republic (FER) of 
the early 1920s, and the Far East Association for Economic Co-operation (FEAEC) was 
formed. However, these moves towards regional solidarity were unsuccessful, and local 
leaders tended to pay more attention to their own individual relationship with Moscow 
than to common relations with the rest of the RFE. Despite the failure of the 
independence movement, local leaders are making steadily increasing efforts towards
James W. Dearing and Everett M. Roger, Agenda-Setting (London: Sage, 1996), p. 35.
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greater local autonomy within the federation. For the RFE as a whole, the search for 
greater autonomy has been, and will continue to be, a complicated process and one that 
is influenced by the federal authorities as well as the regions themselves.
In the post-Soviet period the joint issues of the environment and public health 
have also become a high priority for not only for Far Eastern leaders and people (see 
section 3.3) but also for the nation as a whole. With the RFE relying heavily on the 
exploitation of its rich natural resources, the region has always had to deal with serious 
environmental issues including air and water pollution, the destruction of forests, 
uncontrolled fires and the disposal of radioactive waste into the sea. The native peoples’ 
preservation of a traditional life style has also become a significant environmental issue 
in the region. The development of northern Russia in the interests of industrial 
civilisation has resulted in deep conflict. As a result, native peoples have been 
threatened by declining life expectancy, chronic diseases caused by radioactivity, and 
even the threat of extinction.
We have seen the effects of the deterioration of the environment in the decline 
in general health and rising death rates in the RFE. According to the figures provided in 
1993 (see section 3.3.3), the infant mortality rate was higher in the RFE than in the RF 
as a whole. Also, the RFE average life expectancy for males and females at birth was 
lower than in the federation as a whole. The critical environmental situation in the RFE 
is highlighted by the international concern that has been shown and the co-operation 
offered. The international community has been closely involved in several regional 
conservation projects in the RFE (see section 3.3.4). At present the RFE is precariously 
balanced between economic dependence on the exploitation of natural resources and the 
increasing need for environmental protection and conservation.
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In addition to the above, various social issues also emerged high up on the 
domestic political agenda. In the late and post-Soviet period, the increasing crime rate, 
high level of unemployment, rising living costs, and increasing emigration have all 
become important socio-economic issues in the RFE. The media further emphasised 
those issues by placing them on a par with opening regional markets and political 
autonomy in the importance that was accorded to them.
In order to examine how the RFE differs from other parts of Russia in these 
respects, I have explored the current socio-economic situation in the 10 regions of the 
RFE and compared them with the other 79 subjects of the RF, establishing that the Far 
East differs from more general Russian patterns. The RFE experienced a steadily 
declining population mainly due to its relatively high mortality rate and low fertility 
rate, the figures for the region being higher than those for the rest of the federation. The 
region’s high levels of emigration were also a significant factor in the population 
decline. Yet another concern in Russia in the post-Soviet era has been the steadily 
increasing rate of crime. In terms of the frequency of crime, the RFE is shown to be a 
relatively more dangerous place to live in than the rest of the federation. As with the 
incidence of crime, rates of alcoholism were higher in the RFE than in the RF as a 
whole. This factor along with others is indicative of deep social problems in the region.
Within the RFE unemployment levels varied widely, and in most areas they 
were higher than in the RF as a whole, A large number of people in the RFE were 
employed in industry and there was increasing interest in non-production sectors, such 
as transport, communication and trade. Both the RFE’s extracting and food industries 
ranked second among the eleven economic regions in the RF, the latter consisting 
mainly of fishing and fish processing. In terms of monthly income, the RFE as a whole
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appears to have been a relatively rich region when compared with other regions in the 
RF, notwithstanding wide variations within it. In terms of purchasing power, though, 
Chukotka was the most expensive place to buy food in the federation as a whole. Also 
seven other Far Eastern cities headed the list of the most expensive in Russia. So, in 
fact, people in the RFE were not better off than the nation as a whole; levels of poverty 
were actually higher than the national average (see section 4.3).
The eighth New Russia Barometer (in January 2000)"^  reported a public opinion 
survey which showed both Russia's socio-economic conditions and the attitudes of 
Russians towards government. Section 13 deals with the following question: how much 
priority do you think the next Russian government ought to give to each of the 
following problems facing this country? There is a list of ten problems, with four 
different options: highest priority, important, low priority and unimportant. Of these, I 
have chosen five problems as related to my research, analysing the figures for highest 
priority only. Table 7-1 displays the main problems respondents identified as the top 
priorities in their daily life. The following problems (in order of priority) were given by 
respondents in the RFE.
Unemployment, it will be seen, is regarded as the most important issue among 
the Far Eastern public. This figure in the RFE are slightly higher than in the RF as a 
whole. However, high levels of unemployment have also become a top priority for 
government action across the nation. Crime is still a dominant social problem in both
The eighth NRB survey was organised by the Centre for the Study o f  Public Policy and conducted by the 
Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM). Fieldwork occurred between 13 and 29 January 
2000, just after the Duma election and the seasonal holidays. The total respondents age 18 or over are 
1,940. The universe consisted o f the residents o f the Russian Federation age 16 and over, excluding 
soldiers, convicts and those without a fixed address. VCIOM stratified the RF into 10 large regions 
classified by seven social, economic and infrastructure attributes: North with North-West, Central, Central- 
Tchemozemie, North Caucasus, Volgo-Viatka, Volga, Urals, West Siberia, East Siberia and Far East. For a 
full details see Richard Rose, Russia Between Elections: New Russia Barometer VEI (Glasgow: University
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the RFE and the RF, but concern, on the evidence of the NRB, is higher in the RF as a 
whole than in the RFE. Aside from normal price fluctuation, concern over rising prices 
is still high in both the RF and the RFE. Again the levels of concern in the RFE is 
slightly higher than in the RFE. The problems of environmental pollution appears to 
cause relatively less concern in the RFE than in the RF, however, it is here, as 
elsewhere, a high priority. Taken as a whole, public concerns in the RFE are largely 
similar to those across the federation, but rising prices and environmental pollution are 
clearly more prominent.
Table 7-1: Urgency Problems Facing Russia in January 2000 f%)
Main Concerns RFE RF
Unemployment 70 68
Crime 64 69
Rising prices 61 77
Crisis in health service 56 59
Environmental pollution 27 36
Source: Derived from the New Russia Barometer VIII (fieldwork 13-29 January 2000, 
n = 1940, used with permission)
The press and public opinion polls reveal that despite of years of economic 
and political reform, people are still losing jobs, there is growing poverty, living costs 
are higher, and social conditions are unstable. According to my content analysis, in the 
early transitional period environmental pollution was revealed as an issue at the top of 
the political agenda (along with that of autonomy); this survey shows it as a relatively 
low priority in the RFE, although it is a more salient concern than elsewhere in the
of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy, No. 328,2000).
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federation. In other respects there is close agreement between the political agenda that 
is derived from the survey evidence and the political agenda that emerges from my 
content analysis of printed sources.
In this thesis we have seen (chapters 5 and 6) that the establishing and 
maintaining of favourable political and economic relations with neighbouring countries 
has been revealed as one of the most significance issues on the RFE’s international 
political agenda. As Bradshaw notes, ‘a complex blend of political and economic 
factors continue to influence the prospects for economic co-operation between the RFE 
and its neighbouring countries.’^
The wide coverage of the joint issues of demarcation and Chinese influx into 
the RFE has illustrated this priority on the political agenda, in relation to the 
development of bilateral relations with China. The demarcation process between Russia 
and China was re-started in 1987 and finally concluded a decade later. With the opened 
border their economic relationship has been further advanced. Under Yeltsin, a sound 
foundation was laid for a long-term military and political relationship, which had 
previously been difficult to realise. However, the demarcation process caused centre- 
periphery governmental friction within Russia, as local leaders felt that national goals 
were being placed before regional ones. As discussed in section 5.1, whilst there has 
been considerable improvement in economic exchanges, some anti-Chinese sentiment 
still lingers among Far Eastern residents. Local leaders in the RFE and nationalist 
groups have severely criticised the government on this matter. They widely regard the 
Chinese as a threat to the region. Of particular concern has been the demographic
 ^Michael J. Bradshaw, "Economic Relations o f  the Russian Far East with the Asian-Pacific States,” Post- 
Soviet Geography. Vol. 35, No. 4 ,1994, pp. 245-46.
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intervention of Chinese immigrants, many of whom are in fact illegal, and some of 
whom are known to bring with them criminal activities, such as the smuggling of drugs.
As noted in section 5.2, the territorial dispute has also remained very high on 
the political agenda for the further economic development between the RFE and Japan. 
Regarding the territorial dispute with Japan in the post-Soviet era, it is clear that at 
present Russia holds a more positive and flexible attitude to the ownership of the Kuril 
islands than previously.^ No conclusion has yet been reached over the ownership of the 
islands and they remain under Russian control. The Krasnoyarsk summit (in November
1997) notably produced a joint agreement to work towards a peace treaty between the 
two countries by 2000, based on the principles of the 1993 Tokyo DeclaratiotL At the 
Kawana summit (in April 1998), the two countries leaders repeated their intention to 
seek a comprehensive peace treaty and to continue dialogue at the highest level.
It is evident from several public opinion surveys that Russia, Japan and the 
Kuril islanders all hold strongly contrasting views on the future ownership of the 
islands. Russians and Japanese both maintain their claims to the land, whilst opinions of 
the islanders themselves vary according to each disputed island. Shikotan islanders 
favour Japanese ownership relatively more than the other islanders. Electrical blackouts, 
fuel shortages, the earthquake of 1994 and lack of government support have led those on 
Shikotan (the poorest island) to sign petitions proposing that Russia lease the islands to 
Japan. At the national and local levels, Russia still recognises the value of the Kuril 
islands in terms of the fishing industry, foreign trade and business, and military 
positioning. The government may, in fact, submit to the broader alternative of leaving
 ^M. Y Krupyanko, Yaponiva 9Q-kh: v poiskah modeli otnoshenü s novoi Rossiei (Moscow: Izdatefskaya 
Firma, 1997), p. 127.
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the matter to future generations of Kuril islanders, as their rights are beginning to be 
considered above those of central government in this issue.
As mentioned in chapter 1, another major issue on the international political 
agenda in the REE has been the development of relations with the two Koreas. Russia 
lost much of its influence with North Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
However, in a tentative balancing act, Moscow has attempted to re-establish normal 
relations with North Korea while still preserving favourable links with South Korea. ^  In 
the early 1990s, local residents of the RFE targeted North Korea as a major cause of 
regional problems, partly due to the political issue of North Korean timber workers (see 
section 6.2). Since the mid 1990s, however. Far Eastern local leaders have continued to 
depend upon the employment of North Korean labourers in the timber, agriculture and 
construction industries. Support within the RFE for continued co-operation with North 
Korea remains high, with the possibility of influencing the resolution of the inter- 
Korean problem and thus enhancing prospects for regional economic projects (e.g. the 
Tumen river development project)
Since the late 1990s, local leaders have steadily developed their relations with 
South Korea through various economic, cultural and political exchanges (see section 
6.3). South Korea hopes that this kind of development in the RFE will provide a stable 
political enviromnent for the unification of the peninsula at some point in the future. 
Economically, the long-term jointly run South Korean and Russian industrial park 
project (in the Nakhodka FEZ) was finalised at a Moscow summit in May 1999. This 
encourages the growth of small and medium-size private enterprises and attract South 
Korean investment, both within the industrial park and in the RFE as a whole. Also,
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since 1991, Russian shuttlers have been trading very actively in South Korea, as they 
have with Russia’s East European neighbours and Turkey. They have made a large and 
unexpected contribution to the improvement of economic relationships between Russia 
and South Korea. Overall, South Korea has gradually become one of the RFE’s major 
economic partners. Politically, their co-operation will involve further developing a 
sustainable policy of ethnic diversity in the RFE. In this, there will be a particular focus 
on the re-integration of ethnic Korean communities who were forcibly removed from the 
region during the Stalin era (see section 6.1).
As discussed in chapter 6, the RFE has become heavily dependent on joint 
ventures (JVs) with foreign countries. JVs figured prominently on the international 
political agenda (see table 1-3). Many of these JVs are in fishing, hotels, restaurants and 
entertainment, and some offer business services to foreign clients. The greatest number 
of JVs in the RFE are those with the Chinese, followed by those with the Japanese, 
South Koreans and Americans. Overall, many firms are justifiably cautious about 
investing in a business environment as politically and economically unstable as 
contemporary Russia. Excessive tariffs and problems in the transportation infrastructure 
delay shipping and make doing business in the RFE prohibitively expensive. 
Inefficiencies in Russian customs delay deliveries and raise costs. Pervasive organised 
crime and corruption create additional obstacles to foreign investment.^ Under these 
conditions, it is not surprising that major corporations are reluctant to invest in Russia. 
But small and medium sized firms, and trade based on cash transactions, have developed 
more readily (see section 6.3).
 ^A. N. Lankov, Sevemava Koreva: Vchera i seeodnva (Moscow: Izdatefskaya Firma, 1995), pp. 4-5.
 ^ I. Boiko and O. Petrunin, “Analytical Survey o f  the Russian Far East Economy; 1996-1997, DaFniy 
Vostok Rossii (Vladivostok!. No. 1, 1998, pp. 12-4.
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As discussed earlier, questions of agenda setting include the scope and nature 
of information that is available to the public in any given society. In this respect the 
influence of the news media on the agenda of the public cannot be underestimated, with 
issues emerging on to the agenda directly linked to the amount of news coverage they 
receive. These issues covered in the media have appeared on the political agenda, 
moved up or down, or disappeared. In relation to the political agenda in the RFE, the 
following fiirther questions need to be considered in the post-Yeltsin period. Firstly, 
which political issues are perceived as being most important in the region? Secondly, 
how will regional leaders and their public shape the prospects for the RFE’s 
development? Thirdly, who is exercising most control in constructing this agenda?
In discussion of these questions, the following issues will be particularly taken 
into account. Firstly, under the federation, the RFE has experienced a decline in 
population, rampant crime, a worsening environment, the region’s financial collapse, a 
high level of unemployment and failure to register economic growth. This failure has 
partly been a result of liberal market reforms, the incomplete nature of these reforms and 
the dependence of the region’s industry on producing and primarily exporting raw 
materials. These difficulties have registered as consistently important on the political 
agenda under influence of its regional and global economic changes. Noticeably, as seen 
in table 7-1, unemployment and crime slowly have emerged as the top issue in the Far 
Eastern region, and rising prices also remain a major regional problem, high on the 
political agenda. This survey suggests that these issues (see table 7-1) have at long last 
become constant political issues. Such issues are likely to continue to be important on 
the political agenda, by the regional leaders, local officials, political elite and the media 
(especially local press and television). Regarding these issues, we can see that the public
3 1 4
opinion survey cited earlier reflects similar public concerns as revealed in my content 
analysis of the media.
Secondly, as long as central and regional leaders are concerned with both 
economic development and environmental protection, environmental issues will 
continue to figure prominently on the political agenda (as shown table 7-1). Protection 
of the natural and human enviromnent (when resources allow) will help to maintain a 
healthy and productive population. Environmentalists and local authorities are 
concerned about the damage to the environment caused by water pollution and dumping 
radioactive waste in the sea and this concern has received wide coverage in the 
newspapers. As mentioned in chapter 3, international aid is being sought to facilitate 
resource conservation and environmental protection. These considerations present 
opportunities for new forms of co-operation for Russia with Japan and America 
particularly. These two countries are assisting in constructing facilities for the 
processing of radioactive waste in the RFE, and are also involved in the cleaning up of 
marine oil spills in the area of the Sakhalin shelf. Dealing with the challenges of 
environmental protection and resource conservation and management in the Far East has 
been one of the major projects involving central and regional administrations. Local 
officials, journalists, environmentalists, academic institutions and the public (including 
indigenous peoples) will continue to persist in their efforts to influence the central and 
regional authorities with regard to the enviromnent.
Thirdly, the RFE continues to welcome greater Japanese and Chinese 
investment and value good relations with these two countries. However, certain regional 
leaders (especially from Primorskii and Khabarovsk krais, and Sakhalin oblast), 
nationalists, and popular public opinion have all voiced opposition, both to the massive
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Chinese expansion into the RFE, and to any territorial concessions to Japan. Given the 
political sensitivity of territorial concessions, it might be difficult to conclude a peace 
treaty in the near future, and more unlikely to secure ratification in parliament.^ The 
central administration, regional authorities, and businessmen have emphasised the 
importance of constructive co-operation with China and Japan, but in dealing with the 
questions above, they will preserve territorial integrity as a matter of national pride and 
(presumably) political expediency. Domestic political forces, political parties, interest 
groups, and the pressure of public opinion all keep these issues in the media eye and 
high on the international agenda. The force of feeling behind these issues will continue 
as a limiting factor to this Chinese influx, and influence the dispute over the Southern 
Kuril islands.
Fourthly, although there remains uncertainty on the matter of eventual Korean 
unification, it will certainly have a major impact on the future of the RFE and its 
relations with neighbouring countries. As such, the issue of the RFE’s relationship with 
the two Koreas has been prominent on the international political agenda. The central and 
regional administrations have significant interests in the Korean peninsula, stemming 
from its shared border with North Korea, the proximity of major population centres in 
the RFE and growing trade relations and military contacts with South Korea. Having 
decided not to renew the military assistance provisions of the Soviet-North Korean 
treaty, Moscow’s policy establishment is in agreement on the need to prevent North 
Korea from developing or utilising nuclear weapons. Further, the federal government, 
regional leaders, local elite, businessmen and the Far Eastern public will share an 
interest in preserving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
Charles E. Ziegler, “Russo-Japanese Relations: A New Start for the Twenty-first Century?,” Problems o f
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Fifthly, with the greater decentralisation and openness of regional politics since 
the early 1990s, expanding cross-border trade in the Far East especially with the 
northern provinces of China was high on the political agenda. To the extent that Russia 
supplies energy to China, China has shown a positive interest in the energy development 
projects that facilitate its country’s supply. With the mass media highlighting the 
energy shortages recently experienced in much of the RFE, the Far Eastern public are 
naturally concerned about future energy needs. Russia’s resources supplies of oil and 
natural gas present further attractive opportunities for joint development using the 
investment capital and technical capability of Japan, America, and other Western 
countries.^ ^  The planned energy projects have begun to attract attention, and to some 
extent have contributed to these issues becoming important international political 
agenda. These projects (in particular, the Sakhalin offshore oil and gas projects and the 
Sakha republic gas-pipeline project) are becoming a priority for the federal 
administration, interest groups, regional leaders, and also for the public in the RFE. The 
primacy of these issues and geographical proximity and close economic ties with Asia- 
Pacific countries provide the impetus for Moscow and the RFE to continue to strive to 
satisfy the basic requirements of APEC. These include the development of a stable 
market economy and the promotion of economic ties with the current members of this 
regionally-based grouping. The need for political and economic stability has 
contributed to activate the process of satisfying these requirements and force this issue 
high on constantly the political agenda in the post-Yeltsin period.
Post-Communism. Vol. 46, No. 3, May/June 1999, p. 24.
Rossiiskii DaFnii Vostok i severo-vostochnava aziva (Moscow; URSS, 1998), pp. 146-47.
Michael J. Bradshaw, “Going Global: The Political Economy o f Oil and Gas Development Offshore o f  
Sakhalin,” Cambridge Review o f International Affairs. Vol. XII, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1998, pp. 147-48. 
Rossiiskive Vesti. 5 December 1997, as cited in RIA-Novosti Daily Review. 5 December 1997, p. 7.
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As McCombs and Shaw have noted, agenda-setting studies serve as an 
improved approach to understanding media e f f ec t sCon ten t  analysis of media 
coverage together with public opinion surveys continue to show that the media has a 
significant effect on public perceptions. In order to drive further regional development in 
the RFE, regional leaders and their publics will be obliged to continue their efforts to 
create a favourable domestic and international political environment for regional 
development. In doing this, to the extent to which they select and prioritise different 
issues they act as constant constructors of the political agenda. In constructing the 
political agenda, a full set of political, legal and social institutions are also involved in 
and motivated by the need to support the region’s political, economic and social 
foundations. The common goal is to increase prosperity and stability in the Far East, To 
integrate and focus on the diverse elements that appear in contemporary problems it has 
been useful to focus on political agendas, which order the range of legitimate concerns 
of the society and prescribe those issues that will command the active attention of 
central and regional political decision-makers.
Despite many common aims, the number of variables involved in setting 
agendas gives rise to conflicts of interests, for example between central and regional 
agendas. Since his accession President Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, has placed 
his emphasis upon the reassertion of central control. In the face of these new 
circumstances, regional leaders and the public have continued to press for further 
economic decentralisation and political autonomy, and for an increase the economic 
integration of the region as a whole with its neighbouring countries and beyond. A 
viable future for the RFE is likely to require a more balanced approach, one that takes
Dearing and Roger, Agenda-Setting, p. 89.
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into account the legitimate concerns of the Far East and its elected representatives, and 
their increasingly dense network of relations with the wider Asia-Pacific region. It will 
also require a political agenda that reflects the full range of their varied and sometimes 
conflicting concerns.
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Appendix 1: Constituent Units of the Russian Federation (according to the 1993 
Constitution)
21 Republics
Adygeya Altai Bashkortostan
Buryatia Chechnya* Dagestan
Chuvashia Ingushetia Kabardino-Balkaria
Karachaevo-Cherkessia Karelia Kalmykia
Khakassia Komi Mari El
Mordovia North Ossetia Sakha(Yakutia)
Tatarstan Tuva Udmurtia
6 Krais
Altai Khabarovsk Krasnodar
Krasnoyarsk Primorskii Stavropol
49 Oblasts
Amur Arkhangel Astrakhan
Belgorod Bryansk Chelyabinsk
Chita Irkutsk Ivanovo
Kaliningrad Kaluga Kamchatka
Kemerovo Kirov Kostroma
Kurgan Kursk Leningrad
Lipetsk Magadan Moscow
Murmansk Nizhnii Novgorod Novogorod
Novosibirsk Omsk Orel
Orenburg Penza Perm
Pskov Rostov Ryazan
Sakhalin Samara Saratov
Smolensk Sverdlovsk Tambov
Tomsk Tula Tver
Tyumen Ulyansk Vladimir
Volgograd Vologda Voronezh
Yaroslavl
Cities of Federal Status (2)
Moscow St Petersburg
Autonomous Oblast (1)
Jewish Autonomous Oblast (in Khabarovsk krai)
Autonomous Olcrugs (10)
Aginsk-Buryatia (in Chita oblast) Chukotka Evenki (in Krasnoyarsk oblast)
Khanty-Mansiisk (in Tyumen oblast) Komi-Permyak (in Perm oblast) Koiyak (in Kamchatka oblast)
Nenets (in Arkhangelsk oblast) Taimyr (in Krasnoyarsk oblast)
Ust-Ordinsk Buryat (in Irkutsk oblast) Yamal-Nenets (in Tyumen oblast)
* Declared independence, but declaration not recognised by the Russian Federation.
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Appendix 3: Trends of South Korean Investment in Russia from 1990 to 1997
Number of Projects Amount of Investment (1,000 US$)
Year Planned Actual Cumulative
Actual
Planned Actual Cumulative
Actual
-1990 5 2 2 9,261 480 480
1991 3 4 6 9,210 16,989 17,469
1992 12 7 13 7,386 3,247 20,716
1993 24 13 26 5,199 3,296 24,012
1994 26 20 46 29,645 11,922 35,934
1995 14 23 69 48,273 30,502 66,436
1996 20 12 81 61,901 41,336 107,772
1997 12 3 84 19,209 7,901 115,673
Source: The Korea Federation of Bank, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook. 1998, p. 22.
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Fieldwork Experience
As a PhD research student in the Department of Politics, I conducted field research in 
both Seoul (South Korea) and Vladivostok (Primorskii krai) in August and September 
1996, in Seoul again in July 1998 and September 1999, and Moscow in April 2000. I 
received grants for these visits jfrom the Politics Department postgraduate research fund, 
the Alec Nove research fund, and the postgraduate research fund of BASEES (British 
Association for Slavonic and East European Studies).
During my visit to Vladivostok (flying from Seoul), I collected various official 
documents, articles and journals. These came mainly from the Institute of History (Far 
Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and the public libraiy. I also met 
with several scholars and senior researchers from the Institute who specialised in my 
area of research and who kindly allowed me to conduct interviews. In addition, they 
furnished me with further material for my research. Interestingly, I met a Korean­
speaking Russian lecturer at the Korean College of the Far Eastern State University, 
who studied the Korean language in Pyongyang (North Korea), and then stayed in Seoul 
as a visiting scholar in 1995. With his help, I was able to obtain a lot of useful materials. 
In addition, I visited KOTRA (Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency) in 
Vladivostok whose director invited me to interview him and who also provided valuable 
statistics on trade relations between the Far East and South Korea.
In Seoul, I visited KOTRA and several political and economic institutes related 
to my research in August 1996 and July 1998. During my second visit to Seoul, I mainly 
collected materials from KOTRA and Koland (Korea Land Corporation). I conducted an
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interview in July 1998 with the vice president of the Koryo Synthetic Fibre Group 
(Kohap). Since May 1994 the Kohap Group has considered setting up a promising JV 
for the production and processing of soya beans in Primorskii krai. The vice president 
was most informative on the subject of his company’s experience of JV projects in the 
RFE. I gratefully received from him unpublished official documents, particularly 
regarding construction of the Far Eastern Korean Villages in Primorskii krai. I also 
discovered that the Chairman of the Kohap Group, Chang Chi Hyok, had opened a new 
Korean College in the Far Eastern State University in Vladivostok; this he funded 
himself to expand the interchange of cultural and educational contacts between Russia 
and Korea. Chang was the first Korean to be awarded Russia’s 'Order of Friendship’ 
medal by the Governor of Primorskii krai, Yevgenii Nazdratenko. Following my return 
to Glasgow a manager from Koland continued to correspond with me, providing me 
with updated information on the Korean-Russian Industrial Park project in the 
Nakhodka Free Economic Zone.
Finally, I flew to Moscow in April 2000 with the purpose of conducting 
additional field work. I visited Moscow State University Library, the Historical library, 
the Russian State Library, the Korean Embassy, and KOTRA to collect further primary 
sources. I carried out a considerable amount of work in the Historical Library, where 
there are excellent catalogues of newspapers, periodicals and books. During my visit, I 
met the Consul General of the Korean Embassy, the Deputy Director of KOTRA, the 
General Director of Samsung World Vending, some experts in trade companies, and a 
number of second-generation Far Eastern Koreans. All these kindly shared their time 
with me, allowing me to conduct interviews and providing me with some exclusive 
materials some of which were unpublished sources.
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On my visits to Russia I have been in receipt both of the hospitality and the 
personal knowledge and experience of Christian missionaries, in Vladivostok and in 
Moscow.
During my study, I have attended various conferences and seminars in the UK 
and in Australia to gain information and to collect materials for my research. These 
included the BASEES Conference at Cambridge, in 1996, 1998 and 1999 (in March 
1999 I myself presented a paper), the IREES Conference at the Bum House in Glenesk 
in January 1998 (where I also gave a paper), the ESRC Research Seminar Series at 
Birmingham University (both in May 1998 and 1999) and LSE (in January 2000), the 
Conference on the RFE: Prospects for the New Millennium at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in London (in August 1998) and Melbourne University in 
Australia, and the International Conference on Communist and Post-Communist 
Societies at the Melbourne University in July 1998 (where I contributed a paper). In 
addition, I also made use of the facilities of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(in December 1995) and the British Library (in January 2000). In order to be present at 
these events, I was awarded funding from the BASEES postgraduate research fund, the 
ESRC regional research fund, the Department of Politics at the University of Glasgow 
and the Alec Nove research fund.
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